Japan to order shooting down of N. Korea missile: reports

A possible scenario:  north Korea launches a test missile similar to the 1998 test and the track is a path through  or perhaps just near Japanese airspace  and Japan shoots it down.  North Korea complains that their test missile was attacked without reason and claims self defense and then launches a missile with a warhead against a Japanese mainland target which hopefully Japan would be successful in shooting down as well.  But of course the question would be: what comes next?

V/R

Dave

Japan to order shooting down of N. Korea missile: reports

BY AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

POSTED ON 04/07/2013 3:03 PM  | UPDATED 04/07/2013 3:03 PM

HTTP://WWW.RAPPLER.COM/WORLD/25694-JAPAN-TO-ORDER-SHOOTING-DOWN-OF-N-KOREA-MISSILE-REPORTS

TOKYO, Japan - Japan will order its armed forces to shoot down any North Korean missile headed towards its territory, press reports said Sunday as Pyongyang was reportedly readying to fire one.

The order may be issued by Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera on Sunday, April 7, or "in a day or two," the Yomiuri newspaper and the Jiji news agency reported.

The order would not be made public so as not to alarm the public, the Kyodo news agency quoted government sources as saying.

Under the order, Aegis destroyers equipped with sea-based interceptor missiles would be deployed in the Sea of Japan so they could intercept a North Korean missile if it appeared likely to land in Japanese territory, Kyodo said.

According to South Korean media, North Korea has loaded two intermediate-range missiles on mobile launchers and hidden them near its east coast, fuelling fear of an imminent launch that may further escalate tensions.

North Korea also also gave an evacuation advisory to some foreign embassies in the capital Pyongyang, warning it could not guarantee their safety after April 10 if a conflict broke out, although most appeared to be staying put.

(Continued at the link below)

HTTP://WWW.RAPPLER.COM/WORLD/25694-JAPAN-TO-ORDER-SHOOTING-DOWN-OF-N-KOREA-MISSILE-REPORTS

How Satellite Pics Are Used to Learn About N.Korea

I think some in our intelligence community rightly might take exception to this statement.

38 North, a website operated by the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, had warned of an impending rocket launch based on analysis of commercial satellite images before even the U.S. and South Korean intelligence agencies found out about it.

I think the more accurate statement might be that 38 North "found out about it" before the US and South Korean intelligence agencies publicly disclosed knowledge of it.  But important open source analysis is being done by 38 North and NGOs such as HRNK.

V/R

Dave

How Satellite Pics Are Used to Learn About N.Korea

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/02/27/2013022701180.html

Think tanks and NGOs in the U.S. have increasingly been monitoring North Korea through satellite pictures. Since access to the isolated communist country is tightly restricted, commercial satellite pictures are virtually the only way to obtain hard data.

This satellite photo shows a North Korean military parade in Pyongyang marking the 100th birthday of regime founder Kim Il-sung on April 15, 2012. /AP

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, an NGO based in the U.S., analyzed pictures taken by a commercial satellite image provider which it said confirms that a notorious labor camp in Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province has been expanded.

The size of the camp increased 72 percent from 580 sq. m to 1,000 sq. m over recent years, according to the group, suggesting that the camp, which earlier had an estimated 5,000 inmates, now houses a lot more people. The number of guard posts also doubled compared to 2003.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/02/27/2013022701180.html

Pundits Call for Fresh N.Korea Strategy

Whether fresh or not, I would just like to see a strategy. Just as a reminder these are the priorities for Korea in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance:

Furthermore, we will maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula by effectively working with
allies and other regional states to deter and defend against provocation from North Korea,
which is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program

There is a lot more to deter and defend against than just provocation and the north's active pursuit of a nuclear weapons program.  And we should recall the 2009 Joint Vision Statement of the Presidents of Korea and the US.  While I often quote the first sentence as the strategic end state toward which policies and a strategy would work, the sentence that follows it is what everyone focuses on, namely the nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to a lesser extent human rights.  

Through our Alliance we aim to build a better future for all people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy. We will work together to achieve the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as ballistic missile programs, and to promote respect for the fundamental human rights of the North Korean people.

Perhaps now we can realize that our policies and actions that focus almost exclusively on the north's nuclear program have not and will not work.  We need to understand that the north's nuclear program is only a "symptom" of the larger problem: i.e.,  all problems stem from the nature of the Kim Family Regime.  As counterintuitive as it may be perhaps this 3d nuclear test is the wake-up call that will provoke the ROK/US Alliance strategists to develop a long term comprehensive strategy to deal with north Korea and its Kim Family Regime.

V/R

Dave

Pundits Call for Fresh N.Korea Strategy

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/02/13/2013021301083.html

Pundits were aflutter Tuesday when North Korea pushed ahead with its third nuclear test on Tuesday despite strong warnings from the international community. The North is now rapidly on its way to becoming a nuclear-armed country, they noted, oblivious to even to strictures from China, on which it relies for energy and food.

