NORTH KOREA’S THEATER OF THE ABSURD AND THE NEW NUMBER TWO’S by Robert Collins

If you only read one article from me today please read this one especially if you want to understand north Korean leadership (And I will be sending out a lot of articles today on this snow day in between reading admissions applications)

Please go to War on the Rocks to read the entire essay: http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/north-koreas-theater-of-the-absurd-and-the-new-number-twos-3/

Bob Collins is one of the foremost experts on north Korea and north Korean leadership.  Few have the access and expertise (and few can speak with north Koreans in their dialect as he can),  When Bob writes on north Korea it behooves us to pay attention.  I can guarantee that you can read what is written below in any classified analysis.  

This is in my opinion one of the most important essays to read on north Korean leadership.

NORTH KOREA’S THEATER OF THE ABSURD AND THE NEW NUMBER TWO’S

Robert Collins

http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/north-koreas-theater-of-the-absurd-and-the-new-number-twos-3/

February 13, 2014 · in Analysis

It seems as though North Korea’s “number two candidates” are the star roles for the Kim Regime’s version of Pirandello’s “Six Characters in Search of an Author.” Jang Song-thaek’s recent execution has raised a number of questions about the Kim Family Regime: What drives these purges? What do they mean? What do they say about the stability of the regime and how it functions?  These are all the right questions, but most of the analysis out there is not providing the right answers.

The North Korean regime’s theater of the absurd has been illustrated, most recently, by the execution of Jang Song-thaek, the uncle of leader Kim Jong-Un. Jang’s execution has left much of the world’s political pundits dumbfounded as to the “why,” “how,” and “what’s next.”  The international media’s speculation on wild stories such as Jang being executed by hungry dogs ripping him apart or Jang sleeping with Kim Jong-un’s wife only added to the surrealism surrounding this episode of Al Capone-like justice. Even Jang’s relatives – sister, brother in-law, nephew and their sons, daughters and grandchildren – have been put to death.  In the North Korean legal system, whole families must suffer the fate of the criminal, especially when the crime is against the Kim Regime.

Because of the level of Jang’s abuse of power and the threat he posed to Kim Jong-un’s authority, Jang’s execution was by far the most critical event to date since Kim Jong-un replaced his father as the North Korean leader. The dramatic removal of Jang from positions of power, including Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Director of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee’s Administration Department, and administrator of some of North Korea’s most productive foreign currency earning operations (FCEO), created a political oversight vacuum within most of those agencies.  The charges against Jang were “stacked” with the accusations covering the areas of economic, political, ethical and even the whimsical, such as not clapping hard enough for the Kim family.  But much of this was fictional scriptwriting of which even Eugene Ionesco would be proud.

The Downfall of Jang Song-thaek

The story of Jang’s downfall requires some understanding of the North Korean socio-political system, which places maximum emphasis on personal and institutional surveillance and loyalty. As such, it is very difficult to create independent organizations – social, political, “factions,” or otherwise – that support individuals other than the supreme leader, or political agendas other than those of the party and the supreme leader.  Therefore, individuals of influence develop “lines” of personal contacts and supporters who become their “men” or “network of influence” who then manipulate institutions for their political and/or economic gain.   Jang, because of his connection to the Kim Family as husband of Kim Jong-un’s aunt, came close to establishing his own power base and certainly developed an extensive line of supporters.

Using this influence, Jang committed perhaps the greatest crime a member of the North Korean elite can commit: he made a profit and did not give the regime a cut.  Paying into the supreme leader’s “revolutionary funds” is an absolute requirement for all FCEOs. Jang’s control of a wide number of foreign currency-earning organizations enabled him to accumulate one billion dollars, which were deposited in the Bank of Shanghai.  Kim Jong-un wanted access to these funds but Jang’s men – primarily Administration Department 1st Vice-Director Ri Yong-ha and Vice-Director Jang Su-gil – mishandled the money to the point that the Chinese government shut down the account.  In December 2013, Jang confessed his crimes before a military tribunal. He was branded a “traitor for all ages” and executed shortly thereafter.

The Bank of Shanghai episode was Jang’s last rodeo, but unbeknownst to many observers, it wasn’t his first. For Kim Jong-un and others, this was likely the last straw in Jang’s long history of abusing his authority, a history that reveals much about the opaque North Korean regime.

From Transgressor to Strongman: Jang’s “Revolutionary Re-Education”

Indeed, throughout his career, Jang Song-thaek frequently overstepped his bounds, bringing trouble down on those close to him.  As husband to the princess of the empire, he was spared many deserved punishments.  However, before his execution, Jang in fact twice received “revolutionary reeducation” for bad behavior. Such “re-education” is a common form of punishment within the Kim regime, if the sentence is not death or banishment to a political prison death camp. The transgressor is sent down to the common worker’s level to learn the lessons of the revolution through hard labor. As early as the 1970’s, Jang was accused of starting a “secret party” and sent to a work in a regional factory.  And in 2004, he was accused of “factional activities” and prevented from working altogether, a form of house arrest.

After returning from his second “revolutionization” experience in 2007, Jang was actually rewarded by his brother-in-law, Kim Jong-il, with an appointment as Director of the very influential Administration Department (AD) of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP).  At the time, the KWP Administration Department was part of the KWP’s Organization and Guidance Department (OGD), an institution expanded in power and influence under Kim Jong-il to the point of it being referred to by party bureaucrats as the “party within the party.”  The OGD’s primary responsibility is maintaining the stability of the regime by requiring loyalty from every North Korean, with a focus on the elite. Only the elite of the elite and the most loyal of the most loyal are permitted to work in the OGD.  Concurrent with Jang’s appointment to the AD, Kim Jong-il separated that department from the OGD, thus creating natural barriers between the two organizations.

