I think Foust makes some important observations here. I think the conflict between actionable intelligence versus "deep understanding" of problems is important. It impacts our ability to anticipate (one of Cohen's and Gooch's 3 failures) - while actionable intelligence seems anticipatory it is generally tactical and of course immediate while "deep understanding" is usually more strategic and deeper in time which again is important for supporting policy development and strategic decision making. But as I have said I would also add that our targeting process and CT operations are generally deliberate and executed on our timelines and although the tactical forces are very agile with F3EA (find, fix, finish, exploit and analyze) process, the national strategic level crisis action decision making may have been weakened by the successes of our deliberate decision making processes. I think his conclusion is sound:
The IC can go back to the basics by prioritizing the kind of information it wants: by focusing less on the daily grind of counterterrorism missions and more on the social, political, and economic currents that are driving change across the Middle East and around the world. By developing a more holistic picture of the foreign policy challenges facing the country in the next four years, smart choices can fill in the knowledge gaps and make future surprises less likely.
V/R
Dave
Myopia: How Counter-Terrorism Has Blinded Our Intelligence Community
JOSHUA FOUST - Joshua Foust is a fellow at the American Security Project and the author ofAfghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. He is also a member of the Young Atlanticist Working Group. More
NOV 13 2012, 7:29 AM ET 6
The United States' overriding interest in "actionable" information on terrorists has produced a dangerous form of tunnel vision.
In the last 24 months, unpredictable events have caught U.S. policymakers by surprise: the "Arab Spring" movement in 2011 and the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. In the wake of both surprises, many in Congress and the public have been wondering: why didn't we see this coming?
Over the last decade of counterterrorism operations, the U.S. intelligence community (IC) has undergone a remarkable transformation. A relatively modest part of the national security community before the 9/11 attacks, by 2010 the IC had swelled to encompass nearly a million people largely focused on prosecuting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global counterterrorism mission.
(Continued at the link above)
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