Thought for the Day

"By three methods we may learn wisdom: First, by reflection, which is noblest; second, by imitation, which is easiest; and third by experience, which is the bitterest." - Confucius

Monday, October 17, 2016

An Information Based Strategy to Reduce Korea’s Increasing Threat

This report is authored by Commander Skip Vincenzo, (US Navy SEAL), who is among the longest serving uniformed officers in Korea in the past two decades.  He assembled a group of Korea hands (page 13 of the report) to work on this project this summer.

Co-published with CNAS, USKI-SAIS, and NDU our Georgetown Security Studies Review.

Special Issue: An Information Based Strategy to Reduce Korea’s Increasing Threat

Special Issue: An Information Based Strategy to Reduce Korea’s Increasing Threat

In cooperation with the Center for a New American Security, National Defense University, and the US-Korea Institute at SAIS, Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies and the Georgetown Security Studies Review present a new special report available for download here.

Executive Summary

Deterrence works, until it doesn’t.”—Sir Lawrence Freedman
The United States’ current approach to North Korea does not fundamentally resolve the risks of its belligerent behavior nor halt the development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. As these capabilities are improved, there is greater potential that Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea— confident he can deter a regime-threatening reaction—will attempt a violent provocation to achieve political objectives but in doing so miscalculates and instead sparks a crisis which escalates disastrously. While the United States has contingency plans for a wide range of conflict scenarios, executing them would be extraordinarily costly—the military capabilities Pyongyang has now amassed would inflict catastrophic damage.
James Clapper, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, has repeatedly warned that Pyongyang is “committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-armed missile that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States…” and that “North Korea has already taken initial steps toward fielding this system…”1 With such a capability, Kim is attempting force the international community to accommodate him to avoid conflict. However, he could underestimate U.S. resolve, which in turn would ignite conflict. If the Kim regime falls, a nuclear-armed, fragmented military could strike the United States.
To avert this, the United States should work with South Korea to develop an information campaign designed to reduce the risks of conflict or regime collapse by convincing regime elites that their best options in these circumstances would be to support ROK-U.S. Alliance efforts. This would require five key elements:
• Enhance our ability to de-escalate a crisis by ensuring that the regime’s elites fully understand the consequences of a war by continually demonstrating the U.S.-ROK Alliance’s advanced military capabilities.
• Reduce the potential for violence by formulating policies that provide credible assurances of amnesty to regime elites and, if they act in ways which support alliance efforts, a beneficial role after the Kim regime collapses or a conflict is resolved on Alliance terms.
• Reduce the humanitarian costs by formulating policies that inform ordinary North Koreans what to expect in a contingency and how to act.
• Reduce civil and military resistance by formulating policies that guarantee North Koreans full rights as citizens of South Korea.
• Mitigate collapse of the civil infrastructure by incentivizing bureaucrats, technicians, and local commanders to protect and maintain critical facilities.
Reducing the wartime damage the North could inflict and lessening the potential chaos of collapse would provide renewed leverage for the U.S.-ROK Alliance to de-escalate a crisis before it erupts. However, if crisis does occur, this strategy would enable a more favorable and less costly conclusion.

Friday, October 14, 2016

NSCITF Report on Countering Violent Extremism

The 38 page report can be accessed directly at think link.

NSCITF Report on Countering Violent Extremism

NSCITF Report on Countering Violent Extremism
The 2016 edition of the National Security Critical Issues Task Force (NSCITF) Report is now available for download here.
The 2016 NSCITF Report on Countering Violent Extremism analyzes issues underlying activities that prevent individuals from radicalizing, adopting violent extremist ideologies, and engaging in terrorist activities. In the report, the Task Force proposes a new framework for conceptualizing and implementing CVE, and identifies recommendations for policymakers to consider for national level CVE efforts in the United States.
Media inquiries and permission requests should be directed to the Georgetown Security Studies ReviewEditor-in-Chief at