The mission of Jang’s AD was political oversight (not command) of the State Security Department (North Korea’s secret police), the Ministry of Public Security (national police force), the courts, the judges, the prosecutors, and the lawyers.  The Administration Department also oversaw a significant number of FCEO’s (though it does not do so not any longer).  In other words, Jang had political watch over of the regime’s internal security apparatus and significant profit-making operations, a very powerful position indeed. The AD has subordinate offices down at the provincial (9), separate city, and county (145) levels.  These offices are integral to the party committees at those levels.  From those subordinate offices, Jang was able to influence the party-state’s internal security and FCEO’s at the micro level.  The combination of those two authorities is what got Jang in trouble for abusing of power.  Everybody that worked for Jang in the KWP AD at each of its levels had been able to leverage their influence for self-aggrandizement. Now, many of those officials will pay severely for their choice of loyalty.

Reporting from a North Korean refugees’ organization suggests that in April 2011, Kim Jong-il gave Jang even more power by appointing him to oversee several FCEO’s.  One of those was Department 54 of the General Political Bureau., which was responsible for manufacturing or acquiring soldier equipment and clothing.  Jang then promoted Department 54 Director, Jang Su-kil (no known relation), to be one of his close aides as a vice director within the AD.  Jang Su-kil, Administration Department 1st Vice Director, Ri Yong-ha, the party secretary of Department 54, and the Political Department Director of the Ministry of Public Security (national police) were known to become Jang Song-thaek’s three closest subordinates.

Then, however, the Department 54 party secretary began reporting secretly to the General Political Bureau (the military’s political commissar organization headed by Vice-Marshal Choi Ryong-hae) about Jang Song-thaek’s corruption and the General Political Bureau reported this directly to Kim Jong-un.  Jang once again miscalculated his influence and power and the effectiveness of his subordinates.  Consequently, the purging process began, with Jang Su-kil and Ri Yong-ha being the first two to be executed. The execution of Jang himself, of course, followed shortly thereafter.

The Aftermath of Jang’s Execution

(Continued at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/north-koreas-theater-of-the-absurd-and-the-new-number-twos-3/

Don Kirk is arguably one the best journalists covering north Korea (or maybe there is no argument about that).

V/R

Dave

1/26/2014 @ 11:06PM |1,297 views

One Way North Korea Battles For Survival -- Purging All Foes

http://www.forbes.com/sites/donaldkirk/2014/01/26/north-korea-battles-for-regime-survival-purging-all-vestiges-of-foes/

Donald Kirk, Contributor

Asia news from Korea's nuclear crisis to Indian foreign policy.

The time-honored way for Korea’s Jeoson dynasty leaders to get rid of a challenger or threat to their power was to execute not only the bad guy but all members of his family. It figures that Kim Jong-un, as the hereditary leader of the latter-day dynasty that rules North Korea in the style of the kings who once held sway over Korea, would want to wipe out the family of the late regent-mentor Jang Song-thaek.

That logic lends credence to a report carried by Yonhap, the South Korean news agency, citing unnamed sources as saying Kim Jong-un’s regime ordered the execution of two former ambassadors and their wives and children. One of them, the ambassador to Cuba, was married to the sister of Jang, Kim’s uncle by marriage , who was executed last month basically for plotting a coup. Another, ambassador to Malaysia, was a nephew.

(Credit: comradeanatolii)

By killing off wives, nieces and nephews of Jang, whose only daughter committed suicide in Paris years ago,  North Korea’s draconian justice system sought to eliminate all trace of the man described in North Korean propaganda as “worse than a dog.” Jang, of course, was the husband of Kim’s aunt, Kim Kyong-hui, younger sister of Kim’s father, the long-time ruler Kim Jong-il, who died in December 2011.

KOKO! (Photo credit: khalid Albaih)

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.forbes.com/sites/donaldkirk/2014/01/26/north-korea-battles-for-regime-survival-purging-all-vestiges-of-foes/

It is very unusual to see an article devoted to the Organization and Guidance Department.  Most of the pundits do not discuss it because they do not have the depth of understanding.  It is rarely mentioned in the mainstream media.  The Korean experts who have and continue to mentor me have always stressed the importance of this organization.  Kim Jong-il was put in charge of this organization in 1973 and used it to consolidate his power for 21 years until the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994.  As Kim Jong-il's health declined one of the key indicators we were looking for was if he would put one of his sons in charge of the OGD but as far as I can recall we never received any confirmation of who succeeded Kim Jong-il.

If Jang's purge/execution may very well be explained by a power struggle within the OGD.  If that is the case and the OGD is not fully controlled by Kim Jong-un now then we are very, very likely to see further friction within the regime and it may not turn out well as it could very well lead to a rapid regime collapse.  On the other hand, if Kim Jong-un does control the OGD then he is very likely to be able to consolidate power and possibly stabilize his rule and the regime.  There are of course a lot of variables but if there is a center of gravity in the Kim Family Regime it is the OGD.
V/R
Dave

This is it: North Korea’s hidden power system

December 31, 2013 by newfocusintl 1 Comment

http://newfocusintl.com/north-koreas-hidden-power-system/

For Kim Jong Un to take control of the Organisation and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers’ Party (the OGD is the key to real, as opposed to symbolic, dictatorial power in North Korea), he would need OGD experience and alliances, and he has neither. There is no indication that he has begun to take the reins of the OGD; on the contrary, there are overwhelming signs that he has not.

