Tuesday, April 8, 2014

Lessons from the Post 9/11 Campaigns

With all due respect to the General I would have to push back on a few comments.

The first question when you are involved in any counterinsurgency is how do we marshal the right combination of our forces necessary to limit and shape the insurgency? 
...
So first is shape the insurgency, second is to move the host nation forces into the lead and the third is to build the kind of enduring capacities necessary within the institutions of the host state that permit, ultimately, for that nation to continue to deal with the insurgency and also to endure over the long term as a viable political entity. 

I would off the first task is to gain an understand of the situation before we think about marshaling the right combination forces.  As part of that detailed and thorough assessment we have to ask whether there is a viable political entity that can achieve a political solution.  We need to address all these issues before we think about committing forces.  In the General's defense he goes on to talk about Iraq and the Awakening and the importance of understanding the operational environment:

We had to understand the operational environment - the role of Al Qaeda, the relationships between the tribes and Al Qaeda, the inter-tribal relations, and the fact that Anbar in many respects was a closed Sunni environment that was distant from the Shia government in Baghdad. If we could understand the value systems of the tribes and how they related to Al Qaeda, then we would have the capacity to target weaknesses in those relationships

But I would offer another lesson to consider that offers a different perspective than this one:
 
 You cannot start the planning for capacity building as you are moving out of decisive operations into sustained operations. I think this is a major problem. In Afghanistan we knew we were going to purposefully destroy the Taliban government. That was our task. But I am not sure we fully understood just how little capacity there was in the human dimension of the Afghan society to create governance in the wake of the fall of the Taliban regime. Now, Colombia always had in essence an intact government. You may not agree necessary with the politics or the politics may have changed, but the government remained essentially intact. The same happened in other insurgency challenges, for example with El Salvador or the Philippines. So while we would have programmed assistance to help the Philippines government to improve itself, we didn’t have to build the Philippines government from the ground up. There was no need for national capacity building, but there was significant need to assist the Philippines government in internal defense operations and in training and advising its forces. The fundamental difference was that there was no phase three (decisive operations) to our operations. You’ve got to start thinking about and preparing for state-building during phase zero. We didn’t get much chance to have a phase zero in Afghanistan. Iraq was different. We had more time and we have to look very hard in retrospect why we didn’t do more to think what our post decisive operations activities should have been. All in all, there is a fundamental difference. El Salvador, Colombia, and Philippines governments remained intact. But there was no government left intact at the end of decisive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that required a far different phase four.

I absolutely agree with the General that you cannot compare Colombia, El Salvador, and the Philippines with Iraq and Afghanistan. But what I would offer is that the mistakes we made in Iraq and Afghanistan are the result of policy decisions and assumptions (and emotions) that caused us to not look at things from a traditional perspective.  Of course we cannot prove a negative so I accept the coming criticism for this. We failed to do something that we have done in most other wars.  We failed to take the surrender of the defeated force or government in each case.  We decisively defeated both Afghanistan and Iraq but instead of taking a surrender as we do in traditional war we took on the mindset of not only did you break it you buy it, we also developed the mindset that would could create whole governments, security forces, and societies out of whole cloth.  An alternative approach might have been to find whomever was left to offer the surrender, we accept it, and then we say we are going to conduct conflict stability operations and the remaining leaders of the country are going to be responsible for re-establishing their government and security.  Yes it will be ugly and difficult for them but I would submit (and again we cannot prove a negative) that it would not have been any uglier than it has been for the last nearly 13 years.  Again our assumption is that they could not have done it themselves and we had to do it for them. But is that a valid assumption?  Again I know we would not have been able to handle the criticism that we would be responsible for internal violence and strife (and we have to follow the "do something now" doctrine) but the fact remains we were not able to fully prevent it through our actions anyway.  We should think real hard about how our actions as an occupying force, trying to create something in our image that was not in accordance with the countries' customs and traditions, contributed to the rise of insurgencies and violence.  Rather than hold back Iraq and and Afghanistan (and later "return" their sovereignty as if it was ours to give back) we should have assured they maintained their sovereignty from the time of surrender and allowed them to figure out how to re-establish their country in their own image and not in ours.  Again I fully accept the criticism that this is a should have or could have and is not based on the reality of the situation on the ground at the time.  I would only counter with one question: did we really understand the reality on the ground at that time?  I think probably not and that might be the root of our problems because instead of understanding the reality we made assumptions, applied our ideology, and made decisions based on emotion and not practical reality.
 

Last excerpt from the conclusion:

The outcome in a COIN campaign will not be determined by military operations, they’ll be determined by the political stability and economic development which will emerge over time from the security purchased by the foreign intervention and indigenous security forces. Understanding that success in these endeavors is a function of a comprehensive, whole of government approach is essential to success over the long term. The question of whether we should educate military officers to that end isn’t the question. The question should be is how do we prepare members of the interagency … the whole of government … for the reality of what comprehensive COIN demands.

