S. Korea creates N. Korea situation index

We are going to have to look more into this. This is the first I have heard of this.  I am not sure of the efficacy of such a system but the fact that they have developed this and are taking the problem of north Korean crisis seriously (which should and hopefully include instability and collapse in addition to "political transition") makes me optimistic that we (the ROK/US Alliance) may actually prepare for these potential crises (in addition to preparations for war, provocations and the nuclear crisis). 

V/R

Dave

S. Korea creates N. Korea situation index

http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?cid=AEN20140126000600315&domain=3&ctype=A&site=0100000000

2014-01-26 10:10

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   South Korea has developed an index that measures the level of crisis in North Korea and the possibility of the communist country's transition to a new political system, a government official said Sunday.

   The index, called the North Korea Situation Index (NKSI), will not be made public and used only for internal decision-making because its announcement may spark the ire of the North, the official at the Ministry of Unification said.

   "The ministry recently concluded the calculation of the NKSI for 2013 and is drawing up an analysis report," the official said. "But it will be difficult to announce the report."

   The NKSI, which is calculated once a year, is composed of subindixes covering three sectors: stability, system transition and crisis.

   The stability subindex measures the stability of the North Korean regime by calculating the level of stability in the country's politics, military and economy.

   The system-transition subindex mirrors the possibility of North Korea's transition to a new political system, while the crisis subindex is a barometer of Pyongyang's overall crisis, according to the official.

   The three subindexes are measured on a scale of zero to 100. The closer to 100 the subindex, the higher the level of instability, crisis and change in North Korea.

   Between 2010 and 2012, the ministry spent 4.65 billion won (US4.31 million) to develop a calculation system for the NKSI.

   North Korea has recently undergone a political upheaval following the surprise execution last month of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's once-powerful uncle, Jang Song-thaek.

   South and North Korea remain technically in a state of war since the 1950-53 Korean War ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty.

   SEOUL, Jan. 26 (Yonhap)
(END)

Conclusion:

What happens next? The immediate question is the depth and severity of the coming purge. It is likely that thousands of officials linked to Jang could face either dismissal or death. The prospect of a reign of terror within North Korea could trigger unforeseen consequences, either intimidating elites near the center power or undermining their loyalty to the system. The very logic of “a traitor in our midst” undermines the Kim clan’s repeated claims of political omniscience and omnipotence, revealing the depravity and deception that has been among the secrets of the regime’s longevity.

The possibility of a far reaching purge in a nuclear-armed state defined predominantly by hostility to the outside world is deeply disquieting. Amidst the uncertainties and dangers posed by Jang’s ouster and execution, there is an urgent need for all surrounding powers and the United States to consult closely to limit the risks of an even larger crisis.

While I agree that consultation is important I also think that we need to be prepared to do more than consult.  Some of the fundamental questions that should be asked is whether we sit and wait to see what happens and then react?  Are there specific preparations that could be implemented now that might mitigate the effects of the next provocation or a possible regime collapse?  And most fundamentally of all – do want to maintain the status quo (Kim Jong-un in power with his emerging nuclear and missile programs and 1.2 million man Army) or would we rather take our chances on what comes after Kim Jong-un?  Will the north's internal contradictions finally come to bear on the regime and if so what actions do we take now to deal with the consequences?

V/R
Dave

 

Jonathan D. Pollack | December 13, 2013 12:11pm

Is North Korea Imperiled?

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/12/13-is-north-korea-imperiled-j-pollack?utm_source=Facebook&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=BrookingsFB1215&utm_content=BrookingsFB1215

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Yesterday’s brutal, abrupt execution of the second ranking ruler of North Korea, Jang Song-thaek, culminated a stunning week in Pyongyang, perhaps the world’s most isolated and repressive capital. For much of its history, North Korea has posed acute threats to the outside world. It is the most militarized regime on earth and in recent years has repeatedly threatened South Korea and persisted in the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, while sustaining a highly repressive course toward its own citizens.

However, the execution of Jang, by marriage a member of the ruling Kim dynasty, represents a very different threat to the system’s viability. For decades, North Korea (though mired in economic dysfunction and international isolation) has sought to maintain a façade of unity within its ruling elites. On Sunday, North Korea’s young leader, Kim Jong-un, presided over an enlarged session of the Party Politburo, where Jang was accused of a wide array of crimes, including the building of a “factional group” within the leadership and a variety of lesser sins. At the staged trial prior to his execution, Zhang was explicitly charged with plotting the overthrow of the Kim regime. Though Jang was not as close to Kim Jong-un over the past year, he seemed the indispensable fixer of the North Korean system, and among the handful of senior politicians who had meaningful international experience, most notably with China.

Jang’s humiliating disgrace at the Politburo meeting, where he was removed from his seat in full view of the country’s ruling elite, and his execution four days later revealed fissures within the political leadership that analysts had long suspected but could never prove. Kim Jong-un, the impetuous young son of Kim Jong-il, anointed as his father’s successor in the elder Kim’s waning months, was the decisive force in these events. Since Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, Kim Jong-un had moved quickly to dislodge elder leaders from power (including many senior military officers) and to establish a political and personal style that had much more in common with his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, who established the Kim dynasty in the 1940s and presided over North Korea for nearly a half century.

As a general rule, North Korean leaders have exited quietly from the scene, presumably enabling them to retain the privileges associated with their status in the system, though from time to time some were banished to the hinterlands. But Jang’s abrupt execution bears immediate comparison with events of the mid 1950s, when Kim Il-sung accused various political rivals of factionalism and illicit dealings with the Soviet Union and China.