The OGD in its present form was built by Kim Jong Il in order to usurp power from his father Kim Il Sung and his supporters. The entity was painstakingly modified to vest all possible chain-of-command powers in Kim Jong Il’s person. The “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il worked as an OGD departmental supervisor, then as OGD departmental director and finally, became the OGD party secretary. Kim Jong Il’s power grew with that of the OGD.

While the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Korean Workers’ Party legitimized the hereditary succession of the Kim family through the cult of Kim Il Sung, the OGD routed policy and executive functions to Kim Jong Il.

In his son Kim Jong Un’s case, succession was authorized by the Politburo, and then his appointment to a role in the National Defence Committee. Both are merely symbolic structures, with no real powers or chain of command.

Even the transfer of symbolic power was coordinated by the OGD: all propaganda outlets nationwide remain under its grip. The OGD needs Kim Jong Un as the head of state, because the symbolic aspect of Kim family power is crucial in sustaining the legitimacy of the North Korean state.

The argument that generational power change has been taking place, and that Kim Jong Un is building his own power base, has depended on observations such as the fact that all of Kim Jong Il’s pallbearers have been purged. Yet not one of them was an OGD man.

Not only do Kim Jong Il’s OGD enforcers remain well and unharmed, they are even appearing with Kim Jong Un in public – North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun just reported the presence of Kim Kyong Ok and Hwang Byong So, two of the leading OGD figures.

After Kim Jong Il’s death, the OGD power structure remained untouched and unchanged, yet it was headless: Kim Jong Un did not inherit command of the OGD from Kim Jong Il.

Why didn’t Kim Jong Il give OGD control to his successor? Was this not possible or not accomplished? All we can say for now is that Kim Jong Il exercised all real powers as the OGD party secretary, with entities such as the military, political institutions and the secret police all answering to him through the OGD structure. This is the position that was not handed to Kim Jong Un by Kim Jong Il before his death.

The problem of Jang Song Thaek also remained – after Kim Jong Il handed over the OGD Administration Department to him in 2007, this remained the only enforceable power base outside the OGD chain of command. This tension manifested itself in the ‘factional’ battles to claim the “legacy of Kim Jong Il” and involved several purges.

This is the context of power struggles over clams, coal and everything else.

The toxic history of suspicion and violent feuds arising from the OGD’s activation of Jang Song Thaek side-branch restrictions and his subsequent revenges was encouraged by Kim Jong Il:

Jang Song Thaek’s brutal 1997 purge of Moon Sung Sul, general secretary of the Central KWP HQ; the suicide of Kim Yong Ryong, First Vice Director of the Ministry of State Security (the premier surveillance and purging arm of the OGD) as a result of a campaign led by Jang Song Thaek in 1998; OGD First Vice Director Ri Je Gang dying in mysterious circumstances in the aftermath of Kim Jong Il’s stroke in 2009; and after Kim Jong Il’s death, Vice Director Ryu Gyong of the Ministry of State Security being accused of espionage and executed; more recently, Wu Dong Cheuk, First Vice Director of the Ministry of State Security purged by Jang Song Thaek’s Ministry of People’s Security.

While the OGD restricted Jang Song Thaek through his side-branch designation, Jang Song Thaek himself was encouraged to prune elements of the OGD who were proving too powerful for Kim Jong Il’s liking.

With no one to authorize the checking of OGD powers as, for example, Kim Jong Il had done in 1997-2000 by giving Jang Song Thaek command over a nationwide Ministry of Social Security (the earlier incarnation of the Ministry of People’s Security) campaign of purges that hacked away at the surveillance rights of the OGD’s Ministry of State Security; or Kim Jong Il’s removal of the Administration Department from the OGD in 2007 to give control of it to Jang Song Thaek, there was no way Jang Song Thaek could survive without establishing his power base outside the OGD through personal diplomatic and economic initiatives.

This, in turn, further complicated the co-existence of Jang Song Thaek with the OGD.

After the OGD lost its military man (General Political Bureau head Ri Young Ho) to Jang Song Thaek’s Kim Jong Il-blessed proxy Choe Ryong Hae, who then turned against Jang Song Thaek, the balance of power was finally tipped against him.

The OGD power structure that has remained untouched and unchanged since Kim Jong Il’s death has reclaimed its head: the symbolic authority of the Kim cult, as manifested through Kim Jong Un’s ‘dictatorial’ power.

The structure of the Organisation and Guidance Department

When you analyse power in North Korea, the only proper way to see it is according to the OGD-enforced hierarchy. The current North Korean system was built to be a totalitarian state by Kim Jong Il’s OGD: all the procedures and processes of power work through the OGD.

This applies to diplomatic and business postings abroad, trading rights, powers of enforcement, and everything else.

How does the OGD work in practice? The OGD has five main spheres of influence:

1 – Monopoly over human resources.

I.e. the exclusive right to allocate positions among the elite. Most cadres are appointed by the Central Party Cadre Section, but any cadre of Director level and above in the central institutions is appointed by the OGD.

In the military, all generals above the level of regimental commander nationwide are directly appointed by the OGD.

