If the Kim Regime Falls in North Korea, Sustained Armed Resistance Could Follow

I am glad Steve is writing about this.  It is important that we recognize the likely resistance that will occur if the Kim Family Regime collapses (and very similar conditions will exist in post-conflict after the regime is destroyed).

My work on this can be found here:

"Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting a Resistance" (2015)

https://www.dropbox.com/s/4ayhve3x9p8e44s/05_David%20S.%20Maxwell%20%283%29%20%281%29.pdf?dl=0

"Should The United States Support Korean Unification: And If So, How?" (2014)

http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/1482467285_add_file_7.pdf

"Thoughts on Irregular Threats for north Korea Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse: Understanding Them to Counter Them" (2010)

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/irregular-warfare-on-the-korean-peninsula

I would say this to Steve (and anyone else who cares about this):  The war, regime collapse, post-conflict, and post-collapse operations will be the biggest "by, with, and through" operation in which the US has ever participated.  We owe it to our blood ally (and to the American people) to help them lead their own unification process but not lead it ourselves.  north Korea is not Iraq and Afghanistan and the ROK military and ROK government is not the Afghan and Iraq military and government.  We cannot approach the north Korea problem the same way we have Afghanistan and Iraq even though the conditions, conflict, and resistance will likely be far worse in north Korea than anything we have encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan (or Syria - and there are lessons there to be learned with the great and medium power interventions).  We are going to have to enable and assist our much more capable partner and blood ally the ROK.  But we cannot occupy the north with US forces and we cannot take the lead in the stabilization and unification process.  If we do we will create a quagmire that will be far worse than the quagmire we have in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and far worse than the one in which the ROK will find itself if they are leading and we are assisting (but it will be a quagmire nonetheless). 

If the Kim Regime Falls in North Korea, Sustained Armed Resistance Could Follow

Steven Metz Friday, Jan. 26, 2018

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24060/if-the-kim-regime-falls-in-north-korea-sustained-armed-resistance-could-follow

At some point, the brutal and parasitic Kim family dictatorship in North Korea must end, but it is impossible to tell whether it will happen sooner or later. Many predictions that the regime would fall have proven false, but it simply cannot last forever. Whether by internal conflict or by provoking a war with South Korea and the United States, the Kim regime eventually will go.

Stressing that “Korean unification is a Korean affair,” South Korean President Moon Jae-in is convinced that whenever reunification comes, it should be under the leadership of the democratic and economically vigorous south, rather than the decrepit, economically incompetent and brutal regime of Kim Jong Un in the north. Seoul has prepared extensively, establishing a National Unification Board in 1969 and later upgrading it to the Ministry of Unification, which has made substantial plans for a post-Kim stabilization of North Korea.

This would certainly be a good thing for everyone, except Kim loyalists. In addition to the Korean people, other nations, including the United States, would benefit from a unified, peaceful, democratic and prosperous Korean Peninsula. The problem is getting there: The Kim regime will not go easily, and even if it is gone, the job will have only just begun.

Today, South Korea recognizes that stabilizing, rebuilding and integrating North Korea will take a massive effort, but it also believes that it will be relatively peaceful. History has made Koreans leery of external intervention, but Seoul assumes most North Koreans will see South Koreans as fellow countrymen and therefore accept—even welcome—unification engineered by their southern brethren and immediately embrace democracy, the rule of law and the free market system. 

(Continued at the link below)

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24060/if-the-kim-regime-falls-in-north-korea-sustained-armed-resistance-could-follow

Collapse of the North Korean regime appears inevitable, and the world needs to prepare for it (From Chinese Scholars)

In the South China Morning Post from two Chinese scholars.  I am somewhat optimistic that we are finally seeing so many people acknowledging the need to PREPARE for north Korean regime collapse.

 

Pretty strong words from China.

 

Excerpts:

 

Thus, while it is still hard to judge North Korea in full, there remains a high probability of regime collapse.

 

Unless Pyongyang gives up its nuclear programme, the byungjin strategy is bound to fail.

 

Even an economic recovery and improvement in people's livelihoods is unlikely to change this trend. Harsh sanctions have left many from the upper classes at odds with the leadership and led to a growing number of defectors. In the most recent case, 13 employees of a North Korean-run restaurant in Ningbo (寧波) defected to the South – the largest single group in the past decade.