The immediate questions—and ones that cannot yet be answered—is whether Kim Jong-un acted out of weakness or out of strength, and also whether Jang’s purge and execution will lead to larger reverberations within the system. To some analysts, Kim Jong-un was increasingly fearful that Jang’s extensive political and personal networks would ultimately enable Jang to undermine young Kim’s rule. Kim’s grandiose and impetuous style might very well have offended others within the system, where deference to elders has long been prized.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/12/13-is-north-korea-imperiled-j-pollack?utm_source=Facebook&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=BrookingsFB1215&utm_content=BrookingsFB1215

Official KCNA Statement on ouster of Jang Song-taek

Below is the official statement regarding the ouster of Jang Song-taek from the Korean Central News Agency.

I think this is a very important statement worth reading to understand the Kim Family Regime.  I think it is pretty clear what hang's crimes are: "anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts."  This phrase is used 7 times in its entirety as well as each part used individually a number of times as well.

Note the statement about "implementing the behests of Kim jong-il" (read Bruce Bechtol's book The Last Days of Kim Jong-il as he explains how Kim Jong-un is following what Kim Jong-il started).  

Note reference to Juche as well as this oft repeated phrase, the part, the army, and the people in various forms.

But I am reminded of this observation about the Jang incident sent to me by a China analyst which I think sums up exactly what Kim Jong-un is doing:

This is the ultimate expression of China’s deterrence strategy of “killing a chicken to scare the monkeys!”

But I think the bottom line is that Kim Jong-un still faces internal dissent and discord.  Whether Jang is the cause of it or a symptom or just convenient to use as an object lesson I do not know.  This is surely an attempt to consolidate power and protect the regime.  I think it is also a strong indicator that Kim Jong-un will not reform, will not open up, and will likely be more difficult and certainly more unstable than Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il – It is ironic that we might be thinking that Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il would be better to still have around.

In order for Kim to continue to govern he requires complete party and military unity (thus the numerous references to unitary effort – e.g., unitary center of leadership).  I think the concluding sentence sums it all up.  This is the ideal way forward for the Kim Family Regime in Kim Jong-un's mind and if he can exercise complete and ultimate power and eliminate all resistance to his rule.  That will be the single guiding factor in all his future decision making and we should keep this in mind when we assess his actions and statements.

No force on earth can deter our party, army and people from dynamically advancing toward a final victory, single-mindedly united around Kim Jong Un under the uplifted banner of great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.

V/R
Dave 

Report on Enlarged Meeting of Political Bureau of Central Committee of WPK http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

Pyongyang, December 9 (KCNA) -- A report on the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) was released on December 8. The following is the full text of the report: An enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK was held in Pyongyang, the capital of the revolution, on Dec. 8. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the WPK, guided the meeting. Present there were members and alternate members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK. Leading officials of the Central Committee of the WPK, provincial party committees and armed forces organs attended it as observers. Our party members, service personnel and all other people have made energetic efforts to implement the behests of leader Kim Jong Il, entrusting their destiny entirely to Kim Jong Un and getting united close around the Central Committee of the WPK since the demise of Kim Jong Il, the greatest loss to the nation. In this historic period for carrying forward the revolutionary cause of Juche the chance elements and alien elements who had made their ways into the party committed such anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts as expanding their forces through factional moves and daring challenge the party, while attempting to undermine the unitary leadership of the party. In this connection, the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK convened its enlarged meeting and discussed the issue related to the anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts committed by Jang Song Thaek. The meeting, to begin with, fully laid bare the anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts of Jang Song Thaek and their harmfulness and reactionary nature. It is the immutable truth proved by the nearly 70-year-long history of the WPK that the party can preserve its revolutionary nature as the party of the leader and fulfill its historic mission only when it firmly ensures its unity and cohesion based on the monolithic idea and the unitary center of leadership. The entire party, whole army and all people are dynamically advancing toward the final victory in the drive for the building of a thriving nation, meeting all challenges of history and resolutely foiling the desperate moves of the enemies of the revolution under the leadership of Kim Jong Un. Such situation urgently calls for consolidating as firm as a rock the single-minded unity of the party and the revolutionary ranks with Kim Jong Un as its unitary centre and more thoroughly establishing the monolithic leadership system of the party throughout the party and society. The Jang Song Thaek group, however, committed such anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts as gnawing at the unity and cohesion of the party and disturbing the work for establishing the party unitary leadership system and perpetrated such ant-state, unpopular crimes as doing enormous harm to the efforts to build a thriving nation and improve the standard of people's living. Jang pretended to uphold the party and leader but was engrossed in such factional acts as dreaming different dreams and involving himself in double-dealing behind the scene. Though he held responsible posts of the party and state thanks to the deep political trust of the party and leader, he committed such perfidious acts as shunning and obstructing in every way the work for holding President Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in high esteem for all ages, behaving against the elementary sense of moral obligation and conscience as a human being. Jang desperately worked to form a faction within the party by creating illusion about him and winning those weak in faith and flatterers to his side. Prompted by his politically-motivated ambition, he tried to increase his force and build his base for realizing it by implanting those who had been punished for their serious wrongs in the past period into ranks of officials of departments of the party central committee and units under them. Jang and his followers did not sincerely accept the line and policies of the party, the organizational will of the WPK, but deliberately neglected their implementation, distorted them and openly played down the policies of the party. In the end, they made no scruple of perpetrating such counter-revolutionary acts as disobeying the order issued by the supreme commander of the Korean People's Army. The Jang group weakened the party's guidance over judicial, prosecution and people's security bodies, bringing very harmful consequences to the work for protecting the social system, policies and people. Such acts are nothing but counter-revolutionary, unpopular criminal acts of giving up the class struggle and paralyzing the function of popular democratic dictatorship, yielding to the offensive of the hostile forces to stifle the DPRK. Jang seriously obstructed the nation's economic affairs and the improvement of the standard of people's living in violation of the pivot-to-the-Cabinet principle and the Cabinet responsibility principle laid down by the WPK. The Jang group put under its control the fields and units which play an important role in the nation's economic development and the improvement of people's living in a crafty manner, making it impossible for the economic guidance organs including the Cabinet to perform their roles. By throwing the state financial management system into confusion and committing such act of treachery as selling off precious resources of the country at cheap prices, the group made it impossible to carry out the behests of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on developing the industries of Juche iron, Juche fertilizer and Juche vinalon. Affected by the capitalist way of living, Jang committed irregularities and corruption and led a dissolute and depraved life. By abusing his power, he was engrossed in irregularities and corruption, had improper relations with several women and was wined and dined at back parlors of deluxe restaurants. Ideologically sick and extremely idle and easy-going, he used drugs and squandered foreign currency at casinos while he was receiving medical treatment in a foreign country under the care of the party. Jang and his followers committed criminal acts baffling imagination and they did tremendous harm to our party and revolution. The ungrateful criminal acts perpetrated by the group of Jang Song Thaek are lashing our party members, service personnel of the People's Army and people into great fury as it committed such crimes before they observed two-year mourning for Kim Jong Il, eternal general secretary of the WPK. Speeches were made at the enlarged meeting. Speakers bitterly criticized in unison the anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts committed by the Jang group and expressed their firm resolution to remain true to the idea and leadership of Kim Jong Un and devotedly defend the Party Central Committee politically and ideologically and with lives. The meeting adopted a decision of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee on relieving Jang of all posts, depriving him of all titles and expelling him and removing his name from the WPK. The party served warning to Jang several times and dealt blows at him, watching his group's anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts as it has been aware of them from long ago. But it did not pay heed to it but went beyond tolerance limit. That was why the party eliminated Jang and purged his group, unable to remain an onlooker to its acts any longer, dealing telling blows at sectarian acts manifested within the party. Our party will never pardon anyone challenging its leadership and infringing upon the interests of the state and people in violation of the principle of the revolution, regardless of his or her position and merits. No matter how mischievously a tiny handful of anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional elements may work, they can never shake the revolutionary faith of all party members, service personnel and people holding Kim Jong Un in high esteem as the unitary centre of unity and unitary centre of leadership. The discovery and purge of the Jang group, a modern day faction and undesirable elements who happened to worm their ways into our party ranks, made our party and revolutionary ranks purer and helped consolidate our single-minded unity remarkably and advance more dynamically the revolutionary cause of Juche along the road of victory. No force on earth can deter our party, army and people from dynamically advancing toward a final victory, single-mindedly united around Kim Jong Un under the uplifted banner of great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.

