U.S. Special Operations Forces at 9-11, Today, and for the Future

thecipherbrief.com · September 11, 2016

September 11, 2016 | LTG Charles Cleveland and COL David Maxwell

LTG Charles Cleveland
Senior Fellow, Madison Policy Forum

Col David Maxwell
Associate Director, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University

Following the tragic attack on 9-11, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the CIA, supported by airpower, conducted a punitive expedition that resulted in the Taliban and al Qaeda being routed from Afghanistan. In 2003, working with the Kurds, U.S. SOF conducted operations in northern Iraq, accomplishing the mission intended for a U.S. infantry division that was not allowed to deploy through Turkey. U.S. SOF were already advising and assisting Colombian military and police operations as part of Plan Colombia that contributed to the peace agreement in 2016. And in Asia, U.S. SOF supported the Philippine security forces in degrading and destroying terrorist organizations linked to al Qaeda while supporting peace negotiations with Moro insurgent groups.

U.S. SOF were well positioned and ready in 2001 to execute their fundamental doctrinal missions for which they were organized, trained, equipped, educated, and optimized: unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense or Special Warfare. However, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations soon came to dominate the U.S. military campaigns for both special operations and regular forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and later in Yemen and throughout Africa.

What emerged after 9-11 was a special operations Surgical Strike capability that combined exquisite intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with precision strikes from unmanned aerial systems and the unparalleled special operations ground and maritime capability to capture or kill high value targets at the time and place of our choosing, including killing Osama bin Laden in 2011. The development of such concepts as F3EAD – find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate – allowed the U.S. national mission force, often supported by regular forces, to take down enemy networks by operating at a tempo that paralyzed terrorist organizations. Counterterrorism direct action operations were raised to a high art form.

The 2006 QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) called for a massive growth in SOF to nearly 70,000 personnel in the United States Special Operations Command. While the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), Ranger Regiment, Special Operations Aviation (Air Force and Army), the National Mission Force, SOF headquarters, and enabling forces (intelligence, communications, and logistics) expanded, the planned growth objectives for Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs were unable to be achieved. This proved two of the five SOF truths: competent SOF cannot be produced after emergencies occur, and SOF cannot be mass produced. One of the important developments post-9-11 was the establishment of SOF operational HQ in theaters as either Special Operations Command Forward (SOC-FWD) or Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF) to provide command and control of the tactical forces executing the full range of special operations missions for the Theater Commander.

While terrorism has been at the forefront of our security strategy the past 15 years, we are coming to realize that the threats we face now and in the future are larger than terrorism alone. Russia’s new generation warfare or non-linear warfare employing active measures and reflexive control; China’s Three Warfare’s: media warfare, lawfare, and psychological warfare; the Iran Action Network , and non-state actors such as ISIS and AQ are exploiting the conditions of political instability and ungoverned spaces and creating new security problems that cannot be addressed through counterterrorism operations as the single focus main effort.

The conditions can be described as revolution, resistance, insurgency, and civil war, and countries and non-state actors are exploiting them to achieve their geostrategic objectives. They are practicing a modern form of what George Kennan described in 1948 as Political Warfare. This is the norm in the Gray Zonespace between peace and war.

(Continued at the link below)

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/north-america/us-special-operations-forces-9-11-today-and-future-1091

Excerpt:

Hagel pointed out in his Thursday speech that McRaven also has "literally written the book on Special Operations." Indeed, McRraven's 1995 book, "Spec Ops," is the standard text on the subject.

I think if you ask ADM McRaven he would tell you that his book with 8 case studies and very good principles for conducting raids does not provide a theory of special operations writ large and in fact only covers the direct action side of special operations as noted here.

For his book, McRaven interviewed many of the key participants in the raids that he examined, and he traveled to the sites of the operations.

After a careful investigation of each raid, he identified six common principles that had made these operations a success: repetition, surprise, security, speed, simplicity and purpose.