Here is a breakdown of the OGD’s personnel appointment structure:

• Sections 1 and 2 for central cadres
• Section 3 for provincial cadres
• Section 4 for military appointments
• Section 5 for Guards Command (protection of Kim family)
• Section 6 for Ministry of State Security
• Section 7 for Ministry of People’s Security
• Section 8 for the judiciary
• Section 9 for government
• Section 11 for inter-Korean related personnel

In this way, every single appointment that matters is routed through the OGD.

2 – Absolute ‘guidance’ rights.

This is the right to intervene in every administrative task carried out at any level. All North Korean cadres and workers’ criticism sessions and political indoctrination meetings that take place daily or weekly is at the capillary level of the OGD’s ‘guidance’ chain of command.

The guidance section is divided into central and provincial concerns. The Central Party arm of the Guidance Department has unchallengeable authority over every institution and entity in Pyongyang. The provincial Party Guidance Department controls every provincial Party branch. Its powers are absolute.

For example, the power of OGD Section 13, in charge of military guidance, is such that the head of the KPA General Political Bureau may be summoned to grovel and be humiliated.

3 – Absolute ‘surveillance’ rights.

I.e. to monitor, purge and expel anyone. It is separated into central, provincial and institutional sections, and in this way, the rule by fear is both extremely compartmentalised and centralised.

In particular, Section 4 of the OGD ‘surveillance’ chain of command specializes in the highest-ranking cadres, wielding a guillotine that can come down on the head of any of them.

4 – Absolute policy sanction rights.

Every institution in North Korea had to route its proposals through the OGD ‘reporting section’ for an authorization from Kim Jong Il before it became valid.

The absolute centralization of policy proposals and policy approvals was emblematic of a totalitarian rule sanctioned by the sole authority of Kim Jong-il’s person.

5 – Protection of and catering for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

Even the most trivial concerns pertaining to the ruling Kim, as well as procurement of all luxury goods and all bodyguard protection rights (Kim’s personal guards number one hundred thousand), is operated by the OGD.

North Korea’s systemic reality

Of the 25,000 North Korean exiles in South Korea, there are only eight with genuine and verified first-hand knowledge of or contact with North Korea’s hidden power hierarchy.

They lived under the direct surveillance and monitoring of Kim Jong Il’s OGD, and among them are some who were once vetted by the OGD and permitted to exercise sanctioned powers, or granted immunity from prosecution and purging by Kim Jong Il himself.

Of these eight, the highest-ranked, according to North Korea’s symbolic hierarchy, is former KWP international secretary Hwang Jang Yop. He died in 2010. Another is in the last stages of cancer.

The remaining six at New Focus are determined that the opacity that sustains North Korea’s totalitarian power structure should be penetrated by means of an interpretative framework rooted in North Korea’s political reality rather than through its outward manifestations. We are supported by cadres still within the North Korean system who, at great personal risk, maintain contact with their former colleagues.

Jang Jin-sung

I could not agree more with this statement.

A new U.S. policy needs to be comprehensive, not simply focused on ridding the world of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. That means working with China, recognizing that we share a common interest in peace, and that we need to be debating how to achieve long-term stability and not just next steps toward denuclearization. With the South Koreans, we need to step up planning for any number of scenarios, from surprising new provocations to a palace coup to the sudden collapse of the Kim Dynasty.

…

The stakes are enormous. The Obama administration can no longer relegate North Korea policy to the back burner. The end of the Kim Dynasty is approaching, and with it the demise of North Korea could quickly follow. If ever there were a time for daring, muscular multilateralism, this is it.

Kim Jong Un Just Got More Dangerous

By PATRICK M. CRONIN

 

December 15, 2013

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/12/kim-jong-un-uncle-north-korea-101172.html?hp=pm_1

“The more you approach infinity,” the French novelist Gustave Flaubert wrote, “the deeper you penetrate terror.”

So it is with Kim Jong Un, already the most dangerous man in the most precarious nuclear state in the world. After the swift execution this week of his uncle-cum-regent, Jang Song Taek, he has become even more dangerous. Kim has boxed himself into a corner where it is hard to fathom a peaceful future for either his family dynasty or the country he rules.

The full implications of this bloody purge will reveal themselves over time as additional disturbing revelations seep out. But Kim’s murderous act leaves an indelible stain. Global risk is now heightened, as the slaughter at the top of Pyongyang’s pyramid locks Kim into a reign of terror, with consequences that threaten the security of the entire region.

There is little doubting Uncle Jang’s “acts of treachery.” To be sure, some of the myriad charges against Jang, listed in a remarkable North Korean news release, belong in the theater of the absurd (underselling his nephew’s stunning achievements, presumably a water park in East Pyongyang and a ski resort set to open at month’s end). But there was indeed skullduggery afoot. Clearly Jang was guilty of building his personal power, a threat to the 30-year-old Kim, whose bloodline entitles him, not the man who married his aunt, to claim the mantle of his father, the late “Dear Leader.”

The abrupt and brutal manner in which Kim dispatched his uncle highlights a disturbing degree of cruelty and erratic behavior. South Korean National Assembly Chairman of Information Seo Sang-gi said he was told that Jang and his subordinates were executed with machine guns and flamethrowers. Kim’s challengers may be silenced for now, but their ranks are undoubtedly on alert as to what must be done—a fact that can only add to the young tyrant’s paranoia.