Monday, September 19, 2016

Special Forces as Military Observers in Modern Combat

Posted by  on Sep 18, 2016 | 0 comments
An Army Special Forces Officer, having been embedded with a Ukrainian infantry company only days earlier, arrives at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, to give a presentation to a conventional Army brigade preparing for a rotation to Europe. He lectures on the latest anti-tank tactics and counter-drone techniques being used against Russian proxy forces.  Across the country, an experienced special operations Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) briefs members of the airborne community at Fort Bragg on the what he observed alongside French paratroopers in Mali, following up on the secure teleconferences that occurred previously while he was still in Africa.  These scenarios are hypothetical, but plausible.  The situations described are examples of “what could be,” if Special Operations Forces (SOF) were used as military observers in modern combat.
Once a widely practiced tradition, professional soldiers are no longer commonly embedded as official military observers during war. This discontinuation can be attributed to reasons ranging from risk aversion, to feasibility, to military culture.  An overview of the insights (and the overlooked, potential indicators) from military observers during the last two centuries indicates that modern militaries may be denying themselves an opportunity for critical insight.  By embedding officially sanctioned and uniformed observers with belligerents, countries have the opportunity to be at the cutting edge of conflict without being actively engaged in combat.  The networked nature of modern militaries means that reports, pictures and videos can be beamed across the planet in near-real time.  Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the best candidates to fulfill this overlooked, but not obsolete, practice.
Before expanding on why SOF can best fulfill this role, a better explanation of how military observers can contribute to increased effectiveness and preparation for future conflict must be offered.  A military observer is different from an attaché, or a journalist, or a spy.  A military observer is a professional military representative present at the conflict wearing the uniform of his own nation (which is not one of the belligerents).  While an attaché could feasibly observe fighting, especially if they take the John J. Pershing approach to serving as an attaché, their primary role is to serve as a liaison with their host nation.  The importance of having a dedicated observer in a conflict is their focus on the actual combat- issues ranging from technology, to the use of terrain, to tactics and strategy.  An official military observer is typically an experienced soldier himself, and as such understands the trials of combat and the military culture overall.
In predicting future conflict, many strategists and leaders look to military histories, and for good reason.  However, even the most ardent student of history would admit that the lessons of battles past cannot be taken as templates and placed on modern conflict with the expectation of identical results.  Not only do conditions and technologies change, but even when military observers are employed, lessons are not always learned.  To explore how some lessons are overlooked, and mitigate that possibility, it is useful to study military observers during their heyday in the 19thcentury and early 20th century, specifically Europeans in the American Civil War, and American observers in the Crimea and later during the Russo-Japanese War.
European Observers: Technical Focuses and Cultural Biases
Continued at the link below:

Monday, September 12, 2016

U.S. Special Operations Forces at 9-11, Today, and for the Future

U.S. Special Operations Forces at 9-11, Today, and for the Future · September 11, 2016
September 11, 2016 | LTG Charles Cleveland and COL David Maxwell