I would offer that the success of a COIN campaign (that should only be conducted and led by the nation threatened with insurgency and not by foreign intervention forces) comes from either the host nation defeating the insurgent forces militarily or the government reaching a political 
 accommodation
 that either satisfies the insurgent demands (such as between the MNLF and MILF in the Philippines) or undercuts the insurgent legitimacy (such as the Huk Rebellion) or some combination of both (El Salvador).  


I think we should consider the idea that the only country that defeat an insurgency is the country that is faced with the insurgency.  We may be able to provide support and advise and assist (i.e. FID) but if we try to do it for them then we are going end up being an occupying power conducting a Pacification campaign (e.g., the US in the Philippines more the 100 years ago).  As long as we believe we can do it for someone else I think we are going to face tremendous military and strategic problems.
 




Lessons from the Post 9/11 Campaigns

by Octavian Manea

Journal Article | April 8, 2014 - 7:58am
Lessons from the Post 9/11 Campaigns: Small Wars Journal Discussion with General John R. Allen
Octavian Manea
General John R. Allen, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.) is a distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policyprogram at Brookings, working within the Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence. Prior to joining Brookings, Allen commanded the NATO International Security Assistance Force and United States Forces in Afghanistan from July 2011 to February 2013.
“The outcome in Afghanistan was not going to be decided by military operations alone. It was to create the security platform operating in the hard end of the hard-power spectrum that then permitted us to leverage those outcomes in governance, economic development and civil society, which was going to deliver the knockout blow to the Taliban.”
SWJ: In the past, the US military trained for high-end maneuver warfare and intensive firepower - historical key ingredients of the American way of war. Since 9/11 we’ve seen a totally different approach. What has changed, in your experience, in the nature and the character of war, in how you wage war? 
General John R. Allen: War is fundamentally a human endeavor; the character of war may change, but not its nature. Conflict may be characterized by high intensity firepower and maneuver dominated operations and campaigns or we may find that the character of war is dominated by counterinsurgency operations, or even cyber operations. But the nature of war still continues to remain the same, a human endeavor. What was unique about Iraq and Afghanistan was what we undertook after the decisive phase of the campaign, because both of them were seen as part of a paradigm that emphasized the traditional application of the American way of war. In the aftermath of those campaigns we ultimately undertook the kind of capacity building and nation-building that would be necessary for that state to endure. We wanted to make sure that what emerged after the destruction of both central governments is something that we could live with. That required and caused us fundamentally to change the manner in which we conduct operations in both theaters.
SWJ: What are the core questions a military commander needs to answer and guide his decisions in a counterinsurgency battlefield?
General John R. Allen: I think there are three very large questions.
The first question when you are involved in any counterinsurgency is how do we marshal the right combination of our forces necessary to limit and shape the insurgency? Being involved in a counterinsurgency campaign would seem to indicate that the host nation at its core has limited or no capacity ultimately to address fundamental issues. So the foreign intervention has to be one that shapes the insurgency while you are doing the next thing which is extraordinarily important, building the capabilities and capacities of the indigenous force to take over from the foreign expeditionary force. Frankly, recognizing when this moment has come and orchestrating the rebalancing of the foreign forces, with moving the indigenous forces into the lead to take over operations is critically important. The commander needs to recognize that moment and be prepared to reshape and rebalance the foreign force from an essentially conventional unit into a force with strong advisory and support capabilities. This is a very significant undertaking.
So first is shape the insurgency, second is to move the host nation forces into the lead and the third is to build the kind of enduring capacities necessary within the institutions of the host state that permit, ultimately, for that nation to continue to deal with the insurgency and also to endure over the long term as a viable political entity. All three of those things have to occur in a counterinsurgency campaign. How do I keep insurgency from winning, how do I get the indigenous security forces into the fight so they become a credible solution to the problem and how do we shape and build endurance in the national institutions so they can bring an end to the insurgency at the political and economic level supported by its own credible and capable security forces and has a hope of enduring beyond the departure of the foreign forces.
One of the challenges with foreign interventions and insurgencies, especially in the kind of interventions where we are investing a lot in capacity-building, is ensuring we are building or developing capacities that are culturally, socially, economically feasible to endure over the long term.  One of the things that I told to my staff, very early on when I have arrived in Afghanistan was that I didn’t want any more big ideas.  As I conveyed to my leadership, I wanted to stop trying remake Afghan institutions into Western institutions. Afghanistan, Iraq, El Salvador, Colombia each of those countries has a unique social environment, history, and faith - the combination of which over time shaped its institutions for governance and government. When we seek to create them in our own image we may well be creating a social dynamic that is unnatural. What I said to my staff was there would be no moratorium on good ideas. What I wanted was to have a good understanding of what works from the context of Afghan solutions. Stop trying to impose unique Western solutions to their unique Afghan problems and needs. Within their own capabilities, we needed to understand Afghan needs and requirements and invest in giving them the capacity to solve their problems or invest in their own capability to build capacities. But if we impose a Western solution and then provide insufficient or no sustainment we can’t expect anything other than collapse of those capabilities once we leave.
SWJ: Is it reasonable to expect military commanders to acquire enough grass-root understanding and insight to influence the local social fabric?
General John R. Allen: This is an important question. I felt very comfortable when I went into Iraq, that I understood the history of the tribes of the Euphrates River and the western desert. I understood, in essence, that if I was to accomplish anything it was going to require very close personal relationships with the sheiks, with the tribal leadership, and understanding how Iraq would govern itself at the civil level. I spent months studying to prepare myself to exist in this environment of an Arab, Muslim, tribal society. At the same time I understood Saddam Hussein, the emergence of modern Iraq. Unfortunately, I didn’t have anything like the same amount of time for my preparations to command in Afghanistan. The enormously complex cultural environment of Afghanistan was far more multifaceted than what I experienced in the Al Anbar Province of Iraq - the ethnicity, the religious and the tribal issues, the fact that the country had been at war non-stop for over 30 years and each phase or segment of that war was different. Each segment had its own unique effect on Afghanistan, the institutions of country, and the Afghan people themselves. These were the Communist uprising, the Soviet invasion, the post Soviet Afghan state against the mujahedin, the civil war, the rise of the Taliban and then the U.S. and Western invasion. Each of these stripes of conflict was different - each one shaped the Afghan society in a very different manner and each deserved to be understood.
(Continued at the link below)