 

Meet the North Korean defector and restaurateur who believes 'reunification of our country starts at the table'

Trouble usually arises within one's own boundaries. Once those who have benefited from the regime in the past start to become dissatisfied with the government and seek an escape route, the collapse of the Kim dynasty, built on the basis of lies and repression, is just around the corner. There may only be 10 to 15 years left for the Kim family to govern, and a collapse could begin at any time. So, how would such a scenario play out?

 

​I have pasted my thoughts on collapse below.  I would love to host a working group of military planners from the US. ROK. China, Russia, and Japan​ and put together a plan for each of the military contingents to present to their political leaders.

 

 

scmp.com

Collapse of the North Korean regime appears inevitable, and the world needs to prepare for it

Deng Yuwen and Huang Ting say the flimsy economic plan unveiled at the Workers' Party congress will do little to alleviate the country's crippling problems, which include severe food shortages and growing discontent

PUBLISHED : Wednesday, 18 May, 2016, 5:25pm
UPDATED : Wednesday, 18 May, 2016, 5:25pm 

3 min read 

 original

The seventh ruling Worker's Party congress in North Korea, the first in 36 years, turned out to be a coronation for Kim Jong-un, formalising the system centred on the young leader and promoting the party's status vis-à-vis the army's.

North Korea's 'rare' party congress only shows a country at a standstill

The national byungjin strategy, which calls for securing a nuclear arsenal while seeking to develop the economy, was re-emphasised.

A five-year plan was put forward to show the government's commitment to economic problems, especially the supply of electricity, as Kim admitted that a lack of power has affected economic development and improvement of people's living standards.

The general idea from the congress was thus that Pyongyang would devote greater efforts to economic reform, pay more attention to developing its economy and improve people's lives.

However, in reality, the plan merely opens the door to reform just a crack instead of pushing hard. Without such opening up, reforms will not make significant progress. So there is still much uncertainty over North Korea's future.

Improved access to education, health care and food in North Korea but right to freedom of movement and the right to life worsen, says new report

With the significant drop in grain output and reduction of food aid as a result of increased international sanctions, North Korea is this year facing the most serious food problem in recent years. According to the UN World Food Programme, there is already a shortfall of 1.1 million tonnes of food, and a quarter of children are severely malnourished.

There have been signs that Pyongyang is preparing to test a fifth nuclear weapon and more missiles. If Kim goes his own way, regardless of opposition from the international community, he will surely bring harsher sanctions upon his nation, which will affect his plan to build North Korea into economic power.

Thus, while it is still hard to judge North Korea in full, there remains a high probability of regime collapse.Unless Pyongyang gives up its nuclear programme, the byungjinstrategy is bound to fail.

Even an economic recovery and improvement in people's livelihoods is unlikely to change this trend. Harsh sanctions have left many from the upper classes at odds with the leadership and led to a growing number of defectors. In the most recent case, 13 employees of a North Korean-run restaurant in Ningbo (寧波) defected to the South – the largest single group in the past decade.

Meet the North Korean defector and restaurateur who believes 'reunification of our country starts at the table'

Trouble usually arises within one's own boundaries. Once those who have benefited from the regime in the past start to become dissatisfied with the government and seek an escape route, the collapse of the Kim dynasty, built on the basis of lies and repression, is just around the corner. There may only be 10 to 15 years left for the Kim family to govern, and a collapse could begin at any time. So, how would such a scenario play out?

There are several possibilities. First, if the economy fails to pick up in the long term, more people will be pushed into extreme poverty, causing general dissatisfaction with the government, leading to more and more people from all classes seeking to flee the country. Under such circumstances, the collapse only needs a catalyst.

With UN sanctions biting, it is impossible for Pyongyang to quickly solve the problems of food and electricity shortages.

Kim gets the party started, but will economic reforms follow?

Sanctions will increasingly isolate North Korea, preventing it from gaining the necessary funds, technology and assistance to spur growth. Thus, in the long term, with no economic recovery, dissatisfaction will grow among the people. With widespread poverty and general social discontent, it would be increasingly hard for the government to deal with any emergency caused by policy mistakes, something which is common in a totalitarian regime.

Second, in order to solve the problem of a lack of food to support a large army, Pyongyang would have to promote self-reliance among its citizens, relax control over the economy in a limited way and, to some extent, even allow some form of capitalism.

