Understanding “Jade Helm” Part 1: UW vs. DA and Part 2: Why We Need This Kind of Training

Good summary here (from Part 2):

To put it in very plain terms, once the decision had been made by the senior leaders within USASOC and Special Forces Command to refocus on Unconventional Warfare:

• 2012, Army Doctrine Publication 3.05 formally introduced into doctrine the two complementary capabilities of ARSOF: special warfare (UW) and surgical strike (DA).
• 2012 USASOC created a 10 year plan, or blueprint to refocus the Green Berets from kicking doors, back to training guerrilla forces.
• 2013 released ARSOF 2022 (the ten year blueprint)
• 2014 released ARSOF 2022 part 2 showing the lesson learned, progress and way ahead.
• 2014 created 1st SFC (A) which combines all the Army units trained in UW
• JULY 15 – SEP 15 2015 JADE HELM

Basically JADE HELM 15 is the culmination of three years of work. It is an exercise for USASOC and the 1st Special Forces Command (A) to see how their 10 year blueprint is coming along. It will allow them to find out which skills are on track, and find those that need more work. deficient and need to be emphasized. and at what level that need to be

With all that being said and explained what does it have to do with Jade Helm 15? Jade Helm 15 has two goals. The first is to give the teams on the ground a chance to practice all of the varied skill’s required to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating “by with and through” an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

The second and in my opinion the most important reason for Jade Helm 15 is to give the commanders, and staffs at multiple echelons a chance to practice command and control of a SIMULATED regional UW campaign.

Every Green Beret has to go through Robin Sage before they graduate. Robin Sage is UW training that happens during the last phase of the Special Forces Qualification Course. It takes place in south central NC, and has for over 50 years. (For more information on Robin Sage and other types of off realistic military training RMT check out Jade Helm 15: Special Forces Off-Post Training.)

Richard, a Green Beret on the popular Special Forces forum Professionalsoldiers.com put Jade Helm 15 vs Robin sage in a beautifully simplistic way everyone can understand.

Robin Sage, the large UW exercise for SF students which has been taking place throughout NC for over fifty years, is only an introductory 100 level undergrad course for an SF soldier in training.

Once assigned to an SF Group, follow-on exercises like Jade Helm 15, for example, are the 500-800 level courses for advanced studies in UW to be applied world-wide when directed in support of US strategic policy.

Understanding “Jade Helm” Part 1: UW vs. DA

July 16, 2015 by Loren Schofield ~ Leave A Comment

http://www.havokjournal.com/nation/understanding-jade-helm-part-1-uw-vs-da/

To understand Jade Helm 15, and why this type of training is important, people need to understand two major key concepts. The first is Unconventional Warfare (UW); what it is, why it is used and the training required to become proficient at it. The second is the internal fight within the Special Forces community on the UW vs. Direct Action (DA) mentality.

Understanding “Jade Helm” Part 2: Why We Need This Kind of Training

http://www.havokjournal.com/nation/understanding-jade-helm-part-2-need-kind-training/

July 18, 2015 by Loren Schofield ~ Leave A Comment

If you missed Part 1 of this series, you can read it here.  And if you are not familiar with Special Forces history I recommend looking at my article Special Forces Primer: Lesson 1 – Correcting Misconceptions:

Special Forces traces its roots as the Army’s premier proponent of unconventional warfare from the Operational Groups and Jedburgh teams of the Office of Strategic Services. The OSS was formed in World War II to gather intelligence and conduct operations behind enemy lines in support of resistance groups in Europe and Burma. After the war, individuals such as Col. Aaron Bank, Col. Wendell Fertig and Lt. Col. Russell Volckmann used their wartime OSS experience to formulate the doctrine of unconventional warfare that became the cornerstone of the Special Forces. In June of 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was established under Col. Aaron Bank. Concurrently with this was the establishment of the Psychological Warfare School, which ultimately became today’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Special Forces Soldiers first saw combat in 1953 as individuals deployed from 10th SFG (A) to Korea.

For eight or nine years Special Forces was getting further and further away from their roots. As the GWOT progressed, Special Forces commanders were only giving lip service to UW. Instead they focused more and more on DA. During this time there were people within the community screaming, that we can’t lose our UW skills. Behind closed doors there was intense and extremely heated debates. From the team rooms to the highest level of command, up and down the hallways there was the argument on UW vs DA.

With Iraq over in 2011, and (at the time) what looked like U.S. troops being pulled out of Afghanistan, coupled with the downsizing of the military, Special Forces Command finally realized the need to rebuild their UW capabilities, and use the lessons we learned from over a decade of war. In July of 2012, LTG Charles T. Cleveland took command of the United States Special Operations Command (USASOC) and in April of 2013 releasedARSOF 2022.

LTG Cleveland said in a 2014 interview:

Last year, USASOC took a major step forward by introducing ARSOF 2022 as our blueprint for the future. ARSOF 2022 sought to clarify the narrative for Army special operations, provide direction to the force, and establish a process for future force development that leads to better support of joint force commanders in the future environment. It set in motion a number of changes primarily focused on the tactical aspects of our business and exploring the beginnings of SOF operational art.