Following the tragic attack on 9-11, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the CIA, supported by airpower, conducted a punitive expedition that resulted in the Taliban and al Qaeda being routed from Afghanistan. In 2003, working with the Kurds, U.S. SOF conducted operations in northern Iraq, accomplishing the mission intended for a U.S. infantry division that was not allowed to deploy through Turkey. U.S. SOF were already advising and assisting Colombian military and police operations as part of Plan Colombia that contributed to the peace agreement in 2016. And in Asia, U.S. SOF supported the Philippine security forces in degrading and destroying terrorist organizations linked to al Qaeda while supporting peace negotiations with Moro insurgent groups.
U.S. SOF were well positioned and ready in 2001 to execute their fundamental doctrinal missions for which they were organized, trained, equipped, educated, and optimized: unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense or Special Warfare. However, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations soon came to dominate the U.S. military campaigns for both special operations and regular forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and later in Yemen and throughout Africa.
What emerged after 9-11 was a special operations Surgical Strike capability that combined exquisite intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with precision strikes from unmanned aerial systems and the unparalleled special operations ground and maritime capability to capture or kill high value targets at the time and place of our choosing, including killing Osama bin Laden in 2011. The development of such concepts as F3EAD – find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate – allowed the U.S. national mission force, often supported by regular forces, to take down enemy networks by operating at a tempo that paralyzed terrorist organizations. Counterterrorism direct action operations were raised to a high art form.
The 2006 QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) called for a massive growth in SOF to nearly 70,000 personnel in the United States Special Operations Command. While the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), Ranger Regiment, Special Operations Aviation (Air Force and Army), the National Mission Force, SOF headquarters, and enabling forces (intelligence, communications, and logistics) expanded, the planned growth objectives for Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs were unable to be achieved. This proved two of the five SOF truths: competent SOF cannot be produced after emergencies occur, and SOF cannot be mass produced. One of the important developments post-9-11 was the establishment of SOF operational HQ in theaters as either Special Operations Command Forward (SOC-FWD) or Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF) to provide command and control of the tactical forces executing the full range of special operations missions for the Theater Commander.
While terrorism has been at the forefront of our security strategy the past 15 years, we are coming to realize that the threats we face now and in the future are larger than terrorism alone. Russia’s new generation warfare or non-linear warfare employing active measures and reflexive control; China’s Three Warfare’s: media warfare, lawfare, and psychological warfare; the Iran Action Network , and non-state actors such as ISIS and AQ are exploiting the conditions of political instability and ungoverned spaces and creating new security problems that cannot be addressed through counterterrorism operations as the single focus main effort.
The conditions can be described as revolution, resistance, insurgency, and civil war, and countries and non-state actors are exploiting them to achieve their geostrategic objectives. They are practicing a modern form of what George Kennan described in 1948 as Political Warfare. This is the norm in the Gray Zonespace between peace and war.
(Continued at the link below)

Interrogation, Intelligence Gathering, and Public Policy

This dialogue between Dr. Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault and Former Deputy Director of the CIA, John McLaughlin, is well worth watching for anyone interested in post 9-11 interrogation and intelligence operations.  Both of their views will make you think regardless of which side of the issue you come down on.

Interrogation, Intelligence Gathering, and Public Policy
Georgetown University Center for Security Studies
The Center for Security Studies Lunch Series: "Interrogation, Intelligence Gathering, and Public Policy" - A Conversation with John McLaughlin and Dr. Elizabeth Arsenault

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the intelligence community faced significant pressure to capture, detain, and interrogate suspected terrorists. However, the question remained: once they were found, how should the US handle captured fighters in U.S. custody? What measures were legal, moral, and effective to acquire actionable intelligence in the war on terror?

John McLaughlin, who served as the CIA's deputy director from 2000 to 2004, and Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault, who teaches in the Security Studies Program, examined these questions as well as the implications of these decisions.

Thursday, September 8, 2016

North Korea and Military Proliferation to Iran: An International Security Dilemma by Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.

This is arguably the most authoritative open source analysis of north Korean proliferation activities with Iran.  It is extremely well sourced analysis.  Unfortunately it is not online so you have to download the PDF from my dropbox at the link below.  It is well worth the read for anyone interested in north Korea's proliferation.

Summary:  This article looks at North Korea’s military proliferation to Iran – all of it.  For those who have questions about North Korea’s long history of proliferation (which is ongoing) to Iran, or perhaps even question that there is a robust proliferation relationship this article will help answer them.

Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. “North Korea and Military Proliferation to Iran: An International
Security Dilemma,” ChiMoKoJa – Histories of China, Mongolia, Korea and Japan, Vol. 2, (2016), 71-95.

 ChiMoKoJa – Histories of China, Mongolia, Korea and Japan

Saturday, August 27, 2016

Information and Influence Campaign in north Korea When, Why, and How?

Here is a draft paper I am working on.