Yes, I used his book in my class on UW and SOF for policy makers and strategists because it is an important contribution but it cannot be called the standard text on the subject.  Brian Pettit's book 

Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero provides a more comprehensive approach to the full range of special operations from surgical strike to special warfare (though I despise the use of the term Phase Zero).  I also think Chapter 2 of the 5th edition of US National Security: Policymakers, Processes, & Politics (by Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala) gives a very useful overview of modern special operations.  

But the real foundation for special operations and specifically the special warfare side of special operations lies in the ARIS project - Assessing Revolutions and Insurgent Strategies which can be accessed at this link: 

  http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html

  If you have not read, synthesized and internalized the lessons in the ARIS project then you really cannot be a practitioner of special operations.

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts

 

  http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/CasebookV1S.pdf

Original Version referred to as Volume I by the ARIS project. Primary research responsibility Paul A. Jureidini, Norman A. La Charite, Bert H. Cooper, and William A. Lybrand. Special Operations Research Office The American University, Washington D.C., December 1962.

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II 1962 - 2009 

  

http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/Casebook%20Vol%202%20%2004-27-12S.pdf

This Casebook provides a summary of twenty-three insurgencies and revolutions; the goal of the book is to introduce the reader to modern-style irregular and unconventional warfare, as well as to act as an informational resource on these particular cases. While not trying to provide an in-depth analysis of any case, our intent was to provide enough background material and description of the revolution to allow comparisons and analysis of broader ideas and insights across this broad spectrum of cases. 

 

Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies, 2d Edition, 2013, http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/HumanFactorsS.pdf

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare, 2d Edition, 2013,http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/UndergroundsS.pdf

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography, http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/IWAnnotated_BibliographyS.pdf 

 

The man who hunted bin Laden, Saddam and the pirates

By Peter Bergen

updated 12:23 AM EDT, Sun August 31, 2014

http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/30/opinion/bergen-mcraven-special-forces-influence/index.html

Editor's note: Peter Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, a vice president at the New America Foundation and the author of "Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for bin Laden -- From 9/11 to Abbottabad," from which this article is, in part, adapted.

(CNN) -- On Thursday in Tampa, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel presided over a change of command ceremony during which Adm. William "Bill" McRaven handed over the reins of Special Operations Command to his successor, Gen. Joseph Votel.

As McRaven stepped down he observed, "We are in perilous times." He pointed out that U.S. Special Operations Forces are helping to fight the fast-growing Islamic State in Iraq; the al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines; the militant group Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

McRaven also said, "We are in the golden age of Special Operations" in which elements of the 67,000 men and women under his command have deployed to 92 countries.

Peter Bergen

Now, after more than 3½ decades working in the world of special operations, Bill McRaven, 58, is retiring. In his next incarnation he will become chancellor of the University of Texas.

As Hagel pointed out in his speech on Thursday that celebrated McRaven's storied career, no one has written McRaven's full history, but if it ever was to be written it "would need to be heavily redacted" because so much of it took place in the "black" (secret) arena.

"Revered" is the word you often hear about McRaven in the special operations community. That's in part because even as a three-star admiral, about once a month in Afghanistan, McRaven went out with his teams on risky snatch-and-grab missions. (His predecessor as the commander of Joint Special Operations Command, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, also went out regularly on such missions and is similarly held in the highest regard.)

The book

Hagel pointed out in his Thursday speech that McRaven also has "literally written the book on Special Operations." Indeed, McRraven's 1995 book, "Spec Ops," is the standard text on the subject.

Adm. McRaven on the bin Laden raid

It features lucid dissections of eight decisive special operations actions, ranging from the British forces who used midget submarines to badly damage the Tirpitz, a key Nazi battleship, in 1943; to the Nazi rescue the same year of the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini from his anti-Fascist captors; to the raid at Entebbe in 1976 that freed Israeli hostages held in Uganda by Palestinian terrorists.

For his book, McRaven interviewed many of the key participants in the raids that he examined, and he traveled to the sites of the operations.