North Korea: The new capitalists

This is why influence operations conducted by the ROK/US Alliance are so important.  

The nuclear threat and the vicious eccentricities of its leadership are, for the West, the most compelling of the country’s features. But, as our briefingexplains, a revolutionary force is rising from below: a new class of traders and merchants.

An assessment does need to be made as to the resistance potential among the population. It may not be a traditional resistance with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force but these traders and merchants will be critical in a post Kim Family Regime situation (as will the 2d tier leaders on whom we should also be focusing).  Opportunities are being created but the question is will anyone be prepared to exploit them.

V/R
Dave

North Korea

The new capitalists

Even as another nuclear provocation looms, hope glimmers for the world’s most oppressed people

http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571421-even-another-nuclear-provocation-looms-hope-glimmers-worlds-most-oppressed-people/print

Feb 9th 2013 |From the print edition

NOT long ago North Korea-watchers were speculating that the new leader, Kim Jong Un, might prove a moderniser. The path-breaking boy-dictator let himself be seen with his fashionable wife. He actually spoke in public, whereas his late father’s speeches were as rare as a well-stocked Pyongyang supermarket. Lately, though, Mr Kim has reverted to type by prophesying war. Experts fear the North’s Punggye-ri underground complex is about to host a nuclear test. If it does, Mr Kim will inherit the family title of Asia’s pariah-in-chief.

The nuclear threat and the vicious eccentricities of its leadership are, for the West, the most compelling of the country’s features. But, as our briefingexplains, a revolutionary force is rising from below: a new class of traders and merchants. Capitalism is seeping through the bamboo curtain. This is not at the behest of the regime, as happened in Deng Xiaoping’s China. North Korea is more repressive and backward than Cuba or the old Soviet Union. The regime will not depart quickly or easily: in the short term, Mr Kim’s growing unease could well make him still more of a threat to his neighbours. But a familiar picture is emerging—and the world should do what it can to encourage it.

Jinxed by juche

Mr Kim’s grandfather, Kim Il Sung, built his post-war paradise in the north on the principle of juche, or “self-reliance” (though, the Soviet Union greatly helped). At first the North and South Korean economies matched each other won for won but, starting in the 1970s, autarky decayed into inefficiency. The North’s huge army hogged resources. Managers and workers stripped state factories bare and flogged anything of value on new black markets. Today perhaps 200,000 North Koreans remain imprisoned in the gulag. Output per head is over 17 times larger in the South than the North. Twenty-year-old South Koreans stand 6cm (2.4 inches) above North Korean contemporaries stunted by famine and malnutrition.

In the 1990s famine provided an opening for a new sort of North Korean trader. Many of them were smallholders, often women, selling vegetables grubbed up from the family plot. The facts are patchy, but it is becoming clear that other merchants operate today on a far more ambitious scale, exporting raw materials to China and bringing back consumer goods. The merchants use an informal system of money-changing to move funds in and out of the country. In the capital those with cash go to restaurants and play the slot machines. It sounds surreal, but they are the North’s nouveaux riches.

North Korea’s capitalists are here to stay. The regime has repeatedly tried to purge them, by suppressing the farmers’ markets and cracking down on smuggling. But money talks in today’s North Korea, and the traders often have enough cash to bribe their way out of trouble. Moreover, they have become an indispensable part of the economy. Industry functions so poorly that tower blocks in Pyongyang cannot be built without the imported supplies the merchants provide.