In its fragile state, North Korea would also be increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters. Without external aid, which has shored up the government in the past during such calamities, Pyongyang would find it difficult, if not impossible, to handle any natural or man-made disaster on its own.

Ordinary North Koreans are the true audience for Pyongyang's nuclear weapons tests

The possibility of an internal coup also exists; the moody and unstable nature of the totalitarian regime leads to fear and insecurity that could bubble over into a bloody internal power struggle.

It is believed that it was fear of a coup that prompted Kim to execute his uncle, Jang Song-taek, and other veterans. The congress seemed to further consolidate Kim's power, but its stability is very superficial and new dissenters could be created by the regime's actions at any moment.

Lastly, outside intervention, including a targeted assassination and military strikes, is possible. In terms of its capabilities, there would be little North Korea could do if the US decided to press ahead with such an option.

In such circumstances, it would be difficult for Kim and his family to survive challenges at home and abroad.

In any of the above scenarios, great calamity would befall a Pyongyang that is already suffering much stress and danger.

The collapse of North Korea is just a matter of time; it is important for the international community to realise this, explore the issue and be prepared for the inevitable chain reactions.

Deng Yuwen is a researcher at the Charhar Institute think tank. Huang Ting is a researcher at the Innovation and Development Institute, Shenzhen

​My thoughts as an outline/start point to begin planning discussions:

 

Korea and the future:  Some Thoughts

The "Big 5"

1. War

2. Regime Collapse

3. Human Rights Atrocities/Crimes Against Humanity

4. Nuclear and Missile Delivery Programs

5. Unification

Big 8 Contingencies

1. Provocations to gain political and economic concessions

2. nk Attack – execution of the nK campaign plan to reunify the peninsula by force

3. Civil War/Chaos/Anarchy

4. Refugee crisis

5. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster relief

6. WMD, loss of control – seize and secure operations

7. Resistance to foreign intervention (e.g., insurgency)

8. How to handle the nKPA during regime collapse short of war

7 Steps of Preparation

1. Shared vision – a new durable political arrangement** (see below)

2. Roles & Missions  - national responsibilities for action

3. Organizational Framework for operations  (UNC/ROK/US CFC, independent operations, other)

4. Command, Control, Coordination, and liaison processes & methods (including information sharing)

5. Concept of operations for deploying required forces (air, land, and sea)

6. Resource commitment – which countries provide what

7. And most important  - information/psychological preparation of the environment – a sophisticated and aggressive information and influence activities campaign focused on the population to prepare then for the future (e.g., unification) and the "2d tier leadership" by using a combination of coercion and co-option.  – An "exit strategy" for 2d tier military leaders and party members outside the core elite.

Guiding Principles:

1.  Defense of ROK is paramount – all decisions must support defense of ROK against the full range of threats from the north.

2.  Must provide options to national policy makers – early decisions required to overcome the law of physics: time, distance, and space.  Must have the right capabilities in the right place for employment at the right time.

3.  Transparency is critical when dealing with the 5 Parties and international community.  Must have decisive and consistent themes and messages.  This is not the situation in which we should employ deception.  Only through clear articulation of alliance priorities and intent can we have a chancing at reducing the chance of conflict due to misunderstanding of intentions.  Examples for consideration (and these would be consistently expressed by the ROK/US Alliance.

            A.  Defense and Security of ROK is the number one priority.

            B. UNC and ROK/US CFC have the following priorities:

                        (1) Security of nuclear weapons, followed by chemical weapons and then the biological program

                        (2) Security, health, and welfare of the Korean people living in the north.

                        (3) UNC and ROK/US CFC desire to work with all interested nations to bring security, stability and long term peace to the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.

                        (4) UNC and ROK/US CFC will support the establishment of a unified peninsula – a United Republic of Korea.

**Proposed new durable political arrangement: A stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people:  A United Republic of Korea (UROK) orUnited Republic of Corea (UROC)

​

Time to Prepare for Regime Change in N.Korea

We have rarely read and heard the Korean media say this.  But we have wasted the last 19 years (since we really began looking at the possibility of regime collapse) by not effectively preparing for it and only paying it lip service because we really do not want to invest in the necessary preparations and instead only deal with problems when they become crises after they happen.

The reign of terror stems from Kim’s insecurity about his grip on power because he inherited his position. This is evident in the frequency of demotions and promotions among his top officials. But this type of rule is certain to have serious repercussions.

