From the Elliott School at George Washington University. Download at the link below.
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Balancing Acts:
The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability
Robert G. Sutter, Michael E. Brown, and Timothy J. A. Adamson,
with Mike M. Mochizuki and Deepa Ollapally August 2013
Contents
Executive Summary
Origins and Evolution of the Rebalance
Elements of the Rebalance
Regional Responses to the Rebalance
Critiques and Rebuttals: The U.S. Policy Debate
Assessments, Recommendations, and Prospects for the Future
I. Chronology
II. Suggestions for Further Reading
III. Regional Responses
China’s Response to the U.S. Rebalance, Timothy J.A. Adamson
Japan’s Response to the U.S. Rebalance, Mike M. Mochizuki
India’s Response to the U.S. Rebalance, Deepa Ollapally
IV. Biographies of the Authors
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalance” in U.S. relations with the Asia-Pacific region. The paper analyzes the strategic rationale for this policy shift, the main elements of the new U.S. policy, regional responses to the new initiatives, and the prospects for U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific region.
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE REBALANCE
Beginning in the fall of 2011, the Obama administration has issued a series of announcements and taken a series of steps to expand and intensify the already significant role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Explicitly identifying the Asia-Pacific region as a geostrategic priority for the United States, the Obama administration is paying a higher level of attention to the region across a wide range of issue areas. This represents a significant shift in U.S. policy.
However, the story of the rebalance is not a story of U.S. disengagement and then re-engagement in Asia. Instead, it is a matter of emphasis and priority, building on an elaborate foundation of U.S.-Asia relations that was already in place. The United States has had powerful national interests in the Asia-Pacific region since World War II and was deeply engaged in the region – militarily, economically, and diplomatically – throughout the Cold War. The post-Cold War administrations of presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were actively engaged in Asia.
The Obama administration’s policy toward the Asia-Pacific region has evolved over time and has gone through two distinct phases. When the policy was first rolled out in 2011-12, much of the emphasis was placed on military initiatives in the region. China disapproved of these initiatives, and Beijing took steps to demonstrate its power in maritime territorial disputes with U.S. allies. The Obama administration adjusted its approach in late 2012, playing down the significance of military initiatives, emphasizing economic and diplomatic elements, and calling for closer U.S. engagement with China.
STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR THE REBALANCE
Although commentators in China and some observers elsewhere have suggested that the rebalance was designed to contain China, this is a simplistic (and, in the case of China, partially contrived) reading of the new policy. U.S. policymakers are certainly aware of China’s economic rise and its growing military power, but the rebalance has been driven by a much broader set of strategic, economic, and political considerations. Following more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration has been trying to place more emphasis on Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia – parts of the world that will be of growing strategic and economic importance in the first half of the 21st century. In geostrategic terms, the rebalance is the Obama administration’s grand strategy for U.S. foreign policy.
The new U.S. policy is also based on the need – widely felt throughout most of the Asia-Pacific region – for strategic reassurance in the face of a rising and increasingly assertive China. The rebalance is also driven by a desire to reassure U.S. allies, friends, and other countries in the region that the United States has not been exhausted after a decade of war, that it has not been weakened by economic and political problems at home, and that it is not going to disengage from Asia-Pacific affairs.
The fundamental goals of the new U.S. policy are to broaden areas of cooperation beneficial to the United States with regional states and institutions; strengthen relations with American allies and partners, including great powers such as China and India as well as important regional powers such as Indonesia; and develop regional norms and rules compatible with the international security, economic, and political order long supported the United States.
ELEMENTS OF THE REBALANCE
The rebalance is a region-wide, multidimensional policy initiative. In regional terms, the shift includes a stronger emphasis on Southeast Asia and South Asia to complement traditionally strong American attention to Northeast Asia. In policy terms, the rebalance entails three sets of initiatives – security, economic, and diplomatic elements.
Changes in the U.S. military force structure are highly visible and have attracted much attention. The United States is shifting substantial military capacities from other theaters of operation to the Asia-Pacific and restructuring its regional security arrangements to generate more widely dispersed U.S. forces across the region. This has included high-profile new military deployments to Australia and the Philippines, and has been accompanied by expanded security arrangements with regional partners which emphasize greater military integration.
