Excerpt:

Hagel pointed out in his Thursday speech that McRaven also has "literally written the book on Special Operations." Indeed, McRraven's 1995 book, "Spec Ops," is the standard text on the subject.

I think if you ask ADM McRaven he would tell you that his book with 8 case studies and very good principles for conducting raids does not provide a theory of special operations writ large and in fact only covers the direct action side of special operations as noted here.

For his book, McRaven interviewed many of the key participants in the raids that he examined, and he traveled to the sites of the operations.

After a careful investigation of each raid, he identified six common principles that had made these operations a success: repetition, surprise, security, speed, simplicity and purpose.

Yes, I used his book in my class on UW and SOF for policy makers and strategists because it is an important contribution but it cannot be called the standard text on the subject.  Brian Pettit's book 

Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero provides a more comprehensive approach to the full range of special operations from surgical strike to special warfare (though I despise the use of the term Phase Zero).  I also think Chapter 2 of the 5th edition of US National Security: Policymakers, Processes, & Politics (by Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala) gives a very useful overview of modern special operations.  

But the real foundation for special operations and specifically the special warfare side of special operations lies in the ARIS project - Assessing Revolutions and Insurgent Strategies which can be accessed at this link: 

  http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html

  If you have not read, synthesized and internalized the lessons in the ARIS project then you really cannot be a practitioner of special operations.

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts

 

  http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/CasebookV1S.pdf

Original Version referred to as Volume I by the ARIS project. Primary research responsibility Paul A. Jureidini, Norman A. La Charite, Bert H. Cooper, and William A. Lybrand. Special Operations Research Office The American University, Washington D.C., December 1962.

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II 1962 - 2009 

  

http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/Casebook%20Vol%202%20%2004-27-12S.pdf

This Casebook provides a summary of twenty-three insurgencies and revolutions; the goal of the book is to introduce the reader to modern-style irregular and unconventional warfare, as well as to act as an informational resource on these particular cases. While not trying to provide an in-depth analysis of any case, our intent was to provide enough background material and description of the revolution to allow comparisons and analysis of broader ideas and insights across this broad spectrum of cases. 

 

Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies, 2d Edition, 2013, http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/HumanFactorsS.pdf

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare, 2d Edition, 2013,http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/UndergroundsS.pdf

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography, http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/IWAnnotated_BibliographyS.pdf 

 

The man who hunted bin Laden, Saddam and the pirates

By Peter Bergen

updated 12:23 AM EDT, Sun August 31, 2014

http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/30/opinion/bergen-mcraven-special-forces-influence/index.html

Editor's note: Peter Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, a vice president at the New America Foundation and the author of "Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for bin Laden -- From 9/11 to Abbottabad," from which this article is, in part, adapted.

(CNN) -- On Thursday in Tampa, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel presided over a change of command ceremony during which Adm. William "Bill" McRaven handed over the reins of Special Operations Command to his successor, Gen. Joseph Votel.

As McRaven stepped down he observed, "We are in perilous times." He pointed out that U.S. Special Operations Forces are helping to fight the fast-growing Islamic State in Iraq; the al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines; the militant group Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

McRaven also said, "We are in the golden age of Special Operations" in which elements of the 67,000 men and women under his command have deployed to 92 countries.

Peter Bergen

Now, after more than 3½ decades working in the world of special operations, Bill McRaven, 58, is retiring. In his next incarnation he will become chancellor of the University of Texas.

As Hagel pointed out in his speech on Thursday that celebrated McRaven's storied career, no one has written McRaven's full history, but if it ever was to be written it "would need to be heavily redacted" because so much of it took place in the "black" (secret) arena.

"Revered" is the word you often hear about McRaven in the special operations community. That's in part because even as a three-star admiral, about once a month in Afghanistan, McRaven went out with his teams on risky snatch-and-grab missions. (His predecessor as the commander of Joint Special Operations Command, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, also went out regularly on such missions and is similarly held in the highest regard.)

The book

Hagel pointed out in his Thursday speech that McRaven also has "literally written the book on Special Operations." Indeed, McRraven's 1995 book, "Spec Ops," is the standard text on the subject.