There are limits to human endurance. Skepticism about Kim's leadership ability is apparently spreading in the North, and top officials are probably the most vulnerable to such suspicions. 

Suzanne Scholte of the North Korea Freedom Coalition always says North Korea will soon collapse. This never seemed very plausible, but it is beginning to now. Seoul must prepare for this possibility. 

Time to Prepare for Regime Change in N.Korea

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/05/14/2015051401985.html

North Korean Army chief Hyon Yong-chol was executed for treason on April 30, the National Intelligence Service told lawmakers here Wednesday. 

According to the NIS, Hyon was caught dozing off during a military rally on April 24-25 and failed to obey or complained about Kim's orders. Hyon was apparently executed by anti-aircraft gun as hundreds of people watched the gruesome spectacle at a military academy in Pyongyang. 

The NIS said that several other key North Korean officials were purged over the last six months, including Ma Won-chun, the director of a new agency under the North's National Defense Commission overseeing the construction industry, Pyon In-son, a vice minister of the People's Armed Forces and central party finance and accounting cadre Han Kwang-sang.

The weapon used to execute Hyon was a FLAK gun, which would have blown his body to smithereens. Kim apparently executed his uncle Jang Song-taek the same way back in late 2013. One of the offenses Jang was found guilty of was applauding Kim too feebly and lounging in his seat during one of Kim's speeches. Jang was executed four days after his arrest and Hyon three days, but where Jang was dragged before a kangaroo court, there no trial at all before Hyon's execution. 

Kim has apparently executed around 70 of his officials since he took power more than three years ago. Some were executed by flame thrower in order to leave no trace. Witnesses to the grisly executions must not turn their heads or shed tears and must write essays on how they felt after watching the horrific events. This is too barbaric for words.

The reign of terror stems from Kim’s insecurity about his grip on power because he inherited his position. This is evident in the frequency of demotions and promotions among his top officials. But this type of rule is certain to have serious repercussions.

There are limits to human endurance. Skepticism about Kim's leadership ability is apparently spreading in the North, and top officials are probably the most vulnerable to such suspicions. 

Suzanne Scholte of the North Korea Freedom Coalition always says North Korea will soon collapse. This never seemed very plausible, but it is beginning to now. Seoul must prepare for this possibility. 

 Read this article in Korean

englishnews@chosun.com / May 14, 2015 12:48 KST

Obama: North Korea is bound to collapse

President Obama provides strategic guidance on north Korea via YouTube. We have to be careful what we ask for especially if we have not prepared for it.  Are we really looking for ways to accelerate that change?  And what happens when it occurs?  Do we have an unconventional warfare plan to support this strategic guidance? 

Excerpts:

   "The kind of authoritarianism that exists there, you almost can't duplicate anywhere else. It's brutal and it's oppressive and as a consequence, the country can't really even feed its own people," Obama said. "Over time, you will see a regime like this collapse."

...

   "So the answer is not going to be a military solution. We will keep on ratcheting the pressure, but part of what's happening is that the environment that we're speaking in today, the Internet, over time is going to be penetrating this country," Obama said.

   "And it is very hard to sustain that kind of brutal authoritarian regime in this modern world. Information ends up seeping in over time and bringing about change, and that's something that we are constantly looking for ways to accelerate," he added.

...

   Many analysts agree that North Korea stands low in the U.S. priority listand that the Obama administration has little interest in resuming nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang. The U.S. has demanded Pyongyang take concrete steps demonstrating its denuclearization commitments before nuclear talks reopen.

(LEAD) Obama: North Korea is bound to collapse

http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?cid=AEN20150124000251315&domain=3&ctype=A&site=0400000000

2015-01-24 04:23

Normal FontLarge Font

(ATTN: RECASTS paras 1-2, ADDS background in last 3 paras)
   U.S. President Barack Obama said he believes North Korea will ultimately collapse, but a military solution is not the answer to handling the communist nation armed with nuclear technologies and missiles.

   Obama made the remark in an interview on Youtube on Thursday, stressing that the Internet will ultimately find its way into the isolated totalitarian nation and spread information that will undercut the authoritarian regime.

   Obama called the North "the most isolated, the most sanctioned, the most cut-off nation on Earth."

   "The kind of authoritarianism that exists there, you almost can't duplicate anywhere else. It's brutal and it's oppressive and as a consequence, the country can't really even feed its own people," Obama said. "Over time, you will see a regime like this collapse."