We have successfully deterred the restart of hostilities for more than six decades.  However, as Sir Lawrence Freedman says "Deterrence works, until it doesn't."  We can deter a rational decision maker from going to war.  But we cannot deter regime collapse and we cannot deter a decision maker from opting for war in the face of regime collapse.  This is one reason why we need a supplemental strategy and a new approach.

Information and Influence Campaign in north Korea
When, Why, and How?
David S. Maxwell

"Deterrence works, until it doesn’t”  Sir Lawrence Freedman

“There are only two ways to approach planning for the collapse of North Korea: to be ill-prepared or to be really ill-prepared” Dr. Kurt Campbell 1 May 1998

Sun Tzu - "never assume the enemy will not attack, make yourself invincible." -  The Collapse Corollary: Never assume the KFR will not collapse - prepare now.

Strategic Planning and Preparation Paralysis arises from a fear of what comes next - the War/Collapse Paradox

The Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia and the world are faced with five “big” scenarios that are going to have to be addressed in the future.  The “Big Five” are:

1. War
2. Collapse of the Kim Family Regime
3. Human Rights Atrocities/Crimes Against Humanity
4. Nuclear weapons and missile development and proliferation
5. Korean Unification

I will state my bias up front.  I believe that the only way that we will see an end to the north Korean nuclear program and the crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family Regime is through unification and the establishment of a non-nuclear, economically vibrant peninsula with a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people resulting in a United Republic of Korea (UROK) a name which the Center for New American Security proposed last December.

The challenge for the Republic of Korea (ROK), the US, the regional powers, and the international community is how to get from our current state to unification as the path most likely will involve some level of conflict ranging from war to civil conflict and potentially horrendous human suffering in the northern part of Korea.  The ROK and its friends and allies face an extraordinary security challenge because of the “Big Five.”  War, regime collapse, and the nuclear and missile programs pose an existential threat.  It is a moral imperative to work to relieve the suffering of the Korean people who live in the worst human rights conditions in history.  While unification is the desired and necessary “end state,” achieving it will be costly in treasure for sure and blood as well as there is likely no path to unification without some form of conflict, it may only be a question of scale.

There are four paths to unification.  The ideal is peaceful unification that comes as a result of respect, reconciliation, reform, rebuilding, and reunification (R5).  Although this is unlikely to occur because of the nature of the Kim Family Regime and its zero sum view of unification (whichever government unifies the peninsula means the other government will be eliminated).  Perhaps counterintuitive, this is the most difficult path to plan for because it requires complete integration of the political and economic systems, the security forces, and a complete overhaul of the infrastructure in the northern part of Korea.  However, planning for this most difficult case will apply to any of the other paths to unification.  People often are confounded by planning for unification because they want to know in what way it will be achieved: through peace, war, or regime collapse.  Peaceful unification planning requires the broadest range of planning that encompasses every aspect of the Korea on the north and south side of the DMZ.  The second path is through war.  Of course we do not want to experience a war but that will be decided by Kim Jong-un and his decision making process.  Again it is counterintuitive that after a war might be the easiest path to unification because the north Korean military will be defeated, the economy completely destroyed, and the political system will no longer exist, and the vast majority of the infrastructure will be irreparable and require rebuilding from the ground up.  The third path is arguably the most complex because regime collapse will lead to some form of conflict which could include war.  Collapse is unlikely to be a benign event resulting in absorption though if it does planning for peaceful unification will have proven to be wise.

There is a fourth path that may be considered an outlier.  That is one in which some form of internal resistance is able to gain power, eliminate the Kim Family Regime and if prepared and properly support by the ROK, it might seek peaceful unification in order to ensure survival of the Korean people living in the north. 

These paths and the contingencies that we can expect are complex and require detailed planning and preparation.  Although they are related each must be planned for in detail and each requires different forces and resources and concepts of operation. 

While these varied scenarios require complex planning and preparation, there is one action that is common to all scenarios: a comprehensive information campaign that will provide the intellectual and emotional foundation for unification.  While planning is important, the ROK and its friends, partners, and allies can begin preparing now for unification through an integrated, long term, focused, and fully resourced information campaign plan.