Jang’s execution is alarming for reasons beyond what it says about Kim’s state of mind. He was not just Kim’s uncle; he was a powerful figure inside the regime, and many saw him as an advocate of gradual, Chinese-style reform. That made him a key interlocutor for Beijing, because what Chinese officials fear most about North Korea is not its nuclear weapons or its grandiose threats to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire,” but a collapse of the North Korean state that would send millions of starving refugees streaming across its border. China’s plan for a soft landing appeared to include a combination of personal cooption (Jang was reportedly deep into Chinese pockets) and hard infrastructure (investments in special economic zones and resource extraction). Now, that dream has died with Uncle Jang.

Indeed, a complete economic meltdown seems inevitable. Kim’s relentless determination to pursue nuclear weapons, coupled with his ruthless brand of authoritarianism, will deter foreign investment and accelerate North Korea’s decline. Despite hopes that his Swiss education would give him a more Western outlook, Kim has failed to follow through on any significant economic reforms. His concern for domestic enemies will ensure that yet more resources are poured into security and defense—a vicious downward spiral from which North Korea might never recover.

Sitting atop a failed economy and a closed society, maintaining order through terror and a police state, Kim is running out of moves. In the span of two years, his image has lurched from that of a youthful, reform-minded man of the people and caring father to the worst kind of medieval despot. It harkens back to Choson Korea, where killing competing royal family members was not uncommon. There is even an historical precedent in which a young 15th century ruler, King Danjong, was overthrown and eventually killed by his regent uncle. Five hundred years later, North Korea stands as a paean to pre-modern barbarity. Execution instills a sort of order and discipline, at least on the surface. But in the 21st century, it is a prelude to bitter demise. Morality aside, the reason despotism has fallen out of fashion is because there’s little future in it.

But North Korea, already the world’s most repressive state, could get much worse in the interim. As Kim fears for his absolute power and survival, he is apt to plunge his country into full totalitarian terror, with momentous consequences that won’t be easily contained. North Korea’s retrograde technology and its bizarre propaganda may make us laugh, but it is also a heavily armed nuclear state with a leader who is losing contact with reality. That ought to concentrate some minds in the White House.

(Continued at the link below)
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/12/kim-jong-un-uncle-north-korea-101172.html?hp=pm_1

Analysis: Kim Jong-un’s agenda brutally clear after execution of his uncle

Analysis from the former UK ambassador to north Korea.

Almost all analysis revolves around Kim consolidating power or that there could be further instability.  

What I do not read about is whether there are any opportunities being created here or the fact that if there is further instability and the potential for regime collapse what are we doing now to prepare for the contingency to include preparations that might mitigate the effects of regime collapse. Are opportunities being presented to be able to influence what might come after Kim Jong-un (I deliberately use what vice who)?  Should the ROK government or the ROK/US Alliance be executing a comprehensive influence campaign now?  Should the Alliance be assessing whether there is growing resistance potential inside north Korea and determine how it could be exploited to achieve Alliance objectives?  But in every crisis there are opportunities that can be exploited and we should be observing for them.   Just as an aside here is the abstract from my 2004 research project at the National War College.  Note the last paragraph (recall also that in 2004 the ROK/US Alliance was not in very good shape).  As an aside I have waited a long time for such events as are taking place in north Korea.  But can they be exploited?

ABSTRACT

            This paper has as its thesis five propositions that will be discussed in detail:

• US and ROK policies are in turmoil are not coherent, and not synchronized.  There is no long term approach to the “Korea Question.”
• The ROK-US alliance is eroding rapidly due to actions by both governments and their respective populations.
• North Korea will continue to execute its strategy to protect its vital national interest: Survival of the Kim Family Regime (KFR) and any strategy devised must take this into account.
• To achieve a lasting peace on the peninsula, a combined ROK-US strategy that seeks to achieve a mutually agreed upon and acceptable end state must be developed and executed in an orchestrated and cooperative approach.
• Divergent ROK and US policies must be made compatible (e.g., Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy - and now the Roh Moo Hyun administration’s Peace and Prosperity policy - versus those in the US who want to focus on Regime Change).  Instead of causing regime change externally the ROK and US strategy must be to prepare for a post Kim Family Regime era that arises from internal regime change while at the same time managing the crises as they occur, identifying and exploiting opportunities as they arise, and preparing for the potential conflict that a post-KFR peninsula may trigger.

            This paper proposes a long term ROK-US combined security strategy to work toward resolution of the “Korea question”: Comprehensive Engagement with Strength: Partner and Prosper.  It establishes a long term end state toward which all efforts will focus.  It provides a framework that allows management of the current and future crises while simultaneously allowing the ROK and US to identify opportunities stemming from current and future emerging crises that will support achievement of the long term end state. 

Key Points:

·      Ensure that an effective defensive capability remains in place until the “Korea Question” is resolved

·      Method for developing a combined strategy

(1) Consultations at the political and military level between the ROKG and USG. 

(2) Increased high level contacts. 

(3) Establishment of a combined planning group (Korea Strategy Group (KSG)) with permanent NSC level members that meet on a rotating basis in Washington and Seoul.

• Repair the alliance: This will take a concerted effort by the President and senior US leadership.  Must come to agreement on the divergent ROK and US policies (sunshine policy versus regime change).  They are not mutually exclusive if you do not use the Iraq/Afghanistan models for regime change. 

• Proposed mutually acceptable strategic end state: A stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.