We analyze this in terms of the continuous resistance potential assessment we should be making in north Korea.  The regime's crackdown on DVDs is an indication of the regime's fear of growing resistance.  The adaptation by the north Korean people in the face of crackdowns indicates that the resistance potential may be deeply ingrained.

He said the proliferation of miniature radios in the country was likely to do more for North Koreans’ understanding of life outside their country than that of DVDs.

“The spread of miniature radios is a more serious headache for the North Korean authorities than illegal visual media,” he said.

I received these comments from one of the America's noted authorities on the Smith-Mundt act, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications (note the acronym BBG is Broadcasting Board of Governors which oversees Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Voice of America).

A few points.  

First, I love that Dave posts articles from RFE/RL, RFA, and VOA.  Before HASC/SASC realized we live in a global information environment, and that the BBG family of networks were not propaganda organs, such material was not supposed to be available to people inside the United States.  Thank you Congressmen Thornberry and Adam Smith, and the other Members and staff of HASC / SASC.  And to a key staffer for his early heavy lifting when he was on Thornberry's staff to make this happen.  

Second, and to the point of the article below, we are seeing an evolution of the consumer.  Don't pretend that radio transmissions have been equal from yesterday through today.  DVDs are important as they provide access to rich content -- visual, audio, and textual.  They are, however, a medium that can be handled and thus found.  And, as noted in the article, the hardware to view them are larger and more expensive.  Perhaps more importantly with respect to the RFA article below, they provide information that is from no sooner than yesterday.  They are not immediate.  They have a certain value, as well: they tend to be entertaining and insightful.  They provide an escape and a porthole into another society.

Third, the trend could be read that the consumer is more willing to take risks to get information today.  The consumer is wanting not just to reduce the chance of detection by authorities, but to know what is happening now.  

I'm interested to see what this does for group dynamics.  DVDs are shared.  Tiny radios are less likely to be.  They are more personal.  Will we see more or less group building as the consumer switches to personal rather than shared mediums?  How will the immediacy of radio content build groups, create knowledge that people are not alone in their thoughts?  It is also worth noting that radio requires synchronizing the broadcaster with the listener, where as DVDs are entirely on the schedule of the consumers.  I'll also repeat, as I noted it before, that we are expanding radio into North Korea and that, unlike China, North Korea lacks the resources to effectively jam anything.  (It takes electricity and working transmitters to jam, which NK demonstrably lacks.) 

North Koreans Tuning Into Miniature Radios Following DVD Crackdown

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/radios-02282014160921.html

2014-02-28

A North Korean Radio listener shown in a file photo.

 KBS

Miniature radios smuggled in from China are in high demand in North Korea as people in the reclusive country desperately try to maintain contacts with the outside world following a crackdown on visual media, according to sources inside the country.

Authorities in the hermit kingdom have been relentlessly pursuing producers of cheap and easily copied DVDs featuring content like television dramas and movies depicting a better life outside the country’s borders, the sources said, and the highly concealable miniature radios are rapidly filling the void.

“A mass influx of miniature radios can be predicted to meet the skyrocketing demand in North Korea,” a source in Yanggang province along the border with China told RFA’s Korean Service on condition of anonymity.

The miniature radios now serve as the conduit through which news and culture from abroad—mostly China—flows into the country, he said. North Korean radios, by comparison, are locked to domestic, state-approved frequencies during the manufacturing process which toe the party line.

And while anyone found with one of the smuggled Chinese radios can be arrested for “espionage,” the units—which are roughly the size of two cell phones in width—are cheaper and easier to hide than the equipment needed to view illegal DVDs, the source said.

Additionally, he said the radios do not rely on power from North Korea’s spotty electricity grid, which regularly suffers from outages, and can last on cheap batteries available from most local markets for between three to four months at a time.

A source in Hamgyong province, also neighboring China, said that another advantage over DVDs is that radio programming provides listeners with a constantly updated source of information about life outside of the North, while content on DVDs is fixed and static.

The government keeps an iron grip on information in North Korea, where citizens can be severely punished for accessing foreign radio and other media or for using smuggled cell phones that operate on Chinese networks across the border.

Authorities also actively jam radio broadcasts from abroad, though their ability to do so is limited by the country’s power supply.

Changing market

Another source in Hamgyong said that the crackdown on DVDs had recently led to a major shift in the cost of both DVD equipment and the smuggled miniature radios.

“The price of DVD players called ‘DVD’ and ‘Notel’ were approximately U.S. $65,” the source said, adding that the crackdown had caused prices for each brand to drop by nearly one-third to around U.S. $41.

Conversely, as demand grows, the cost of miniature radios is beginning to climb.

“The miniature radio used to be U.S. $4, but now it is hard to find even at U.S. $16,” he said of the units which typically are sold for around U.S. $1.30 in China—providing smugglers with a profitable markup.

Sources predicted that the flow of smuggled radios into North Korea would continue to increase through the next several months.

“With all of these reasons taken together, smuggling will certainly become very common, so that large quantity of miniature radios will enter the country this summer,” the second Hamgyong source predicted.