The ROK and US Presidents need to decide to execute a holistic information campaign to support unification. Before we discuss an information campaign I would like to outline the eight major contingencies, guiding principles and seven steps of preparation for strategy and campaign planning.

Big 8 Contingencies
1. Provocations to gain political and economic concessions.
2. nK Attack – execution of the nK campaign plan to reunify the peninsula by force.
3. Civil War/Chaos/Anarchy.
4. Refugee crisis.
5. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster relief.
6. WMD, loss of control – seize and secure operations.
7. Resistance to foreign intervention (e.g., insurgency).
8. How to handle the nKPA during regime collapse short of war.

Guiding Principles:
1.  Defense of ROK is paramount – all decisions must support defense of ROK against the full range of threats from the north.
2.  Must provide options to national policy makers – early decisions required to overcome the law of physics: time, distance, and space.  Must have the right capabilities in the right place for employment at the right time.
3.  Transparency is critical when dealing with the 5 Parties and international community.  Must have decisive and consistent themes and messages.  This is not the situation in which we should employ deception.  Only through clear articulation of alliance priorities and intent can we have a chance of reducing the chance of conflict due to misunderstanding of intentions.  Examples for consideration (and these should be consistently expressed by the ROK/US Alliance):
            A.  Defense and Security of ROK is the number one priority.
            B. UNC and ROK/US CFC have the following priorities:
                        (1) Security of nuclear weapons, followed by chemical weapons and then the biological program
                        (2) Security, health, and welfare of the Korean people living in the north.
                        (3) UNC and ROK/US CFC desire to work with all interested nations to bring security, stability and long term peace to the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.
                        (4) UNC and ROK/US CFC will support the establishment of a unified peninsula – a United Republic of Korea.

7 Steps of Preparation
1. Shared vision – a new durable political arrangement**
2. Roles & Missions  - national responsibilities for action
3. Organizational Framework for operations  (UNC/ROK/US CFC, independent operations, other)
4. Command, Control, Coordination, and liaison processes & methods (including information sharing)
5. Concept of operations for deploying required forces (air, land, and sea)
6. Resource commitment – which countries provide what
7. And most important  - information/psychological preparation of the environment – a sophisticated and aggressive information and influence activities campaign focused on the population to prepare then for the future (e.g., unification) and the "2d tier leadership" by using a combination of coercion and co-option.  – An "exit strategy" for 2d tier military leaders and party members outside the core elite.

Such a campaign must be tasked at the highest level of government, i.e.,  at the national security council level, with sustained oversight of execution.  From a ROK/US Alliance perspective a combined strategic working group should be established with permanent members from the ROK and US NSCs with the brief to prepare for unification.  This working group will be responsible for providing the unification policy and strategy to executing organizations who will develop methods to transmit themes and messages that will begin the process of educating the Korean people in the north as to how unification will occur and what roles they will play.

The first step is for the ROK to develop comprehensive unification policies and plans that can be made public.  Of course there will be classified intelligence and security plans but there must be a comprehensive unification plan laid out to gain public support and to use to educate the Korean people living in both the north and the South.

Outlining such policies and plans is beyond the scope of this paper.  What follows are suggestions for specific themes, messages, and actions for an information campaign.

Before a comprehensive plan can be developed and executed a comprehensive survey of all organizations operating in the information and influence sphere should be conducted to determine all the actors, their objectives, and their strategy and methods of operation.  We may learn that there are non-governmental organizations working in this space than government resources.   Although NGOs will never allow their work to be orchestrated by governments it is important for government planners to know and understand the NGOs and capitalize on the work they are doing.  Once the information sphere is mapped planners can begin development of a holistic strategy, a campaign plan and lines of effort.