As in China, capitalism is letting in the outside world—a vital change for a people fed only grotesque lies. Corrupt border guards and security operatives can be bribed by people determined, for religious or political reasons, to get information in and out. The mobile phones, computers and radios that the traders sell are eroding the state’s monopoly on truth. Television shows and films smuggled in on memory sticks confront North Koreans with the potentially revolutionary fact that their brethren in the South live in comfort and plenty—and without the fear of a knock on the door at midnight. They discover that the Workers’ Utopia is built on a Great Lie.

And the capitalists count because they stand somewhat apart from the security establishment. The Kims have always surrounded themselves with a caste of revolutionary families present at the North’s creation. For decades power began and ended with them. But some of the merchants come from outside the Kims’ circle—and all have a keen eye on their wealth. Although the traders make money from the status quo, they are likely to value growth more and security less than the ruling clique. Competition for resources is also emerging in parts of the government-controlled economy. Fissures are thus emerging in what used to be a monolithic state.

For years now the world’s dealings with North Korea have chiefly been about stopping its nuclear programme, which poses a grave threat to peace. But that policy has pretty much failed. Today’s nuclear intimidation is just the latest in a series of provocations from a state that will lie, threaten and blackmail its way to the negotiating table only to storm off again into belligerent isolation. The bet is that Mr Kim will never give up his weapons, because they are his only claim to influence.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571421-even-another-nuclear-provocation-looms-hope-glimmers-worlds-most-oppressed-people/print

Seoul develops index gauging N. Korea's stability

Interesting initiative and I am gratified to see the ROKG looking seriously at north Korean instability and potential for regime collapse.  There is still not better framework for indications and warnings that Bob Collins' Seven Phases of north Korea Collapse or Patterns of Collapse.  Whether those currently in the ROK-US Combined Forces Command know this or not, much of the indications and warnings in effect today are based on Bob's work.  He was truly cutting edge when he wrote his thesis while attending Korean graduate school.   This seminal work provides a way to frame the problem and ask the right questions to determine what is happening and what might happen in the north.  I would be leery of indices and mathematical analysis (they could be useful but I would not depend on them for forecasting and decision-making).  Lastly the idea that this will be outsourced to a private firm in order to have impartiality seems to me an abdication of government responsibility.  Professional analysts should be able to provide objective and impartial views.  But if it must be outsourced, I would recommend the ROKG hire Bob Collins to advise them.

V/R
Dave

2013/01/29 16:56 KST

Seoul develops index gauging N. Korea's stability

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/01/29/14/0401000000AEN20130129007800315F.HTML

SEOUL, Jan. 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has developed an index gauging the level of stability in North Korea but it has yet to decide whether to release the index's figures to the public, a government official said Tuesday.

   The Ministry of Unification, which deals with inter-Korean relations, has recently completed the development of the so-called North Korea condition index, an official said. The project to develop the index began in 2010.

   The 100 point-scale index, designed to measure the overall stability of the country, assesses three key conditions -- risk of instability, regime change and crisis -- of the largely unpredictable and reclusive country. The index assess stability and recent transformations as well as the likelihood of a crisis developing in the fields of politics, economy, social affairs and the North military.

   The closer the number is to 100, the higher the risk of instability in the North.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/01/29/14/0401000000AEN20130129007800315F.HTML

The Quality of Life of North Korean: Current Status and Understanding

Should be of interest for those who want to know what life is like inside north Korea.  There are some very important insights in this and for those who someday may have to operate there I recommend reading this and keeping it for reference.  You can download the enture report at the link below from the Korean Institute for National Unification.

V/R

Dave

The Quality of Life of North Korean: Current Status and Understanding

http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_02_01.jsp?bid=DATA05&page=1&num=140&mode=view&category

Author Kim Soo Am, Kim Kook Shin, Kim Young Yoon, Lim Soon Hee, Jeong Eun Mee, Park Young Ja Publish Date / Page 2012-12-31 / 62 p. Series No. Study Series 2012-02 File

• 
  North Korea’s economic difficulties during the mid-1990s were the decisive factor in fundamentally damaging the North Korean people’s quality of life. The standard of living has deteriorated to extreme levels of deprivation in which the right to food security, the right to health and other minimum needs for human survival are denied. Since its inauguration, the Lee Myung-bak administration has proposed policies that strive to improve the North Korean people’s “quality of life” by providing humanitarian aid to the North. Although concern regarding the “quality of life” has been discussed with a focus on aid provisions, the reality is that there is a lack of specific analyses on this subject. It is true that one can refute such analyses by stating that it would be pointless to discuss the quality of life when the North Korean economy is in a state of ruin. However, an academic approach is necessary in such discussions as a means to evaluate the propriety of applying international views onto the concept of the quality of life. With this perspective, the paper aims to review the possibility of applying international standards onto North Korea in order to systematically analyze the phenomenon that has disintegrated its quality of life. Should the international views be applicable, then this paper will explore the means by which they can be applied while also acknowledging North Korea’s special characteristics...

Don't Engage Kim Jong Un -- Bankrupt Him: It's time to play hardball with North Korea's new leader.

The Banco Delta Asia operation was a good one.  Excerpt:

There is a precedent for this: In September 2005, Treasury declared the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia a "primary concern" for North Korean money laundering, and a haven for drug dealing and counterfeiting proceeds. Treasury's action only directly affected $25 million in deposits, but its indirect effects were far greater, causing a run on Banco Delta and damming one of North Korea's main streams of illicit revenue. 