            This end state implies regime change.  But it must come from within.  Most importantly while the US desires regime change it has not prepared for it.  Fundamental to the strategy is that near term crises must be managed (and exploited for possible opportunities) while it prepares the foundation for a post Kim Family Regime era.

Analysis: Kim Jong-un’s agenda brutally clear after execution of his uncle

http://ww2.nationalpost.com/m/wp/blog.html?b=fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/12/14/analysis-kim-jong-uns-agenda-brutally-clear-after-execution-of-his-uncle

John Everard, The Daily Telegraph, National Post Wire Services
Saturday, Dec. 14, 2013

This photo released by Yonhap on Dec. 13, 2013 shows Jang Song-thaek being escorted in court on Dec. 12, 2013. North Korea has executed the uncle of its leader Kim Jong-un after a shock purge, state news agency KCNA announced. Yonhap/AFP/Getty Images

LONDON — Never before has North Korea purged someone so publicly as it has just eliminated Kim Jong-un’s uncle, Jang Song-thaek.

In the past, purges were usually conducted in secret. But this time not only has the detailed political indictment against Jang been published, but his actual eviction from a party meeting was broadcast on North Korean television.

Then, yesterday, came the announcement from state television that he had been executed for treason, branded “despicable human scum”.

In making this very public display of ruthlessness, Kim probably had three objectives.

First, nobody in North Korea can doubt now that he, and he alone, is in charge. Nor can anybody doubt that he is utterly ruthless in removing anybody who might, in the colourful language of the indictment, “dream different dreams”.

Related

• Uncle’s execution in Kim Jong-un’s ‘empire of horror’ stokes fear of further purges
• North Korea confirms purge of Kim Jong-un’s influential uncle and mentor for alleged gambling and ‘anti-state’ acts
• Purged Kim Jong-un uncle cut out of propaganda film rerun
• North Korean firing squads reportedly execute 80 for watching foreign films

If even the immensely powerful Jang can be brought so low and dispatched so swiftly, then nobody is safe.

Second, Kim has told his country – and the world – that not only Jang the man, but also the vision that he stood for, has been purged.

Jang seems to have argued for a less closed North Korea, one that embraced trade and sought inward investment. He was in charge of several (perhaps all) of its planned special economic zones (an experiment copied from the early days of China’s transformation) and was seen as a strong supporter of economic reform.

The indictment of which he was immediately found guilty accused Jang of “selling off precious resources of the country at cheap prices” and opposing the “development of the industries of Juche iron, Juche fertiliser and Juche vinalon”. This is Pyongyang-speak for the development of indigenous industries (vinalon is a uniquely North Korean – and uniquely uncomfortable – artificial fibre).

So Jang probably argued that North Korea should trade its abundant natural resources to secure the basic materials that it needs rather than try (inefficiently) to manufacture them itself. This heresy will have infuriated the ideologues and, apparently, Kim too. Jang’s purge probably signals a reverse perestroika – that North Korea is abandoning its timid attempts at structural economic reform.

Third, this is a slap in the face for China. Beijing is often described as North Korea’s only ally, but with every nuclear test and every provocative missile launch, the relationship has become more strained. After North Korea’s third nuclear test in February, China recalibrated its policy. It stopped giving Pyongyang cash aid. It changed the lead department on policy towards its awkward neighbour from the Communist Party, which has been generally kind, to the much sterner ministry of foreign affairs. It made public a long list of items whose delivery to North Korea its customs officials were instructed to prevent.

And – a particular sting – it banned top-level contacts. This has meant that Kim has been unable to visit Beijing, a big snub in Asian diplomacy. To rub salt in the wound, President Xi Jinping of China hosted a very successful state visit in June by Kim’s arch-rival, President Park Geun-hye of South Korea, and said last week that he hoped to visit South Korea himself.

Xi has neither visited Pyongyang nor shown any interest in doing so. All this will have alarmed and angered the regime, and Jang’s indictment and dismissal is probably, among other things, Kim’s answer to China. The sale of “precious resources” mentioned above was to China, so North Korea has come close to declaring much of its trade with that country illegitimate.

KNS/AFP/Getty Images; Jason Lee - Pool/Getty ImagesRelations have been strained between North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un and China's President Xi Jinping.

Beijing regarded Jang as its main friend at the court of Kim. Its stunned silence at the news of his removal, followed by a terse statement that this was North Korea’s internal affair, speaks volumes.

(Continued at the link below)

http://ww2.nationalpost.com/m/wp/blog.html?b=fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/12/14/analysis-kim-jong-uns-agenda-brutally-clear-after-execution-of-his-uncle

Excerpt form the CNN article below:

Depending on how you read the signs, the execution of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's uncle and formerly trusted regent, Jang Song Thaek, either shows a young leader further cementing his control, or the first death throes of a regime teetering on collapse.

Because of these questions I would like to offer a couple of things.  First is a definition of regime collapse.  Kim Jong-un will be faced with regime collapse when there is no longer central governing effectiveness and there is a loss of coherency and support of the military and security services.  So far there is no evidence that he has lost central governing effectiveness and the military and security services seem to be functioning "normally" (from a nK perspective) and in support of Kim Jong-un.

However, the only person to ever conduct a thorough and objective analysis of the process the regime might go through to collapse is Robert Collins who produced the seminal work of Patterns of Collapse which is also known as the Seven Phases of Collapse.  I would just like to provide the excerpts of possible scenarios of the phases 4 through 7 below so that we might see the process which could occur in the north if the current suppression phase is not successful (and so far I see no evidence yet that the suppression mechanisms are failing – by definition Jang's arrest and execution indicate the suppression system is working).

