Showing posts with label ADM McRaven. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ADM McRaven. Show all posts

Sunday, August 31, 2014

The man who hunted bin Laden, Saddam and the pirates

Excerpt:

Hagel pointed out in his Thursday speech that McRaven also has "literally written the book on Special Operations." Indeed, McRraven's 1995 book, "Spec Ops," is the standard text on the subject.

I think if you ask ADM McRaven he would tell you that his book with 8 case studies and very good principles for conducting raids does not provide a theory of special operations writ large and in fact only covers the direct action side of special operations as noted here.

For his book, McRaven interviewed many of the key participants in the raids that he examined, and he traveled to the sites of the operations.

After a careful investigation of each raid, he identified six common principles that had made these operations a success: repetition, surprise, security, speed, simplicity and purpose.

Yes, I used his book in my class on UW and SOF for policy makers and strategists because it is an important contribution but it cannot be called the standard text on the subject.  Brian Pettit's book 
Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero provides a more comprehensive approach to the full range of special operations from surgical strike to special warfare (though I despise the use of the term Phase Zero).  I also think Chapter 2 of the 5th edition of US National Security: Policymakers, Processes, & Politics (by Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala) gives a very useful overview of modern special operations.  

But the real foundation for special operations and specifically the special warfare side of special operations lies in the ARIS project - Assessing Revolutions and Insurgent Strategies which can be accessed at this link: 
  http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html
  If you have not read, synthesized and internalized the lessons in the ARIS project then you really cannot be a practitioner of special operations.

Original Version referred to as Volume I by the ARIS project. Primary research responsibility Paul A. Jureidini, Norman A. La Charite, Bert H. Cooper, and William A. Lybrand. Special Operations Research Office The American University, Washington D.C., December 1962.
This Casebook provides a summary of twenty-three insurgencies and revolutions; the goal of the book is to introduce the reader to modern-style irregular and unconventional warfare, as well as to act as an informational resource on these particular cases. While not trying to provide an in-depth analysis of any case, our intent was to provide enough background material and description of the revolution to allow comparisons and analysis of broader ideas and insights across this broad spectrum of cases. 

 
Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies, 2d Edition, 2013, http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/HumanFactorsS.pdf

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare, 2d Edition, 2013,http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/UndergroundsS.pdf

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography, http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/IWAnnotated_BibliographyS.pdf 

 

The man who hunted bin Laden, Saddam and the pirates

By Peter Bergen
updated 12:23 AM EDT, Sun August 31, 2014
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/30/opinion/bergen-mcraven-special-forces-influence/index.html


Editor's note: Peter Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, a vice president at the New America Foundation and the author of "Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for bin Laden -- From 9/11 to Abbottabad," from which this article is, in part, adapted.
(CNN) -- On Thursday in Tampa, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel presided over a change of command ceremony during which Adm. William "Bill" McRaven handed over the reins of Special Operations Command to his successor, Gen. Joseph Votel.
As McRaven stepped down he observed, "We are in perilous times." He pointed out that U.S. Special Operations Forces are helping to fight the fast-growing Islamic State in Iraq; the al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines; the militant group Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
McRaven also said, "We are in the golden age of Special Operations" in which elements of the 67,000 men and women under his command have deployed to 92 countries.
Peter Bergen
Peter Bergen
Now, after more than 3½ decades working in the world of special operations, Bill McRaven, 58, is retiring. In his next incarnation he will become chancellor of the University of Texas.
As Hagel pointed out in his speech on Thursday that celebrated McRaven's storied career, no one has written McRaven's full history, but if it ever was to be written it "would need to be heavily redacted" because so much of it took place in the "black" (secret) arena.
"Revered" is the word you often hear about McRaven in the special operations community. That's in part because even as a three-star admiral, about once a month in Afghanistan, McRaven went out with his teams on risky snatch-and-grab missions. (His predecessor as the commander of Joint Special Operations Command, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, also went out regularly on such missions and is similarly held in the highest regard.)
The book
Hagel pointed out in his Thursday speech that McRaven also has "literally written the book on Special Operations." Indeed, McRraven's 1995 book, "Spec Ops," is the standard text on the subject.
Adm. McRaven on the bin Laden raid
It features lucid dissections of eight decisive special operations actions, ranging from the British forces who used midget submarines to badly damage the Tirpitz, a key Nazi battleship, in 1943; to the Nazi rescue the same year of the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini from his anti-Fascist captors; to the raid at Entebbe in 1976 that freed Israeli hostages held in Uganda by Palestinian terrorists.
For his book, McRaven interviewed many of the key participants in the raids that he examined, and he traveled to the sites of the operations.
After a careful investigation of each raid, he identified six common principles that had made these operations a success: repetition, surprise, security, speed, simplicity and purpose.
-- Repetition meant frequent and realistic rehearsals so that the "friction" of actual battle was reduced.
-- Surprise meant catching the enemy entirely off guard; for example, the Nazi rescuers of Mussolini crash-landed gliders on a mountain near the hotel where the Fascist leader was being held and rescued him without a shot being fired.
-- Security meant confining the knowledge of the operation to a small circle.
-- Speed meant that "relative superiority" over the enemy needed to be achieved in the first few minutes of the attack, and that the entire mission should be completed in no more than a half-hour.
-- Simplicity ensured that the goal of the operation was well understood by each of the soldiers involved -- "release the hostages" at Entebbe.
-- Purpose meant that the soldiers were completely committed to the mission.
But McRaven's influence on "spec ops" goes far beyond just the book he wrote. McRaven helped establish a curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. And after taking up a job in the White House just weeks after 9/11, he became one of the principal authors of the Bush administration's counterterrorism strategy.
During the Iraq War, McRaven led the shadowy Task Force 121, which tracked down Saddam Hussein in December 2003. Much of the public credit for Saddam's capture went to conventional army units, but it was, in fact, the Special Operations forces under McRaven's command who did much of the work to find the Iraqi dictator.
Rescue of Capt. Phillips
(Continued at the link below)