Some pundits believe the latest test has changed the entire game plan for South Korea and its allies. "North Korea conducted a nuclear test just two months after it launched a long-range rocket capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, demonstrating its capacity of firing an intercontinental ballistic missile," said Choi Kang at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. "We need to acknowledge that we can no longer control North Korean aggression with existing strategies and must come up with more realistic measures."

North Korea's nukes would be outside the control of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty just like India's and Pakistan's. "By conducting its latest nuclear test, North Korea has made it clear that it intends to overcome any obstacle to becoming a nuclear power," said Shin Beom-chul at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/02/13/2013021301083.html

U.S., China in deal on U.N. North Korea rebuke; Russia to back it

I will believe it when I see it.  According to the article no new sanctions but only the expansion of the current ones.  As I have said, too little, too late.  Rather than another resolution I would rather the Chinese cooperate on cutting off the flow of hard currency to the north.  It would be good to execute another Banco Delta Asia operation as that would have an impact on Kim Jong-un's decision making.

V/R
Dave

U.S., China in deal on U.N. North Korea rebuke; Russia to back it

3:26pm EST

By Louis Charbonneau

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/us-korea-north-un-idUSBRE90H16W20130118

UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - The United States and China have struck a tentative deal on a draft U.N. Security Council resolution condemning North Korea for its December rocket launch, U.N. diplomats said on Friday, and Russia predicted it would be approved by the council.

The resolution would not impose new sanctions, but would call for expanding existing U.N. sanctions measures against Pyongyang, the envoys said on condition of anonymity. They added that China's support for the move would be a significant diplomatic blow to Pyongyang.

The 15-nation council could adopt the compromise resolution next week, they said.

Russian U.N. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin confirmed the diplomats' comments in remarks quoted by the Russian state-run RIA Novosti news agency, saying that adoption was likely early next week.

"I expect we will support it," RIA quoted Churkin as saying. "I don't expect that the U.N. Security Council members will have any serious problems (with the resolution)."

"Our position is that the North Korean rocket launch is a violation of a U.N. Security Council resolution, so the council should react," he said.

South Korean Ambassador Kim Sook told reporters that the draft might take a few days to reach the council.

The United States had wanted to punish North Korea with a U.N. Security Council resolution that imposed new sanctions against Pyongyang, but Beijing rejected that option.

Beijing had wanted the council to merely issue a statement calling for the council's North Korea sanctions committee to expand the existing U.N. blacklists, diplomats said.

The tentative deal, they said, was that Washington would forgo the idea of immediate new sanctions, while Beijing would accept the idea of a resolution instead of a statement, which makes the rebuke more forceful.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/us-korea-north-un-idUSBRE90H16W20130118

From Unha to Shahab: Contextualizing Notions of Iranian Help with North Korea’s Missile Launch

An interesting excerpt:

The relationship between North Korea and Iran is often a triangular one. China has played a major role since at least the Iran-Iraq War, when Beijing profitedfrom the conflict by selling arms to third parties such as the DPRK, which would then resell said weaponry to Tehran. China, by design or not, has played a role in the connections between the DPRK and the Islamic Republic. In 1986, China first attempted to shift blame the DPRK for sales of its HY-2 antiship cruise missiles to the Islamic Republic. Though some of the cruise missiles may have come from the DPRK, U.S. intelligence agencies were supposedly able to show that China had also been a supplier for the Islamic Republic.

V/R

Dave

From Unha to Shahab: Contextualizing Notions of Iranian Help with North Korea’s Missile Launch

Technical style drawing of Unha-3 / Shahab – 6 via Michael Vick at Global Security.org

http://sinonk.com/2013/01/02/unha-shahab-iran-nk-missile/

Jende Huang applies his arms control expertise toward wondering how North Korea went so quickly from “failure to achieve orbit” in April to a surprise December launch one cold morning when the rest of the world thought that technical difficulties once again reigned at the launch pad in North Pyong’an province. Every time North Korea adds another charge to their international rap sheet, there are allegations (and usually some hard proof) that they had outside help. Here at SinoNK, we have examined previous similar allegations by deconstructing tropes, managing information fall out and even looked atdisarming dreams.

Unha-3 (은하 3 호/银河 3号) looks, functions and shares many characteristics of Iran’s Shahab-6. However, all rockets battle the same challenges when trying to puncture the atmosphere and slip the surly bonds of gravity so there are always going to be certain characteristics in common.

Technological questions matter, but so too to questions of theocracy and cultural understanding. If Iranians really are in DPRK, or DPRK scientists in Iran, what kinds of Status of Forces Agreements are there in case one side breaks a law? How are religious issues reconciled? How is halal food procured in North Korea? And so many more questions; enough for another article. In any event, the case of how the North Koreans pulled off this amazing technological feat in less time than one human gestational cycle may also have indirect and intersecting pathways. –Roger Cavazos, Coordinator

From Unha to Shahab: Contextualizing Notions of Iranian Help with North Korea’s Missile Launch

by Jende Huang

With the successful 12 December 2012 launch of the DPRK’s Unha-3 rocket—and its apparently non-transmitting satellite—into orbit, renewed focus has turned to how the DPRK was able to so quickly learn from their failed 5 April 2012 launch attempt. Many are turning to Iranian involvement as a possible explanation. In early December, Arms Control Wonk noted a Japanese media report stating that the Iranians had agreed to put four weapons experts in a military facility to assist the North Koreans. According to the news report, the DPRK and the Islamic Republic had signed Memorandums of Understanding(MOU) in September, and signed a separate agreement to place the Iranian personnel in North Korea.