Excerpt from Patterns of Collapse (note this was written around 1995 thus the reference to Kim  Chong-il).  

Possible Scenarios in Phases 4 through 7.

d. Phase Four: Suppression - Both the incorporation of local internal security elements into independent activity and the activity itself are perceived as direct challenges to the authority of Kim Chong-il and the Core Group.  The Core Group will respond to such challenges in both indiscriminate and calculated manners.  This phase must be successful to prevent the further breakdown of the regime’s control.  The regime’s full energies will address whatever the regime itself perceives as threats.  nKorea’s track record at suppressing isolated incidents is well established.  Again, success here is paramount to the survival of the regime and world public opinion will not be an effective deterrent.

                        1/ Internal Security systems (even paramilitary units) will be mobilized to employ indiscriminate force to make examples of groups of citizens or entire sub-system(s). Entire sub-systems, such as collective farms deemed collectively guilty of independent (read politically disloyal) activity, will be instantly converted into political crime camps guarded by military or paramilitary units.

                        2/ Local active-duty company and battalion-level military units will be mobilized to employ indiscriminate violent force for the most severe cases.  A severe case would be organized demonstrations (of any kind, but food riots would be an eminent example) against the local or national government.

                       

                        3/ Suppression operations could be streamlined to improve overall effectiveness in dealing with dissidence and/or independent activity.  An example of this streamlining would be the establishment of local “civil order” commands which consolidate local internal security and military assets.  (Inter-agency sharing of information and planning is indeed uncommon to the nKorean political structure.  However, the severity of the situation most likely would be perceived as justification to consolidate.) This inter-agency cooperation would facilitate both detection of and response to increased dissidence and/or independent activity.  The command function could vary.  Two proto-types would be a local ministry of state security official obtaining operational control of a military quick reaction force provided by the local military commander for the purpose of immediate countermeasure.  A more likely proto-type would be the requirement for local security officials to report not only up their chain of command but laterally or even directly to the local military commander.  The commander then acts on this information and, armed with the authority of the “local civil order command,” orders his troops to suppress the reported dissidence with whatever force necessary. 

                        4/ Mass arrests and purges. nKorea has a long history of this activity.  Political reasons are invariably cited as justification, even when activity is clearly not political but civil crime.  The nKorean regime has already divided the nKorean populace into 51 distinct categories of loyalty or disloyalty.  Those arrested and their families are reclassified to disloyal categories.  Arrests and purges become indiscriminate when local authorities feel personally threatened when pyongyang’s intended impact is not delivered to the expected extent.  

                        5/ Show trials and public executions.  These are employed to demonstrate regime’s resolve and demand for adherence to political guidelines.

            e. Phase Five: Resistance - This phase presupposes that the supression phase failed to meet its intended goals.  Local groups, even new sub-systems evolving out of independent activity, will gain confidence in their ability not to succumb to the government’s suppression attempts either through open resistance or manipulation of reporting that forwards false data.

                        1/  Refusal to obey government directives.  These directives will be ignored because those that resist perceive enforcement is unlikely.

                        2/ Usurpation of government assets, such as storehouses or competing sub-systems.  This will enhance the power of local resistance activities, whether economically or politically based.

                        3/ Threats and violence employed against internal security representatives to either win their culpability or simple elimination.  Resistance groups will lose their fear of internal security forces and either eliminate them, beginning at the basic level, or incorporate them into their local sub-system to assist in their activity.

                        4/ The more successful local resistance becomes, the more likely a resource-denied sub-system (which is already a paramilitary unit within the nKorean social system) will begin to employ counter-force against the regime’s mobilized military units.  Such an incident will become a central issue dominating the attention of the Core Group.

                        5/ Successful armed resistance, though only at the sub-system level (company to battalion-sized paramilitary level) will lead the regime’s Core Group to employ combined arms operations against the resistance group.  Some military leaders receiving such orders will hesitate to employ maximum indiscriminate force against local citizens and will immediately be relieved if not executed on the spot.  Other leaders will execute the executioner.  The depth of the resistance phase can be measured by the rank of the officer who does not obey orders from Pyongyang.

                        6/ Low echelon border units, along both the northern border and the DMZ, will cross the border and the MDL while senior echelons are preoccupied with resistance suppression.   Platoon commanders will be capable of initiating a platoon level crossing of the border or DMZ for the purpose of avoiding punishment, chaos, or worse.  After eliminating the company’s single political officer, a company commander would be capable of taking a whole company across the DMZ.  The senior battalion commander would be forced to call for artillery fires into the DMZ or beyond to halt the platoon or company-sized defections across the DMZ.  He would do this knowing that he would probably be immediately executed for permitting it to happen in the first place.  This process would not likely end until the division or corps level.

            f. Phase Six: Fracture - This phase is the most unpredictable.  The current regime and its Core Group members must see the success of the suppression phase as critical to their survival.  Failure of the suppression phase likely results in a quick transition through the resistance phase to the fracture phase.  Fracture will likely result in violence.  The types of fracture are calculable but where the fissures begin is not.  This phase will be characterized by the following:

                        1/ Internal Security systems (regional or national)  will be unable to comply with directives due to ineffectiveness.