Wednesday, May 1, 2013

A Commander Seeks to Chart a New Path for Special Operations


The "SOF antibodies" that exist:

Admiral McRaven’s goal is to recast the command from its popular image of commandos killing or capturing terrorists, and expand a force capable of carrying out a range of missions short of combat — including training foreign militaries to counter terrorists, drug traffickers and insurgents, gathering intelligence and assessing pending risk, and advising embassies on security.
But along the way, the ambitious Admiral McRaven has run into critics who say he is overreaching, or as one Congressional critic put it, “empire building” at a time when the military is shrinking its footprint in Afghanistan and refocusing on other hot spots around the world. Congress has blocked, at least temporarily, an idea to consolidate several hundred of the command’s Washington-based staff members in a $10 million-a-year satellite office here, saying it would violate spending limits on such offices. 
At the same time, Admiral McRaven has also faced criticism that he is encroaching on the turf of the military’s traditionally powerful regional commanders.
V/R
Dave
A Commander Seeks to Chart a New Path for Special Operations


Published: May 1, 2013

WASHINGTON — Not long after Adm. William H. McRaven led the mission to kill Osama bin Laden, he was put in charge of the nation’s entire contingent of Special Operations forces, and set to work revamping them to face a widening array of new threats as America’s combat role in the Middle East and southwest Asia winds down.
Enlarge This Image


His efforts to apply the lessons learned from more than a decade of fighting in the shadows of the larger wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have high-level support from a White House and Pentagon eager to avoid large-scale foreign interventions and to encourage allies to assume more of the burden of combating extremism and instability.

Admiral McRaven’s goal is to recast the command from its popular image of commandos killing or capturing terrorists, and expand a force capable of carrying out a range of missions short of combat — including training foreign militaries to counter terrorists, drug traffickers and insurgents, gathering intelligence and assessing pending risk, and advising embassies on security.

But along the way, the ambitious Admiral McRaven has run into critics who say he is overreaching, or as one Congressional critic put it, “empire building” at a time when the military is shrinking its footprint in Afghanistan and refocusing on other hot spots around the world. Congress has blocked, at least temporarily, an idea to consolidate several hundred of the command’s Washington-based staff members in a $10 million-a-year satellite office here, saying it would violate spending limits on such offices.
At the same time, Admiral McRaven has also faced criticism that he is encroaching on the turf of the military’s traditionally powerful regional commanders.

Shortly before leaving the Pentagon, former Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta granted Admiral McRaven new authority to make staffing decisions in the Special Operations units assigned to the regional commanders. While they will still have the final say on missions in their region, Admiral McRaven will now have the ability to allocate the much sought-after 11,000 deployed Special Operations forces where he determines intelligence and world events indicate they are most needed.
“I don’t command and control anything,” Admiral McRaven said in an interview. “I hope to be able to influence some of their decisions. But I’m not going to move pieces around the chessboard.”

As for the office he has sought in Washington, Admiral McRaven couches his plans to consolidate the command’s disparate operations into a new “National Capital Region” office in similar reform-minded terms, telling Congress in April that it would “better support coordination and decision-making” with other federal agencies.
(Continued at the link below)


Wednesday, January 30, 2013

Update - Special Operators Depend on Good Partners, Commander Says

Here is an update from an email exchange I had regarding ADM McRaven's comments from my original post at this link: http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2013/01/special-operators-depend-on-good.html


In response to ADM McRaven's article and my comments below I had this exchange with a friend and colleague that allowed me to provide further thoughts on this.