Adm. McRaven on the bin Laden raid

It features lucid dissections of eight decisive special operations actions, ranging from the British forces who used midget submarines to badly damage the Tirpitz, a key Nazi battleship, in 1943; to the Nazi rescue the same year of the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini from his anti-Fascist captors; to the raid at Entebbe in 1976 that freed Israeli hostages held in Uganda by Palestinian terrorists.

For his book, McRaven interviewed many of the key participants in the raids that he examined, and he traveled to the sites of the operations.

After a careful investigation of each raid, he identified six common principles that had made these operations a success: repetition, surprise, security, speed, simplicity and purpose.

-- Repetition meant frequent and realistic rehearsals so that the "friction" of actual battle was reduced.

-- Surprise meant catching the enemy entirely off guard; for example, the Nazi rescuers of Mussolini crash-landed gliders on a mountain near the hotel where the Fascist leader was being held and rescued him without a shot being fired.

-- Security meant confining the knowledge of the operation to a small circle.

-- Speed meant that "relative superiority" over the enemy needed to be achieved in the first few minutes of the attack, and that the entire mission should be completed in no more than a half-hour.

-- Simplicity ensured that the goal of the operation was well understood by each of the soldiers involved -- "release the hostages" at Entebbe.

-- Purpose meant that the soldiers were completely committed to the mission.

But McRaven's influence on "spec ops" goes far beyond just the book he wrote. McRaven helped establish a curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. And after taking up a job in the White House just weeks after 9/11, he became one of the principal authors of the Bush administration's counterterrorism strategy.

During the Iraq War, McRaven led the shadowy Task Force 121, which tracked down Saddam Hussein in December 2003. Much of the public credit for Saddam's capture went to conventional army units, but it was, in fact, the Special Operations forces under McRaven's command who did much of the work to find the Iraqi dictator.

Rescue of Capt. Phillips

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/30/opinion/bergen-mcraven-special-forces-influence/index.html

Obama’s counterterrorism blueprint looks good, on paper

Conclusion:

Obama has the right concept in creating a global network of Special Operations forces and intelligence services that can combat the frightening evolution of al-Qaeda into new and potentially more toxic offshoots. But someone at the White House needs to drive this policy every day and make sure it’s happening on the ground, in Syria and Iraq and all the other potential ungoverned places on Obama’s new map.

We can take issue with the policy and strategy (and the proposed ways and means as some have done).  But I think Ignatius is exactly right.  Someone has to "do strategy" and do it every day, managing the process and making sure the efforts of the government are well orchestrated to to achieve the strategic end state and support the policies.

And I would also argue that there are other challenges to the US besides terrorism and that we have to have our strategy fully integrated and not stove piped dealing separate problem sets in isolation.

Obama’s counterterrorism 

blueprint looks good, on 

paper

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-obamas-counterterrorism-blueprint-l

ooks-good-on-paper/2014/07/10/fe65ed5e-084d-11e4-a0dd-f2b22a257353_story.html

By David Ignatius Opinion writer July 10 at 7:53 PM 

In President Obama’s sometimes maddeningly cautious foreign policy, you can see him struggling to answer what may be the hardest question of his presidency: How should the United States project power in a disorderly world without making the same mistakes it did in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Obama, whose deliberative approach often resembles that of a Supreme Court justice rather than a politician, has developed a conceptual framework for combating terrorism and instability. It looks good on paper. But the problem is that he hasn’t yet applied this framework successfully in dealing with the challenges that arose on his watch: civil wars in Libya, Yemen and Syria, and the emergence in Iraq of the Islamic State.

David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column and contributes to the PostPartisan blog. View Archive

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Obama is emphatic about what he doesn’t want to do. He wants to avoid “boots on the ground” with U.S. troops; he wants to avoid unilateral actions that isolate the United States; he prefers quiet partnerships that shield America and its allies from domestic political criticism. He is willing to use what amounts to targeted killing.

