In a perfect world the ICG's 6 points below would be what everyone should be striving for. I agree the solution has to be political.
Whether or not the U.S. chooses to launch a military offensive, its responsibility should be to try to optimize chances of a diplomatic breakthrough. This requires a two-fold effort lacking to date: developing a realistic compromise political offer as well as genuinely reaching out to both Russia and Iran in a manner capable of eliciting their interest - rather than investing in a prolonged conflict that has a seemingly bottomless capacity to escalate.
But like so much criticism of US foreign policy, why is it assumed that the US is not genuinely reaching out to both Russia and Iran? What about Russia and Iran's ability to reach out genuinely? Have their efforts been any more genuine that the US?
One of the things about this entire crisis that is interesting to me is that despite all the criticism of the United States (even in the statement below regarding US evidence be suspect based on Iraqi WMD in 2003) countries around the world and groups like the ICG still seek if not demand US leadership in crisis. All of the burden of responsibility for Syria and getting out of the current situation seems to rest on the shoulders of the United States: not the regional organizations, not Russia or China or Saudi Arabia, not the UN, but only the United States. Every other country or organization seems to abdicate leadership and responsibility and all turn to the US to "do something."
I wonder, given recent history (or despite recent history) of US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the war on terrorism, NSA surveillance and everything else that the US is criticized for, if regardless of what we do in the Syrian situation (strike or not strike, with or without Congressional approval, etc) will the international community still come to the US for leadership in the next crisis? I think based on the history of the last couple of decades that they will. Despite intense political criticism of US decisions (or lack of decisions) and actions (or non-actions) the international community will keep coming to the US though I think the primary reason my be that there is no other country or organization in the international community who is willing to step up.
Which leads me to the thought that in the Congressional debate that will soon take place, that perhaps we should not be worrying so much about "credibility" and reputation and get down to really working out substantive policies and a strategy with balance and coherency amongst ends, ways, and means.
V/R
Dave
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INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW STATEMENT
Syria Statement
Assuming the U.S. Congress authorises them, Washington (together with some allies) soon will launch military strikes against Syrian regime targets. If so, it will have taken such action for reasons largely divorced from the interests of the Syrian people. The administration has cited the need to punish, deter and prevent use of chemical weapons - a defensible goal, though Syrians have suffered from far deadlier mass atrocities during the course of the conflict without this prompting much collective action in their defence. The administration also refers to the need, given President Obama's asserted "redline" against use of chemical weapons, to protect Washington's credibility - again an understandable objective though unlikely to resonate much with Syrians. Quite apart from talk of outrage, deterrence and restoring U.S. credibility, the priority must be the welfare of the Syrian people. Whether or not military strikes are ordered, this only can be achieved through imposition of a sustained ceasefire and widely accepted political transition.
To precisely gauge in advance the impact of a U.S. military attack, regardless of its scope and of efforts to carefully calibrate it, by definition is a fool's errand. In a conflict that has settled into a deadly if familiar pattern - and in a region close to boiling point - it inevitably will introduce a powerful element of uncertainty. Consequences almost certainly will be unpredictable. Still, several observations can be made about what it might and might not do:
- A military attack will not, nor can it, be met with even minimal international consensus; in this sense, the attempt to come up with solid evidence of regime use of chemical weapons, however necessary, also is futile. Given the false pretenses that informed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and, since then, regional and international polarisation coupled with the dynamics of the Syrian conflict itself, proof put forward by the U.S. will be insufficient to sway disbelievers and skepticism will be widespread.
- It might discourage future use of chemical weapons by signaling even harsher punishment in the event of recidivism - an important achievement in and of itself. Should the regime find itself fighting for its survival, however, that consideration might not weigh heavily. Elements within the opposition also might be tempted to use such weapons and then blame the regime, precisely in order to provoke further U.S. intervention.
- It could trigger violent escalation within Syria as the regime might exact revenge on rebels and rebel-held areas, while the opposition seeks to seize the opportunity to make its own gains.
- Major regional or international escalation (such as retaliatory actions by the regime, Iran or Hizbollah, notably against Israel) is possible but probably not likely given the risks involved, though this could depend on the scope of the strikes.
- Military action, which the U.S. has stated will not aim at provoking the regime's collapse, might not even have an enduring effect on the balance of power on the ground. Indeed, the regime could register a propaganda victory, claiming it had stood fast against the U.S. and rallying domestic and regional opinion around an anti-Western, anti-imperialist mantra.
Ultimately, the principal question regarding a possible military strike is whether diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict can be reenergized in its aftermath. Smart money says they will not: in the wake of an attack they condemn as illegal and illegitimate, the regime and its allies arguably will not be in a mood to negotiate with the U.S. Carefully calibrating the strike to hurt enough to change their calculations but not enough to prompt retaliation or impede diplomacy is appealing in theory. In practice, it almost certainly is not feasible.
(Continued at the link below)
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