Monday, April 7, 2014

S. Korean military vows to step up anti-drone measures

I hope people will think this through.  These small UAS/RPVs (or drones) are difficult to detect by anyone.  I remember the difficulties we had for year detecting the AN-2 Colts (canvas covered bi-plane that is a main nKPA SOF infiltration platform).

I think the most important thing the north might have done was to fly over the ROK and observe the action of the ROK military in response to the recent provocations.  But based on the photos that have been released it looks like all they are taking are rudimentary low quality still photos.  I do not think they were capable of streaming real time video.

The alleged photos of the Blue House were also of poor quality.  I compared them with Google Earth and Google Earth had much better resolution.  I wonder if the nKPA UAS/RPV operators are substituting Google Earth images for their images when they show them to Kim Jong-un.  I wonder if these overflights are for internal north Korean propaganda or perhaps the result of Kim Jong-un saying he wanted the "advanced capability" like modern nations have.  (Maybe they will halt their long range missile and nuclear weapons programs and shift to UAS/RPVs so they can move from these airplane toy systems to something more sophisticated).

On the other hand this could very well be psychological operations directed against the ROK.  It is easy to see the effects they might want to achieve - political problems for the President, undermining of confidence in the ROK military capabilities, a rapid shift of resources to develop the capabilities try to detect and defend against these systems.  

I think we should spend some time trying to understand the north Korean strategy (and in particular the psychological operations strategy) before we go overboard chasing these toy systems around.  And yes I know people fear that these will be loaded with explosives to attack target but they could probably carry perhaps a kilo of C4 and while that would do some damage it would be relatively minor and certainly have little military effect (so we again have to consider the psychological operations strategy of the north).

But the best immediate reaction to this is to prevent overreaction (which I know is difficult to prevent among ROK politicians and of course any politicians for that matter).

(2nd LD) S. Korean military vows to step up anti-drone measures


2014/04/07 17:30
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, April 7 (Yonhap) - South Korea's defense minister ordered tighter vigilance against new threats of small unmanned aerial vehicles on Monday as a recent discovery of suspected North Korean drones has sparked concern over the nation's air defense system.
Kim Kwan-jin issued the order at a meeting of top military commanders convened to discuss anti-drone measures after South Korea collected three drones in less than a month near the western and eastern front and on a border island.
One was found in late March in Paju, just south of the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, and the other was retrieved from the front-line island of Baengnyeong during the North's live-fire drills near the western maritime border last week.
Most recently, the military on Sunday revealed a third drone similar to the other two drones, which a local resident found in a mountain on the east coast in early October.
"If (North Korea) developed the small unmanned aerial aircraft for reconnaissance purposes to enhance its relatively weak surveillance capability, it is expected to develop drones for secret infiltration and terrorism purposes in the future," Kim said during the video conference held at the Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters in Seoul.
South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin convenes a meeting of top commanders to discuss anti-drone measures at the Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters on April 7, 2014. (Yonhap)

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin convenes a meeting of top commanders to discuss anti-drone measures at the Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters on April 7, 2014. (Yonhap)

"We should strengthen our military readiness to be able to monitor, detect, identify and strike (the drones) with existing military assets along the border."

