Sunday, August 31, 2014

Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 (Irregular Warfare)

No significant change from the December 2008 version.  In fact I have not been able to find anything significantly different except that the 2014 version is signed by DEPSECDEF Robert Work as the new DEPSECDEF,  the elimination of US Joint Forces Command (which of course no longer exists today but did in 2008), and the new one is 14 pages long while the 2008 version was 12 pages long.

The document can be viewed directly at this link: http://www.scribd.com/doc/238269602/DoD-Directive-3000-07-IW

I would also point out that like the 2008 version there are three  terms that are not doctrinal and not in JP 1-02 (Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).  I would have thought that by now these two terms would have been added to the Joint Dictionary.

civilian-military teams. Temporary organizations of civilian and military personnel specifically 
task-organized to provide an optimal mix of capabilities and expertise to accomplish specific 
operational and planning tasks, or to achieve objectives at the strategic, operational, or tactical 
levels. Civilian-military teams may conduct both overt and clandestine operations. 

irregular. Characterization used to describe a deviation from the traditional form of warfare 
where actors may use non-traditional methods such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, 
subversion, criminal activities, and insurgency for control of relevant populations.  

(note in JP 1-02 there are the terms irregular forces and irregular warfare but not the singular irregular with the above definition)

traditional warfare. A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of 
states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s 
war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s 
government or policies.


(For reference for the next comment:  IW. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the 
relevant population(s).)

I wish that we could relook the definition of irregular warfare (and irregular above) because I think the focus on "control of relevant populations" or a struggle for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).  In my mind this implies that IW is overly focused on insurgency and being "population centric."  I think this limits our thinking about IW.  I would say that in Ukraine, in Syria, and in Iraq the actions and strategies of Russian and the ISIL/IS are not dependent on the legitimacy and influence over the "relevant" population.  Counterinsurgency tactics, techniques and procedures or a campaign designed around the principles of FM 3-14 are unlikely to have much utility in Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq today.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.07

by SWJ Editors

SWJ Blog Post | August 31, 2014 - 8:00pm
Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 - Irregular Warfare (IW) Dated August 28, 2014
Of note, it is DoD policy that:
a. IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare and DoD must be equally capable in both. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater.
b. DoD will be proficient in IW.
c. IW is conducted independently of, or in combination with, traditional warfare.
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About the Author

The man who hunted bin Laden, Saddam and the pirates

Excerpt:

Hagel pointed out in his Thursday speech that McRaven also has "literally written the book on Special Operations." Indeed, McRraven's 1995 book, "Spec Ops," is the standard text on the subject.

I think if you ask ADM McRaven he would tell you that his book with 8 case studies and very good principles for conducting raids does not provide a theory of special operations writ large and in fact only covers the direct action side of special operations as noted here.

For his book, McRaven interviewed many of the key participants in the raids that he examined, and he traveled to the sites of the operations.

After a careful investigation of each raid, he identified six common principles that had made these operations a success: repetition, surprise, security, speed, simplicity and purpose.

Yes, I used his book in my class on UW and SOF for policy makers and strategists because it is an important contribution but it cannot be called the standard text on the subject.  Brian Pettit's book 
Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero provides a more comprehensive approach to the full range of special operations from surgical strike to special warfare (though I despise the use of the term Phase Zero).  I also think Chapter 2 of the 5th edition of US National Security: Policymakers, Processes, & Politics (by Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala) gives a very useful overview of modern special operations.  

But the real foundation for special operations and specifically the special warfare side of special operations lies in the ARIS project - Assessing Revolutions and Insurgent Strategies which can be accessed at this link: 
  http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html
  If you have not read, synthesized and internalized the lessons in the ARIS project then you really cannot be a practitioner of special operations.

Original Version referred to as Volume I by the ARIS project. Primary research responsibility Paul A. Jureidini, Norman A. La Charite, Bert H. Cooper, and William A. Lybrand. Special Operations Research Office The American University, Washington D.C., December 1962.
This Casebook provides a summary of twenty-three insurgencies and revolutions; the goal of the book is to introduce the reader to modern-style irregular and unconventional warfare, as well as to act as an informational resource on these particular cases. While not trying to provide an in-depth analysis of any case, our intent was to provide enough background material and description of the revolution to allow comparisons and analysis of broader ideas and insights across this broad spectrum of cases. 