After a careful investigation of each raid, he identified six common principles that had made these operations a success: repetition, surprise, security, speed, simplicity and purpose.

-- Repetition meant frequent and realistic rehearsals so that the "friction" of actual battle was reduced.

-- Surprise meant catching the enemy entirely off guard; for example, the Nazi rescuers of Mussolini crash-landed gliders on a mountain near the hotel where the Fascist leader was being held and rescued him without a shot being fired.

-- Security meant confining the knowledge of the operation to a small circle.

-- Speed meant that "relative superiority" over the enemy needed to be achieved in the first few minutes of the attack, and that the entire mission should be completed in no more than a half-hour.

-- Simplicity ensured that the goal of the operation was well understood by each of the soldiers involved -- "release the hostages" at Entebbe.

-- Purpose meant that the soldiers were completely committed to the mission.

But McRaven's influence on "spec ops" goes far beyond just the book he wrote. McRaven helped establish a curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. And after taking up a job in the White House just weeks after 9/11, he became one of the principal authors of the Bush administration's counterterrorism strategy.

During the Iraq War, McRaven led the shadowy Task Force 121, which tracked down Saddam Hussein in December 2003. Much of the public credit for Saddam's capture went to conventional army units, but it was, in fact, the Special Operations forces under McRaven's command who did much of the work to find the Iraqi dictator.

Rescue of Capt. Phillips

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/30/opinion/bergen-mcraven-special-forces-influence/index.html

Army Irregular Warfare Center prepares to stand down

For those who think that the need to study insurgency (and revolutionary warfare or irregular warfare) is no longer necessary, I would call your attention to the project by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) and American University in 1962 and USASOC and Johns Hopkins in 2009 on the ARIS project (Assessing Revolution and Insurgent Strategies).  Below are the 46 case studies

,

 23 in Volume I (1962) and 23 in Volume II (2009) in the Casebook

 on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare.  Note that

   th

e

s

e

 case studies are only illustrative and not a comprehensive list of all the insurgencies and revolutions that have occurred.  They were chosen because they are worthy of study to prepare for likely similar events in the future. 

 Note the five categories defined in Vol II below.

Both casebooks and other important references can be downloaded at this link: 

http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html

   (also linked on the left side of this page under Research and News Links with the title Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies)

Table 1: Contents of Volume I published in 1962

I. Southeast Asia

1. The Revolution in Vietnam: 1946–1954

2. The Indonesian Rebellion: 1945–1949

3. The Revolution in Malaya: 1948–1957

II. Latin America

4. The Guatemalan Revolution of 1944

5. The Venezuelan Revolution of 1945

6. The Argentine Revolution of June 1943

7. The Bolivian Revolution of 1952

8. The Cuban Revolution: 1953–1959

III. North Africa

9. The Tunisian Revolution: 1950–1954

10. The Algerian Revolution: 1954–1962

IV. Africa South of the Sahara

11. The Revolution in French Cameroun:

1956–1960

12. The Congolese Coup of 1960

V. Middle East

13. The Iraqi Coup of 1936

14. The Egyptian Coup of 1952

15. The Iranian Coup of 1953

16. The Iraqi Coup of 1958

17. The Sudan Coup of 1958

VI. Far East

18. The Korean Revolution of 1960

19. The Chinese Communist Revolution:

1927–1949

VII. Europe

20. The German Revolution of 1933

21. The Spanish Revolution of 1936

22. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956

23. The Czechoslovakian Coup of 1948

Volume II, 1962-2009

The first section deals with revolutions that desire to greatly modify the type of government. They include:

1. New People’s Army (NPA)

2. Fuerzas Armada Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)

3. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)

4. 1979 Iranian Revolution

5. Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional

(FMLN)

6. Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)

The second section describes revolutions where identity or ethnic  issues are prime motivations for the warfare:

7. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

8. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

9. Hutu-Tutsi genocides

10. Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

11. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)