In addition, a complete assessment of the human situation in the north must be conducted.  Experts must analyze the culture, the economy, the ideology, the methods of control, the political system, and every aspect of the north in order to discern effective and ineffective messages.  Such analysis might reveal that it is counter-productive to directly attack Kim Jong-un or Juche ideology or other ideas that are ingrained into the psyche of the north Korean people.

The overall objective of an information campaign should be on preparing the population and second tier leadership for unification. We can assume that the core elite of the Kim Family Regime will not support a United Republic of Korea.  However, there are senior officials outside the core elite who will wield varying levels of power that can be exploited during the unification process.  They must be coerced or co-opted to support unification.  One policy the ROK could implement would be to state that if a military commander restrains the military forces under his command from attacking the ROK then he would have a place in a Unified Republic of Korea.  The transmission of such a message over time may influence a senior military leader to take the right action in time of crisis.  This must be an established ROK policy and there must be a sustained transmission of the message in various forms through various media so that it has the chance of achieving the desired effect.

While many will want to provide information to foment resistance among the population, any overt attempt to do so will likely undercut the legitimacy of the information campaign.   Attempts to directly incite political and popular resistance are likely to be met with resistance to such messages.  The long term objective of unification must be kept in the forefront of all planning efforts.  In fact all officials should keep in mind a guiding strategic question as they plan and implement an information campaign.  How will this policy, strategy, plan, or program support unification? 

However, if resistance is observed among the Korean people livening in the north actions can be taken to directly support them with information.  However, this must be done in a very careful way so as not to undercut the legitimacy of the resistance or to cause it to be compromised when it is especially vulnerable in the nascent stages.  If over zealous planners latch on to potential resistance and use it to attempt to achieve information objectives it could result in the resistance being put down.

The following are some recommendations that a combined NSC strategy group should consider in directing the execution of an information campaign to support unification.

1.  Adopt simple concepts that are meaningful to the Korean people and support the idea of unification.  One has been used throughout this paper and that is eliminating the use of “north Koreans” and instead always talk about the Korean people living in the north and South.  Use of this will reinforce the idea of one Korean people. 

Rather than attacking Juche and the Kim Family regime emphasize the sameness of the Korean people.  A retired ROK navy Admiral once told me about tow miracles in Korea.  Of course I know the Miracle on the Han – the story of the ROK rising from the ashes of the Korean War going from a major aid recipient to a major donor nation and developing economically, politically, militarily, and culturally in a great middle power with one of the most vibrant populations and successful economies in the world.  However, he told me the second miracle is the Miracle on the Taedong which is the river than runs through Pyongyang just as the Han runs through Seoul.  He said the miracle is that for more than six decades the Korean people living in the north have suffered under one of the most despotic and harsh regimes surviving war and human rights atrocities that are among the worst in history.  They went straight from the Japanese Colonial period where the Korean culture and identify were threatened by the occupiers and went straight into the oppression of the Kim Family Regime in a political and economics system that enslaved them.   The miracle is that they have survived.  This is a message that should form the basis of one Korean people.  If given the opportunity Korean will thrive.  The Koreans living in the South had the same history up until World War II yet after the Korean War they took the independent spirit of Koreans, turn entrepreneurial, and thrived.  When Koreans are faced with hardship they survive.  As different as the people on the north and South sides appear to be their inner “Koreaness” remains common to both and this should be part of all messaging. 

2.  Focus on human rights violation by the Kim Family Regime.  This is important for three purposes.  First it is the morally right thing to do.  Second, the Korean people living in the north must be made aware that the Koreans in the South and the international community are concerned for their welfare.  Third, this undermines the legitimacy of the regime.  Over focusing on the north’s nuclear program enhances regime legitimacy.   Along with human rights, inform those in the north that they will be able to establish truth and reconciliation processes and play leading roles in reconciliation and the administration of justice.

3.  Focus on educating the people on the unification process.  The Korean people will have to quickly learn about such things as property ownership and market economics.  It is important to build on the gray market economy that has arisen after the failure of the regime’s public distribution system.  Although still overseen by the regime and the people are vulnerable to crackdowns at any time by the security services any free market activity will have positive long term benefits. 