He said the proliferation of miniature radios in the country was likely to do more for North Koreans’ understanding of life outside their country than that of DVDs.

“The spread of miniature radios is a more serious headache for the North Korean authorities than illegal visual media,” he said.

North Korean authorities have long tried to forbid South Korean soap operas, movies, and music into the country in an attempt to keep unwanted foreign influences from seeping into the Hermit Kingdom.

In November, authorities publicly executed some 80 people in a wave of capital punishments across seven cities, many of them for watching foreign media, South Korean media reported.

Despite such punishments, more and more music and videos from South Korea have slipped through the country’s information blockade in recent years, as “Korean Wave” cultural exports from the South grew increasingly popular in other Asian countries.

Reported by Sung-hui Moon for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Hyosun Kim. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

CHENG: Winning a war without fighting

We would do well to pay attention to my good friend Dean Cheng.  Also at this link is an expanded piece from Dean from last year that goes into more detail on the "Three Warfares" below today's article.  http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/11/winning-without-fighting-chinese-public-opinion-warfare-and-the-need-for-a-robust-american-response

We should not only gain a better understanding of China from this, there are also lessons we could learn as well.

V/R

Dave

CHENG: Winning a war without fighting

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/17/cheng-winning-a-war-without-fighting/

By Dean Cheng

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

ANALYSIS/OPINION

The ultimate proof of generalship, Sun-Tzu observed nearly two millennia ago, is the ability to defeat an opponent without fighting. How did one go about convincing opponents that their cause was hopeless and that they were doomed to defeat, in an era before nuclear weapons?

By striking at the psychological will of opponents to resist — whether by displays of overwhelming might, undermining of their home fronts, or luring them into disadvantageous ground.

Fast-forward to the 21st century, and we find that the People's Republic of China has updated Sun-Tzu’s playbook. The People’s Liberation Army has issued regulations regarding “political warfare” to be conducted by the General Political Department — one of the four general departments that manage the army. These regulations highlight the “three warfares”: legal warfare, public opinion warfare, and psychological warfare, reflecting modern ways of ensnaring and defeating opponents without having to engage in combat.

Legal warfare, or lawfare, involves the use of national and international law to constrain and restrict an opponent’s ability to wage war. Whether it is raising doubts about whether one could legally fire missiles at Mullah Mohammed Omar’s convoy or debating the legality of drone warfare, it is clear that the courts are another battlefield in modern warfare.

Meanwhile, in the struggle to mold perceptions worldwide, China has established a global 24/7 news presence through such state-owned media outlets as the Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television. Both of these support the broader effort to influence military and civilian decision-makers, the ultimate focus of psychological warfare.

Too often, we associate psychological warfare with tactical actions, e.g., leaflets and loudspeakers. Indeed, elements in the U.S. military now prefer the term “military information support operations” over “psychological warfare.”

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/17/cheng-winning-a-war-without-fighting/

N. Korea could fall faster than we think By Bruce Bennett

Dr. Bennett has a new report coming out soon and it is the most comprehensive report on north Korean collapse that I have read in 20 years.  It will be of tremendous value to policy makers, strategists, and planners in the ROK/US Alliance.  I think the collapse of the Kim Family Regime is the most complex threat the Alliance and the countries in Northeast Asia faces and one for which extensive preparations need to be made immediately, most importantly by South Korea and particularly in the area of influence operations.  I will not predict a time for collapse (most of us thinking about collapse have never made a time prediction) but I do agree that it could really surprise us when it happens.

V/R
Dave

N. Korea could fall faster than we think

http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130602000197

Published : 2013-06-02 20:38
Updated : 2013-06-02 20:38

Bruce Bennett

On Oct. 7, 1989, members of the East German Politburo looked on approvingly as sharply dressed soldiers and shiny military hardware paraded by them in a gaudy display of military might to mark the 40th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic.

To the world, the 1989 celebration may have looked no different than any of the countless East German military parades that had come before it. But inside East Germany, this one was different. That night, demonstrations demanding political reform spread to the capital for the first time. Whispered calls for democracy were becoming shouts. Whether the rest of the world knew it or not, the days of the German Democratic Republic were numbered.

Within weeks, the Berlin Wall fell. Less than a year later, agreements for the reunification of East and West Germany were signed. And just like that, there was one fewer communist nation threatening Europe.

When it comes to ostentatious displays of military might these days, no one outdoes North Korea, where parades are only the beginning. When leader Kim Jong-un wants a macho show of military strength, he’s likely to order nuclear tests, or rocket launches, or the firing of short range missiles into the sea as he did this week.

What the former East Germany and North Korea have in common is that they both have relied on shows of military might to divert domestic dissent while propping up regimes that face enormous challenges, both internal and external. Could North Korea collapse with as little warning as East Germany did 24 years ago? It’s possible.

When analysts look at the Korean Peninsula, they often talk of the reunification of the two Koreas as a long-off goal that should be planned for over the span of decades. But in the 1980s, the reunification of Germany seemed equally distant.