 
Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies, 2d Edition, 2013, http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/HumanFactorsS.pdf

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare, 2d Edition, 2013,http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/UndergroundsS.pdf

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography, http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/IWAnnotated_BibliographyS.pdf 

 

The man who hunted bin Laden, Saddam and the pirates

By Peter Bergen
updated 12:23 AM EDT, Sun August 31, 2014
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/30/opinion/bergen-mcraven-special-forces-influence/index.html


Editor's note: Peter Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, a vice president at the New America Foundation and the author of "Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for bin Laden -- From 9/11 to Abbottabad," from which this article is, in part, adapted.
(CNN) -- On Thursday in Tampa, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel presided over a change of command ceremony during which Adm. William "Bill" McRaven handed over the reins of Special Operations Command to his successor, Gen. Joseph Votel.
As McRaven stepped down he observed, "We are in perilous times." He pointed out that U.S. Special Operations Forces are helping to fight the fast-growing Islamic State in Iraq; the al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines; the militant group Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
McRaven also said, "We are in the golden age of Special Operations" in which elements of the 67,000 men and women under his command have deployed to 92 countries.
Peter Bergen
Peter Bergen
Now, after more than 3½ decades working in the world of special operations, Bill McRaven, 58, is retiring. In his next incarnation he will become chancellor of the University of Texas.
As Hagel pointed out in his speech on Thursday that celebrated McRaven's storied career, no one has written McRaven's full history, but if it ever was to be written it "would need to be heavily redacted" because so much of it took place in the "black" (secret) arena.
"Revered" is the word you often hear about McRaven in the special operations community. That's in part because even as a three-star admiral, about once a month in Afghanistan, McRaven went out with his teams on risky snatch-and-grab missions. (His predecessor as the commander of Joint Special Operations Command, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, also went out regularly on such missions and is similarly held in the highest regard.)
The book
Hagel pointed out in his Thursday speech that McRaven also has "literally written the book on Special Operations." Indeed, McRraven's 1995 book, "Spec Ops," is the standard text on the subject.
Adm. McRaven on the bin Laden raid
It features lucid dissections of eight decisive special operations actions, ranging from the British forces who used midget submarines to badly damage the Tirpitz, a key Nazi battleship, in 1943; to the Nazi rescue the same year of the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini from his anti-Fascist captors; to the raid at Entebbe in 1976 that freed Israeli hostages held in Uganda by Palestinian terrorists.
For his book, McRaven interviewed many of the key participants in the raids that he examined, and he traveled to the sites of the operations.
After a careful investigation of each raid, he identified six common principles that had made these operations a success: repetition, surprise, security, speed, simplicity and purpose.
-- Repetition meant frequent and realistic rehearsals so that the "friction" of actual battle was reduced.
-- Surprise meant catching the enemy entirely off guard; for example, the Nazi rescuers of Mussolini crash-landed gliders on a mountain near the hotel where the Fascist leader was being held and rescued him without a shot being fired.
-- Security meant confining the knowledge of the operation to a small circle.
-- Speed meant that "relative superiority" over the enemy needed to be achieved in the first few minutes of the attack, and that the entire mission should be completed in no more than a half-hour.
-- Simplicity ensured that the goal of the operation was well understood by each of the soldiers involved -- "release the hostages" at Entebbe.
-- Purpose meant that the soldiers were completely committed to the mission.
But McRaven's influence on "spec ops" goes far beyond just the book he wrote. McRaven helped establish a curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. And after taking up a job in the White House just weeks after 9/11, he became one of the principal authors of the Bush administration's counterterrorism strategy.
During the Iraq War, McRaven led the shadowy Task Force 121, which tracked down Saddam Hussein in December 2003. Much of the public credit for Saddam's capture went to conventional army units, but it was, in fact, the Special Operations forces under McRaven's command who did much of the work to find the Iraqi dictator.
Rescue of Capt. Phillips
(Continued at the link below)

Friday, August 29, 2014

10 Things Every College Professor Hates

I am very pleased to be able to say that this does not describe the students I have had the pleasure of of teaching.  


