If it is north Korea how should we respond? Besides all the obvious ones (e.g., sanctions, statements of condemnation) here are a few for consideration.There are four major diplomatic, economic/financial and military actions that can be taken to have a significant impact on Kim Jong-un's authority and the ability to keep the regime together.One is to focus on the financial aspects of the regime's illicit activities and reprise the Banco Delta Asia actions but on a scale even greater than the $25 million. Of course this would take Chinese agreement and tacit support.The diplomatic action would be to persuade countries around the world where north Korean diplomats are conducting illicit activities to enforce their national laws and at a minimum declare them PNG and have them sent home or on the more extreme end incarcerate them for breaking national laws as they participate in drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and other illicit activities while hiding behind their diplomatic immunity. The specific focus would be on Department 39. Effective intelligence sharing and law enforcement activities could cripple the regime's ability to gain hard currency which could cause a loss of support among the regime elite and bring the regime to its knees.The third action would be an aggressive enforcement of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Diplomatically the US should request all contributors to PSI to conduct enforcement actions together with the US to interdict the north's proliferation activities around the world which would also cut off the flow of hard currency to the regime as well as military material flowing to other bad actors.The fourth would be to conduct cyber operations against north Korean commercial interests (illicit and front organizations) around the world (again this would reduce regime access to hard currency and resources). Or as an alternative directly target the nKPA's hacking units and try to shut down their access to the internet (if that is possible).These are some specific ways to get at the center of power of the regime and possibly influence regime behavior by creating a very painful existence for the regime and its elite.
Wednesday, December 17, 2014
Sunday, December 14, 2014
As we consider Unconventional Warfare, Political Warfare, and Counter-Unconventional Warfare in the 21st Century and look to operate in the strategic gap between peace and conflict or between diplomacy and war, this book looks at the US experience in the Cold War and provides many lessons for consideration. Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Terrorism, 1940-1990 by Michael McClintock, Pantheon Books, March 31, 1992.
PART ONE: Cold War and Special Warfare
- Interest, Intervention, and Containment
- Toward a Doctrine of Special Warfare
- The Legacy of World War II
- Toward a New Counterinsurgency: Philippines, Laos, and Vietnam
- Waging Unconventional Warfare: Guatemala, the Congo, and the Cubans
PART TWO: Camelot and Counterinsurgency
- The Kennedy Crusade
- The Apparatus in the Field
- Edward Geary Lansdale and the New Counterinsurgency
- The Heart of Doctrine
- Counterterror and Counterorganization
- Tactical Totalitarianism
- The Problem of Ideology
PART THREE: Special Warfare and Low-lntensity Conflict
- The Carter Years
- Morning in America and the Special Warfare Revival
- The Special Forces' Buildup
- The Middle East Calls the Shots
- Watching the Neighbors: Low-Intensity Conflict in Central America
- An Un-American Way of War
© 2002 Michael McClintock
Saturday, December 13, 2014
I outline what I think are the four broad paths to Korean unification at this link. http://icks.org/
Is Peaceful Korean Unification Possible?
After decades of dreaming of a reunified North and South Korea, many South Koreans, young people in particular, now see unification as irrelevant or too costly. This gives urgency to the effort by Park Geun-hye, president of South Korea, to boost domestic support for unification and lay the practical groundwork to make it happen.
The dream is at once quixotic and prudent. On the one hand, it is hard to imagine the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, voluntarily giving up his family-run dictatorship. On the other, recent Middle East history has shown how quickly borders can shift and regimes can crumble. If that should happen on the Korean Peninsula, leaders there and elsewhere in the region must be prepared to manage a hugely complex and disruptive transition.
As part of her initiative, Ms. Park has named a 50-member commission — including private-sector experts, government officials and the heads of six state-run research institutes — to develop a vision of what a unified Korea might look like, as well as road maps for getting there. In the best case, peaceful reunification would reunite long-separated families, free 24 million North Koreans from dictatorship, enhance regional security and eliminate North Korea’s nuclear threat. Unfortunately, other outcomes seem more likely: the continuation of the present hostile impasse, or, conceivably, the violent collapse of the North Korean regime.