The United States, South Korea and their allies would be well advised to factor in the possibility that North Korea could collapse in a fit of revolt and economic decay at any time, just as East Germany did.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye has made clear her hopes for talks at some point between Seoul and Pyongyang to prepare for peaceful coexistence and perhaps even unification over the coming decades. But she has said little about how South Korea might deal with an early collapse of the North. A sudden collapse is possible in the coming years and could create regional chaos and impossible burdens on the road to reunification unless South Korea and its allies are better prepared.

Should Kim Jong-un be assassinated and a successor government fail to arise from the likely factions, South Korea and its neighbors would find themselves dealing with a humanitarian crisis of historic proportions. In the aftermath of a collapse, hunger would likely be the immediate urgency and food the most valued commodity. South Korea should make it clear to North Koreans that it is creating stockpiles of food that will be available in the event of a collapse, just as the West German’s offered “greeting money” to East Germans during the unification process.

At the same time, South Korea will have to deal with a broad range of other issues, like securing North Korean weapons, keeping its massive military appeased, and dealing with the remnants of Kim Jong-un’s regime.

How these huge issues are resolved will depend largely on how invested the North Korean people are in becoming one with the south. In the divided Germany of the late 1980s, virtually all Germans thought they would be better off if unification occurred. South Korea should be working toward creating this same kind of feeling of solidarity between its people and those of North Korea. If the North Korean people oppose unification, it may be impossible to secure the North, aborting the unification process. Once aborted, unification may never happen ― there may only be one chance.

South Korea has been successful in recent years in establishing a national brand that is cultural, economic and political. It includes music and technology and all the things South Korea is known for around the world. Making this brand more inclusive of all Koreans would be a good place to start creating a shared view of Korean success.

South Korea should seek to communicate to the North Korean people, and especially the elites, how life after unification will be in their best interest. They will share in the Korean economic plenty, have broad access to education including college, and only those guilty of serious human rights violations will be subjected to judicial punishments. While such offers may seem overly generous, they may be necessary to secure North Korean support for unification.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130602000197

Report raps military propaganda efforts as ineffective

I think it is somewhat ironic that we expended all the effort to change the name from Psychological Operations (PSYOP) to Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to try to eliminate the perception that these operations are considered propaganda and yet this entire article calls these MISO operations "propaganda efforts."  Of course Tom Vanden Brook has targeted anything dealing with information operations. PSYOP, MISO, influence, etc, etc as propaganda.  But old Vanden Brook is just like the other journalists who cannot tell the difference among Special Operations Forces as illustrated in these excerpts:

The report also outlines how propaganda works. In war zones such as Afghanistan, the military deploys three- and four-soldier MISO teams to drop leaflets telling insurgents how to surrender, air radio broadcasts "to explain U.S. military operations in a favorable light," collect local propaganda and devise counterpropaganda, according to the report.
….
In safer countries, teams of two to 10 special forces soldiers are deployed at the request of combatant commanders and ambassadors. They lead programs that include helping "instill confidence by local populations in their law enforcement" and offering rewards for information.

V/R

Dave

Report raps military propaganda efforts as ineffective

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/23/military-propaganda-operations-poorly-coordinated-often-ineffective/2354235/

Tom Vanden Brook, USATODAY 4:57 p.m. EDT May 23, 2013

(Photo: NONE ISAF)

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

• Series of Pentagon-run websites not coordinated with other efforts
• Pentagon runs propaganda operations in 22 countries
• The GAO did not release the report publicly

WASHINGTON — Pentagon propaganda programs are inadequately tracked, their impact is unclear, and the military doesn't know if it is targeting the right foreign audiences, according to a government report obtained by USA TODAY.

Since 2005, the Pentagon has spent hundreds of million of dollars on Military Information Support Operations (MISO). These propaganda efforts include websites, leaflets and broadcasts intended to change foreigners' "attitudes and behaviors in support of U.S. Government" objectives, according to the report by the Government Accountability Office. Some of them disclose the U.S. military as the source; others don't.

The Pentagon's response noted that it partly concurred with the GAO criticism. Lt. Col. James Gregory, a Pentagon spokesman, said Thursday the military is revising its tracking requirements for propaganda programs, has a pilot program to assess their effectiveness and will soon publish revised guidelines that emphasize better planning of its operations.

The report offers a rare glimpse inside the cloaked world of military propaganda, much of which is held secret by the Pentagon. It shows the effort extends from Southeast Asia to South America, with special operations troops deployed to embassies to "erode support for violent extremist ideologies."

The stakes are high. Used effectively, the programs can dampen extremism and increase support for U.S. military operations. However, "if used ineffectively, MISO activities have the potential to undermine the credibility of the United States and threaten (Pentagon) and other agencies' efforts to accomplish key foreign policy goals," the report says.

While the report says some of the military's propaganda teams have succeeded in the 22 countries, "it is unclear whether MISO activities are effective overall."

"Once again we are seeing a misguided spending approach by the government," said Scott Amey, general counsel of the non-partisan watchdog the Project on Government Oversight. "It is horrifying to think that millions are spent on propaganda with little administration of those funds and without some metric of the campaigns' success."