The rebalance also entails economic initiatives which aim to expand bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation between the United States and the region. Much of the discussion has focused on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed free-trade agreement that presently involves the United States and 11 other countries, but does not currently include China. The Obama administration has also begun a process which will increase foreign assistance to the Asia-Pacific region by seven percent.
Finally, the rebalance has seen a greatly intensified level of U.S. diplomatic engagement in the region. U.S. diplomatic activism has involved strengthening U.S. alliances; building deeper relationships with partners such as Singapore and India; deepening engagement with multilateral institutions; and managing the U.S.-China relationship.
REGIONAL RESPONSES TO THE REBALANCE
China has reacted at two levels to the Obama administration’s rebalancing of U.S.-Asia relations. At the official level, Chinese government representatives and official media have leveled measured criticism of the new U.S. policy, especially its military aspects. Official sources have also criticized U.S. diplomatic activism seen in Beijing as U.S. support for American allies and associates that have maritime and territorial disputes with China. In China’s burgeoning non-official media, criticism of the rebalance and the United States has been vociferous. Some commentators have alleged that the United States is engaged in a conspiracy to develop a Cold War-style “containment” of China.
Significantly, the run-up to the June 7-8, 2013 summit between President Obama and newly installed Chinese President Xi Jinping coincided with greater moderation in Chinese assessments, with Chinese officials telling foreign visitors there were “no fundamental, structural, or irreconcilable differences” between the two countries. Chinese military commanders have noted that, as the rebalance has evolved, Washington has been placing less emphasis on military initiatives and less emphasis on China as a focus of U.S. policy. While still wary of U.S. intentions, Chinese officials are now more positive toward U.S.-China military cooperation than at any time during the Obama administration.
Almost every other regional power in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia holds to two positions. First, most regional powers have been publicly or privately pleased to see the stronger U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. Second, regional powers are also keen to avoid having to choose between the United States and China. They very much want to have good relationships with both countries. A few regional powers, including Indonesia, Thailand (a formal U..S. ally), and Malaysia, have been “straddling the fence” – avoiding any public sign of tilting toward either the United States or China.
The Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore have been exceptions to the generally muted official reactions in the region; their support for a greater U.S. presence in the region has been quite explicit. It is not a coincidence that the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea are embroiled in territorial and security disputes. The Philippines and Japan have been engaged in protracted, intense disputes with China over maritime and territorial claims, with China exerting extraordinary coercive diplomatic, economic, and military power in both cases. A small and vulnerable city-state, Singapore has done more than many U.S. allies to embrace close strategic cooperation with what it sees as the stabilizing influence of the United States.
Australia and New Zealand also have warmly welcomed the U.S. rebalance, though both have taken pains to avoid upsetting China and their important economic ties with Beijing. Many other key countries in the region – including India, Vietnam and Burma – have taken significant steps to improve relations with the United States in recent years. Although governments in these countries have been careful to preserve their close economic ties with China and to avoid offending the region’s rising power, they have found it strategically reassuring to position themselves a few steps closer to the world’s preeminent superpower. In the face of a rising and increasingly assertive China, many countries in the Asia-Pacific region have drawn on classic balance-of-power thinking and “rebalanced” their positions closer to the non-threatening great power.
The many countries that have explicitly supported or quietly embraced the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific have probably been motivated more by concerns over China than by the intrinsic appeal of U.S. policies. Although many Chinese commentators accuse the United States of having a containment strategy, it might be more accurate to say that China is engaging in self-containing behavior. The regional votes are in, and they are generally favorable toward the new U.S. Policy.
ASSESSMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
A Continuing Strategic Imperative: Given the rise of Asia, the U.S. rebalance toward Asia is a reasonable reflection of changing geostrategic realities; it makes strategic sense. The rebalance has more promise for advancing U.S. interests, especially economic interests, than U.S. policy efforts in most other parts of the world. The Obama administration is committed to the rebalance, and this is likely to continue through the end of the president’s term in office. Given Asia’s continuing importance in the first half of the 21st century, U.S. grand strategy is likely to continue focusing on the Asia-Pacific region after President Obama leaves office. Nevertheless, the Obama administration continues to take care to reassure its European allies, Russia, and powers in the Middle East that the rebalance does not mean U.S disengagement from these regions. In particular, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has gone to extraordinary lengths to demonstrate deep American involvement in issues including Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, in moves welcomed by European and Middle Eastern powers.