A key player in the peninsula’s future will be China, the North’s chief political patron and the source of its fuel and food imports. Fearful of chaos on its border, China has long refused to exert the kind of pressure that would force radical change in Pyongyang. But China has recently shown more willingness to listen to South Korea on the unification issue, a good sign since Beijing’s cooperation in managing that process would be essential.
Ms. Park is the latest South Korean president to push for unification. But as the differences between the countries harden and younger generations of South Koreans lose interest, she may also be the last.
Friday, December 12, 2014
Wednesday, December 10, 2014
I will have to leave it to the cyber experts but it seems like we are trying hard to make this not attributable to north Korea. Seems like north Korea is the state with the capability and intent to execute such an attack. Are we more worried about the north's response to such accusations? Are we worried that too much pressure is being put on the Kim Family Regime as the Commission of Inquiry's Human Rights report goes to the UN Security Council? Given the north Korean threats of late the north, if the north did execute this cyber attack and we have evidence of it and decide to downplay it or refute the allegations against it, the regime will likely interpret our action as justifying their threats and blackmail diplomacy. All they have to do is make threats of nuclear and missile tests and the US will back down to try to prevent a provocation. We may be reinforcing bad behavior. Could a policy decision be trumping reality and common sense? And to speculate even further is the Administration really thinking about re-engaging with the 6 party talks; e.g., if there is a violent provocation it would force a further delay in US engagement (yet this cyber attack should be seen as a severe provocation that in this instance cost some treasure to a corporation, what if the next cyber attack targets infrastructure and causes casualties? Yes , I am probably exaggerating and can be called chicken little and the boy who cried wolf. But if north Korea did this and we are deliberately trying to not attribute this to the north we may as well be paying ransom to kidnappers because the regime will not stop with this one when they assess they can get away with more.
FBI official: 'No attribution' to N. Korea in Sony hack probe
An entrance gate to Sony Pictures Entertainment at the Sony Pictures lot is pictured in Culver City, Calif., in this April 14, 2013 file photo. REUTERS/Fred Prouser/Files
WASHINGTON - A senior FBI official said on Tuesday that the agency has not confirmed widely held suspicions that North Korea is behind the unprecedented cyber attack on Sony's Hollywood studio.
"There is no attribution to North Korea at this point," Joe Demarest, assistant director with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's cyber division, said while speaking on a panel at a cybersecurity conference sponsored by Bloomberg Government.
The comment casts at least some doubt on the widely held belief that North Korea has definitely been determined to be the culprit in the massive attack on the Hollywood studio, leaving room for other theories to emerge.
Cybersecurity researchers who have analyzed the malicious software used in the attack say that technical indicators suggest North Korean hackers launched the attack. People close to separate investigations being conducted by Sony and the government have told Reuters that North Korea is a principal suspect, yet a North Korean diplomat has denied that his nation is involved.
Demarest also said that there has been no confirmation of government involvement to date, though he did not elaborate.
FBI spokesman Joshua Campbell said the agency is continuing its search for the attackers but had no additional information.
Demarest's brief comments were the first public remarks by a senior FBI official about its investigation into the unprecedented attack on U.S. soil. Hackers stole vast quantities of data, then used malicious software to wipe data on computers, shutting down much of the Sony Corp unit's network for more than a week.
FBI representatives plan to meet with Sony employees on Wednesday to provide them training in cybersecurity practices, Campbell said.
"As part of our commitment to helping private industry protect against the threat posed by malicious cyber criminals, the FBI routinely provides briefings on cyber security awareness," he said.
Saturday, December 6, 2014
An unfortunate outcome of course. We should keep in mind the title of James Kyle's book on Operation Eagle Claw - "The Guts to Try."
The only good that could have come out of this would have been for the administration to establish a new precedent and not name the unit conducting the operation and discussing the details - lot of operational information - launched from the USS Makin Island - CV-22 infil 10km from the objective, team compromised on the last 100 yards - surgeon aboard CV-22, etc. We really should stop releasing the names of units and operational information. Especially the names of units should not be released after the warnings on the military use of social media because of potential terrorist targeting.