The Iranian-DPRK Triumvirate | This MOU, and the notion that Iranian technicians might be stationed in the DPRK, is best interpreted as part of a much larger pattern of activity between the two countries that stretch back decades. The DPRK and Iran had established diplomatic ties in 1973, but the rise to power of the Aytollah and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) appears to have solidified the already blossoming relationship between the two nations.

(Continued at the link below)

http://sinonk.com/2013/01/02/unha-shahab-iran-nk-missile/

U.S. official: North Korea likely deceived U.S., allies before launching rocket

Yes, we did get deceived. North Korea depends on denial and deception as a fundamental method of operations.  But we should did get deceived this time.

We should realize that the north understands our surveillance methods and that if we can see something it is because they want us to see it.  They wanted us to see that they were dismantling the missile. It is also likely that they had a good idea of how we would react to their statements and what our ISR could observe and they provided the picture and the information that would confirm our analysis bias (e.g., the north continues to have technical problems so it was very plausible that a delay was needed) 

But why the deception?  To reduce our ability to observe and gain data from the launch?  To "protect" the launch? – did fear the US or Japan would try to shoot it down? (note I did not include the ROK as a threat to the north's missile).  Did they simply just want to embarrass us?

But again we must understand that the north will use denial and deception in everything it does and we must look for it and be prepared to deal with it.

V/R
Dave

December 27th, 2012

05:28 PM ET

U.S. official: North Korea likely deceived U.S., allies before launching rocket

By Barbara Starr

http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/27/u-s-official-north-korea-likely-deceived-u-s-allies-before-launching-rocket/?hpt=hp_t3

North Korea likely engaged in a deliberate campaign of deception before a December 12 long-range missile launch, catching the United States and its Asian allies "off guard," according to a U.S. official with direct knowledge of analysis of the incident conducted by U.S. military and intelligence agencies.

The official told CNN that American and Japanese military ships and missile defenses were fully operational and protecting land, sea and airspace on December 12, but that the launch was a surprise when it actually happened.

"We had our dukes up, operationally, but we were caught off guard," the official said.

"The clues point to a concerted effort to deceive us," the official said. The analysis was ordered in the wake of the launch to determine what exactly happened and how much the U.S. intelligence knew at the time.

The official said one conclusion was that while missile defenses can fully protect against a North Korean attack, the North Koreans have shown they can counter U.S. measures to gather intelligence about what they are up to.

"Look, they know when our satellites are passing overhead," the official said. It's believed the North Koreans essentially manipulated the launch so U.S. intelligence satellites simply would not be overhead and able to see what was happening.

The most likely scenario, the official said, was that North Korea wasn't telling the truth when it announced several days before the launch that there were technical problems with the missile.

According to the official, the intelligence analysis found that:

(Continued at the link below)

http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/27/u-s-official-north-korea-likely-deceived-u-s-allies-before-launching-rocket/?hpt=hp_t3

The prospect of a North Korean ICBM

I think the regime's intentions have always been clear on wanting this capability but I am glad that it is not longer in question for some. That is one very positive thing that come from last week's launch – there should be no questions as the regime's priorities and intent.

Hugh White is right to question the impact on the concept of extended deterrence now.  However, I think he is wrong in his assessment that an ICBM is a bad investment for Pyongyang.  He is correct from a Western viewpoint but from the regime's viewpoint it provides multiple opportunities for a return on investment from its belief that it provides a deterrence and defense capability, that it is instrumental in multiple ways to support its blackmail diplomacy based on provocations to gain political and economic concessions, it supports domestic propaganda, it enhances credibility with the regime elite, and proliferation brings hard currency.  From the regime's calculus it is a damn good investment.

V/R

Dave

The prospect of a North Korean ICBM

By Hugh White - 17 December 2012 11:39AM

As usual, most commentary on North Korea's rocket launch last week focuses on the politics and diplomacy of Pyongyang's delinquency. But it is worth exploring the strategic implications more specifically. These are significant, but not straightforward.

The apparently successful launch of a three-stage rocket makes it rather clearer than before that North Korea has both the capacity and the intention to build an intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM). It is now prudent to expect that in perhaps as little as a decade, if North Korea survives in its present form, it may well have an operational ICBM capability. This would give Pyongyang the capacity to deliver a small number of probably relatively low-yield nuclear warheads onto American cities. 

The key question, therefore, is what this would mean for strategic affairs in Northeast Asia over coming decades.

