I received the below recommendations from a PSYOP (MISO) professional who knows his PSYOP history on the Peninsula as a follow-up to Michael Mazza's assessment on our lack of action. As he notes I am a great believer in using PSYOP against north Korea and multiple target audiences (not only regime leadership but also the second tier leadership and the population) to prepare for the eventual change that will occur on the Peninsula either through regime collapse or war. The recommendation below is certainly a proposal that is targeted on influencing the regime leadership but it could do that by also targeting the other audiences. But the bottom line is we do need to get back in the game on the Peninsula and stop being afraid to use PSYOP (or MISO) overtly.
V/R
Dave
There is one thing the U.S. could do that we haven't done sine approximately 1971/2 when "Voice of the United Nations" operated by the 14th PSYOP Battalion was taken off air. It's something you always say we should be doing more of - that of course being PSYOP against nK.
If the US wants to show the north they have in fact crossed a red line and alter their behavior in the future - perhaps say stopping the transfer of the missile to Iran or Venezuela - then the US should get into the game again. The message on the product - broadcast or print - would be irrelevant. The message to the regime would be you've gone too far so now the US is rejoining the battle in the information (or human) domain. Products can be benign information but just that they admit the US through DoD is doing them would send a message and achieve the desired effect.
It would be clear to them that, to steal Yamamoto's words, they had awakened the sleeping giant. If they are worried about defector balloons and leaflets and what the ROK can do, now they would truly have something to be scared of with the potential of the full weight of the ROK-US Alliance focused on winning the information war. I am sure that is a war they know they can't win and won't want to fight. After 6 months or a year of that, I think they'd be very ready to discuss ways to reduce the pressure on themselves.
And for those who think PSYOP would have no impact, we only have to look at the north's own demands. Not their demands against the very limited in scope and effect defector operations, but their demands in 1999-2004 to the Kim Dae Jung and Roh administrations. Their demands to both before talks and summits was got the ROK to stop its PSYOP efforts. Which in both cases it did. Stopping balloon - and gift sets of rice and toiletries - before the 2000 summit and all remaining PSYOP -radio, visual, and loudspeaker ops along DMZ in 2004. What did ROK get in return - 2 nuke tests, 3 ICBM tests, and the attacks on the Cheonan and Yongpyeong island.
This is a case where the pen is mightier (and safer) than the sword. The threat isn't doing PSYOP. the threat to the ROK, the US, and the world is the world community doing nothing once again.
Just my thoughts of course, no one else's.
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