The North Koreans sought new banks elsewhere, but Treasury followed them. Senior Treasury officials visited banks throughout Asia, warned their officers of the risks of doing business with North Korea, and stated that it was "almost impossible to distinguish between the North's legitimate and illegitimate dealings." Multiple banks quickly cut their ties with the North. Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, economists who study North Korea, estimated that Treasury sanctions and Japan'scrackdown on remittances to North Korea badly hurt Pyongyang's capacity to launder the proceeds of its illicit activities, which accounted for approximately half of the North's income in the 1990s and still made up a significant share of Pyongyang's total earnings in 2005. As a result, the regime was forced to sell off some of its gold reserves. By January 2006, Kim Jong Il was so desperate that he reportedly told Chinese President Hu Jintao that he feared that the sanctions would cause his regime to collapse.

In principle I agree with Joshua and if we wanted to really strangle north Korea we would go after Department 39 operatives around the world to cut off the supply of illicit trade and the flow of hard currency and luxury goods back to the regime to keep the elite happy.  But I think it will e hard for us to replicate the Banco Delta Asia operation for the very reason highlighted in the last sentence above. We could cause the collapse of the regime but this time China is unlikely to cooperate (as it had to tacitly in 2005) because of the Chinese policy of "Three no's" - no war, no nukes and no collapse.  China will not support regime collapse and going after the north's finances is too dangerous for China.

V/R

Dave

Don't Engage Kim Jong Un -- Bankrupt Him

It's time to play hardball with North Korea's new leader.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/09/dont_engage_kim_jong_un_bankrupt_him?page=full

BY JOSHUA STANTON, SUNG-YOON LEE | JANUARY 9, 2013

Barack Obama and Sen. John McCain clearly agree on one thing: Bill Richardson and Eric Schmidt should not have visited Pyongyang this week. A State Department spokeswoman said last week that the timing, coming just four weeks after a rocket launch that violated three U.N. Security Council Resolutions, was not helpful. McCain tweeted that Richardson and Schmidt were "useful idiots." Richardson is among the staunchest advocates of appeasing North Korea after billions of dollars in U.S. and South Korean aid have bought little more than attacks, provocations, threats, and broken promises to disarm.

This could be the Hermit Kingdom's year of living provocatively. North Korea's dynastic ruler, Kim Jong Un, who turned 29 (or possibly 30) on Jan. 8, is very likely to act aggressively toward his neighbors in 2013 to burnish his leadership credentials at home and to deal with the new South Korean president-elect, Park Geun Hye, from a position of strength. New administrations in Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Moscow will seek to avoid foreign crises as they consolidate their power domestically, creating a less confrontational and moreappeasement-prone neighborhood in 2013.

The provocations have already begun. North Korea's rocket launch in December was calculated to intimidate the U.S. and South Korean governments: The rocket was theoretically capable of reaching the United States, and North Korea carried out the test on Dec. 12, seven days before South Korea's presidential election. Pyongyang's announcements that it might postpone the test due to technical difficulties in the days leading up to the launch appear to have caught Obama's Asia team off guard.

So far, the Obama administration's response to the North Korean test has been to return to the United Nations to ask for more Security Council sanctions, but the test already violated three Security Council resolutions that China won't enforce. Despite prior U.N. condemnations, North Korea followed its 2006 and 2009 missile tests with nuclear tests three and two months later, respectively. Beijing's new leadership will likely keep funding the Kim regime and letting it smugglemissile parts and sanctioned luxury goods through Chinese ports. (China claims to "resolutely"oppose North Korea's nuclear programs, but probably sees its behavior as useful in keeping the United States distracted and Korea divided, while it pursues territorial ambitions elsewhere in the Pacific.) If the pattern holds, North Korea's next nuclear test could occur around the time of the late Kim Jong Il's Feb. 16 birthday, or president-elect Park's Feb. 25 inauguration.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/09/dont_engage_kim_jong_un_bankrupt_him?page=full

(north Korea) Marked for Life; Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment; The Hidden Gulag

As I have said Bob Collins' report on Songbun should be mandatory reading for any policy maker or strategist and anyone dealing with north Korea.  Good to see Foreign Affairs recognizing the good work of the Committee for Human Rights in north Korea.

V/R

Dave

Marked for Life; Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment; The Hidden Gulag

Robert Collins

Ken Gause

David Hawk

Reviewed by Andrew J. Nathan

January/February 2013

Article Summary and Author Biography

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138688/robert-collins-ken-gause-david-hawk/marked-for-life-songbun-north-koreas-social-classification-syste

The Washington-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea produces valuable research that sheds light on life in the “hermit kingdom.” These three recent reports reveal North Korea’s extraordinary system of repression. Collins describes the institution of songbun, under which each North Korean citizen is assigned “a heredity-based class and socio-political rank over which the individual exercises no control but which determines all aspects of his or her life.” Fifty-one subcategories are clustered into three classes, defined by their level of commitment to the regime: core, wavering, and hostile. Access to jobs, housing, medical care, and even marriage depends on one’s class status. Members of the lower classes are not allowed to live in relatively prosperous cities, such as Pyongyang. The regime directs foreign aid to the “core” group, while the lower groups—perhaps up to 80 percent of the population—suffer from famine and a high risk of political imprisonment.

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http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138688/robert-collins-ken-gause-david-hawk/marked-for-life-songbun-north-koreas-social-classification-syste

Out Of Desperation, North Korean Women Become Breadwinners

A good illustration of the suffering in north Korea which is a result of the failed policies and actions of the regime over the last 60+ years.

V/R

Dave

Out Of Desperation, North Korean Women Become Breadwinners

by LOUISA LIM

December 28, 201212:11 PM

http://www.npr.org/2012/12/28/168193827/out-of-desperation-north-korean-women-become-breadwinners

Imagine going to work every day and not getting paid. Then, one day, you're told there's no work to do — so you must pay the company for the privilege of not working.