The first thing to say is what it doesn't mean. It does not mean North Korea has any rational options to initiate an unprovoked nuclear attack on the US, because that would certainly produce a totally devastating US response. Nor does it make much if any difference to Pyongyang's capacity to deter a nuclear, or regime-threatening conventional, attack on North Korea. Its existing medium-range nuclear delivery options bring plenty of high-value targets within range of its nuclear forces today, so Pyongyang already has the capacity to deter military action which potential attackers would fear might cross Pyongyang's red lines.

But an ICBM capability would undermine the deterrent umbrella extended by the US to its Asian allies.

Extended deterrence depends on the credibility (to both the adversary and the ally) of US threats to respond to any nuclear attack on the ally with a US nuclear attack on the adversary. Such credibility depends a great deal on whether the adversary has the capacity to hit back at the US. As long as North Korea has no credible capacity to target America itself, a US retaliatory strike on the North carries relatively low risks for the US itself. 

But if the North can hit back, the costs for the US go up dramatically, and the credibility of the US threat goes down. In a crisis, everyone will be asking whether stopping North Korea doing whatever it wants to do is important enough to America to risk a nuclear attack on Honolulu or LA.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/12/17/The-prospect-of-a-North-Korean-ICBM.aspx

What North Korea's rocket launch tells us about Iran's role

I think some will say that this report has the Iranian-north Korean cooperative relationship reversed.  But we should be very clear that regardless of who is helping whom and who is developing the technology there is definitely Iranian-north Korean cooperation and collaboration.

V/R

Dave

What North Korea's rocket launch tells us about Iran's role

Tom Gjelten with NPR | December 14th, 2012, 11:30am

http://www.scpr.org/news/2012/12/14/35257/what-north-koreas-rocket-launch-tells-us-about-ira/

U.S. officials say the satellite put into orbit by North Korea's rocket launch this week is wobbling, but that doesn't necessarily mean the launch itself was unsuccessful.

U.S. analysts say the North Koreans' main goal was not to put a satellite into orbit, but just to see all three stages of their rocket work, to show that the rocket could carry its payload a long distance. That it did. In the last test, in April, the first rocket stages worked as designed, but the third stage failed. Charles Vick, a missile expert at GlobalSecurity.org, credits the North Koreans with learning from their past mistakes.

"They have demonstrated not merely an ability to identify problems, but to resolve those problems and get the total system to work together, all three stages working as a single launch vehicle," he said.

So, the North Koreans are making progress.

Iran's Role

Next question: What, if anything, did this launch mean for Iran?

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.scpr.org/news/2012/12/14/35257/what-north-koreas-rocket-launch-tells-us-about-ira/

Experts: North Korea missile launch should spark pact

There will be a ROK-Japanese alliance when pigs fly.  I am surprised by this excerpt:

Michael Mazza, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, says the countries should unite to toughen sanctions as well as conduct extensive military exercises and share intelligence. 

They could also form a military pact guaranteeing each would come to each other's defense, a move that may get the attention and cooperation of China, North Korea's backer and chief ally.

While that is a perfectly logical proposal from a US perspective, just think about the domestic political problems a Korean president would have by signing a pact that would call for guaranteeing the defense of Japan.  Unfortunately domestic politics (and the impact of culture and history that just cannot be removed from the Korean psyche) trump national security.

V/R
Dave

Experts: North Korea missile launch should spark pact

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/12/13/us-options-after-north-korea-launch/1764241/

• With second launch this year, North Koreans have picked up the pace on weapons work
• Past sanctions and diplomacy have not altered the North's nuclear trajectory
• Should prompt a defense pact between the USA, Japan and South Korea

5:00PM EST December 13. 2012 - Japan and South Korea must form a military alliance and bolster missile-defense systems to counter the nuclear threat from North Korea, which on Wednesday launched its first three-stage rocket, experts say.

Michael Mazza, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, says the countries should unite to toughen sanctions as well as conduct extensive military exercises and share intelligence.

They could also form a military pact guaranteeing each would come to each other's defense, a move that may get the attention and cooperation of China, North Korea's backer and chief ally.

"It would be a message to North Korea, 'You can't play one off the other. You're dealing with a united front,'" he said.

The initial reaction from the USA, South Korea and Japan was to condemn the launch of the Unha-3 rocket, which the North Korean regime said was to put a peaceful satellite into orbit. But the USA said the launch was a test of long-range missile technology that in theory could deliver an attack against the USA.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/12/13/us-options-after-north-korea-launch/1764241/

How Obama Got North Korea Wrong

A pretty provocative assessment by Michael Mazza.  Of course if his recommended course of action had been executed it would have also deprived Iran of a missile capability.

President Obama made a serious error when he failed to order that the rocket launched in April be shot down — if not destroyed on the launch pad, admittedly a highly provocative act. Had he done so, he would have deprived the North Koreans of the lessons it learned from that missile’s failure and we might not be where we are today. In fact, had the president established a new precedent — the United States simply does not allow North Korea to conduct unfettered missile tests — he might have quickly made such tests a thing of the past.
…
If President Obama was mistaken in not adopting a more proactive approach in April, he was negligent in failing to do so this time around. New circumstances in North Korea virtually screamed for a novel approach in responding to the missile launch.

