But I think we need a little more history written about 2001-2002 from people who were there. I want to read about the proposals that were made by those on the ground and that were not accepted by those not on the ground. Then there can be an analysis of what might have been (though of course this is all water under the bridge but it would be worth knowing that if people on the ground early on had been listened to, things might have turned out differently - though in the end tactical actions are no substitute for poor or no strategy).
V/R
Dave
VSO/ALP
Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local Defense
Journal Article | December 27, 2012 - 5:30am
In August 2010, President Karzai authorized the establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program by presidential decree (p. 68). The program falls under the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and aims to train local Afghans in rural areas to defend their communities against insurgents and other illegally-armed groups. The program was designed, and is currently funded and supported by, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in a broader initiative to enhance security and stability at the village level through the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program.
The ALP was originally intended to be a temporary program, targeting a 10,000-man end strength by 2013. On December 11, 2011, U.S. Special Operations Commander Admiral William H. McRaven announced his intention to extend the program beyond its original mandate, and to exceed 30,000 ALP members by 2015. The announcement signaled an important shift in strategic thinking about the way forward in Afghanistan; one geared toward empowering Afghans to take over the reins of local defense, rather than relying on an undetermined level of national and coalition force presence to secure the countryside. However, the notion of expanding the ALP program has been met with skepticism from numerous media, think tank, and NGO (pp. 40-45) reports that cite allegations of human rights abuse, corruption, and poorly-trained ALP recruits among the rationales for calls to disband the initiative altogether. Such competing perspectives of the value and efficacy of the ALP program underscore the need to examine the program in greater detail.
To this aim, this paper aspires to describe the VSO/ALP program within the Afghan context. The first section provides a brief history of post 9/11 local defense initiatives in Afghanistan and identifies how VSO/ALP differs from past programs. The second section highlights some of the challenges facing the initiative and discusses some recent successes that suggest that the program has the potential to emerge as a viable and enduring solution to security and stability in Afghanistan.
Local Defense Initiatives (2001-current)
(Continued at the link below)
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