Military propaganda and marketing efforts have been the focus of a series of USA TODAY stories. In 2012, the paper found that the Pentagon had spent as much as $580 million per year on propaganda programs at the height of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan but had trouble gauging their effectiveness. It spent $54 million last year, according to the GAO. The GAO refused USA TODAY's request for the report, which was obtained from another government source.

The GAO found three "weaknesses" in the Pentagon's tracking of its propaganda programs:

• The Pentagon and Congress "do not have a complete picture" of the efforts and the funding used to pay for the programs.

• The Pentagon can't measure the effects of propaganda programs well enough to know where to allocate funding.

• Lacking goals, the Pentagon does not have "reasonable assurance" that it is putting resources into countries that need it.

Gregory noted that the Pentagon already provides Congress with substantial data on its MISO programs every three months.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/23/military-propaganda-operations-poorly-coordinated-often-ineffective/2354235/

Kaesong Closure Poses Challenges for North

I do worry what will become of the workers in Kaesong, especially those that had the most interaction with South Koreans.  I do not think we can understand deeply enough the importance of information to and contact with the north Korean people.  Again, I hate to beat the dead horse but this is another indication of why we (the ROK/US Alliance) need a comprehensive PSYOP/MISO, influence campaign.  North Korea is probably one of the most important PSYOP targets and one where we can achieve the most long term effects.

V/R
Dave

• May 6, 2013, 4:17 PM KST

Kaesong Closure Poses Challenges for North

ByAlastair Gale

http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/05/06/kaesong-closure-poses-challenges-for-north/tab/print/

A South Korean police officer stands guard on an empty road connecting the Kaesong Industrial Complex inside North Korea with the South after all South Koreans returned from the park on May 3.

After the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and delivery of millions of dollars in final wage and tax payments to North Korea on Friday, several questions remain about the fate of the plant and the people who worked there.

Setting aside North Korea’s claim that it isn’t worried about the lost income, Pyongyang’s biggest headache is what to do with the 53,000 or so workers who have lost their jobs. The shutdown has effectively tossed one in six people in Kaesong–North Korea’s third-largest city–out of work.

Reassigning that number of people to new jobs presents a major logistical challenge, coupled with the potential risks to the regime of the spread of information about the capitalist system at the facility. Daily NK, a website based in Seoul that specializes in news about North Korea and is partially staffed by defectors, reported Monday that the workers have been sent to a wide range of other workplaces in the adjoining region to Kaesong.

The former Kaesong workers are also being given lectures and special study sessions to tackle the problematic ideas they have been exposed to, according to the report. By spreading the workers over a large area, North Korea likely hopes to dilute the politically toxic message they may bring.

The South Korean companies that operated at the Kaesong plant still have machinery and raw materials there that they were unable to bring out during the evacuation. North Korea could expropriate everything but it won’t be able to restart the plant because the South has stopped almost all of the electricity supply that is used to power the facility. A small amount of electricity and water that is used by the city of Kaesong is still being provided at the North’s request.

Meanwhile, as Seoul and the South Korean companies hold out for a potential return to Kaesong, North Korea is sticking to its demand for an end to “hostile acts and military provocations” from the South in order to reopen the plant.

(Continued at the link below)

http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/05/06/kaesong-closure-poses-challenges-for-north/tab/print/

The secret item found in every North Korean home

Received from another Korean expert (I have a number of mentors on Korea) in response to the article and my comments below.

Targeting the minds of North Koreans will be, in the end, the most effective force, kinetic or non-kinetic, in establishing a base for intellectual resistance to the Kim Family Regime.  Transitioning that intellectual resistance to physical force is another thing under the current conditions of complete dominance of the tools of force by the regime.  But without the willingness to believe in values and beliefs counter to the regime, willingness to act is impossible.  The more counter-regime psyop the better.  This calls for ingenuity and one has to believe that the boys at Ft. Bragg can do it.  Now we just need the policy makers to give the go ahead.  Perhaps some of those visiting B2's can drop radios instead of ordnance...just kidding…not

I would just add this.   I would not necessarily use direct counter propaganda but instead try to show that Juche has corrupted true Korean culture and that in the end the north and South Koreans are more alike than different and that their true Korean culture that has been suppressed does allow them to have the values and beliefs that will allow for unification. Totally rejecting everything the population in the north has experienced may be more psychologically damaging and may lead to more resistance in the long run.   We cannot even vilify the Kim Family too much at first.  We do not want to undercut the individual's identity too much, too fast (and in actuality we need to help individuals reclaim their individuality).  Too many individuals are still likely to have a belief in the system thinking about the good old days when Kim Il-Sung was alive.  (Note when I use "we" I mean the ROK/US Alliance with the ROK in the lead with US support.)

Orignal Comments:  

Another indicator of why we should and can develop and execute an effective ROK/US Alliance influence campaign (PSYOP/MISO) to target the north Korean population (and one that should also target the second tier leadership as well).  The comprehensive plan is necessary now to achieve the effects at the unknown time in the future when we will need those effects to have been achieved.  We cannot wait to execute PSYOP after the crisis occurs.