But the bottom line mistake that has been made by ROK, US and international policymakers and strategists is the flawed strategic assumption that the Kim Family Regime can or would change its behavior in response to carrots and sticks. We must understand north Korea as it really exists.  Michael makes some good comments about regime legitimacy and the importance of a successful missile launch to its myth of international strength.  

But I just wonder if the north did not execute a deception operation to guard against its missile from being shot down.  Did the extension of the launch window and the announcement of technical problems cause a reduction in readiness?  It has been reported that after the launch window was extended the ROK military alert status was reduced.  I doubt this would have affected US military readiness and of course we do not know if there was even a plan and authorization to shoot it down at all,  but again I just wonder if the north was executing a planned deception operation as a precaution.  We should know the deception is a key aspect of north Korean military strategy and operations.

VR

Dave

How Obama Got North Korea Wrong

By Michael Mazza

December 13, 2012

http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/12/13/how-obama-got-north-korea-wrong/

Just hours ago North Korea successfully tested what many consider to be intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology, underscoring the failure of two decades of U.S. policy. How Washington expected to halt Pyongyang’s missile development program without taking serious steps to do so remains a mystery. While ineffective policies date back to the previous Bush and Clinton administrations, the current administration bears its fair share of the blame.

President Obama made a serious error when he failed to order that the rocket launched in April be shot down — if not destroyed on the launch pad, admittedly a highly provocative act. Had he done so, he would have deprived the North Koreans of the lessons it learned from that missile’s failure and we might not be where we are today. In fact, had the president established a new precedent — the United States simply does not allow North Korea to conduct unfettered missile tests — he might have quickly made such tests a thing of the past.

But for whatever reason, when Pyongyang launched its rocket in April, the president chose to stick to an old playbook full of defensive formations that has never given North Korea pause. The State Department unwittingly admitted last week that the old approach — stern warnings before a launch, stepped up sanctions after — has all but failed. As spokesman Mark Toner explained at last Wednesday’s press briefing, “there’s always ways to toughen enforcement of sanctions. They can always be tweaked or modified so that there’s better enforcement of existing sanctions.”

In other words, existing sanctions are porous and have failed to stop North Korea from developing its missile technology. Mr. Toner was right to assert that present sanctions enforcement can be strengthened, but there is little reason to believe that China, Kim’s favorite enabler, will acquiesce in any effort to do so. Indeed, following Wednesday’s demonstration that North Korea is closer to acquiring the capacity to strike the United States, Beijing merely expressed “regret” that the test had occurred and appealed for “calm” from all sides, while making it a point to emphasize that “the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has the right to make peaceful use of outer space,” albeit a restricted one in light of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

If President Obama was mistaken in not adopting a more proactive approach in April, he was negligent in failing to do so this time around. New circumstances in North Korea virtually screamed for a novel approach in responding to the missile launch.

First, the Kim regime may actually be less stable today than it was back in April. Top military officers have continued to be purged since the summer, and, according to some estimates, Kim has now purged at least 31 top military officers since taking control of the country after the death of his father a year ago. While that suggests Kim has sufficient authority over personnel choices, it also suggests he may be struggling to find lieutenants he can trust. Reports that Kim goes nowhere without conspicuous armed guards and that he has stepped up repression of the hungry masses point to an insecure leader uncertain of his own safety.

Second, this launch marked the shortest-ever interval between North Korean long-range missile tests. The four previous tests occurred in 1998, 2006, 2009, and April 2012. The decision to conduct a second test this year may have indicated that the young Kim is desperate to consolidate his power over the military. But the stepped-up testing frequency also suggests Pyongyang is actually serious about developing a functioning intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), instead of simply using occasional tests to extract aid concessions from the international community. That the North’s rocket scientists apparently determined the causes of the April test’s failure and corrected those flaws should tell us that they are not to be underestimated.

Shooting the missile down would have undermined what is perhaps the regime’s greatest myth — that it is powerful and feared abroad. Now, that myth has been reinforced. Intercepting the rocket in flight might also have sown dissension within the ruling clique, as military and party leaders could not have helped but notice that the United States had never taken such bold action when Kim Jong-il was alive. But in sticking to the old script, Washington passed up an opportunity to destabilize the regime, a necessity if America’s ultimate goal is to reunify the Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s democratic leadership.

(Continued at this link)

http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/12/13/how-obama-got-north-korea-wrong/

The Kim Family Regime Cannot and Will Not Change

The Kim Family Regime Cannot and Will Not Change

By Dave Maxwell

There should be no doubt now about north Korea, the Kim Family Regime and the intentions of Kim Jong-un.

Those who hoped for change with the succession of the western educated Kim Jong-un have had their hopes dashed.