10 Things Every College Professor Hates

students notes
Getty Images/Kevork Djansezian
I got this email from an Ivy League student when I arrived to give a speech. She was responsible for making sure that I was delivered to my hotel and knew where to go the next day:
Omg you’re here! Ahh i need to get my s--t together now lol. Jk. Give me a ring when u can/want, my cell is [redacted]. I have class until 1230 but then im free! i will let the teacher she u will be there, shes a darling. Perhaps ill come to the end of the talk and meet you there after. Between the faculty lunch and your talk, we can chat! ill take make sure the rooms are all ready for u. See ya!
To say the least, this did not make me feel confident that my visit would go smoothly.
I will use this poor student to kick off this year’s list of Professors’ Pet Peeves. I reached out to my network and collected some things that really get on instructors’ nerves. Here are the results: some of the “don’ts” for how to interact with your professor or teaching assistant. For what it’s worth, No. 2 was by far the most common complaint.
1. Don’t use unprofessional correspondence.
Your instructors are not your friends. Correspond with them as if you’re in a workplace, because you are. We’re not saying that you can’t ever write like this, but you do need to demonstrate that you know when such communication is and isn’t appropriate. You don’t wear pajamas to a job interview, right? Same thing.
2. Don’t ask the professor if you “missed anything important” during an absence.
No, you didn’t miss anything important. We spent the whole hour watching cats play the theremin on YouTube!
Of course you missed something important! We’re college professors! Thinking everything we do is important is an occupational hazard. Here’s an alternative way to phrase it: “I’m so sorry I missed class. I’m sure it was awesome.”
If you’re concerned about what you missed, try this instead: Do the reading, get notes from a classmate (if you don’t have any friends in class, ask the professor if they’ll send an email to help you find a partner to swap notes with), read them over, and drop by office hours to discuss anything you didn’t understand.
3. Don’t pack up your things as the class is ending.
We get it. The minute hand is closing in on the end of class, there’s a shift in the instructor’s voice, and you hear something like “For next time …” That’s the cue for the students to start putting their stuff away. Once one person does it, it’s like an avalanche of notebooks slapping closed, backpack zippers zipping, and cell phones coming out.
Don’t do it.
Just wait 10 more seconds until the class is actually over. If you don’t, it makes it seem as if you are dying to get out of there and, hey, that hurts our feelings!
4. Don’t ask a question about the readings or assignments until checking the syllabus first.
It’s easy to send off an email asking your instructor a quick question, but that person put a lot of effort into the syllabus for a reason. Remember, each professor has dozens or hundreds of students. What seems like a small thing on your end can add up to death-by-a-thousand-paper-cuts on our end. Make a good-faith effort to figure out the answer before you ask the professor.
5. Don’t get mad if you receive critical feedback.
If an instructor takes a red pen and massacres your writing, that’s a sign that they care. Giving negative feedback is hard work, so the red ink means that we’re taking an interest in you and your future. Moreover, we know it’s going to make some students angry with us. We do it anyway because we care enough about you to try to help you become a stronger thinker and writer. It’s counterintuitive, but lots of red ink is probably a sign that the instructor thinks you have a lot of potential.
6. Don’t grade grub.
Definitely go into office hours to find out how to study better or improve your performance, but don’t go in expecting to change your instructor’s mind about the grade. Put your energy into studying harder on the next exam, bringing your paper idea to the professor or teaching assistant in office hours, doing the reading, and raising your hand in class. That will have more of a payoff in the long run.
7. Don’t futz with paper formatting.
Paper isn’t long enough? Think you can make the font a teensy bit bigger or the margins a tad bit wider? Think we won’t notice if you use a 12-point font that’s just a little more widely spaced? Don’t do it. We’ve been staring at the printed page for thousands of hours. We have an eagle eye for these kinds of things. Whatever your motivation, here’s what they say to us: “Hi Prof!, I’m trying to trick you into thinking that I’m fulfilling the assignment requirements. I’m lazy and you’re stupid!” Work on the assignment, not the document settings.
8. Don’t pad your introductions and conclusions with fluff.
Never start off a paper with the phrase, “Since the beginning of time …” “Since the beginning of time, men have engaged in war.” Wait, what? Like, the big bang? And, anyway, how the heck do you know? You better have a damn strong citation for that! “Historically,” “Traditionally,” and “Throughout history” are equally bad offenders. Strike them from your vocabulary now.
In your conclusion, say something smart. Or, barring that, just say what you said. But never say: “Hopefully someday there will be no war.” Duh. We’d all like that, but unless you’ve got ideas as to how to make it that way, such statements are simple hopefulness and inappropriate in an academic paper.
9. Don’t misrepresent facts as opinions and opinions as facts.
Figure out the difference. Here’s an example of how not to represent a fact, via CNN:
Considering that Clinton’s departure will leave only 16 women in the Senate out of 100 senators, many feminists believe women are underrepresented on Capitol Hill.
Wait. Feminists “believe”? Given that women are 51% of the population, 16 out of 100 means that women are underrepresented on Capitol Hill. This is a social fact, yeah? Now, you can agree or disagree with feminists that this is a problem, but don’t suggest, as CNN does, that the fact itself is an opinion.
This is a common mistake, and it’s frustrating for both instructors and students to get past. Life will be much easier if you know the difference.
10. Don’t be too cool for school.
You know the student who sits at the back of the class, hunches down in his or her chair, and makes an art of looking bored? Don’t be that person. Professors and teaching assistants are the top 3% of students. They most likely spent more than a decade in college. For better or worse, they value education. To stay on their good side, you should show them that you care, too. And, if you don’t, pretend as if you do.