   The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Choi Yun-hee, talked with the commander of U.S. Forces Korea, Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, via the video conference system to discuss ways to cooperate in dealing with North Korean drones, as well as threats posed by its missile and nuclear weapons, his office said. Scaparrotti is now in the U.S. to attend a congressional panel meeting on security situations on the Korean Peninsula.
Rudimentary drones have existed for almost as long as aircraft themselves for reconnaissance and surveillance missions have, but the drone incursions have raised concerns over more sophisticated, armed UAVs that can launch attacks on military assets and major facilities.
Seoul officials have discussed anti-UAV measures in the past years, but so far, defenses against drones mostly consist of signal jamming, radar detection and conventional counterattack used against other types of aircraft.
In light of the drone incursions, Seoul's defense ministry said it is considering purchasing advanced low-altitude surveillance radars and anti-aircraft guns to better guard against infiltration by small aircraft.
With an in-depth analysis current underway, the three sky blue drones equipped with cameras, which crashed either due to engine failure or lack of fuels, showed Pyongyang's UAV technology to be at a rudimentary level.
In light of the drone discovery made by reports from local residents, military units across the country began searching for other drones that may have crashed in South Korea.
During the meeting, the defense chief also pledged to cooperate with related government agencies and civilians to better spot the small aircraft, which are hard to detect with the existing radars.
As part of the measures, the military is considering giving a monetary reward to any informant who reports the existence of a drone, according to officials.
The latest details from the investigation showed that the drones found in Paju and Samcheok may have extended their flight range by having had their glow engines modified to run on a more effective gasoline fuel, said a military official with knowledge of the ongoing investigation. The glow engine is a small internal combustion engine typically used in model aircraft.
While the triangle-shaped drones with an average speed of 100-120 km per hour are believed to have flown as far as 200 km, the Samcheok drone was discovered 130 km south of the military demarcation line. It is a strong indication that the engine may have used more cost effective gasoline fuel as it is designed to fly a round trip covering a distance of over 260 km, the official said.
"The joint investigation team has assembled the drones to look into engines to figure out whether they were modified to gasoline engines to extend their flight range," the official said. "An in-depth analysis of the engine structure would provide (knowledge about the North's) technology to make drones that can fly according to prearranged coordinates unaffected by wind."

   If the North successfully modified the glow engine to run on gasoline mix, it could conduct spy missions farther south, he added.
Experts say North Korea is believed to have deployed about 100 attack drones it unveiled last March during military drills, which was lauded by leader Kim Jong-un.
The range of the drones is estimated at up to 800 kilometers, sufficient to strike major South Korean and U.S. military targets in South Korea.
The North on Saturday derided the discovery of the drones that flew undetected over key areas in Seoul that tarnished the image of the South Korean forces, but made no mention of its involvement.
If the ongoing probe confirms that the drones were sent by the North, the spokesman for Seoul's defense ministry said it would constitute a violation of the Armistice Agreement of the 1950-53 Korean War and international regulations, and vowed to take "relevant actions" without elaborating on the details of potential measures.
The JCS said Sunday it will take necessary "military and legal actions" over the North's violation of its airspace if the drones are found to have come from the country.

Friday, April 4, 2014

North Korea tells world 'wait and see' on new nuclear test

I guess the secret is out.  Now the north knows.  I want to know if "hell bent" describes ways or means in strategy!

"The U.S. is hell bent on eliminating the DPRK politically, isolating DPRK economically and annihilating the DPRK militarily," Ri told reporters. "There is a great question mark why the U.S. is hell bent on increasing the tension, ignoring the DPRK proposals, very important for peace and security."