                        2/ Core Group members or sub-group(s) openly (as opposed to private consultation) oppose Core Group directives.

                        3/ Division-sized military unit commanders ignore Core Group orders.  They perceive the orders extraordinary and do not believe them or are so appalled (through Korean perception) by the orders they make a conscious decision not to obey.

                        4/ Public execution employed against core-group member or members.  This is an indication of severe disagreement within the Core Group.  However, successful execution of one of these Core Group members is also an indication of containment to a limited degree.

                        5/ Division-sized military unit commanders who oppose Core Group orders ally with one another to oppose counter actions.  This amounts to civil war.  If Kim Chong-il and the Core Group wait to this point before initiating a nKorean attack against the Republic of Korea (as

a means to put an end to resistance energies), it may be too late.  As other dictators have in the past, a wartime footing provides the opportunity for internal security apparati to eliminate military commanders previously perceived by the regime to as supporters of resistance.

                        6/ Internal security officers executed or neutralized within entire systems or numerous adjacent sub-systems.

            g. Phase Seven: Realignment: This will be the most straight forward of the seven phases because the implications of previous actions or non-actions have played themselves out.

                        1/ Pre-identification of a nKorean individual or a oligarchic group as successor to the leadership of Kim Chong-il is extremely difficult to predict.  However, centuries-old historical korean patterns of political realignment indicate the nKorean military maintains the only power to actually replace the previous regime, resist internal security apparati, and  maintain public stability.  This process will be simplified if internal security procedures have been streamlined to include consolidation of control.

                       

                        2/ This military group will be shaped by an associational bond such as common military class, common military training, or regional background.  The overwhelmingly dominant common associational bond in existence now is graduation from the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School.  Service/duty in the organizational guidance department of the Korean Workers’ Party, whether military or civilian, is also a common associational bond among real power holders.  However, this department is so strongly associated with Kim Chong-il that its influence will evaporate with Kim Chong-il’s downfall.

                        3/ This or any other associational bond is likely to search for solutions/methods which enable them to hold onto power in nKorea for themselves.  This groups’ announcement of its intention to reform economically is more likely than an announcement supporting the concept of immediate peninsular unification.

                        4/ A new Core Group will move to protect its own interests and new domination of power. The new Core Group will attempt to ensure nKorean sovereignty through international efforts at the United Nations and other world bodies.  Because they view it as a method of cementing their new-found control, the new Core Group will seek immediate humanitarian relief for the nKorean populace and will seek assistance in improving the nKorean economic infrastructure.

This is another graphic depiction of the uncertainty and complexity we might face given regime collapse.

North Korean execution raises more question than answers

By Peter Shadbolt, CNN

http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/world/asia/north-korea-uncle-analysis/

updated 4:37 AM EST, Fri December 13, 2013

Some analysts believe Kim Jong Un's purge will consolidate his grip on power, others that it has seriously weakened it.

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

• Execution of Jong Song Thaek reveals glimpse into closed world of the North Korean regime
• Some analysts say it shows Kim Jong Un consolidating power over a politburo gerontocracy
• Others say it reveals a regime in meltdown as Kim battles military hardliners within the party

(CNN) -- Take one part Shakespeare's "Hamlet," two parts Machiavelli's "The Prince" and an even larger measure of guesswork and North Korea's latest political drama could seem like a Cold War thriller.

For North Korea watchers, the all too real political theater playing out in Pyongyang may offer another tantalizing glimpse behind the opaque curtain of the North Korean regime, but raises more questions than answers.

Depending on how you read the signs, the execution of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's uncle and formerly trusted regent, Jang Song Thaek, either shows a young leader further cementing his control, or the first death throes of a regime teetering on collapse.

In the absence of any independently verifiable information, and in a regime where paranoid rhetoric is the normal register of almost all diplomatic language, any conjecture is likely to be as accurate as it is to be wide of the mark.

North Korea: Leader's 'traitor' uncle executed

For Jasper Kim, the founder of the Asia-Pacific Global Research Group, North Korea remains for analysts a "Rubik's Cube that no one can solve."

North Korea leader's uncle executed

Chang: Regime like Richard III with nukes

North Korea: 'Unprecedented development'

He said North Korea is a master at carefully choreographing the way it releases news events to cloak its real intentions. Nevertheless, he said a careful reading between the lines of North Korean new agency KCNA sometimes reveals glimpses of the state of the regime.

He said that far from asserting the leadership of Kim, recent events suggest that his position has been seriously eroded by the execution of his uncle.

"My guess is that these events happened some time ago and they are only now being released," Kim told CNN. "The fact is that we don't know what's going on in North Korea but what we are seeing coming through on KCNA is very concerning.

"When you look at the language used in these KCNA reports it is particularly hawkish and it's much more reflective of the military than it is of Kim Jong Un.

"Basically we are seeing the hardline faction reassert itself. For Kim Jong Un, Jang Song Thaek was the bridge between him and his father, and now he will have very little protection."

He said that North Korea, famous for tightly controlling the drip feed of real information coming out of the country, was now sending out violently mixed messages.

"The recent release of the prisoner (Merrill Newman) and this execution couldn't be more at odds; what this indicates is that it's a chaotic situation in there," he added. "What this points to in terms of regime change is that it's a question of 'when' rather than 'if.'

"What history tells us is that when it does happen it will be unexpected and extreme and everyone must be prepared for the worst case scenario."

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/world/asia/north-korea-uncle-analysis/