Read more: http://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2014/08/25/professors-pet-peeves/#ixzz3Bnr1V8os

Wednesday, August 27, 2014

Sen. Corker: Use Syria Strikes Authorization To Reform Post-9/11 AUMF

There are a lot more threats out there than AQ.  We need both the President and Congress to exercise their constitutional responsibilities for national security to address the full range of threats.  You do not write a blank check to the President and the President should not be turning one authorization into a blank check.  The adversarial relationship between the President and Congress, while frustrating for national security "purists" is a necessary function built into our federal democratic republic that is the one of the first lines of defense of our Constitution.  

AQ is a threat and still a dangerous one but we should not be myopically focused on it or look to tying everything to AQ.  I really think that hinders our strategic thinking.

Sen. Corker: Use Syria Strikes Authorization To Reform Post-9/11 AUMF

Aug. 26, 2014 - 08:26PM   |  
By JOHN T. BENNETT   |   Comments
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140826/DEFREG02/308260018/Sen-Corker-Use-Syria-Strikes-Authorization-Reform-Post-9-11-AUMF

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing O
Sen. Bob Corker is urging the Obama administration to come to Congress and request authority before launching strikes inside Syria. (Chip Somodevilla/ / Getty Images)
WASHINGTON — US President Barack Obama should seek congressional approval before launching strikes inside Syria, and Congress should answer by amending a key post-9/11 measure, says the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s top Republican.
As reports surfaced about Pentagon planning at the White House’s behest to strike Islamic State targets on Syrian soil, lawmakers are interrupting their August recess to urge Obama to let Congress give him clear legal approval before any bombing campaign begins.
“We should, certainly, authorize this,” Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., said on MSNBC’s “Daily Rundown” political program. “Congress should own … military action.”
Some national security law scholars say the Obama administration simply could use the authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) passed after 9/11 to justify the attacks.
“I hope that is not what they will do,” Corker said, joining the ranks in Congress pushing for the first revision to the 2001-passed measure. “I hope what they will instead do is come to Congress and ask for a new authorization for a new threat that has evolved over time.
“What Congress wants to do, in fact, is broaden his authority, and narrow it at the same time,” Corker said, acknowledging, “I know that sound strange.”
(Continued at the link below)

North Korean MANPADS showing up in the hands of fighters of the Islamic State?

There is no sourcing on this report.  I am not sure if north Korea produces MANPADs indigenously but like so many of Soviet and Chinese weapons they probably have made their own modifications.  And I do not doubt that north Korea would sell MANPADs to Syria (or anyone else for that matter).  It is interesting that this report would come out now as the US contemplates air strikes against ISIS in Syria.  But I do not think these will pose a significant threat to US advanced attack aircraft.  But they could to other (perhaps civilian) aircraft.




Wednesday, 27 August 2014

North Korean MANPADS showing up in the hands of fighters of the Islamic State?





A photo published by the Islamic State after the capture of Tabqa airbase apparently revealed the capture of an Igla-1E man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) at this base. However, it has now been uncovered the missile isn't an Igla-1E and the photo was not taken at Tabqa but at Kshesh, an airbase captured from Jaish al-Islam that is now being used as a training base by the Islamic State. The row of decommissioned MiG-17s in the background and the presence of two L-39s gave the identity of the base away.

While the missile was initially identified as an Igla-1E, the MANPADS seen operated by the fighter didn't quite match the system's visual appearance. The presence of an aerodynamic spike (as seen on the 9M39 Igla) indicated it isn't just a regular Soviet-produced Igla-1E, which all have pyramidal nosecones. Other external features ruled out other Russian systems and foreign copies thereof. Few other countries produce Igla-1Es, however, North Korea acquired a license to produce them along with 9K111 anti-tank missile systems and subsequently modified and produced different variants of Igla-1Es for its own needs. While the modified 9K111s received the designation of Bulsae-2, it is currently not known what name the Igla-1E received. However, MANPADS in North Korean service often receive the nickname "Hwaseong Chong" (Arquebus).