North Korea tells world 'wait and see' on new nuclear test

UNITED NATIONS Fri Apr 4, 2014 7:22pm EDT
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un addresses commanding officers of the combined units of the Korean People's Army (KPA) in this undated photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang April 2, 2014. REUTERS/KCNA
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un addresses commanding officers of the combined units of the Korean People's Army (KPA) in this undated photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang April 2, 2014.
CREDIT: REUTERS/KCNA
(Reuters) - North Korea said on Friday that the world would have to "wait and see" when asked for details of "a new form" of nuclear test it threatened to carry out after the United Nations Security Council condemned Pyongyang's recent ballistic missile launch.
North Korea fired two medium-range Rodong ballistic missiles into the sea on March 26. Its first firing in four years of mid-range missiles that can hit Japan followed a series of short-range rocket launches over the past two months.
Members of the Security Council on March 27 condemned the move as a violation of U.N. resolutions and that it would continue discussions on an "appropriate response.
North Korea (DPRK) reacted on Sunday with a threat to conduct what it called "a new form of nuclear test.
"The DPRK made it very clear, we will carry out a new form of nuclear test. But I recommend you to wait and see what it is," North Korea's Deputy U.N. Ambassador Ri Tong Il said on Friday during the normally reclusive state's third U.N. news conference this year.
Ballistic missile launches are banned under U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted in response to North Korea's multiple nuclear tests and rocket firings. The council expanded its existing sanctions after Pyongyang's February 2013 atomic test, its third nuclear detonation since 2006.
The Security Council's sanctions on Pyongyang target the country's missile and nuclear programs and attempt to punish North Korea's reclusive leadership through a ban on the export of luxury goods to the country.
Ri accused the United States of being "hell bent on regime change" in North Korea by blaming its leaders for human rights violations. He also said Washington was blocking a bid for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula by ignoring North Korean proposals, so it can maintain military presence in the region.
U.S. 'GOING AROUND CRAZY'
"The U.S. is hell bent on eliminating the DPRK politically, isolating DPRK economically and annihilating the DPRK militarily," Ri told reporters. "There is a great question mark why the U.S. is hell bent on increasing the tension, ignoring the DPRK proposals, very important for peace and security."
A U.S. diplomat said that Washington had long made clear that it was open to improved relations with North Korea if Pyongyang lived up to its international obligations.
"North Korea's nuclear programs will not make the country more secure. The only way for North Korea to achieve the security and prosperity it seeks is by complying with its international obligations and commitments," the diplomat said.
Nuclear expert Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in the United States, said North Korea's reference to a new form of nuclear test could mean simultaneous detonation of two or more devices as part of a program of more intense testing expected over the next few years.
Lewis said he thought it unlikely North Korean leader Kim Jong Un would move for the moment from underground to atmospheric testing - something he might do to demonstrate an ability to deploy nuclear armed missiles or artillery - for fear of inflaming Chinese public opinion.
"He's only likely to do that ... if he no longer cares what Beijing thinks," Lewis said. "Still, it is useful to remember that Kim Jong Un has a number of other unpleasant provocations from which he might choose."
(Continued at the link below)

Army and SOCOM Add Training, UAVs and Tech to Unfunded Lists

I would think that JSOC would be fully funded for training.  A $25 million training shortfall for the best resourced military unit in DOD seems like quite a problem. (but maybe that means that all the special warfare training capabilities are fully funded)

Excerpts:

In a related request, the Special Operations Command requested $400 million in funds, most of it tabbed to training and construction needs, including $95 million for more aircrew training and $47 million of processing, exploitation and dissemination capabilities for the “SOF ISR Enterprise.” That money would also be directed to enhancing the “reach back network” for SOCOMs MW-9 Reaper UAV fleet. There is also a request for $25 million for further training of JSOC elements, and about $175 million more to fund further training and communications upgrades for the command’s Theater Special Operations Command offices that work with Combatant Commanders around the globe.

Interestingly, the request also asks for $3.5 million for the construction of a Stryker Maintenance Area at Ft. Lewis, Wash. While not widely publicized, Army SOF has been using the fast, eight-wheeled Stryker in combat since 2005 when a unit of the 75th Ranger Regiment operated sixteen of the vehicles in Afghanistan, and then again in 2012 when the 2nd Battalion, 75th Rangers from Ft. Lewis deployed to Afghanistan’s Helmand province.


Army and SOCOM Add Training, UAVs and Tech to Unfunded Lists

Apr. 4, 2014 - 06:10PM   |  
By PAUL MCLEARY   |   Comments
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140404/DEFREG02/304040027?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter
 