The ballistic missile launch that occurred on 12/12/12 confirms what many have suspected for a long time:

The north Korean nation-state under the rule of the Kim Family Regime is incapable of being a responsible member of the international community.

We really need to understand this fundamental problem and the conundrum with which we are faced on the Korean Peninsula.

There is a wide range of speculation about why the north conducted this ballistic missile test:  some examples include regime legitimacy, solidification of Kim Jong-un’s leadership, domestic propaganda – live up to the goal of 2012 as the year of strength and prosperity; support to Iranian missile development and for international sales and proliferation; influence on the ROK and Japanese elections; to somehow gain political and economic concessions and support to its blackmail diplomacy; deterrence and national security and finally because it was required to move the missile program to the next level of development.

Regardless of the reasons the regime is likely to face international condemnation and perhaps increased UN sanctions if that is possible.  It will likely lose the opportunity for a near term return to any type of Sunshine Policy or “Trustpolitik” with the ROK depending on who is elected as the next ROK President.  Efforts to support the Proliferation Security Initiative will be increased.  International aid could very well dry up.

But regardless of the rationale for this test launch one thing should be absolutely clear about the regime:

            It has prioritized its missile (and likely its nuclear) program over all else. 

This is a clear indication that regime survival remains its vital national interest and the leadership believes that it must have a strong military capability for deterrence and security even at the expense of the welfare of its people.  It has no intention of returning to the Six Party Talks, making economic or political reforms to improve the life of its people, or doing anything whatsoever to give even the appearance of being a reasonably responsible member of the international community.

North Korea apologists can blame the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, or the Kim, Roh and Lee administrations but each has made offers and overtures, tried to reach out and give a hand up, and provided aid (food and energy) and the only thing to show for their efforts are missile and nuclear tests, continued provocations, and a failed economy and the suffering of 23 million people on a scale likely never before seen in history.

The Kim Family Regime will not change.  It cannot change because to do so means that its legitimacy will be undercut and this will lead to regime collapse.

Although north Korea is a Communist state, it is in name only and cannot be compared to China or the former Soviet Union. North Korea, being more homogenous than either of those countries, has been able to both indoctrinate and suppress its people to degrees that Stalin and Mao could only dream.  Kim Jong-un cannot allow for any relief of this suppression nor can he allow economic reform in any way because it will lead to political pressures under which the regime will not survive.  It is the design of the system itself which is focused only on the perpetuation of the Kim Family Regime that prevents it from changing.  

As we move forward from 12/12/12 policy makers and strategists must understand the situation and the Kim Family Regime  as it really exists and not as they would wish it to be.  For the last two decades a lot of wishful thinking about north Korea has formed the basis for strategic assumptions.

Today the Chinese news agency Xinhua made the following comment:

“In international relations, as in life, the best way to make an enemy of a country is to treat it like one. This rule of thumb is also true with making friends.”

We have seen how the Kim Family Regime has acted despite the Agreed Framework, the ROK Sunshine Policy and the Six Party Talks.  Perhaps the Xinhua ideal applies in life and in international relations. I do not think it applies to north Korea.  Therefore we must plan accordingly.

Commentary on north Korean Capabiltiies

Some very important comments from Dr. Bechtol regarding north Korean capabilities:

There is, already, some semi-accurate information being disseminated - just hours after the (what appears to be) successful test launch of the Taepo Dong 2.  How very fascinating!

I heard a CNN reporter early this morning talk about how the North Koreans may still face issues with "re-entry technology."

Not exactly.

They already have the the technology.  I guess he does not realize that one needs such technology for other ballistic missiles (successfully tested by the NK's), such as the Musudan.

He also stated that accuracy will "be a problem."

Again, not exactly.

Not likely to be a concern for the North Koreans.  If they hit Oahu (something they have just proven they can do), they have an 75% chance of hitting a population center (3/4 of the island is heavily populated now).  Even if the missile is only equipped with a chemical warhead - and not a nuke - they would be able to create casualties (mostly civilians) in the thousands.

This is a big deal.

There are three major issues that the North Koreans must overcome (of course not widely discussed in reporting yet - but hopefully soon):

- Launching the missile by avoiding a preemptive strike.  A difficult measure right now for the North Koreans, since everything is out in the open and the Americans could destroy the missile well before it is launched.  The North Koreans will need to either develop a mobile launcher and/or site, or a covert site where we cannot detect launch preparations ahead time (as we can now).

-  Placing a nuclear payload on the missile.  It is unclear if the North Koreans have stablized the platform to the point that they could place a nuclear warhead on the missile.  In fact, it is unlikely that they have been able to do so yet.  Their big challenge now will be fitting a nuclear warhead to a Taepo Dong 2.  If they are (so far) unable to do so, the likely alternative is a chemical payload - a much easier proposition. 