While Syria is known to have acquired North Korean arms, MANPADS were never noted to have been delivered to the Syrian regime. While both the DPRK and Syria were never too keen on publishing information about arms transfers, the possible North Korean design wasn't yet recognized in Syria during the now three-and-a-half-year-long conflict either, which saw numerous other MANPADS fall in the hands of opposition fighters.

The missile also wasn't sighted in various photo and video reports coming out of the captured bases of Division 17, Regiment 121 and Brigade 93, which showed scores of other equipment being captured, including Iranian made I-RAAD anti-tank missiles.

North Korea is well known to have been delivering arms to what have been branded terrorist organizations by the U.S. A recent example of such transfers was confirmed by the sighting of Bulsae-2s used by Hamas.

While it is unknown wether the North Korean version differs qualitywise from its parent design, a couple of external differences can be noted. Firstly, the missile itself appears to use the aerodynamic spike seen on later generation Russian MANPADS instead of the characteristic pyramidal extension. Furthermore, on some models the battery and handles have been modified, and the protective cap is more reminiscent of more modern MANPADS.

It is unlikely that the Islamic State owns a substantial stock of Igla-1Es, as it is not even ruled out the missile pictured is the only one in their possession. It is therefore improbable the Igla-1E sighted will have any impact on the day-to-day operations of the air forces of the United States, Syria and Iraq over the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields.

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Thursday, August 21, 2014

Pacific Command's boss talks military challenges, opportunities

Quite a quote from CINCPAC (oops, I mean Commander Pacific Command):

The budget situation was one of Locklear’s main concerns, but not his No. 1 challenge -- that goes to relations with North Korea.
“North Korea remains, in my perspective, the most dangerous security threat to global security that’s out there,” Locklear said. “It’s easy to become numb or anesthetized to North Korea because our grandfathers dealt with it, our fathers dealt with it … but we can’t take our eye off of it and certainly can’t become numb to the continuous cycle of provocation in North Korea.”



Pacific Command's boss talks military challenges, opportunities


Wednesday, August 20, 2014





Adm. Samuel Locklear III, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, has a lot on his plate.
He discussed the challenges and opportunities within his area of responsibility -- which runs from “Hollywood to Bollywood” and includes 60 percent of the world’s population -- at an SDMAC breakfast at Naval Base Point Loma Tuesday, underscoring the important role he hopes San Diego will continue to play in the Navy’s rebalance to the Pacific, though looming budget cuts in 2016 pose a threat.
The budget situation was one of Locklear’s main concerns, but not his No. 1 challenge -- that goes to relations with North Korea.
“North Korea remains, in my perspective, the most dangerous security threat to global security that’s out there,” Locklear said. “It’s easy to become numb or anesthetized to North Korea because our grandfathers dealt with it, our fathers dealt with it … but we can’t take our eye off of it and certainly can’t become numb to the continuous cycle of provocation in North Korea.”
Escalating tensions in the East China and South China seas also topped the admiral’s challenges in his AOR, tensions that he said really stem from a resource management -- food and energy -- perspective as the world’s population climbs. He said he’s keeping an eye on Russia as well, though it doesn’t currently pose a significant threat to U.S. national security.
The rise of China is next on his list, as the country tries to amass an appropriately-sized defense fleet while maintaining transparency. China’s participation in the Rim of the Pacific exercises for the first time, and San Diego hosting a Chinese warship recently, will go a long way to this end.

Adm. Samuel Locklear III, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, spoke to attendees at an SDMAC breakfast at Naval Base Point Loma Tuesday. Staff photo by Katherine Connor
“They’re building a military that’s primarily designed, I think, to counter a U.S. capability,” Locklear said. “They are struggling with how they employ that military in a way that’s more transparent so things like bringing them into RIMPAC and bringing them to San Diego encourage that transparency.”
The last geographic-related challenge his force faces is providing humanitarian aid for an increasing number of catastrophic weather events, primarily in Southeast Asia.
The budget crisis and uncertainty surrounding the possibility of sequestration in 2016 is a major concern.
“I would say that in my time in leadership positions and in the time that I spent in budgeting and building programs for the Navy, we’re probably, from a Joint Force perspective, in the most tumultuous, uncertain time that we’ve ever been in,” Locklear said.
Should no legislative budget decision be reached in time and sequestration be put back in effect, Locklear said the maintenance and repair side of military operations would be the first to feel the pain, which doesn’t bode well for San Diego and doesn’t bode well for national security.