V/R

Dave

The secret item found in every North Korean home

March 31, 2013 0 Comments and 15 Reactions

http://newfocusintl.com/secret-item-found-in-every-north-korean-home/

‘South Korean’ at home, ‘North Korean’ outside the home

Many North Korean families keep a secret item at home, whose discovery may lead to harsh punishment. Away from prying eyes and in the privacy of their homes, North Koreans enjoy using items forbidden by the state, according to North Koreans recently escaped from the country.

“In every North Korean home, there is at least one secret item” says Jung Young-chul* (age 34), who escaped from North Korea in 2012. He had a short-wave radio in the house and the family would secretly listen to South Korean broadcasts. To avoid being caught, they kept the radio hidden under a container for keeping rice.

They were not the only ones with a hidden radio. Jung continues, “Once, a friend described a story that I had heard the night before while listening to a South Korean broadcast. I brought it up with him one night in drink, and he confided that his family too had a radio. We laughed about it together.”

Kim Hee-young is from Chongjin and also escaped from North Korea in 2012. She tells us, “We secretly traded South Korean TV shows in the markets and they always went very quickly. We ran out of stock on most days.” She added how outside the home, North Koreans would dutifully obey the cultural restrictions enforced by the state. Yet at home, Hee-young describes how everything is different: “Where I lived, I would guess that almost every family owned a South Korean TV show. You can’t borrow what you want to watch if you don’t have something to trade it for, so everyone liked to keep at least one show at home.”

(Continued at the link below)

http://newfocusintl.com/secret-item-found-in-every-north-korean-home/

North Korea: What happens if Kim Jong-un acts on his threats?

If I had been asked I would have challenged this comment (while still agreeing and emphasizing that PSYOP/MISO is critically important)

One key focus for the US and South Korean militaries would be psychological operations, which would be focused on trying “to dissuade the North Korean public from believing all this propaganda they’ve been hearing their whole lives.” 

PSYOP illustrates best a variation of one of the five SOF truths:  "Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur" which I would adapt and say PSYOP cannot be effective if it is not used until a crisis occurs. Nowhere is this more important than on the Korean Peninsula.  More than anything else to prepare for war or regime collapse, PSYOP must be conduct now, an influence campaign targeting not only the population but also the second tier leadership has to start now (or should have begun 17 years ago when we recommended it to the SECDEF as part of CONPLAN 5029). It is a critical component of preparation of the environment.

V/R

Dave

North Korea: What happens if Kim Jong-un acts on his threats?

In the event that the 'bellicose rhetoric' of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un turns into something more serious, the opening hours of conflict could be 'pretty ugly,' defense analysts warn.

http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/USA/Military/2013/0329/North-Korea-What-happens-if-Kim-Jong-un-acts-on-his-threats

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un speaks during a meeting of information workers of the whole army at the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang, March 28, 2013.

(KCNA/REUTERS)

By Anna Mulrine, Staff writer / March 29, 2013 at 6:19 pm EDT

Washington

Veteran North Korea watchers, citing what they see as increasingly troubling signs coming from the dictatorial regime, are voicing concerns that its new young leader, Kim Jong-un, could do something ill-advised, even start a war.

On Friday North Korea renewed what the U.S. has condemned as its “bellicose rhetoric,” saying Kim had ordered the nation’s missile forces to prepare to strike the United States and South Korea.

In response to the prospect of North Korea following through on this and other marginally less dire threats, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said Thursday that the US military “will unequivocally defend, and [is] unequivocally committed to the alliance with, South Korea.”

But if hostilities were in fact to erupt, how might they play out?

Some former US Special Operations Forces and longtime Korea defense analysts have their own thoughts on what an “unequivocal” US military response could look like, including how US troops would be deployed in the event of a lethal first strike on US and allied military forces by North Korea – precisely the sort of move Mr. Kim has been threatening to make.

What would such a first North Korean move resemble? It might involve small-scale infiltrations using mini-submarines, assassination attempts, “maybe shooting someone on the DMZ [demilitarized zone] or missile tests that fly too close over Japan,” says Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.

This might be done “to show he’s in charge, he won’t be intimidated, or because he’s truly desperate,” Dr. Cronin says.

In the past, most such provocations generally have been met with international condemnation and strengthened sanctions.

Should Kim choose to do “something even more outlandish,” the US military and South Korean response would be more dire, he adds.

One of the scenarios that most concerns US defense analysts, for example, involves North Korea’s estimated 500,000 to 700,000 rounds of artillery aimed at Seoul, says retired Brig. Gen. Russell Howard, former commander of the 1st Special Forces Group, which has an Asia focus. 