4.  Emphasize local leaders in the north during the unification process.  Since the Koreans in the north have been so thoroughly indoctrinated with the notion that all outsiders, to include those from the South, are bad, the ROK must emphasize that local leadership vice imported external leadership will play the leading role in the unification process.  The ROK should abandon plans to use people who used to live in the north as new province governors and instead plan to provide advisers to help local leaders guide the unification process.

5.  Identify and support key communicators in the north.  With more and more contact between people in the north and South particularly with the defector community, the focus should be on identifying Koreans who have leadership potential and are able to influence their fellow Koreans.  Support through covert funding, communications, equipment, and when feasible training to help them develop organizations that will be vital to support unification.  If these organizations develop the means to resist the regime then that could lead to the outlier path to unification although it is admittedly a long shot.  Perhaps even more valuable than resistance to the current regime would be organizations that are supported by the South that would NOT resist unification.  One of the biggest challenges facing the ROK will be resistance among the 2d tier leaders, the military and the Korean people in the north to unification.  The “Guerrilla Ethos” as described by Adrian Buzo will be a threat to unification.  If potential resistance can be co-opted before war, collapse, or peaceful unification the effects of resistance could be mitigated.  If there is war of regime collapse we should not assume that any outsiders to include those Koreans from the South will be welcomed with open arms.  Certainly many may welcome the outside relief but there is likely to be a significant amount of resistance and this could make the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan pale in comparison.  Therefore, the more Koreans in the north who can be influenced and educated about the benefits of the unification process the less resistance we will encounter.

The above five planning recommendations are not all inclusive.  They are provided merely as points of departure to consider in developing an information plan.  The question is how do we operationalize the right themes and messages?

Defector organizations are sending balloons with DVDs and thumb drives, leaflets and even cash to the north.  They are using creative means to get information into the north.  NGOs and government organizations do conduct broadcasts into the north with limited access due to north Korean jamming and restrictions on receivers.  Although currently the north’s access to the Internet is severely restricted by the regime and the cell phone infrastructure is not connected to the outside the internet and cell phones will eventually penetrate throughout the north and we should plan now for that. 

All of these actions can have some effect and we know from anecdotal reporting that the Koreans in the north know much more about the outside world.  Some of the anecdotes we hear from defectors is that South Korean dramas are very popular in the north.  Such popularity could be exploited to help educate the Korean people about unification by developing a concept of “Unification Dramas.”

The ROK should “operationalize” its unification plans and policies by providing information to the Korean entertainment industry and in return Korean companies can develop dramas that will illustrate the unification process.  The storylines would be almost infinite.  Such dramas could focus on what happens during regime collapse and follow a village or province from the time of the collapse of the Kim Family Regime through liberation, to land ownership to political integration and economic development.  Dramas about the north Korean military could show what happens to commanders and units who do not attack the South and what happens to those who do.  Other dramas could illustrate resistance organizations and how they can prepare for unification.  These stories could be filled with human interest stories from tragedy to love stories to include relationships between Koreans from the South and north.  By understanding the ROK government plans and policies for unification entertainment companies can craft dramas that are entertain and profitable while subtly and indirectly influencing the Korean people living in the north.

Korean unification is one of the most complex strategic problems in Northeast Asia.  It is the only outcome that will ensure elimination of the north Korean nuclear program and the threat to the South, the region and the international community.  It is also the only way to end the human rights atrocities being perpetrated against the Korean people living in the north.  We experience strategic planning paralysis because of the complex scenarios and contingencies we are likely to face.  However, regardless of the scenario or contingency the one concrete effort we can take is to focus on an information campaign to prepare the Korean people living in the north for unification.  This must be a comprehensive, fully resourced, and sustained campaign plan.  It must be based on ROK unification plans and policies.   The guiding principle for policy makers and strategist in the ROK and US is how does this policy, strategy, plan, or program support achievement of Korean unification?