    The Army is requesting $500 million for 28 Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as part of it's unfunded priorities list.
    The Army is requesting $500 million for 28 Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as part of it's unfunded priorities list. (Defense Department)
    • FILED UNDER
    WASHINGTON — Following the request of the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Buck McKeon (R-Ca.), the Army along with its sister services passed along its “Unfunded Priorities List” for fiscal 2015 this week. The $10.6 billion request includes the $7.5 billion Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative already put together by the White House, though it tweaks those numbers slightly.
    It tracks pretty closely to that previously publicized request which called for $600 million to buy 26 Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, $500 million for 28 Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters, and $100 million for two Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters, along with $1.8 billion to bolster Army training and readiness accounts.
    The latest unfunded request list wraps all that up into one big $1.3 billion pot that calls for 23 remanufactured Apache helicopters (along with training devices and cockpit displays), 28 Black Hawks, two Ch-47s, and upgrades for eighteen Gray Eagle UAVs.
    The Army also requested an additional $681 million to procure a fourth brigade of Stryker Double-V Hull vehicles and to buy an additional 23 M88 Hercules hauler trucks.
    According to long-term budgetary planning documents previously obtained by Defense News, the Army plans on transforming all nine of its Stryker brigades to the Double V Hull variant, though funding past the first three had not been identified until this latest request.
    The Army is also trying to buy back some of its earlier communications and tech modernization that had been curtailed in earlier base budget cuts.
    The service is asking Congress to find an additional $387 million to pay for a variety of commercial-off-the-shelf hardware to outfit and field the controversial Distributed Common Ground System-Army, and $405 million to fund mission command systems that would patch soldiers and their vehicles in to the WIN-T battlefield network that is currently fielded.
    (Continued at the link below)

    Policy Chief Nominee BacksGlobal Spec Ops Network

    Excerpt:

    Christine Wormuth, deputy defense undersecretary for strategy, plans and force development, told the House Armed Services Committee that DoD’s 2015 spending plan and the QDR include plans, equipment and dollars to “continue” using “direct action” where needed to target al-Qaeda leaders and operatives.

    ...
    US Special Operations Command chief Adm. William McRaven has been pushing his plan for a “global SOF network,” which Wormuth — nominated become Pentagon policy chief — fully endorsed on Thursday.

    I thought the focus was developing a SOF campaign plan to support the Geographic Combatant Commanders across the spectrum of special operations capabilities, not just surgical strike but also special warfare.  I thought the phrase global SOF network had been phased out. 

    But if USSOCOM focus is only on using direct action to target AQ leaders and operatives then we need to consider reorganizing special operations and do something else with our special warfare capabilities, to include Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs which do not seem to be on the minds of our policymakers.  Perhaps they just do not understand the full spectrum of special operations and only know the high end surgical strike capabilities they see in the news and movies (or at capabilities exercise demonstrations),


    Unless her remarks (and Congressman Smith's) were not fully reported or taken out of context, their views are troubling for special operations. There are a lot more threats out there for SOF to support addressing than just AQ.
    V/R
    Dave
     
     


    1. Policy Chief Nominee Backs
      Global Spec Ops Network

    WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is moving aggressively to establish a “network” of elite American commandos across the globe as part of its changing strategy to combat al-Qaida cells in places like North Africa.
    Senior Defense Department officials on Thursday also told a House panel that had Russia invaded Crimea before the 2014 quadrennial defense review (QDR) was completed, the Obama administration would not have altered plans to place more emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region.
    Christine Wormuth, deputy defense undersecretary for strategy, plans and force development, told the House Armed Services Committee that DoD’s 2015 spending plan and the QDR include plans, equipment and dollars to “continue” using “direct action” where needed to target al-Qaeda leaders and operatives.
    A major part of the Obama administration’s strategy to counter the changed nature of the violent Islamic extremist organization, which now is strongest in Yemen and North Africa, will be placing additional US special operations forces (SOF) in those — and other — regions, Wormuth said.
    Under questioning from committee Ranking Member Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., Wormuth said the need to directly strike al-Qaeda targets is a main reason that — in an era of defense cuts — Pentagon and administration officials maintained growth for special operations forces.
    US Special Operations Command chief Adm. William McRaven has been pushing his plan for a “global SOF network,” which Wormuth — nominated become Pentagon policy chief — fully endorsed on Thursday.
    The Obama administration wants to work more closely with US allies in the fight against al-Qaeda than has been the case over the “last 10 years,” Wormuth said, adding McRaven’s vision will be the backbone of such efforts.
    The latest QDR makes clear the administration continues to be a big believer in SOF’s role in fighting al-Qaeda.
    “The United States will maintain a worldwide approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats using a combination of economic, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, development, and military tools,” the QDR states. “The Department of Defense will rebalance our counterterrorism efforts toward greater emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in fragile states, while retaining robust capability for direct action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance, precision strike, and special operations forces.”
    Notably, it includes a passage that the administration plans to “grow overall special operations forces end strength to 69,700 personnel.”
    Such growth, it states, is necessary to protect “our ability to sustain persistent, networked, distributed operations to defeat [al-Qaeda], counter other emerging transnational threats, counter WMD, build the capacity of our partners, and support conventional operations.”
    The QDR also says a more-robust cadre of elite commandos is needed to “preserve the element of surprise.”
    Meantime, Wormuth and Vice Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. James “Sandy” Winnefeld assured the House panel that had Russia invaded Ukrainian soil before the QDR was complete, its contents largely would have remained the same.
    Winnefeld acknowledged to committee Vice Chairman Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, that an earlier Russian move would have changed “the tone” of parts of the quadrennial strategy document. And Wormuth told Thornberry that the underlying strategy — and its increased focus on the Asia-Pacific — would not have changed.
    Some lawmakers and analysts have criticized the Obama administration for failing to anticipate the Russian invasion — and for being, as they see it, too “weak” in dealings with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
    The QDR mentions Russia 10 times. Those passages mostly focus on how US officials will work with counterparts in Moscow to avoid conflict, maintain stability in Europe and Asia, and further reduce American and Russian stockpiles of nuclear arms. On the latter, Wormuth assured lawmakers that there are no nuclear arms talks with Russia, and she doesn’t expect new ones in the foreseeable future.
    (continued at the link below)