Good morning.

Great comment but I suspect that what the Admiral said and what he meant didn’t shake hands here.  When he says “in and out…quickly” I think he means “in quickly” to take advantage of fleeting SFA/FID opportunities and “out quickly” to take care of preservation of the force issues.  He gets the persistent presence thing real well.

In general, however, he’s right.  Our strat lift for SOF (or for anyone for that matter) in PACOM is broken.  My teams became adept at moving themselves and their gear to some very remote places by plane, DHL, ferry, and dug-out canoes….okay, I made the last one up.  But it still stands that PACOM is difficult to traverse, infil, and exfil.

My Response:


XXXX,

Thank you for your comments.  I certainly understand well about moving in PACOM.  It has never been good for SF.  I spent 20 years watching teams move around PACOM by commair and non-military, non-standard air.  Except for JCS exercise funded airlift using STRATAIR it is for the most part cost prohibitive.  SF and SOF (less national mission forces with dedicated air)  in general will never be able to make use of STRATAIR because we are too small and it is not efficient for the Air Force to move us (unless we pay the SAAM costs  -  and JA/AAT air is not always good because we cannot always line up our training and of course it can easily be diverted to higher priorities leaving our guys out on a limb - or on the proverbial deserted island).  Intra-theater air is useful and of course SOF air in theater is very responsive.  The Asia focused SOF (primarily 1st SFG) know how to get around in PACOM and up to 9–11 we had SFODAs doing it routinely (and in large measure they have continued to do so despite being somewhat distracted with OIF/OEF deployments.) But let me push back on your comments a little more.  

First is FID is by nature and definition long duration and we should never be thinking in terms of "fleeting" FID opportunities (and I will not use SFA because that has been a waste of a lot of  trees developing that concept when FID is sufficient and useful).  FID is not simply conducting a training event with the host nation military.  It has to be part of a broad and comprehensive strategy to support achieving national security objectives.  

Second, the preservation of the force argument is also an important discussion.  But we cannot think about the Asia-Pacific region in terms of the Afghan/Iraq paradigm and the way we employed SOF there.  To be effective we need long duration SOF presence and I remain pretty confident that the Special Forces Soldiers are very happy to sign up for long deployments in Asia (as long as they know they are supporting an effective and comprehensive strategy). That is one of the traits that Special Forces selects for. And of course this is also why I advocate the stationing of more SOF in theater.     We have to be very careful about the one size fits all cookie cutter solution for SOF – e.g., while we want to capture and exploit lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, we have to ensure we use the right lessons for the right situations.  The preservation of the force issue we will have for our Asia apportioned forces will not stem from employing SOF in theater for long duration but rather from not employing them long enough to make a difference.  I think the idea of getting in and out quickly for FID is a misunderstanding of the nature of Special Warfare and its subordinate elements of FID and UW.  I am afraid that SOCOM wants to think in terms of Afghanistan and Iraq and apply those ideas to Asia and I think that is a mistake.   Frankly, SOCOM is going to need some people with SOF Special Warfare experience in Asia to prevent it from employing SOF from an Afghan/Iraq paradigm.  As I heard Ola Mize (retired SF Colonel and MOH recipient) once tell a group of new SF Soldiers there are only two places for an SF Soldier to be – either deployed for long periods of time with indigenous forces or back at SWCS at the schoolhouse training future SF Soldiers.
V/R
Dave

01/29/2013 03:33 PM CST

Special Operators Depend on Good Partners, Commander Says
By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Jan. 29, 2013 - Close partnership with U.S. geographic combatant commanders will be crucial to keeping the nation's special operations forces effective as budgets and formations dwindle, U.S. Special Operations Command's leader said here today.
Navy Adm. William H. McRaven talked about special operations support to national strategy during a speech at the National Defense Industrial Association's 24th Annual Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict Symposium.

Socom troops around the world, McRaven said, are "doing exceedingly well, operating as an integral part of the geographic combatant commanders' strategy."
(Continued at the link below)
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119137

Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Special Operators Depend on Good Partners, Commander Says


A pretty detailed overview from ADM McRaven.  I am going to start counting how many times people now invoke the Philippines as an example.  But it is good to hear broader discussion about Special Operations in Asia.  However,  I have to take some exception to this statement from ADM McRaven and offer a counterpoint.

Socom also has to consider, he said, how to move Special Forces "A" teams, Marine special operations teams, Navy SEAL platoons and the platforms that support them in and out of theater quickly. That requires working closely with each of the services, he noted.

