The Moral and Strategic Blindspot in Obama’s Pivot to Asia

This begs the long discussed but not often asked question as to the efficacy of military-to-military engagement as a method to influence the behavior of other nations.  The author does not believe we should be conducting military-to-military engagement with countries such as Cambodia, Laos, and Burma.

Whatever the Pentagon’s ability to transform these regimes, it’s worth noting that they do not even provide the strategic benefits to the U.S. that would justify such cooperation. Some U.S. officials warn that, without closer American engagement, Cambodia might be “lost” to China, which already is Phnom Penh’s biggest donor and investor, giving Cambodia some $500 million in soft loans two months ago. Laos could also plausibly tilt towards China, which provides extensive training for Lao soldiers, and is probably now Laos’ biggest donor (though no one knows for sure). But even if Cambodia and Laos tilted heavily toward China, would that be a serious blow to America’s presence in Asia? Not as long as the United States has strong ties to the more democratic countries in the region; the efficacy of the pivot doesn't depend on its unanimity in the region.
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But it seems the White House would prefer to test its theory about the Pentagon’s ability to serve as a leading diplomatic actor. That’s good news for the militaries we’re “pivoting” towards; less so for the political opposition in those countries. What remains to be seen, of course, is what it will mean for America’s long-term interests in the region.

V/R
Dave

The Moral and Strategic Blindspot in Obama’s Pivot to Asia

• Joshua Kurlantzick
• November 20, 2012 | 12:00 am

The Obama administration deserves credit for the successes produced so far by its “pivot to Asia”, from the encouragement of political reform in Myanmar, to the creation of a permanent Marines base in Australia, to the initiation of joint military exercises with the Philippines. After a decade in which the Bush administration mostly ignored the Pacific, failing even to send high-level officials to some regional meetings, the Obama administration was right to focus military and diplomatic attention on countries neighboring China, a potential great power adversary.

The enthusiasm in Washington for the “pivot” has gone much too far, however. It’s true that Southeast Asian nations like Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, are eager for closer cooperation with the United States to counter China’s perceived rise. But the Obama administration has been so eager to reciprocate that its has failed to give those countries’ governments, and especially their militaries, the scrutiny they deserve.

Some of the countries that Washington has been dealing with as part of its outreach don't merit any suspicion. Australia has a long democratic tradition, and the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia are all “flawed” democracies by the standards of Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit. Vietnam, though not a democracy, has a well-disciplined military that does not, by and large, commit massive abuses against its own population. But the Obama administration has also engaged with much seamier political actors, including regimes in Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos, where the military has often dominated politics.

http://www.tnr.com/print/blog/plank/110332/the-moral-and-strategic-blindspot-in-obamas-pivot-asia

(Continued at the link above)