      Wednesday, April 2, 2014

      Taking a Spoon to a Gunfight: The West Dealing with Russian Unconventional and Political Warfare in Former Soviet States

      My latest article on War on the Rocks.  To read the entire piece please go to the WOTR web site. http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/taking-a-spoon-to-a-gunfight/

      Taking a Spoon to a Gunfight

      TAKING A SPOON TO A GUNFIGHT

      April 2, 2014 · in 
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      Taking a Spoon to a Gunfight: The West Dealing with Russian Unconventional and Political Warfare in Former Soviet States
      As the Russians now try to reach a diplomatic solution in order to consolidate their gains in Crimea – as evidenced by Putin’s call to Obama and SECSTATE’s meeting with the Russian foreign minister – it is useful to try to understand how Russia has used all of its elements of national power to achieve its objectives.
      While the United States has spent the last decade-plus trying to learn to “eat soup with a knife,” the Russians have been reaching back to some tried and true methods from the Cold War.  Some in the U.S. national security community want to continue to focus on expeditionary counterinsurgency warfare and armed nation building while others long for large-scale maneuver warfare along the lines of the Fulda Gap.  However, while we debate these two forms of warfare and the proper balance between them, the Russians are practicing something different: unconventional warfare in support of political warfare to achieve its strategic objectives.
      A friend asked me recently if the Russians were conducting unconventional warfare in Ukraine and in particular in Crimea.  Even a superficial analysis shows that they are using much of the standard definition of unconventional warfare:
      activities to enable a resistance or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power through and with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla forces in a denied area.
      With the backing of Russian special operations forces, the Russians aided and exploited Russian-speaking Ukrainians who appeared to form some kind of resistance – as feigned as it might have been – against the Ukrainian government.  Certainly in Crimea the objective was to coerce the population into voting for cessation from Ukraine, which the Russians have achieved. Broader Russian objectives in Ukraine are to coerce and disrupt the current government and, in the long term, possibly overthrow it as well.  There is some evidence that Russian advisors have been assisting pro-Russian factions to form variations of an underground and an auxiliary in Eastern Ukraine. They also seem to have been developing some elements into overt action arms to politically mobilize the population against the Ukrainian government and conduct psychological warfare.
      Of course the unconventional warfare campaign was only a supporting element to the overall Russian strategy.  Not only has Russia employed all the elements of national power in this endeavor, it has also deployed significant ground combat conventional forces in Crimea and on Ukraine’s eastern and southern borders.  Whether those forces are supporting the unconventional warfare campaign or vice versa, the fact is that they have effectively integrated multiple military and intelligence capabilities to achieve their strategic aims.  Unconventional warfare is not solely a special operation. An effective strategy and campaign plan may call for the orchestration of various joint military and interagency capabilities to achieve the desired effects.  It appears that the Russians are doing this very well in Crimea and Ukraine.
      Some may question whether this is unconventional warfare at all since there have been relatively low levels of violence. So far there has been no force-on-force conflict.  While they have shown us many elements of unconventional warfare, what we are really seeing is unconventional warfare employed in support of political warfare.  George Kennan described political warfare as all means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.   More recently Joe Celeski (Colonel, US Army, SF Ret) provided a deeper description:
      (Continued at the link below)

      Tuesday, April 1, 2014

      KOREA: STRATEGIC PATIENCE = STRATEGIC PARALYSIS: Finding the Ideal Path to Reunification to Solve the Nuclear and Human Rights Issues

      For the entire essay please go to War on the Rocks: http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/korea-strategic-patience-strategic-paralysis/
      Korea: Strategic Patience = Strategic Paralysis