This is the daily reality facing Mrs. Kim, a petite 52-year-old North Korean. Her husband's job in a state-run steel factory requires him to build roads. She can't remember the last time he received a monthly salary. When there are no roads to build, he has to pay his company around 20 times his paltry monthly salary, she says.

"He had to pay not to work for about six months of last year," Mrs. Kim told NPR, sighing. "You have to pay, even if you can't afford to eat. It's mandatory."

So she is the one who must keep the family alive, as her husband wrestles with this state-sanctioned extortion.

Welcome to the Orwellian world of work in North Korea. In this reclusive country, profound social change is happening beyond the view of the outside world. The demands of politics have dramatically redrawn gender roles, forcing women to become the breadwinners.

Markets Thrive, With Women At The Helm

Five North Koreans visiting China spoke with NPR recently, offering a rare insight into how political dictates have had an extraordinary social impact in their own homes.

All of them count among the elite, who have enough money to enter China legally and hope to return to their families in North Korea. Talking to foreign media is risky, so they are being identified only by their surnames.

"In the past, our husbands would bring home rations, and we'd live off that," says Mrs. Kim. "Now there are no rations, and the women support the families. If we don't make money, they starve, so life is hard for women."

Facing a catastrophic famine in the mid-1990s, the state had reduced — and then mostly stopped — giving out the rations, known as the Public Distribution System.

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http://www.npr.org/2012/12/28/168193827/out-of-desperation-north-korean-women-become-breadwinners

China poses potential obstacle to reunification of Koreas: U.S. Congress report

Some interesting analysis and conclusions in the report; however, in the end I think that China will ultimately support unification because it does not want to have to be responsible for north Korea (though it will want to ensure access to resources and I believe it is posturing now through the establishment of the 50 and 100 year leases to mineral rights).  As an aside in the report the authors use the Korean name for the Amnok River and put the Chinese name of the Yalu River in parentheses.

The Senate report can be downloaded at this link: http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/China-Koreas-Unification-Lugar-Dec-2012.pdf

V/R

Dave

2013/01/01 10:03 KST

China poses potential obstacle to reunification of Koreas: U.S. Congress report

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/01/01/17/0401000000AEN20130101000900315F.HTML

By Lee Chi-dong

Dec. 31 (Yonhap) -- China may prove to be a major stumbling block to any future efforts by the two Koreas for reunification, a U.S. congressional report said Monday.

   "China could attempt to manage, and conceivably block the unification process," said the report released by the office of Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)

Lugar, a ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the report is aimed at alerting his colleagues in Congress that the reunification of South and North Korea may not follow the German model due to China's history claims and growing influence on the peninsula.

   The 84-page report, titled "China's impact on Korean Peninsula unification and questions for the Senate," was authored by staff members at the chamber with the help of Korean and Chinese historians.

   It calls for a painstaking review of how the U.S. will respond in case there is a unification process on the peninsula driven either by the warming of inter-Korean relations or by a collapse of the North Korean regime.

   China may try to impede the reunification of the two Koreas, which have been divided for more than 60 years, or seek to play a major role on a reunified Korea, according to the report.

   The report cited China's historical claims that North Korea belonged to it and Pyongyang's economic dependence on Beijing.

   "Disputes about the Korea-China borderline are historic and endless," it said.

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http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/01/01/17/0401000000AEN20130101000900315F.HTML

North Korea's caste system faces power of wealth

I cannot emphasize this enough.  Anyone who is making policy or strategy concerning north Korea must read Bob Collins' report on Songbun published by HRNK.   Without reading that report one cannot begin to understand the nature of the north Korean system and society and will not be able to make effective policy and develop the strategies necessary to support the ROK-US Joint Vision of 2009 which calls for peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.

"If you were a peasant and you owned nothing, then all of a sudden you were at the top of the society," said Bob Collins, who wove together smuggled documents, interviews with former North Korean security officials and discussions with an array of ordinary North Koreans to write an exhaustive songbun study released this year by the Washington-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. While the songbun system theoretically allows for movement within the hierarchy, Collins said most families' standing today remains a reflection of their ancestors' position in the 1950s and '60s.

V/R

Dave

North Korea's caste system faces power of wealth

By: TIM SULLIVAN | Associated Press 

Published: December 29, 2012

http://www2.wsls.com/news/2012/dec/29/north-koreas-caste-system-faces-power-of-wealth-ar-2439082/

SEOUL, South Korea --

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) For more than a half-century, a mysterious caste system has shadowed the life of every North Korean. It can decide whether they will live in the gated compounds of the minuscule elite, or in mountain villages where farmers hack at rocky soil with handmade tools. It can help determine what hospital will take them if they fall sick, whether they go to college and, very often, whom they will marry.

It is called songbun. And officially, it does not exist at all.

The power of caste remains potent, exiles and scholars say, generations after it was permanently branded onto every family based on their supposed ideological purity. But today it is also quietly fraying, weakened by the growing importance of something that barely existed until recently in socialist North Korea: wealth.

Like almost all change in North Korea's deeply opaque society, where so much is hidden to outsiders, the shift is happening slowly and often silently. But in the contest for power within the closed world that Pyongyang has created, defectors, analysts and activists say money is now competing with the domination of political caste.

"There's one place where songbun doesn't matter, and that's in business," said a North Korean soldier-turned-businessman who fled to South Korea after a prison stint, and who now lives in a working-class apartment building on the fringes of Seoul. "Songbun means nothing to people who want to make money."

Songbun, a word that translates as "ingredient" but effectively means "background," first took shape in the 1950s and '60s. It was a time when North Korea's founder, Kim Il Sung, was forging one of the world's most repressive states and seeking ways to reward supporters and isolate potential enemies.