The desire to drive out a foreign power from their area constitutes the third section, with the cases:

12. Afghan Mujahidin

13. Vietcong

14. Chechen Revolution

15. Hizbollah

16. Hizbul Mujahedeen

The fourth section deals with the pressing rise of revolutions based upon religious fundamentalism:

17. Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)

18. Taliban

19. Al Qaeda

The last section covers issues of modernization or reform, including:

20. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)

21. Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

22. Orange Revolution of Ukraine

23. Solidarity

Army Irregular Warfare Center prepares to stand down

By Bill Ackerly | Mission Command Center of Excellence Public Affairs 
Posted Jun. 26, 2014 @ 12:35 pm 

http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/article/20140626/NEWS/140629538/1347/sthash.ldIWNvwG.uxfs

Since its beginning in 2006, the Army Irregular Warfare Center, originally the Counterinsurgency Center, has prepared more than 40 brigade combat teams, as well division and corps headquarters, for COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. AIWC also conducted more than 50 irregular warfare webcasts for the community of interest and deploying soldiers.

Beginning Oct. 1, AIWC’s critical tasks and responsibilities will transition to other Army organizations as resources and priorities are realigned.

In recognizing AIWC’s numerous accomplishments during the last eight years, Maj. Gen. Thomas S. James Jr., director of the Mission Command Center of Excellence, said, “AIWC was the driving force that led to the analysis, development and integration of irregular warfare-related concepts, doctrine, training, leadership and education, ensuring the lessons we’ve learned permeate across the Army now through 2025 and beyond.”

The COIN Center was established in July 2006 by then-Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, in conjunction with Marine Corps Deputy Commandant Lt. Gen. James Mattis. The COIN Center was designated in September 2010 as the Army’s focal point for irregular warfare and transitioned to its current organization as the AIWC.

AIWC was established with an initial heavy emphasis on providing first-rate, near real-time support to units preparing for combat. It quickly developed a flexible five-day COIN seminar for BCTs deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, AIWC leveraged the experience and insights of combat veterans to ensure relevancy of seminar content for deploying war-fighting units. The result was an interactive seminar model that was so successful it was requested by III Corps, V Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps, as well as non-deploying units.

AIWC’s primary responsibilities included developing doctrine; coordinating, analyzing and integrating irregular warfare doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities solutions across the Army; advising training centers and other programs; integrating COIN doctrine into training and education; and conducting outreach to the COIN community of interest.

In addition to its seminars and webcasts, other AIWC significant contributions since 2006 included facilitating the re-write of Field Manual 3-24, “Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies,” writing six Army techniques publications, and collaborating irregular warfare issues with military partners, such as France, Iraq, Great Britain, Canada, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Singapore, Afghanistan and India.

AIWC has provided irregular warfare support and expertise through guest lecturers/facilitators at civilian and academic seminars, conferences and workshops, including the Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, Global Center for Security Cooperation, U.S. Institute of Peace and International Development, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Kansas State University, University of Kansas, the National Defense University and Massey University, New Zealand.

AIWC Director Col. Gus Benton II said, “As a SOF (special operations force) practitioner, it’s readily clear that the value of AIWC to the Army goes far beyond the number of events supported; the value is truly drawn from the numerous enlightening anecdotes offered by individual Army leaders up to corps commanders as to how their forces were shaped and prepared to operate successfully within complex COIN environments.”

Page 2 of 2 - As the COIN Center’s first director in 2006, retired Col. Pete Mansoor, said, the mission of the COIN Center was “to think about how we can change our organization (the Army); integrate new technologies; come up with better tactics, techniques and procedures; how to better train our doctrine; and understand the culture, languages and skills that we need to counter insurgency.”

And that is precisely what today’s AIWC has been doing ever since.

- See more at: http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/article/20140626/NEWS/140629538/1347/sthash.ldIWNvwG.uxfs?tag=2#sthash.zqywqhP8.dpuf