Instead of significant U.S. military intervention, Obama seeks a network of partnerships stretching from Morocco to South Asia. The United States would provide training and other support for the security services and militaries of nations across this belt. Where governance has vanished and terrorism reigns — as is the case now in parts of Syria and Iraq — the United States would fill the gaps, using surveillance drones, armed drones and Special Operations forces.

It’s a strategy in which Obama, despite his legalistic temperament, plays a role I’ve described as “covert commander in chief.” He relies on the two instruments of national power he most trusts: the CIA and its armed drones and “special activities,” overseen by Director John Brennan, one of his closest aides; and Special Operations Command’s “Global SOF Network,” developed by Adm. William McRaven, the architect of the Osama bin Laden raid and perhaps Obama’s favorite military adviser.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-obamas-counterterrorism-blueprint-looks-good-on-paper/2014/07/10/fe65ed5e-084d-11e4-a0dd-f2b22a257353_story.html

Adapt or Die: Special Operations in Uncertainty

This is a research paper by COL Bob Wilson (soon to be commander of 3d Special Forces Group) while a student at the The Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy National Defense University. It can be downloaded at this link: https://db.tt/wtbHJki1

This should contribute to and inform the debate on the future of special operations.

Excerpts from the introduction are below.

AY 2013-2014
Research Fellowship Paper

Adapt or Die: Special Operations in 
Uncertainty 

Robert L. Wilson
Colonel, U. S. Army
April 27, 2014

Introduction

Special operations Forces, or SOF, play a growing role in the United States’

pursuit of its interests abroad. Special operations unit capabilities have increased

considerably in the past decade, as have their formations and budgets.1 Funding and

personnel growth aside, however, SOF have continued to exhibit one inherent, critical

trait in the modern security environment, an attribute that will grow increasingly more

important as the US approaches future challenges: adaptability. Special operations forces

can rapidly adapt to a broad range of emerging challenges, many of which are altogether

unanticipated, and provide effective ways and means for the US to confront them. SOF

have proven multiple times that they respond to strategic and operational change much

faster than other military elements or government agencies. And much like enemies the

US has faced over the past two decades, SOF have proven adept at transforming

themselves, iteratively at times, to achieve strategic effects.

Adaptability is recognized as an increasingly important trait of the US foreign

policy establishment, particularly in the Department of Defense, though DOD’s inability

to rapidly adapt and innovate has been particularly apparent of late. After he left the

Pentagon, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked that when it came to

identifying future threats and resourcing requirements, the United States “has never once

gotten it right”, and often fails to appropriately prepare for future conflicts.2 A recent

Defense Science Board study also concluded that the Department of Defense lacks the

capacity to foresee change and respond effectively to it.3

Predicting the future is very difficult. Likewise, the failure to respond to change

can lead to strategic deficiencies and excessive cost, since the nation must either abandon

objectives or ultimately invest in the appropriate resources to achieve them after

shortfalls become apparent. Thus, although the ability to project power and mass effects

are critical to national defense, the ability to rapidly adapt to the environment is

increasingly important.

While the United States has faced challenges responding to change, many of the

adversaries the US has faced over the past decade have been extremely adaptable, and

have proven adept at rapidly changing strategies, tactics and even their very structure to

considerable advantage. Al Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington were low cost

and forsook expensive technology. Nonetheless, in executing their attack, the terrorist

organization achieved significant effects against the country with the world’s highest

defense budget, driving it to spend trillions more over the next decade in conflicts around

the world and on domestic security here. The threat of Islamic terror organizations

continued to evolve yet further, becoming even more difficult to detect and deter; the

most recent terrorist attack in the US was planned by two legal immigrants in their

Cambridge, Massachusetts apartment.4

...

Unlike many other military units and government agencies, special operations

forces have demonstrated considerable adaptability in the preceding twelve years. SOF’s

ability to innovate tactically is often the most visible manifestation of this trait. Prior to

the invasion in Afghanistan, special operations units staged aboard an aircraft carrier and

from there directed the actions of personnel on the ground, a decidedly unconventional

command and control platform.16 Those special operations forces on the ground fought

alongside Afghan militias while mounted on horseback, often guiding high tech fires to

decisive effect against the Taliban in an unorthodox mix of 19th and 21st century tactics.