      KOREA: STRATEGIC PATIENCE = STRATEGIC PARALYSIS

      April 1, 2014 · in 
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      Korea: Strategic Patience = Strategic Paralysis
      Finding the Ideal Path to Reunification to Solve the Nuclear and Human Rights Issues
      “Strategic Patience,” America’s approach to North Korea, has only gotten us strategic paralysis. If the desired effects are changing North Korean behavior, fostering good faith efforts towards denuclearization, and restarting the six party talks, Washington cannot point to any real successes. There are two major challenges in North Korea: the regime’s nuclear weapons program and its human rights atrocities. There is also the threat of war and the effects of regime collapse. The United States has worked for twenty years to try to end North Korea’s nuclear program and the United Nations just published its comprehensive Commission of Inquiry report on the abhorrent human rights violations being committed in the North. Yet neither of these efforts has or will likely result in changes in this troublesome country, or the achievement of objectives desired by the U.S. and the international community.
      Elimination of the nuclear program or liberating North Korea by force are not options, as the second and third order effects would be too severe to the Republic of Korea, the region, and the world. Some policymakers rely on China to influence the North to end its nuclear program and wait patiently for the regime to change its behavior; however, this has not achieved the desired effects to date.
      Why haven’t we gotten anywhere? Based on our knowledge of the nature of the Kim family’s regime and its strategy, it is clear that North Korea will not give up its nuclear program under any circumstances, and the horrendous human rights atrocities will not end as long as the Kim regime remains in power. If that is the case, the question is this: what policies and strategy should the United States and the Republic of Korea develop and implement?
      The answer lies in the 2009 U.S–ROK Joint Vision Statement that says the Republic of Korea and United States will seek peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. This vision was reaffirmed in May 2013 when South Korean President Park Geun-hye and President Obama met in Washington. Reunification has long been overlooked—seen as a distant dream—discounted because of the disparity between North and South, or viewed as an exclusively Korean problem. Little international attention has been paid to reunification and even less planning and no preparation made, save for the work that the Republic of Korea has done over the years.
      But it is time to recognize that no change will occur on the Korean Peninsula unless there is reunification, and that the international community, and in particular the United States, should stand behind and assist the Republic of Korea in developing a path to reunification.
      Some will ask how we can think about reunification when there is the threat of provocation, regime collapse, and conventional and nuclear war from North Korea. The common belief is that as long as these threats exist, there can be no possibility of reunification, let alone peacefulreunification. However, this is the very thinking that has led to the current strategic paralysis when it comes to addressing the North Korean problem.
      The ideal path to peaceful reunification is built on respect, reconciliation, reform, rebuilding, and reunification (R5). The operative word is ideal. Some will immediately discount this as a mere dream; however, such a path can form the basis of a strategy and supporting campaign plan that provides multiple benefits even if peaceful reunification is not achieved in the near-term.
      We should defer to (and support) the reunification plan of the Republic of Korea as President Park has initially described in her speech in Dresdenon March 28, 2014. In addition to the points made in her speech, the ideal reunification plan that we should support will likely reflect several key objectives:
      • Develop a comprehensive information operations and influence campaign to inform the North Korean population about the outside world and educate about the benefits or reunification.
      • Establish peninsula-wide land ownership policies to include compensation vice recompense for those with pre-1948 claims in the North.
      • Develop military integration plans with specific focus on how the two militaries will be integrated and how senior military leaders will be treated if they support reunification.
      • Conduct detailed planning for infrastructure development and identify required government and non-government investment.
      • Conduct detailed planning for economic transition and ultimately integration.
      • Conduct detailed planning for the integration of governmental/administration functions.
      • Conduct comprehensive diplomatic coordination for international cooperation for support of reunification.
      Again, these are just some of highlights of an ideal and desired path to reunification. While we should strive to follow this path, the Kim regime has a vote and for various reasons may not agree. Unfortunately, there are three other paths that the North could pursue, any of which could be more likely than an embrace of the principles of an ideal reunification plan.
      Bottom up internal resistance to the regime appears to be growing among parts of North Korea’s population and even within the periphery of the political elite and military. This could create the first alternative to the ideal reunification path.  Such resistance should be monitored, assessed, understood, and possibly supported, to include through an unconventional warfare campaign led by the Republic of Korea. Although it is unlikely to lead an “Arab Spring” phenomenon, given the regime suppression mechanism, it is still possible and cannot be discounted.  Such grassroots resistance could lead to a coup that might then seek reunification with the South. The danger with internal resistance is that it can lead to conflict within the North, which could grow out of control and spill over into the Republic of Korea. However, if there was a regime change, with or without conflict, there would eventually be opportunity to get back on the ideal path to reunification. All the planning and preparation that has been previously conducted would still have value after regime change that followed from internal resistance.
      (Continued at the link below)

      Giving Tuesday Recommendations

        Dear Friends,  I do not normally do this (except I did this last year and for the last few years now, too) and I certainly do not mean to ...