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/USA/Military/2013/0329/North-Korea-What-happens-if-Kim-Jong-un-acts-on-his-threats

North Korea Cracks Down on Knowledge Smugglers

I hate to continue to beat the horse but this is another indicator that illustrates how much the regime fears outside information and that the operations by the north Korean defector organizations and other NGOs are having an impact.  This is all the more reason why a comprehensive ROK-US influence operations strategy (PSYOP/MISO) should be sustained.  As an aside when looking at Bob Collins' patterns of collapse or 7 phases of collapse this is an indication of how the regime remains in the suppression phase has it has been for more than two decades.  But reports such as this show that the suppression mechanisms may be strained.  If suppression fails then we can potentially see a rapid progression though the remaining phases of collapse and if that is the case the potential for conflict increases.  The bottom line is that reports such as these should be watched closely and of course we should not only be planning for what comes next but actively preparing to deal with the "fall out" when regime collapse occurs.  But call me chicken little.

V/R

Dave

North Korea Cracks Down on Knowledge Smugglers

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/north-korea-cracks-knowledge-smugglers-18102031?singlePage=true#.UOIp_4njmAE

By By TIM SULLIVAN Associated Press

HUNCHUN, China December 31, 2012 (AP)

The warning came from Kim Jong Un, the North Korean ruler who sees his isolated nation, just across the border from this busy Chinese trading town, as under siege. The attack, he said, must be stopped.

"We must extend the fight against the enemy's ideological and cultural infiltration," Kim said in an October speech at the headquarters of his immensely powerful internal security service. Kim, who became North Korea's supreme leader after the death of his father a year ago, called upon his vast security network to "ruthlessly crush those hostile elements."

Over the past year, Kim has intensified a border crackdown that has attempted to seal the once-porous 1,420-kilometer (880-mile) frontier with China, smugglers and analysts say, trying to hold back the onslaught.

The assault that he fears? It's being waged with cheap televisions rigged to receive foreign broadcasts, and with smuggled mobile phones that — if you can get a Chinese signal along the border — can call the outside world. Very often, it arrives in the form of wildly popular South Korean soap operas smuggled in on DVDs or computer thumb drives.

In North Korea, a country where international phone calls and Internet connections exist only for a tiny fraction of a tiny elite, and televisions and radios must be permanently preset to receive only state broadcasts, it's Korean-language TV heartache they crave.

(Continued at the ink below)

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/north-korea-cracks-knowledge-smugglers-18102031?singlePage=true#.UOIp_4njmAE

The US is encouraging the Foreign Office to back plans to establish a BBC Korean service

Interesting development.  Any information to the people of north Korea is helpful and though I am happy to see that Lord Alton hopes to have talks with the new ROK Administration, I hope that with the US approaching the BBC to do this would be from an Alliance perspective and that this is not purely a bilateral US-UK initiative.  Anything we do in north Korea has to be in support of our treaty ally the ROK and must be to further the 2009 ROK-US Joint Vision which is to achieve unification of the Peninsula (hopefully peacefully).  Government initiatives should (must?) be in synch with the ROK government and the overall influence strategy for solving the "Korea question."  We should be long past trying to do anything unilaterally or not involving the ROK on the Korean Peninsula.

V/R

Dave

How do you solve a problem like BBC World Service Korea?

The US is encouraging the Foreign Office to  back plans to establish a BBC Korean service

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/tv-radio/how-do-you-solve-a-problem-like-bbc-world-service-korea-8432714.html

IAN BURRELL 

  

FRIDAY 28 DECEMBER 2012

The BBC World Service could broadcast programmes aimed at residents of North Korea for the first time, under proposals being discussed by MPs, corporation bosses and US officials.

Barack Obama’s administration is encouraging the Foreign Office to back plans to establish a BBC Korean service to help open up the most secret country on earth.

They believe the BBC’s reputation for impartiality could help build up trust with communist state's 24 million population.

The talks come amid signs that North Korean citizens are increasingly ignoring a ban that forbids them from accessing foreign media. A Korean network is also seen as having potential commercial and cultural benefits in South Korea.

Peter Horrocks, the head of the BBC World Service, will discuss the matter in Westminster with MPs from the All Party Group on North Korea early in the new year. Lord Alton, who leads the group, which has also met with the Foreign Office minister Hugo Swire, said Washington-based officials had recently been in London to support the idea of a BBC service. The US government-run networks Voice of America and Radio Free Asia already broadcast into North Korea.

The peer said: “Within the last month I have had discussions with senior [US] State Department officials. They are very positive about the idea of the BBC becoming involved in transmission.”

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/tv-radio/how-do-you-solve-a-problem-like-bbc-world-service-korea-8432714.html

NKOREA CRITICIZES SKOREAN BORDER XMAS TOWER

We can chuckle about a Christmas tree's effect on north Korea but we should also realize that from a PSYOP/MISO perspective that this is in indication both of how seriously the regime takes psychological warfare and how much it fears it when its people are exposed to outside information.  This is one more reason why we need the ROK/US alliance to conduct comprehensive psychological operations – both overtly and covertly.

V/R

Dave

NKOREA CRITICIZES SKOREAN BORDER XMAS TOWER

Dec. 24 5:00 AM EST

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/nkorea-criticizes-skorean-border-xmas-tower

Home » Seoul » NKorea criticizes SKorean border Xmas tower

A 30-meter-tall (100-foot-tall) steel Christmas tree with about 30,000 light bulbs, is lit by Christian groups at the western mountain peak, known as Aegibong, in Gimpo, South Korea, Saturday, Dec. 22, 2012. The Christmas tree would be visible by North Koreans living near the Demilitarized Zone that divided the two Koreas. (AP Photo/Lee Jin-man)

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea is accusing rival South Korea of using an illuminated frontline Christmas tower to engage in psychological warfare.