I would submit that we should not be figuring out how to move Special Forces Operational Detachments Alpha (SFODAs) "in and out of theater quickly."  What we need to be doing is figuring out how to have them remain in theater for long duration.  While we definitely want to be abel to get Surgical Strike forces in and out of theater quickly, we need those forces conducting Special Warfare to remain in theater.  We really should be exploring the potential for stationing Special Forces in theater (more than just 1-10 SFG in Germany and 1-1 SFG in Okinawa).  We have some good historical examples as models that have worked (and continue to work as in the case of Special Forces Detachment Korea (Det 39) - which as an aside is the longest continuously serving US Special Forces organization in Asia). Potential examples include the 46th SF Company in Thailand, DET-A in Berlin, and DET-T in Taiwan, all with different force structure and missions based on the regional conditions and strategy.  Although it is counterintuitive to most, effective Special Warfare is characterized by more deliberate planning for the long term while Surgical Strike requires the rapid deployment capability.  Sure CONUS based Special Forces will still have to deploy and redeploy but if there are forward stationed forces in key areas in theater SF can provide a range of options to the Theater Commander as well as assist in providing situational understanding.  
V/R
Dave


01/29/2013 03:33 PM CST

Special Operators Depend on Good Partners, Commander Says
By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Jan. 29, 2013 - Close partnership with U.S. geographic combatant commanders will be crucial to keeping the nation's special operations forces effective as budgets and formations dwindle, U.S. Special Operations Command's leader said here today.
Navy Adm. William H. McRaven talked about special operations support to national strategy during a speech at the National Defense Industrial Association's 24th Annual Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict Symposium.

Socom troops around the world, McRaven said, are "doing exceedingly well, operating as an integral part of the geographic combatant commanders' strategy."

The admiral said while his forces operate in more than 70 countries around the world, Afghanistan remains a key focus. U.S. Central Command is the geographic combatant command responsible for Afghanistan, with NATO's International Security Assistance Force in charge of operations there.

McRaven noted all coalition special operations forces in Afghanistan now are united under one special operations joint task force, commanded by Army Maj. Gen. Tony Thomas.
"His headquarters, which reached its full operational capability on 1 January, has done a phenomenal job," the admiral said. "During my most recent visit there, I was impressed to see [the headquarters] integrating, coordinating and fully synchronizing all [special operations activities] -- not only with each other, but with ISAF."

Village stability operations and support to Afghan local police –- both programs aimed at growing security and extending governance in rural areas -- are among the "most compelling success stories" special operations forces are logging in Afghanistan, McRaven said.
"These programs have been game-changers to our efforts," he noted.

McRaven said he recently visited some of the places where Afghan local police groups have established outposts. "I was amazed at the relationships forged with our Afghan counterparts," he told the symposium audience. "These relationships, built on trust, have clearly paved the way for greater security in the remote areas of the country. They have also helped bridge the gap between the local, district and provincial governments."
The thinning of U.S. conventional forces in Afghanistan this year and in 2014, McRaven said, will give special operations troops "more opportunity to do more in places that we have neglected."

While he doesn't yet know the number of special operations forces that will be needed in Afghanistan beyond 2014, he said, one approach now under way to bridge the anticipated gap is a "surge" in Afghan local police.

The local police program across Afghanistan now numbers close to 19,000 "guardians," he said, which Afghan leaders want to build to 45,000. Around 60 Special Forces or SEAL units, working with Afghan counterparts, support the program as trainers, he added.

McRaven said Thomas has a plan to sustain the program, with coalition special operations forces shifting to a "train the trainer focus," helping the Afghan uniformed police and Afghan special operations forces to take over training local forces.

"I think [the program is] on a good glide path right now," he said. The post-2014 special operations contribution in Afghanistan isn't yet known, he added, but officials are making plans to enable helping the Afghans continue to build the local police program even if special operations forces draw down to a small number.

Special operators also are achieving "similar positive results" around the world, their commander said. He noted that in the Philippines, "our Green Berets and [Navy] SEALs are doing a terrific job with our Filipino partners."

McRaven said on a recent visit to the Philippines, he stopped in two places that "10 years ago ... were safe havens for Abu Sayyaf and other extremist organizations." A decade ago, security for the people in such places depended on "how well they knew the enemy," McRaven said.
"Beheadings, bombings, and families fleeing their homes were a constant part of life," he said. "Today, largely through the magnificent efforts of our [special operations forces] advisory teams and their Filipino counterparts, the threat is contained. Security has greatly improved."
McRaven said improvement in the Philippines, where economic progress and stable local government have followed security gains, rivals similar success in Colombia, where U.S. special operators have worked for decades. Such special efforts are also taking place now in Africa, he added, where U.S. special operations troops are "working with our African counterparts to end the [Lord's Resistance Army] tyranny in Central Africa."
(Continued at the link below)
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119137

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