Special operations forces also honed their ability to identify and target threat networks,

and dealt impressive damage to al Qaeda as well as the insurgencies in Iraq and

Afghanistan. Later, SOF units dramatically changed their approach and even their

organizational structure to more effectively combat insurgent and terrorist networks

during the course of the war.17 Finally, a decade into the Afghan war, SOF units proved

adept at operating in austere rural areas, effectively combining security, governance and

development operations via their village stability operations model.18

Recent experience and future projections indicate that adaptability and flexibility

will remain critical components of our national security. The Secretary of Defense, noting

this, placed a priority on ensuring that the military has “ the maximum possible flexibility

to deal with the widest possible range of scenarios and conflicts."19 However, as

discussed, adaptability is not an inherent trait of the defense establishment, and no major

initiatives are underway to increase its ability to respond to change. Additionally, while

the Department of Defense has developed some new doctrinal approaches to employing

joint forces, much of the Defense Department’s efforts are instead on focused upon

budgets and narrow debates about force structure requirements.20 Air Sea Battle has been

the most ambitious operational concept proposed in the post 9/11 military, and most

would argue it is not a dramatic advancement of previous military thought. Ground

forces, emerging after carrying the lion’s share of the burden Iraq and Afghanistan, have

not proffered a new paradigm for more effective future employment; if anything, their

efforts have largely been defensive, attempting to demonstrate relevance in their efforts

to maintain force structure.21

Conversely, special operations forces are advantageously poised to achieve

decisive effects in an uncertain future. The force’s culture, size, networked structure,

personnel force and leadership lend it to be much more adaptable than service

counterparts. Moreover, some of its recent, dramatic successes have increased policy

makers’ confidence in the force, and endeared it with the American Public.22 If there

were ever a time for United States Special Operations Command and its advocates to

present a bold vision for the future, one that increases the national security

establishment’s ability to anticipate change and respond to or preempt emerging threats

altogether, this is it. A highly adaptive, globally networked special operations capability

would dramatically enhance the United States’ ability to anticipate and respond to threats;

it would have, at times the potential to diminish the requirement for costly, large scale

military conflicts, or obviate them altogether.

However, while the current force is highly capable, there are shortfalls that must

be addressed for SOF to truly achieve the vision outlined above. Special operations

leaders will need greater control over personnel policies, and they will also have to

address organizational challenges that impede the force’s effectiveness. Additionally,

many current USSOCOM initiatives designed to increase the force’s capabilities will also

have to overcome bureaucratic and political obstacles as well.

This paper will explore special operations’ current initiatives, suggest structural

and policy changes, and argue how such change will enhance the ability of SOF to

respond to complex, adaptive threats. It will also look at tradeoffs and risks associated

with many of the suggested organizational changes. In arguing to enhance the capabilities

of SOF, it will also suggest how the force can play a more useful role in the future as a

policy tool. It will also explore some of the forms SOF evolution may take in the future.

Overall, this paper will explore how bold investments and innovation today will make

special operations forces invaluable during the uncertainty ahead.

Policy Chief Nominee BacksGlobal Spec Ops Network

Excerpt:

Christine Wormuth, deputy defense undersecretary for strategy, plans and force development, told the House Armed Services Committee that DoD’s 2015 spending plan and the QDR include plans, equipment and dollars to “continue” using “direct action” where needed to target al-Qaeda leaders and operatives.

...

US Special Operations Command chief Adm. William McRaven has been pushing his plan for a “global SOF network,” which Wormuth — nominated become Pentagon policy chief — fully endorsed on Thursday.

I thought the focus was developing a SOF campaign plan to support the Geographic Combatant Commanders across the spectrum of special operations capabilities, not just surgical strike but also special warfare.  I thought the phrase global SOF network had been phased out. 

But if USSOCOM focus is only on using direct action to target AQ leaders and operatives then we need to consider reorganizing special operations and do something else with our special warfare capabilities, to include Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs which do not seem to be on the minds of our policymakers.  Perhaps they just do not understand the full spectrum of special operations and only know the high end surgical strike capabilities they see in the news and movies (or at capabilities exercise demonstrations),

Unless her remarks (and Congressman Smith's) were not fully reported or taken out of context, their views are troubling for special operations. There are a lot more threats out there for SOF to support addressing than just AQ.