-  Proliferating the missile to Iran.  The Taepo Dong 2 is so big that it would likely have to be sent to Iran in stages if transported by aircraft.  Because of PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) it will be difficult to fly aircraft to Iran without having to pass through the airspace of nations who would force it down.  One alternative of course, is to fly through China and then south to Iran.  The question is, will the Chinese allow this (as they did with HEU parts and No Dong missiles going back and forth to Pakistan during the 1990s until 2002)?  Alternatively, the North Koreans could use maritime means to transport the missiles to Iran.  This has proven to be dicey at times as well (largely, again, because of PSI), but the North Koreans have proven to be quite clever in their use of tactics, techniques, and procedures for getting around international counter-proliferation.
Best Wishes,
Bruce

N. Korea shouts 'look at me' with rocket

Excerpt:

The curious timing of North Korea's Unha-3 rocket launch, outside of its usual spring-summer launch window, raises questions about the political motivations behind Pyongyang's attention-grabbing move.
…
Taking heed of launch and the usual caveats about reading North Korean government behavior, we can discern three motives underlying Pyongyang's latest move: international bargaining, domestic legitimacy and strategic leverage.

Or the test was necessary to advance their program.

V/R

Dave

N. Korea shouts 'look at me' with rocket

By Benjamin Habib, Special to CNN

updated 9:18 PM EST, Tue December 11, 2012

http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/opinion/north-korea-rocket-timing/

North Korean technicians check the Unha-3 rocket at Tangachai -ri space center on April 8, 2012.

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

• Report: North Korea launches long-range rocket Wednesday
• Habib: Timing of North Korean regime rocket launch is out of ordinary
• Habib: Successful launch would be sterling commemoration of Kim Jong Il's death

Editor's note: Benjamin Habib is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia. Habib is an internationally published scholar with research and teaching interests including the political economy of North Korea's nuclear program, East Asian security, international politics of climate change.

Melbourne (CNN) -- The curious timing of North Korea's Unha-3 rocket launch, outside of its usual spring-summer launch window, raises questions about the political motivations behind Pyongyang's attention-grabbing move.

On Wednesday morning, just before 10 a.m. local time, South Korean news agency Yonhap and the Japanese government reported that the rocket had been launched. It came just days after North Korea extended the launch window due to technical issues.

Read more: North Korea rocket breaks up in flight

Taking heed of launch and the usual caveats about reading North Korean government behavior, we can discern three motives underlying Pyongyang's latest move: international bargaining, domestic legitimacy and strategic leverage.

This year, Northeast Asia is experiencing a unique convergence of elections and leadership transitions in the United States, China, Japan and South Korea. This follows the change of leadership in North Korea in December 2011.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/opinion/north-korea-rocket-timing/

North Koreans Launch Rocket in Defiant Act

The north Koreans are doing a nice job of playing the international community.  They had everyone thinking they had technical difficulties, extended the launch window, and then launched.  It will be interesting to see the data and if it was successful in putting a satellite in space.  If they are successful then they potential have an intercontinental ballistic missile capability that can potential carry a nuclear warhead (though there is still more work to do on that capability)

V/R
Dave

December 11, 2012

North Koreans Launch Rocket in Defiant Act

By CHOE SANG-HUN

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/world/asia/north-korea-launches-rocket-defying-likely-sanctions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&pagewanted=print

SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea defied the likelihood of more sanctions by the United Nations Security Council to launch a rocket on Wednesday, demonstrating that the government of its new leader, Kim Jong-un, was pressing ahead to master the technology needed to deliver a nuclear warhead on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Unha-3, or Galaxy-3, rocket blasted off from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Tongchang-ri on North Korea’s western coast near China on Wednesday morning, a spokesman for South Korea’s Defense Ministry said.

“That’s all we can confirm right now,” the spokesman said, speaking on the condition of anonymity until his government made an official announcement.

It was not immediately known whether the rocket had succeeded in fulfilling North Korea’s stated goal of putting a satellite into orbit.

North Korea has said its three-stage rocket would carry an earth-observation satellite named Kwangmyongsong-3, or Shining Star-3, and that it was exercising its right to peaceful activity in space.

But Washington and its allies have said they think that North Korea’s rocket program has less to do with putting a satellite into orbit than with developing a delivery vehicle for a nuclear warhead and trying to turn the country into a more urgent threat that Washington must deal with by offering diplomatic and economic concessions.

While North Korea may still have other technological thresholds to cross, like the miniaturizing of its nuclear weapons, a successful launching of a satellite into orbit would suggest that the country had overcome a major hurdle in its efforts to demonstrate its potential of mating its growing nuclear weapons program with intercontinental ballistic missile capability.

A failure would be an embarrassment for the young Mr. Kim, who has been struggling to establish himself a new North Korean leader hailed at home and feared abroad. Whether the launching was successful or not, Mr. Kim, by attempting a second rocket launching in the first year of his rule despite international condemnations, was dashing hopes among some analysts that he might soften North Korea’s confrontational stance. Instead, he was seen as intent on bolstering his father’s main legacy of nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs to justify his own hereditary rule.