   Obama emphasized that the U.S. capacity to effect change in North Korea is limited because the communist nation has a 1-million-strong military as well as nuclear technologies and missiles. Moreover, South Korea would be "severely affected" if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, he said.

   "So the answer is not going to be a military solution. We will keep on ratcheting the pressure, but part of what's happening is that the environment that we're speaking in today, the Internet, over time is going to be penetrating this country," Obama said.

   "And it is very hard to sustain that kind of brutal authoritarian regime in this modern world. Information ends up seeping in over time and bringing about change, and that's something that we are constantly looking for ways to accelerate," he added.

   Obama made no mention of North Korea in his State of the Union address, though he vowed to make sure that "no foreign nation" will disrupt American computer networks in apparent reference to the North's alleged hack on Sony Pictures.

   After the FBI determined the North was responsible for the hack on Sony, Obama strongly condemned the attack and vowed to respond proportionally. Early this month, Obama authorized fresh sanctions on North Korean entities and officials, including the General Reconnaissance Bureau, Pyongyang's top spy agency.

   Many analysts agree that North Korea stands low in the U.S. priority list and that the Obama administration has little interest in resuming nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang. The U.S. has demanded Pyongyang take concrete steps demonstrating its denuclearization commitments before nuclear talks reopen.

   WASHINGTON, Jan. 23 (Yonhap)
   jschang@yna.co.kr
(END)

Excerpt form the CNN article below:

Depending on how you read the signs, the execution of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's uncle and formerly trusted regent, Jang Song Thaek, either shows a young leader further cementing his control, or the first death throes of a regime teetering on collapse.

Because of these questions I would like to offer a couple of things.  First is a definition of regime collapse.  Kim Jong-un will be faced with regime collapse when there is no longer central governing effectiveness and there is a loss of coherency and support of the military and security services.  So far there is no evidence that he has lost central governing effectiveness and the military and security services seem to be functioning "normally" (from a nK perspective) and in support of Kim Jong-un.

However, the only person to ever conduct a thorough and objective analysis of the process the regime might go through to collapse is Robert Collins who produced the seminal work of Patterns of Collapse which is also known as the Seven Phases of Collapse.  I would just like to provide the excerpts of possible scenarios of the phases 4 through 7 below so that we might see the process which could occur in the north if the current suppression phase is not successful (and so far I see no evidence yet that the suppression mechanisms are failing – by definition Jang's arrest and execution indicate the suppression system is working).

Excerpt from Patterns of Collapse (note this was written around 1995 thus the reference to Kim  Chong-il).  

Possible Scenarios in Phases 4 through 7.

d. Phase Four: Suppression - Both the incorporation of local internal security elements into independent activity and the activity itself are perceived as direct challenges to the authority of Kim Chong-il and the Core Group.  The Core Group will respond to such challenges in both indiscriminate and calculated manners.  This phase must be successful to prevent the further breakdown of the regime’s control.  The regime’s full energies will address whatever the regime itself perceives as threats.  nKorea’s track record at suppressing isolated incidents is well established.  Again, success here is paramount to the survival of the regime and world public opinion will not be an effective deterrent.

                        1/ Internal Security systems (even paramilitary units) will be mobilized to employ indiscriminate force to make examples of groups of citizens or entire sub-system(s). Entire sub-systems, such as collective farms deemed collectively guilty of independent (read politically disloyal) activity, will be instantly converted into political crime camps guarded by military or paramilitary units.

                        2/ Local active-duty company and battalion-level military units will be mobilized to employ indiscriminate violent force for the most severe cases.  A severe case would be organized demonstrations (of any kind, but food riots would be an eminent example) against the local or national government.

                       

                        3/ Suppression operations could be streamlined to improve overall effectiveness in dealing with dissidence and/or independent activity.  An example of this streamlining would be the establishment of local “civil order” commands which consolidate local internal security and military assets.  (Inter-agency sharing of information and planning is indeed uncommon to the nKorean political structure.  However, the severity of the situation most likely would be perceived as justification to consolidate.) This inter-agency cooperation would facilitate both detection of and response to increased dissidence and/or independent activity.  The command function could vary.  Two proto-types would be a local ministry of state security official obtaining operational control of a military quick reaction force provided by the local military commander for the purpose of immediate countermeasure.  A more likely proto-type would be the requirement for local security officials to report not only up their chain of command but laterally or even directly to the local military commander.  The commander then acts on this information and, armed with the authority of the “local civil order command,” orders his troops to suppress the reported dissidence with whatever force necessary. 

