The North Korea Problem

This except from the conclusion sums up both the policy and strategic dilemma we face and is an illustration of the "tyranny of proximity" (the advantage the north has with its capability to fire on Seoul):

But this policy of patiently waiting for verifiable changes in DPRK policies possesses several risks. First, it provides North Koreans with additional time to refine their nuclear and missile programs. Second, the current stalemate is inherently unstable. The DPRK could at any time resume testing its nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, likely to confirm and support its quest for a reliable nuclear deterrent but also possibly out of simple frustration about being ignored. The strategy also risks allowing a minor incident to escalate through the ROK’s “proactive deterrence” policy, which calls for responding immediately and disproportionately to any DPRK military provocations to deter further aggression. 

The worst scenario would see the DPRK leadership, thinking that their nuclear and missile arsenals would protect them by deterring potential counterattacks, launching another provocation only to trigger the massive and prompt response posited in the new ROK strategy. The DPRK might respond by detonating a nuclear device in order to shock the ROK and its foreign allies into de-escalating the crisis. Or it might simply bombard Seoul and its environs with the enormous number of artillery systems that the DPRK has amassed in the border region.

But regardless of the above scenario, if the north conducts another provocation along the lines of P-Y Do it is imperative for the ROK respond immediately at the "point of provocation" with decisive tactical military force.  By "winning" the tactical engagement with a decisive response the ROK can actually prevent escalation.  A slow decision making process leading to a slow response or a decision to strike deeper targets or those not directly tied to the actual provocation is what risks potential escalation.  Tactical readiness of ROK forces that can provide an immediate and decisive response is the key to preventing escalation.

V/R

Dave

The North Korea Problem

December 16, 2012

By Richard Weitz

Pyongyang has successfully tested a long-range rocket. What may happen next -- including missiles someday armed with nuclear warheads -- could make matters worse.

After announcing that its rocket was facing technical difficultiesthat might delay its impending test, North Korea surprised the international community by abruptly launching a three-stage rocket on Wednesday morning local time. Even more surprising than the timing was that the “Unha” (the Korean word for “galaxy”) rocket appears to have successfully placed the Kwangmyongsong-3 (“Shining Star-3”) satellite into orbit, albeit there are reports that it is encountering difficulties.

But space enthusiasts have nothing to cheer. Under the guise of developing a space launch vehicle, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is pursuing an intercontinental-range missile (ICBM) capability that would allow it reach targets as far away as California and Alaska.  Long-range rockets designed as space delivery vehicles and long-range ballistic missiles intended to carry warheads use similar engines, boosters, and other technologies, though a satellite can be made lighter than a nuclear warhead, which needs a dense heat shield to withstand the high temperatures encountered in reentering the earth’s atmosphere. The Kwangmyongsong-3 weighs an estimated 100 kilograms, whereas a typical nuclear warhead weighs ten times more, though a good designer can make them far smaller and therefore lighter.  

(Continued at the link below)

http://thediplomat.com/2012/12/16/the-north-korea-problem-from-bad-to-worse/?all=true