From Unha to Shahab: Contextualizing Notions of Iranian Help with North Korea’s Missile Launch

An interesting excerpt:

The relationship between North Korea and Iran is often a triangular one. China has played a major role since at least the Iran-Iraq War, when Beijing profitedfrom the conflict by selling arms to third parties such as the DPRK, which would then resell said weaponry to Tehran. China, by design or not, has played a role in the connections between the DPRK and the Islamic Republic. In 1986, China first attempted to shift blame the DPRK for sales of its HY-2 antiship cruise missiles to the Islamic Republic. Though some of the cruise missiles may have come from the DPRK, U.S. intelligence agencies were supposedly able to show that China had also been a supplier for the Islamic Republic.

V/R

Dave

From Unha to Shahab: Contextualizing Notions of Iranian Help with North Korea’s Missile Launch

Technical style drawing of Unha-3 / Shahab – 6 via Michael Vick at Global Security.org

http://sinonk.com/2013/01/02/unha-shahab-iran-nk-missile/

Jende Huang applies his arms control expertise toward wondering how North Korea went so quickly from “failure to achieve orbit” in April to a surprise December launch one cold morning when the rest of the world thought that technical difficulties once again reigned at the launch pad in North Pyong’an province. Every time North Korea adds another charge to their international rap sheet, there are allegations (and usually some hard proof) that they had outside help. Here at SinoNK, we have examined previous similar allegations by deconstructing tropes, managing information fall out and even looked atdisarming dreams.

Unha-3 (은하 3 호/银河 3号) looks, functions and shares many characteristics of Iran’s Shahab-6. However, all rockets battle the same challenges when trying to puncture the atmosphere and slip the surly bonds of gravity so there are always going to be certain characteristics in common.

Technological questions matter, but so too to questions of theocracy and cultural understanding. If Iranians really are in DPRK, or DPRK scientists in Iran, what kinds of Status of Forces Agreements are there in case one side breaks a law? How are religious issues reconciled? How is halal food procured in North Korea? And so many more questions; enough for another article. In any event, the case of how the North Koreans pulled off this amazing technological feat in less time than one human gestational cycle may also have indirect and intersecting pathways. –Roger Cavazos, Coordinator

From Unha to Shahab: Contextualizing Notions of Iranian Help with North Korea’s Missile Launch

by Jende Huang

With the successful 12 December 2012 launch of the DPRK’s Unha-3 rocket—and its apparently non-transmitting satellite—into orbit, renewed focus has turned to how the DPRK was able to so quickly learn from their failed 5 April 2012 launch attempt. Many are turning to Iranian involvement as a possible explanation. In early December, Arms Control Wonk noted a Japanese media report stating that the Iranians had agreed to put four weapons experts in a military facility to assist the North Koreans. According to the news report, the DPRK and the Islamic Republic had signed Memorandums of Understanding(MOU) in September, and signed a separate agreement to place the Iranian personnel in North Korea.

The Iranian-DPRK Triumvirate | This MOU, and the notion that Iranian technicians might be stationed in the DPRK, is best interpreted as part of a much larger pattern of activity between the two countries that stretch back decades. The DPRK and Iran had established diplomatic ties in 1973, but the rise to power of the Aytollah and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) appears to have solidified the already blossoming relationship between the two nations.

(Continued at the link below)

http://sinonk.com/2013/01/02/unha-shahab-iran-nk-missile/