North Korean state media said Monday the lighting of the Christmas-tree-shaped tower is because Seoul was humiliated by Pyongyang successfully putting a satellite into orbit Dec. 12.

The United Nations and others call the launch a cover for a banned test of ballistic missile technology.

(Continued at the link below)

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/nkorea-criticizes-skorean-border-xmas-tower

A PSYOP Proposal following north Korea's missile test

I received the below recommendations from a PSYOP (MISO) professional who knows his PSYOP history on the Peninsula as a follow-up to Michael Mazza's assessment on our lack of action.  As he notes I am a great believer in using PSYOP against north Korea and multiple target audiences (not only regime leadership but also the second tier leadership and the population) to prepare for the eventual change that will occur on the Peninsula either through regime collapse or war.  The recommendation below is certainly a proposal that is targeted on influencing the regime leadership but it could do that by also targeting the other audiences.  But the bottom line is we do need to get back in the game on the Peninsula and stop being afraid to use PSYOP (or MISO) overtly.

V/R

Dave

There is one thing the U.S. could do that we haven't done sine approximately 1971/2 when "Voice of the United Nations" operated by the 14th PSYOP Battalion was taken off air.  It's something you always say we should be doing more of - that of course being PSYOP against nK. 

If the US wants to show the north they have in fact crossed a red line and alter their behavior in the future - perhaps say stopping the transfer of the missile to Iran or Venezuela - then the US should get into the game again.  The message on the product - broadcast or print - would be irrelevant.  The message to the regime would be you've gone too far so now the US is rejoining the battle in the information (or human) domain.  Products can be benign information but just that they admit the US through DoD is doing them would send a message and achieve the desired effect. 

It would be clear to them that, to steal Yamamoto's words, they had awakened the sleeping giant.  If they are worried about defector balloons and leaflets and what the ROK can do, now they would truly have something to be scared of with the potential of the full weight of the ROK-US Alliance focused on winning the information war.  I am sure that is a war they know they can't win and won't want to fight.  After 6 months or a year of that, I think they'd be very ready to discuss ways to reduce the pressure on themselves. 

And for those who think PSYOP would have no impact, we only have to look at the north's own demands.  Not their demands against the very limited in scope and effect defector operations, but their demands in 1999-2004 to the Kim Dae Jung and Roh administrations.  Their demands to both before talks and summits was got the ROK to stop its PSYOP efforts.  Which in both cases it did.  Stopping balloon - and gift sets of rice and toiletries - before the 2000 summit and all remaining PSYOP -radio, visual, and loudspeaker ops along DMZ in 2004.  What did ROK get in return - 2 nuke tests, 3 ICBM tests, and the attacks on the Cheonan and Yongpyeong island.   

This is a case where the pen is mightier (and safer) than the sword.  The threat isn't doing PSYOP.  the threat to the ROK, the US, and the world is the world community doing nothing once again. 

Just my thoughts of course, no one else's.

Special Operations Command leads propaganda fight

Vanden Brook on his hobby horse.  Now that he has successfully destroyed strategic communication (in his mind I am sure he takes credit for that) he will take on SOCOM and PSYOP/MISO.  (Of course I thought with the name change to MISO no one would associate that with propaganda again – but I guess Vanden Brook is too smart to be taken in by that)

I am sure from Vanden Book's perspective this excerpt reveals what he thinks SOCOM is made up of and what SOCOM should only be doing:

Special Operations Command, based in Tampa, directs the military's elite commando units — the Navy's SEALs and Army's Delta Force — in counterterrorism missions. SOCOM, as it is known, conducted the operation to kill Osama bin Laden and dealt bloody blows to insurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Stimson Center report can be downloaded here: http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/the-pentagon-as-pitchman-perception-and-reality-of-public-diplomacy/

Special Operations Command leads propaganda fight

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/12/06/socom-leads-propaganda-fight/1746013/

Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY

• Spending on propaganda websites has more than doubled since 2009
• Controversial longtime military PR guru is a key SOCOM adviser
• SOCOM conducted the operation to kill Osama bin Laden

2:53PM EST December 6. 2012 - WASHINGTON — The military's Special Operations Command has become an emerging player in the Pentagon's propaganda efforts to confront violent extremists around the world, according to documents and a new report from a non-partisan think tank.

Special Operations Command, based in Tampa, directs the military's elite commando units — the Navy's SEALs and Army's Delta Force — in counterterrorism missions. SOCOM, as it is known, conducted the operation to kill Osama bin Laden and dealt bloody blows to insurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Key to its propaganda efforts is a collection of websites known as the Trans Regional Web Initiative aimed at foreign audiences. USA TODAY first reported on its existence in 2008, and it appears to have expanded.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/12/06/socom-leads-propaganda-fight/1746013/