                        4/ Mass arrests and purges. nKorea has a long history of this activity.  Political reasons are invariably cited as justification, even when activity is clearly not political but civil crime.  The nKorean regime has already divided the nKorean populace into 51 distinct categories of loyalty or disloyalty.  Those arrested and their families are reclassified to disloyal categories.  Arrests and purges become indiscriminate when local authorities feel personally threatened when pyongyang’s intended impact is not delivered to the expected extent.  

                        5/ Show trials and public executions.  These are employed to demonstrate regime’s resolve and demand for adherence to political guidelines.

            e. Phase Five: Resistance - This phase presupposes that the supression phase failed to meet its intended goals.  Local groups, even new sub-systems evolving out of independent activity, will gain confidence in their ability not to succumb to the government’s suppression attempts either through open resistance or manipulation of reporting that forwards false data.

                        1/  Refusal to obey government directives.  These directives will be ignored because those that resist perceive enforcement is unlikely.

                        2/ Usurpation of government assets, such as storehouses or competing sub-systems.  This will enhance the power of local resistance activities, whether economically or politically based.

                        3/ Threats and violence employed against internal security representatives to either win their culpability or simple elimination.  Resistance groups will lose their fear of internal security forces and either eliminate them, beginning at the basic level, or incorporate them into their local sub-system to assist in their activity.

                        4/ The more successful local resistance becomes, the more likely a resource-denied sub-system (which is already a paramilitary unit within the nKorean social system) will begin to employ counter-force against the regime’s mobilized military units.  Such an incident will become a central issue dominating the attention of the Core Group.

                        5/ Successful armed resistance, though only at the sub-system level (company to battalion-sized paramilitary level) will lead the regime’s Core Group to employ combined arms operations against the resistance group.  Some military leaders receiving such orders will hesitate to employ maximum indiscriminate force against local citizens and will immediately be relieved if not executed on the spot.  Other leaders will execute the executioner.  The depth of the resistance phase can be measured by the rank of the officer who does not obey orders from Pyongyang.

                        6/ Low echelon border units, along both the northern border and the DMZ, will cross the border and the MDL while senior echelons are preoccupied with resistance suppression.   Platoon commanders will be capable of initiating a platoon level crossing of the border or DMZ for the purpose of avoiding punishment, chaos, or worse.  After eliminating the company’s single political officer, a company commander would be capable of taking a whole company across the DMZ.  The senior battalion commander would be forced to call for artillery fires into the DMZ or beyond to halt the platoon or company-sized defections across the DMZ.  He would do this knowing that he would probably be immediately executed for permitting it to happen in the first place.  This process would not likely end until the division or corps level.

            f. Phase Six: Fracture - This phase is the most unpredictable.  The current regime and its Core Group members must see the success of the suppression phase as critical to their survival.  Failure of the suppression phase likely results in a quick transition through the resistance phase to the fracture phase.  Fracture will likely result in violence.  The types of fracture are calculable but where the fissures begin is not.  This phase will be characterized by the following:

                        1/ Internal Security systems (regional or national)  will be unable to comply with directives due to ineffectiveness.

                        2/ Core Group members or sub-group(s) openly (as opposed to private consultation) oppose Core Group directives.

                        3/ Division-sized military unit commanders ignore Core Group orders.  They perceive the orders extraordinary and do not believe them or are so appalled (through Korean perception) by the orders they make a conscious decision not to obey.

                        4/ Public execution employed against core-group member or members.  This is an indication of severe disagreement within the Core Group.  However, successful execution of one of these Core Group members is also an indication of containment to a limited degree.

                        5/ Division-sized military unit commanders who oppose Core Group orders ally with one another to oppose counter actions.  This amounts to civil war.  If Kim Chong-il and the Core Group wait to this point before initiating a nKorean attack against the Republic of Korea (as

a means to put an end to resistance energies), it may be too late.  As other dictators have in the past, a wartime footing provides the opportunity for internal security apparati to eliminate military commanders previously perceived by the regime to as supporters of resistance.

                        6/ Internal security officers executed or neutralized within entire systems or numerous adjacent sub-systems.

            g. Phase Seven: Realignment: This will be the most straight forward of the seven phases because the implications of previous actions or non-actions have played themselves out.