(Continued at the link below)

Ground Game: Tunnels in Gaza, Korean Peninsula

Ground Game: Tunnels in Gaza, Korean Peninsula


An Israeli army officer shows journalists a tunnel allegedly used by Palestinian militants for cross-border attacks from Gaza into Israel, July 25, 2014.
An Israeli army officer shows journalists a tunnel allegedly used by Palestinian militants for cross-border attacks from Gaza into Israel, July 25, 2014.
August 21, 2014 1:52 PM
The Palestinian militant group Hamas may have drawn global attention for using tunnels in its latest war with Israel, but the Gaza Strip isn’t the only place where digging has factored into an ongoing conflict.
Just look east to the divided Korean Peninsula.
North Korea is suspected of having as many as 20 cross-border attack tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, some South Korean and U.S. security analysts say.
South Korean officials base their suspicions on testimony from North Korean defectors, some of whom claimed to have built the passages, say analysts such as Go Myong-Hyun, a researcher at the Asian Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul.
korea mapkorea map
South Korean forces and their U.S. allies have found only four infiltration tunnels – three in the 1970s, one in 1990. But the South Korean Defense Ministry continues to be on the alert for more.
"We don’t ignore even the smallest signs of a possible tunnel because these tunnels could determine the outcome of a war and our country’s survival," it told The New York Times in a faxed statement in 2012.  
Meanwhile, at least one South Korean company, the Panmunjom Travel Center, offers a specialized DMZ tour that includes an “infiltration tunnel” visit.
For decades, some South Korean individuals have looked for cross-border tunnels, too – but critics accuse them of using unscientific methods and wasting money and effort.
But there’s no disputing the tunnels that both Hamas and North Korea have built, in their own territories, for defensive purposes.
Other similarities can be found between the North Korean tunnels and those in Hamas-run Gaza, as well as between the forces trying to locate them. But, there are significant differences, too.
Going on offense
Both Hamas and Pyongyang have built cross-border tunnels in pursuit of the same military objective: to sneak their fighters behind enemy lines and hurt enemy morale.
In the current Israel-Hamas conflict, Israeli forces staged a ground offensive against Gaza militants from July 17 to August 5, destroying 32 tunnels, 14 of which crossed into Israel. Militants used the tunnels to ambush and kill 11 Israeli soldiers on Israeli territory.
Gaza StripGaza Strip
Hamas has described the tunnels as strategic weapons in its decades-long fight against Israel. Gaza, the world’s most heavily-militarized zone, shares a border running 59 kilometers, or nearly 37 miles, with the Jewish state.
Israeli authorities have accused Hamas of plotting to use the tunnels to kill civilians in small Israeli communities near the Gaza border.
As for North Korea, its founder and supreme leader, Kim Il Sung, had called for tunneling under the DMZ, which stretches approximately four kilometers or 2.5 miles wide and 240 kilometers or 150 miles long.
The tunnels were intended to give North Korea the capability to send thousands of soldiers to exit points several kilometers south of the DMZ, behind South Korea’s front-line combat posts, said David Maxwell, a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who served in South Korea. 
"If North Korean infiltrators were dressed in South Korean uniforms, and also attacked U.S. forces near the DMZ, that would have a devastating effect on the trust between the U.S. troops and their South Korean allies," said Maxwell, now an analyst at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies in Washington.
Maxwell said such guerrilla tactics have long been a part of North Korean military doctrine.
Tunnels as defense
The U.S. and Israeli militaries suspect Pyongyang and Hamas have built many more tunnels for a different purpose: protecting their military assets from aerial assault.
South Korean soldiers visit the 2nd Underground Tunnel, found in 1975 near the city of Cheorwon, on Sept. 18, 2008.
South Korean soldiers visit the 2nd Underground Tunnel, found in 1975 near the city of Cheorwon, on Sept. 18, 2008.
In 2012, Brig. Gen. Neil H. Tolley, then-commander of all U.S. special operations forces in South Korea, said at a special-ops industry conference that North Korea had hidden its military infrastructure in an underground network. He estimated the network includes 20 subterranean air bases,National Defense magazine reported.
Reports from North Korean defectors and satellite imagery indicate Pyongyang has built thousands of tunnels into mountains and hillsides to house artillery, ammunition and medical supplies, said Maxwell, the Georgetown security analyst.
(Continued at the link below)

We Need a Radical New Approach on North Korea

I strongly disagree with ending the "one Korea policy" As Jay Lefkowitz argues.  I would submit that we have had a "one Kore...