An Affordable Policy: A near-term challenge for the Obama administration will be implementing the rebalance in the face of fiscal challenges, especially the budget cuts imposed by the sequestration process. Although the sequestration cuts are non-trivial, the Obama administration is making the rebalance a strategic priority, and it is likely to move ahead with successful implementation of its Asia-Pacific initiatives. U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel emphasized the U.S. commitment to the rebalance and the region in his June 1, 2013 address at a regional security gathering in Singapore: “The United States will continue to implement the rebalance and prioritize our posture, activities and investments in Asia-Pacific.” The rebalance also enjoys bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress, which is not the case in many other domestic and foreign policy areas. The U.S. capacity to implement the rebalance will be a key variable that merits continued attention.
The Summit: President Obama and President Xi Jinping held an informal summit in California on June 7-8, 2013. This meeting provided an opportunity for the two presidents to focus on this important great power relationship, which had drifted somewhat in 2012 due to the presidential election in the United States and the leadership transition in China. The summit was successful in meeting its limited aims. It appears that both presidents succeeded at the summit in conveying their concerns. However, it is much too early to tell if the summit represents a turning point in a relationship that has growing structural tensions.
A U.S. Balancing Act: Looking farther ahead, a strategic challenge for the Obama administration and its successors will be finding the right balance between two competing sets of regional interests. On the one hand, many countries in the region want strategic reassurance from the United States, and they favor a robust, multidimensional U.S. presence in the region. On the other hand, a robust U.S. presence will be seen by many in Beijing as a U.S.-led containment strategy directed at China. The challenge for the United States is to provide strategic reassurance to allies, friends, and other regional powers without provoking a strategic backlash from China.
A Regional Balancing Act: Most regional powers will continue to want good relations with both China and the United States, and this will entail a second set of balancing acts. China will continue to be vitally important to many Asia-Pacific countries economically. The United States will continue to be important economically and as a provider of strategic reassurance. If Beijing continues or intensifies its assertive policies on maritime and territorial disputes, many countries in the region are likely to favor even closer ties with the United States.
China’s Uncertain Balancing Act: Much will depend on Beijing. China’s military power will continue to grow in the years ahead, and this will inevitably make neighboring countries nervous. Chinese nationalism is also on the rise. China’s leadership has occasionally encouraged nationalistic impulses and it may do so again in the future, but it will find that rising, intensifying nationalism is very difficult to control. The trajectory of Chinese nationalism will be a key variable in the years ahead. China faces a delicate balancing act of its own: Beijing must maintain a robust rate of economic growth and it aspires to a greater role in Asia-Pacific affairs, but it must keep Chinese nationalism and Chinese regional actions from triggering an even stronger regional backlash.
Prospects for U.S.-China Relations and the Asia-Pacific Region: A happy ending is possible but not guaranteed. Rising powers do not always clash with established powers. Great powers can coexist peacefully, if their strategic aspirations are compatible. If Beijing’s regional aspirations are non-hegemonic, then the strategic prerequisites for Asia-Pacific coexistence will be in place. Through constructive engagement with their Chinese counterparts, American leaders can demonstrate the long-term benefits Beijing would enjoy from a Chinese regional posture that eschews egregious pressure, intimidation, and zero-sum competition and embraces existing world norms that hold promise for uninterrupted Chinese development.
To facilitate a positive outcome, it would be advisable to encourage China’s participation in the TPP. Economic interdependence is not a panacea, but it has conflict-dampening benefits. It would also be advisable to encourage China’s involvement in more military-to-military discussions and cooperative security endeavors. Transparency is not a panacea, but it too has conflict-dampening benefits. More generally, it will be advisable to encourage China’s integration into regional and global institutions as much as possible. U.S. leaders may also need to construct ways to show Chinese leaders the significant costs China will likely bear if it insists on using its greater coercive capabilities along narrowly nationalistic paths.
The U.S. rebalance to Asia could provide the strategic impetus and some policy openings for a win-win outcome, but this is far from certain. The Asia-Pacific region is changing rapidly. In this dynamic context, the United, States, China, and regional powers are all – simultaneously – engaged in balancing acts, often involving both domestic and external calculations that will shape the prospects for Asia-Pacific stability in the years ahead.
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