Historians say songbun was partially modeled on Soviet class divisions, and echoes a similar system that China abandoned in the 1980s amid the growth of the market economy there. In Korea, songbun turned a fiercely hierarchical society upside down, pushing peasants to the top of the caste ladder; aristocrats and landlords toward the bottom. The very top was reserved for those closest to Kim: his relatives and guerrillas who had fought with him against Korea's Japanese occupiers.

Very quickly, though, songbun became a professional hierarchy. The low caste became farmers and miners. The high caste filled the powerful bureaucracies. And children grew up and stepped into their parents' roles.

"If you were a peasant and you owned nothing, then all of a sudden you were at the top of the society," said Bob Collins, who wove together smuggled documents, interviews with former North Korean security officials and discussions with an array of ordinary North Koreans to write an exhaustive songbun study released this year by the Washington-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. While the songbun system theoretically allows for movement within the hierarchy, Collins said most families' standing today remains a reflection of their ancestors' position in the 1950s and '60s.

Generations after the system began, many of North Korea's most powerful people are officially identified as "peasants."

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http://www2.wsls.com/news/2012/dec/29/north-koreas-caste-system-faces-power-of-wealth-ar-2439082/

Kim Seeing Change in the Wind

Excerpts:

“Kim Jong Il was an exceptionally talented dictator,” he reiterated. “Kim Jong Eun won’t have been able to inherit his father Kim Jong Il’s personnel management and ruling skills perfectly over such a short period.”
…
“It is time to prepare a little more actively for North Korean systemic change, this is the time to act.” 

V/R

Dave

Kim Seeing Change in the Wind

By Park Seong Guk [2012-12-27 17:42 ]   http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=10192

"The life of the Kim Jong Eun regime will not be long. Change in North Korea’s system is not far off,” NKnet researcher Kim Young Hwan told an event in Seoul on the 26th. Giving a lecture to commemorate the “Republic of Korea Order of Civil Merit” honor he received earlier this month, Kim added, “It is time to prepare a little more actively for North Korean systemic change, this is the time to act.”  “The main reason why North Korea was able to maintain its system after the fall of Eastern Europe and China’s economic opening was because Kim Jong Il had the skill to maintain his dictatorial system and power,” he added. “It is doubtful whether Kim Jong Eun has obtained the same kind of dictatorial and ruling abilities in such a short time.” (Continued at the link below) http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=10192

N. Korean leader to purge more of the old guard in new year: expert

More from Sasha Mansourov based on his essays at 38 North/SAIS.  

But I might take issue with the adjective "reckless" to describe the purges of 2012.  It might seem reckless to us but I think they are calculated and so far have resulted in Kim Jong-un's consolidation of power.   But there is some interesting speculation on what might happen to Kim Yong-nam.

V/R

Dave

2012/12/27 04:07 KST

(LEAD) N. Korean leader to purge more of the old guard in new year: expert

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/12/27/39/0401000000AEN20121227000300315F.HTML

By Lee Chi-dong

WASHINGTON, Dec. 26 (Yonhap) -- As North Korean leader Kim Jong-un wraps up his first year in power, marked by the reckless purging of several old guard elites, he may replace the country's No. 2 leader, Kim Yong-nam, and some other top officials next year, according to a North Korea expert here.

   "Who replaces Kim Yong-nam may tell us about the future direction of the restructuring of the political system," said Alexandre Mansourov, a specialist in Northeast Asian security. He now works as a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University.

   He said Kim Yong-nam will likely "honorably retire," rather than being purged.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/12/27/39/0401000000AEN20121227000300315F.HTML

A New, Highly Detailed Image of North Korea's (Lack of) Electrical Infrastructure

The Atlantic seems to be writing about north Korea quite a bit these days.  But the north does not want this kind of publicity.   Students or researchers might want to reference the photos in the article at the link below.  Many of us in the past have used the 1990's image of the blacked out north Korea.  I believe even former SECDEF Rumsfeld used to keep the picture in his office to remind him about the Kim Family Regime and the situation in the north.

V/R

Dave

A New, Highly Detailed Image of North Korea's (Lack of) Electrical Infrastructure

• JOHN METCALFE
• DEC 18, 2012

http://www.theatlanticcities.com/technology/2012/12/new-highly-detailed-image-north-koreas-lack-electrical-infrastructure/4201/

NASA

Pyongyang has a probable population of more than 3 million people, but you wouldn't know it looking down on the city from space. Only the faintest of glimmers rise from the metropolis, as if all its residents are huddling in the dark for their Supreme Leader's surprise birthday party.

The world has known of North Korea's night-invisibility for a while. On imagery captured by military satellites in the '90s, the country shows up like a gaping hole in the flaming latticework of light that is Japan, South Korea and China. But recent overpasses by NASA's Suomi NPPspacecraft – the one that provided those marvelous shots of nocturnal America – has revealed the country's energy bankruptcy in a level of detail never seen before.

Suomi took these images in September with its mega-sensitive Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite, which can pick out dim light sources such as reflected moonbeams and boat beacons. Today, NASA featured the material on its Earth Observatory site, pointing out that North Korea has fewer lights than the Yellow Sea where glowing fishing vessels "appear to form a line, as if marking a watery boundary between nations":

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http://www.theatlanticcities.com/technology/2012/12/new-highly-detailed-image-north-koreas-lack-electrical-infrastructure/4201/

Kim Jong-eun should fear Sunshine

There is of course the theory that a fully executed Sunshine Policy could unhinge the regime because so much aid and more importantly information would get into the north and it would undercut regime legitimacy and thus lead to collapse.  Under such a theory the end state would be regime collapse and unification of the peninsula.  Unfortunately the Sunshine Policy is based on the flawed assumption that aid to and engagement with the north  will lead to a change in regime behavior.  We should know after the 12/12/12 missile launch that the regime has no intention to (nor can it) change its behavior.  