Only Monday, the Korean government told the rest of the world that it had found a technical problem with its rocket and needed until Dec. 29 to fix it and carry out the launch. Outside analysts have been speculating what might be going on behind the dark cover North Korean engineers had put up around the launching pad to prevent United States spy satellites from watching.

“A successful test would raise as a top-line national security issue for the Obama administration the specter of a direct North Korean threat to the U.S. homeland,” Victor D. Cha and Ellen Kim wrote in a recent analysis posted on the Web site of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Mr. Kim hardly needed another failure. The North’s first rocket launched since he took over after the death of his father a year ago broke apart shortly after blastoff in April, forcing his government to admit to the failure in front of the foreign journalists it had invited to watch the test. This time, North Korea did not invite foreign journalists. Nor did the government announce the launching plan to its domestic audience.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/world/asia/north-korea-launches-rocket-defying-likely-sanctions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&pagewanted=print

North Korea replacing rocket stage, likely to launch as planned: report

I am sure north Korea is enjoying all the speculation.  Although I mention this somewhat with tongue in cheek,  the north likes to have an impact on the holidays.  I wonder if they will string this along for some time.

V/R

Dave

North Korea replacing rocket stage, likely to launch as planned: report

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-korea-north-rocketbre8b9021-20121209,0,3588325.story

By Jack Kim and Ju-min Park

Reuters

8:17 p.m. CST, December 9, 2012

SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea is moving a new rocket component to its missile test site to replace a faulty stage that has delayed its planned launch of a long range rocket and is likely to still go ahead with a launch in December, a South Korean newspaper reported on Monday.

North Korea's state media announced at the weekend that the launch of the rocket carrying what it called a scientific satellite may have to be delayed without disclosing the reasons.

A trailer carrying a new third stage rocket was seen by satellite on Saturday being moved from a missile plant in Pyongyang to the Tongchang-ri missile launch site, South Korea's Chosun Ilbo newspaper quoted a government source as saying.

"From the reading of satellite images, it's definite the North delayed the missile launch because of problems with the third stage rocket," the source was quoted as saying.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-korea-north-rocketbre8b9021-20121209,0,3588325.story

China concerned over North Korea missile

Excerpt:

John Delury, a professor at Yonsei University, said a successful satellite launch this month could provide a platform for better relations with the next South Korean administration by getting the provocative act "out of the way" before February. 

"It's a box they have to tick," said Mr Delury. 

But South Korea’s next president could face tense discussions with Washington if Seoul attempts a radical overhaul of policy towards North Korea.

In addition, I would add that the north is also helping Iran to develop long range missiles:

Washington believes North Korea’s satellite programme is aimed at developing long-range rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads to the US mainland.

V/R

Dave

Last updated: December 2, 2012 11:53 am

China concerned over North Korea missile

By Simon Mundy in Seoul

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/52c1563a-3c1d-11e2-b45f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Du1JeDjZ

China has expressed “deep concern” at North Korea’s plan to launch a ballistic missile in December, but called on all sides to “keep a cool head”.

North Korea on Saturday said it would attempt to put a satellite into orbit between December 10 and 22. The announcement further dashed hopes that Kim Jong-eun might improve relations with the US and South Korea.

KCNA, the North Korean state media agency, stressed the “peaceful” nature of the launch, saying Pyongyang would “fully comply with relevant international regulations”.

The announcement drew immediate condemnation from the US, South Korea and Japan. North Korea is banned from using ballistic missile technology under a UN Security Council resolution imposed after it conducted a nuclear test in 2006.

Washington believes North Korea’s satellite programme is aimed at developing long-range rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads to the US mainland.

The latest move will add to disillusionment in the Obama administration, which hoped to eliminate the North Korean threat through diplomacy.

In February, the two countries signed a deal in which North Korea pledged to suspend its nuclear and missile programmes in exchange for food aid.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/52c1563a-3c1d-11e2-b45f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Du1JeDjZ

Iran stations defense staff at North Korean site

Perhaps it is for commercial reasons that the north is going to make another test rocket launch.  I am sure Iran really wants this capability.  We should be assessing the collaboration between north Korea and Iran to determine potential capabilities.  But I think if they do conduct the test then the relations with Iran (probably because of the cash) will be deemed more important than the outcome of the ROK Presidential election.

V/R

Dave

Iran stations defense staff at North Korean site

By REUTERS

12/02/2012 05:42

http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=294244

Japanese news agency: Iran stationed staff in N. Korea in an effort to strengthen cooperation in missile, nuclear development.

TOKYO - Iran has stationed defense staff in North Korea since late October apparently to strengthen cooperation in missile and nuclear development, Japan's Kyodo News Agency reported on Sunday, citing a Western diplomatic source.

The report came as North Korea said on Saturday it would carry out its second rocket launch of 2012 between December 10 and December 22, near the first anniversary of the death of young leader Kim Jong-un's father.

The Iranian mission, Kyodo said, is made up of four experts from Iran's Ministry of Defense and firms close to it. Citing the source, it said they were staying at a military facility 85 km (53 miles) from the North Korean border with China.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=294244