V/R

Dave

 

 

1. Policy Chief Nominee Backs
   Global Spec Ops Network

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140403/DEFREG02/304030015/Policy-Chief-Nominee-Backs-Global-Spec-Ops-Network

1. 
   

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is moving aggressively to establish a “network” of elite American commandos across the globe as part of its changing strategy to combat al-Qaida cells in places like North Africa.

Senior Defense Department officials on Thursday also told a House panel that had Russia invaded Crimea before the 2014 quadrennial defense review (QDR) was completed, the Obama administration would not have altered plans to place more emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region.

Christine Wormuth, deputy defense undersecretary for strategy, plans and force development, told the House Armed Services Committee that DoD’s 2015 spending plan and the QDR include plans, equipment and dollars to “continue” using “direct action” where needed to target al-Qaeda leaders and operatives.

A major part of the Obama administration’s strategy to counter the changed nature of the violent Islamic extremist organization, which now is strongest in Yemen and North Africa, will be placing additional US special operations forces (SOF) in those — and other — regions, Wormuth said.

Under questioning from committee Ranking Member Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., Wormuth said the need to directly strike al-Qaeda targets is a main reason that — in an era of defense cuts — Pentagon and administration officials maintained growth for special operations forces.

US Special Operations Command chief Adm. William McRaven has been pushing his plan for a “global SOF network,” which Wormuth — nominated become Pentagon policy chief — fully endorsed on Thursday.

The Obama administration wants to work more closely with US allies in the fight against al-Qaeda than has been the case over the “last 10 years,” Wormuth said, adding McRaven’s vision will be the backbone of such efforts.

The latest QDR makes clear the administration continues to be a big believer in SOF’s role in fighting al-Qaeda.

“The United States will maintain a worldwide approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats using a combination of economic, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, development, and military tools,” the QDR states. “The Department of Defense will rebalance our counterterrorism efforts toward greater emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in fragile states, while retaining robust capability for direct action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance, precision strike, and special operations forces.”

Notably, it includes a passage that the administration plans to “grow overall special operations forces end strength to 69,700 personnel.”

Such growth, it states, is necessary to protect “our ability to sustain persistent, networked, distributed operations to defeat [al-Qaeda], counter other emerging transnational threats, counter WMD, build the capacity of our partners, and support conventional operations.”

The QDR also says a more-robust cadre of elite commandos is needed to “preserve the element of surprise.”

Meantime, Wormuth and Vice Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. James “Sandy” Winnefeld assured the House panel that had Russia invaded Ukrainian soil before the QDR was complete, its contents largely would have remained the same.

Winnefeld acknowledged to committee Vice Chairman Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, that an earlier Russian move would have changed “the tone” of parts of the quadrennial strategy document. And Wormuth told Thornberry that the underlying strategy — and its increased focus on the Asia-Pacific — would not have changed.

Some lawmakers and analysts have criticized the Obama administration for failing to anticipate the Russian invasion — and for being, as they see it, too “weak” in dealings with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The QDR mentions Russia 10 times. Those passages mostly focus on how US officials will work with counterparts in Moscow to avoid conflict, maintain stability in Europe and Asia, and further reduce American and Russian stockpiles of nuclear arms. On the latter, Wormuth assured lawmakers that there are no nuclear arms talks with Russia, and she doesn’t expect new ones in the foreseeable future.

(continued at the link below)

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140403/DEFREG02/304030015/Policy-Chief-Nominee-Backs-Global-Spec-Ops-Network

From Die Welt.  This is of course based on Turse's recent article on USSOCOM. However, although it repeats some of Turse's sensationalism (or alarmism as the author puts it) it has a little better balance.  Note the British military analyst Rogers' discussion of remote control warfare. We should note that I believe USSOCOM is no longer using the phrase "Global SOF Network."  I thought James Woolsey's dragon and snake analogy is interesting (and somewhat ironic give the historical moniker of snake eaters).  Although the phrase it takes a network to defeat a network has entered the world of buzz phrase bingo I think Pavel makes an important statement about what the majority of SOF is doing in the world:

That much is confirmed by Barry Pavel, vice president of the Atlantic Council think tank who served on the National Security Council (NSC) for both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. "It takes a network to fight a network," he told DW, adding that most of what SOCCOM does involves cooperating with foreign governments, rather than direct military action. "The largest proportion of USSOCOM is the engagement function - either training, or helping them to get a better sense of how to deal with their own internal threats."