In addition, it would be quite a policy shift by the ROK and the US to actively attempt to undermine the regime to cause it to collapse.  Ironically no one in the region really wants that to happen because 1) it could lead to war and 2) the financial and economic (and not to mention the humanitarian) burden will be so great as to overwhelm the ROK and others potentially destabilize the region.  So while it is in everyone's interest to maintain the status quo we face the moral dilemma of 22, 995,000 people living in a virtual prison suffering on a scale that has little rival in history.

But I would offer this strategic assumption: There will be no change on the Korean peninsula as long as the Kim Family Regime exists.

V/R

Dave

COMMENT Kim Jong-eun should fear Sunshine By Andrei Lankov  http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/NL15Dg01.html Whatever policy towards North Korea will be chosen by the new South Korean government following the December 19 presidential election, it seems clear that it will be significantly softer than that followed by the Lee Myung-bak administration.  Right now it appears that Park Geun-hye, the candidate of the moderate right, has better chance of winning, but it is unlikely that she will continue with the hardline policy of her predecessor.  This looming dovish turn is likely to annoy some people on the political right in South Korea. They often vilify aid to, and cooperation with North Korea as "appeasement", and they point to the obvious lack of reciprocity in North-South relations. It is stated that the money earned by Pyongyang through exchanges with the South is used to strengthen North Korean leader Kim Jong-eun's rule.  These accusations have within them a kernel of truth. In few, if any, cases have interactions between North and South Korea been equal. Much of these interactions are officially termed "economic exchanges", but in most cases they are heavily subsidized by the South Korean government. To be blunt, without direct or indirect subsidies neither the Kaesong industrial complex, nor the now defunct Keumgang and Kaesong city tours would be viable economically.  It is also true that the North Korean government takes the lion's share of all the "profits" from such "economic cooperation" projects, then re-distributing this income as it sees fit. It is indeed likely that many secret police in North Korea have been paid indirectly by the South Korean taxpayers.  However, things are not so simple as all that. Economic exchanges do not merely fill the coffers of the regime, but also introduce dangerous knowledge about the outside world to North Koreans who are involved.  A North Korean seamstress in a Kaesong textiles factory has a South Korean manager to whom she has to talk every day. When the Kaesong city tours were in operation, the entire city of Kaesong could see busloads of South Koreans whose behaviour and dress clearly demonstrated that they were not merely the enslaved, downtrodden pawns of US imperialism. The same can be said about virtually any interaction between North and South Koreans.  (Continued at the link below) http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/NL15Dg01.html

The Kim Family Regime Cannot and Will Not Change

The Kim Family Regime Cannot and Will Not Change

By Dave Maxwell

There should be no doubt now about north Korea, the Kim Family Regime and the intentions of Kim Jong-un.

Those who hoped for change with the succession of the western educated Kim Jong-un have had their hopes dashed.

The ballistic missile launch that occurred on 12/12/12 confirms what many have suspected for a long time:

The north Korean nation-state under the rule of the Kim Family Regime is incapable of being a responsible member of the international community.

We really need to understand this fundamental problem and the conundrum with which we are faced on the Korean Peninsula.

There is a wide range of speculation about why the north conducted this ballistic missile test:  some examples include regime legitimacy, solidification of Kim Jong-un’s leadership, domestic propaganda – live up to the goal of 2012 as the year of strength and prosperity; support to Iranian missile development and for international sales and proliferation; influence on the ROK and Japanese elections; to somehow gain political and economic concessions and support to its blackmail diplomacy; deterrence and national security and finally because it was required to move the missile program to the next level of development.

Regardless of the reasons the regime is likely to face international condemnation and perhaps increased UN sanctions if that is possible.  It will likely lose the opportunity for a near term return to any type of Sunshine Policy or “Trustpolitik” with the ROK depending on who is elected as the next ROK President.  Efforts to support the Proliferation Security Initiative will be increased.  International aid could very well dry up.

But regardless of the rationale for this test launch one thing should be absolutely clear about the regime:

            It has prioritized its missile (and likely its nuclear) program over all else. 

This is a clear indication that regime survival remains its vital national interest and the leadership believes that it must have a strong military capability for deterrence and security even at the expense of the welfare of its people.  It has no intention of returning to the Six Party Talks, making economic or political reforms to improve the life of its people, or doing anything whatsoever to give even the appearance of being a reasonably responsible member of the international community.

North Korea apologists can blame the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, or the Kim, Roh and Lee administrations but each has made offers and overtures, tried to reach out and give a hand up, and provided aid (food and energy) and the only thing to show for their efforts are missile and nuclear tests, continued provocations, and a failed economy and the suffering of 23 million people on a scale likely never before seen in history.

The Kim Family Regime will not change.  It cannot change because to do so means that its legitimacy will be undercut and this will lead to regime collapse.

Although north Korea is a Communist state, it is in name only and cannot be compared to China or the former Soviet Union. North Korea, being more homogenous than either of those countries, has been able to both indoctrinate and suppress its people to degrees that Stalin and Mao could only dream.  Kim Jong-un cannot allow for any relief of this suppression nor can he allow economic reform in any way because it will lead to political pressures under which the regime will not survive.  It is the design of the system itself which is focused only on the perpetuation of the Kim Family Regime that prevents it from changing.  

As we move forward from 12/12/12 policy makers and strategists must understand the situation and the Kim Family Regime  as it really exists and not as they would wish it to be.  For the last two decades a lot of wishful thinking about north Korea has formed the basis for strategic assumptions.

Today the Chinese news agency Xinhua made the following comment:

“In international relations, as in life, the best way to make an enemy of a country is to treat it like one. This rule of thumb is also true with making friends.”

We have seen how the Kim Family Regime has acted despite the Agreed Framework, the ROK Sunshine Policy and the Six Party Talks.  Perhaps the Xinhua ideal applies in life and in international relations. I do not think it applies to north Korea.  Therefore we must plan accordingly.