Friday, March 29, 2013

JOINT DOCTRINE FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE


I would say that as much as we need Joint UW Doctrine we need an interagency framework as well.  

But most importantly: We need Strategists and Policy makers who have a deep understanding of and value the strategic options of UW and Counter-UW. 

V/R
Dave



 JOINT DOCTRINE FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 

 By Maj. Robert S. Burrell, USMC 
Warfare in the 21st Century has changed, and the use of large conventional military forces to achieve the United States’ (US’) objectives, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, has proven a costly and dangerous option for addressing today’s security challenges. Irregular threats – derived from terrorist organizations, intrastate competition, weak and failing states, transnational crime, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – have superseded the danger of state versus state confrontation with traditional military weapons and battlefield tactics.1 

 The US appears unprepared to successfully influence rapidly evolving aspects of regional instability. In January 2011, social media (e.g., blogs, social-network sites, video sharing, and Twitter) played a significant role in organizing and sustaining mass protest in Egypt, a major US ally.2 In a mere eighteen days, a change in Egyptian government transpired, significantly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.3 In February 2011, a rapid Libyan rebellion caught the US off guard, creating more opportunities for non-state actors like the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda to influence the political landscape. In 2011 and 2012, the US appeared unable to successfully influence a Syrian revolutionary movement toward one consistent with democracy and human rights, as opposed to the intolerance and radicalism of the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda.4 Even more disconcerting, the growing collaboration of transnational criminal organizations with terrorist organizations in ungoverned spaces (e.g., Northwestern Africa) poses a serious threat to international security. 


Irregular threats are not confined to the Middle East and Northern Africa. After six years of repulsive violence in Mexico, an estimated 47,000 people have died as a result of conflict with transnational criminal organizations. US objectives to end government corruption and provide stability in its nearest neighbor have proven unsuccessful, and the potential of a failed state remains.5 In order to effectively counter emerging irregular threats, the US should develop joint doctrine for unconventional warfare (UW). 


UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
UW is an increasingly viable US strategic option. UW supports US policy with few resources, low casualty risk, and negates anti-access capabilities of hostile states. The joint definition for UW is: “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerilla force in a denied area.”6 

UW supports opposition groups to a state government or occupying power. US objectives range from the coercion of a hostile state, disruption of that state’s activities, or complete overthrow of its government. In UW, the US uses a surrogate to pursue its objectives, which is an indirect approach versus the direct application of US military power. Additionally, UW is conducted in a denied area, which is an area unsuitable for a conventional US campaign due to geographic, military, economic, or political factors. 

The five pillars of irregular warfare (IW) consist of: UW, foreign internal defense (FID), stability operations (STABOPS), counterterrorism (CT), and counterinsurgency (COIN).7 Irregular threats associated with IW activities normally occur simultaneously within the same region. Consequently, a UW campaign must also consider the relationships and activities of allied, neutral, and hostile countries while providing regional stability and addressing irregular threats within nation states. 

Remainder of the article can be downloaded in PDF from here:


Here is the link to the entire Air Land Sea Bulletin:


CONTENTS 
Director’s Comments .........................................................3 
FEATURE ARTICLES 
Joint Doctrine for Unconventional Warfare ....................4 
Articulating the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Biometrics Operating Model in the United States (US) Africa Command Area of Responsibility ......................................................................................8 
Integrating Conventional Aviation with Special Operations Forces (SOF) is like Running a Marathon at a Sprint Pace .........................................................................14 
Unity of Command Should Guide 
SOF and GPF Integration ................................................18 
Integrating Village Stability Operations into a Conventional Force Battlespace ................................................…

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