                        1/ Pre-identification of a nKorean individual or a oligarchic group as successor to the leadership of Kim Chong-il is extremely difficult to predict.  However, centuries-old historical korean patterns of political realignment indicate the nKorean military maintains the only power to actually replace the previous regime, resist internal security apparati, and  maintain public stability.  This process will be simplified if internal security procedures have been streamlined to include consolidation of control.

                       

                        2/ This military group will be shaped by an associational bond such as common military class, common military training, or regional background.  The overwhelmingly dominant common associational bond in existence now is graduation from the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School.  Service/duty in the organizational guidance department of the Korean Workers’ Party, whether military or civilian, is also a common associational bond among real power holders.  However, this department is so strongly associated with Kim Chong-il that its influence will evaporate with Kim Chong-il’s downfall.

                        3/ This or any other associational bond is likely to search for solutions/methods which enable them to hold onto power in nKorea for themselves.  This groups’ announcement of its intention to reform economically is more likely than an announcement supporting the concept of immediate peninsular unification.

                        4/ A new Core Group will move to protect its own interests and new domination of power. The new Core Group will attempt to ensure nKorean sovereignty through international efforts at the United Nations and other world bodies.  Because they view it as a method of cementing their new-found control, the new Core Group will seek immediate humanitarian relief for the nKorean populace and will seek assistance in improving the nKorean economic infrastructure.

This is another graphic depiction of the uncertainty and complexity we might face given regime collapse.

North Korean execution raises more question than answers

By Peter Shadbolt, CNN

http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/world/asia/north-korea-uncle-analysis/

updated 4:37 AM EST, Fri December 13, 2013

Some analysts believe Kim Jong Un's purge will consolidate his grip on power, others that it has seriously weakened it.

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

• Execution of Jong Song Thaek reveals glimpse into closed world of the North Korean regime
• Some analysts say it shows Kim Jong Un consolidating power over a politburo gerontocracy
• Others say it reveals a regime in meltdown as Kim battles military hardliners within the party

(CNN) -- Take one part Shakespeare's "Hamlet," two parts Machiavelli's "The Prince" and an even larger measure of guesswork and North Korea's latest political drama could seem like a Cold War thriller.

For North Korea watchers, the all too real political theater playing out in Pyongyang may offer another tantalizing glimpse behind the opaque curtain of the North Korean regime, but raises more questions than answers.

Depending on how you read the signs, the execution of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's uncle and formerly trusted regent, Jang Song Thaek, either shows a young leader further cementing his control, or the first death throes of a regime teetering on collapse.

In the absence of any independently verifiable information, and in a regime where paranoid rhetoric is the normal register of almost all diplomatic language, any conjecture is likely to be as accurate as it is to be wide of the mark.

North Korea: Leader's 'traitor' uncle executed

For Jasper Kim, the founder of the Asia-Pacific Global Research Group, North Korea remains for analysts a "Rubik's Cube that no one can solve."

North Korea leader's uncle executed

Chang: Regime like Richard III with nukes

North Korea: 'Unprecedented development'

He said North Korea is a master at carefully choreographing the way it releases news events to cloak its real intentions. Nevertheless, he said a careful reading between the lines of North Korean new agency KCNA sometimes reveals glimpses of the state of the regime.

He said that far from asserting the leadership of Kim, recent events suggest that his position has been seriously eroded by the execution of his uncle.

"My guess is that these events happened some time ago and they are only now being released," Kim told CNN. "The fact is that we don't know what's going on in North Korea but what we are seeing coming through on KCNA is very concerning.

"When you look at the language used in these KCNA reports it is particularly hawkish and it's much more reflective of the military than it is of Kim Jong Un.

"Basically we are seeing the hardline faction reassert itself. For Kim Jong Un, Jang Song Thaek was the bridge between him and his father, and now he will have very little protection."

He said that North Korea, famous for tightly controlling the drip feed of real information coming out of the country, was now sending out violently mixed messages.

"The recent release of the prisoner (Merrill Newman) and this execution couldn't be more at odds; what this indicates is that it's a chaotic situation in there," he added. "What this points to in terms of regime change is that it's a question of 'when' rather than 'if.'

"What history tells us is that when it does happen it will be unexpected and extreme and everyone must be prepared for the worst case scenario."

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/world/asia/north-korea-uncle-analysis/