But they do not get to the heart of a key issue until the conclusion where Pavel says:

Pavel agrees that there is a case to be had for a legitimate debate, but also warns about the possible repercussions. "To the extent you make it transparent you actually reduce their effectiveness to a degree. It depends on what you're talking about in terms of transparency."

V/R
Dave 

MILITARY

US expands reach of clandestine Special Ops

http://www.dw.de/us-expands-reach-of-clandestine-special-ops/a-17379164

The US military is expanding secretive Special Forces at an ever faster rate. Few know the exact reach of these Special Ops, but there are thought to be 11,000 officers on active missions in 80 countries at any one time.

The US is taking over the world - but not with mass armies and awe-inspiring firepower, but by stealth, with undercover teams of highly-trained, heavily-armed soldiers in night-vision goggles. Sometimes these Special Operations, like the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 or last year's abduction of a suspected al Qaeda chief in Libya, become major news events, or the subject of an Oscar-nominated documentary, but few people realize the actual extent of "Special Ops" around the world. Reporter Nick Turse of the website TomDispatch.com has written several articles trying to establish how extensive the use of Special Forces is - his guess is that around 11,000 officers are active in 80 countries at any one time.

Occasionally, Turse's pronouncements sound a little alarmist. "The ambitiousness of the creeping decision to bring every inch of the planet under the watchful eyes of US military commanders should take anyone's breath away," he writes. "It's the sort of thing that once might only have been imaginable in movies where some truly malign and evil force planned to 'conquer the world' and dominate Planet Earth for an eternity."

McRaven has presided over a massive expansion of Special Forces

But the massive recent expansion of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) - the integrated military command established in 1987 in the wake of the Iran hostage crisis - is undisputed. Since 2001, USSOCOM's personnel count has grown from 33,000 to well over 63,000 in 2012, and is set to increase further to above 70,000 by 2015. "To put that in perspective, by that time the entire British army will be under 90,000," said Paul Rogers, military analyst at the UK-based Oxford Research Group.

Special Ops - the future of the military

This is part of the vision of USSOCOM chief Admiral William McRaven, who last year presented his new plan: "Special Operations Forces 2020: The Global SOF Network." Not only does USSOCOM include components in all four branches of the US military - it is also embedded in the intelligence community. According to McRaven himself, speaking at a panel discussion at Washington's Wilson Center in 2013: "I have folks in every agency here in Washington, DC - from the CIA, to the FBI, to the National Security Agency, to the National Geospatial Agency, to the Defense Intelligence Agency."

As a result, writes Turse, "SOCOM is weaving a complex web of alliances with government agencies at home and militaries abroad to ensure that it's at the center of every conceivable global hotspot and power center. In fact, Special Operations Command has turned the planet into a giant battlefield, divided into many discrete fronts."

No dragons but snakes

This proliferation of Special Forces is often seen as a direct reaction to the failure and subsequent unpopularity of large-scale occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, the trend goes back much further - at least to the end of the Cold War, a time when incoming CIA chief James Woolsey famously said, "Yes, we have slain a large dragon [the Soviet Union], but we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes."

Suspected al Qaeda leader al-Liby was seized in Libya last year

That much is confirmed by Barry Pavel, vice president of the Atlantic Council think tank who served on the National Security Council (NSC) for both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. "It takes a network to fight a network," he told DW, adding that most of what SOCCOM does involves cooperating with foreign governments, rather than direct military action. "The largest proportion of USSOCOM is the engagement function - either training, or helping them to get a better sense of how to deal with their own internal threats."

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.dw.de/us-expands-reach-of-clandestine-special-ops/a-17379164