Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 20, 2016

2,900 explosions in a day. Heavy artillery and tank fire returns to the front lines in Ukraine.



Have we forgotten about Ukraine?  There should be no doubt that Russia is conducting unconventional warfare in Ukraine but on a much grander scale.  They are exploiting a resistance movement (even a fabricated one) but employing military and non-military instruments of power and from a military perspective not relying solely on special operations forces but a selective use of its conventional military power.  This is why I say that unconventional warfare does not solely belong to special forces or even the military writ large.  (http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/unconventional-warfare-does-not-belong-to-special-forces/)

We should pay attention to Nate Freier and his Army War College writing team and their report called Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1325 and these words:

Joint ground force commanders—but especially the U.S. Army—will benefit from a thorough reimagining of the potential of expeditionary forces and operations. As it ap­plies to the gray zone, U.S. ground forces need the capability to deploy in large numbers to perform a wide range of missions: enable and support allies, partners, and sister U.S. joint forces; build foreign partner capacity; counter adversary unconventional warfare (UW) campaigns; and perform more traditional offensive and defensive operations (of­ten against hybrid opponents). This requires examining and developing capabilities to defeat A2AD and rapidly delivering ground capabilities on short notice and limited advanced planning. 

This study found UW to be a final area of unique ground force vulnerability for the United States and its partners as they assess and contend with gray zone challenges. As currently defined by American Joint military doctrine, UW is the collection of activi­ties that enable the overthrow of a government through proxy actors in overtly denied areas.  U.S. UW vulnerability emerges in both an offensive and defense context. Offensively, UW provides U.S. decision-makers with a baseline capability for covert degrada­tion of an adversary’s control over contested territory. Defensively, Russian and Iranian UW efforts are currently presenting U.S./partners thorny challenges in Europe and the Middle East. In both instances, U.S. forces are increasingly unfamiliar with the associ­ated ground force demands that might result.

For example, SOF UW competency has atrophied with the substantial counterinsur­gency and counterterrorism demands of the last decade and a half. For their part, GPF have never been required to understand UW as a concept. Improvement is essential on both counts. 

 A sharper offensive UW instrument will be an important tool for pressuring active gray zone revisionist powers who themselves employ UW to aggressively undermine U.S. partners. Likewise, deep understanding of UW on the part of GPF forces will en­able them to engage in defensive UW activities to generate greater resilience among the same at risk partners. Finally, a more robust ground force UW capability that can understand, prosecute, and defend against it, employing the widest set of military and non-military tools, may require a new military competency in “political warfare.” This specific focus would enable both conventional and SOF to grasp the underpinnings and requirements necessary for prosecuting offensive and defensive UW activities against sophisticated gray zone actors.



Excerpt:

While Russia continues to support the separatists, the West has buttressed the Ukrainian war effort through training programs and nonlethal aid that includes vehicles, counter-artillery radar, body armor and night-vision equipment. The most recent defense bill passed by the U.S. Congress allocated an additional $50 million for Ukrainian military assistance in 2017, bringing the total to $350 million.

2,900 explosions in a day. Heavy artillery and tank fire returns to the front lines in Ukraine.

The Washington Post · by Thomas Gibbons-Neff · December 20, 2016

A soldier of the separatist self-proclaimed Lugansk People’s Republic walks in a field near the line of contact with the Ukrainian army at the so-called Svitlodarsk bulge in the Luhansk region. (Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters)
An early morning artillery barrage started the latest bloody scrap in eastern Ukraine Sunday as Russian-backed militants and government troops clashed near the town of Svitlodarsk.
A spokesman for the Ukrainian military, Col. Andriy Lysenko, said that five soldiers were killed and 16 wounded during the day-long battle and that Russian-backed separatist forces had attempted to break through government lines. It was the largest single loss of life for Ukrainian troops in five months.
A resident in a nearby separatist-controlled town, who asked not to be identified for personal security reasons, dismissed the idea that any separatist troops had attempted to attack and said the fighting was merely “rocket-tennis” between the two sides.
Lysenko said the Russian-backed fighters suffered about 50 casualties, but that figure could not be independently confirmed.
The site Censor.net, quoting an unnamed Ukrainian defense official, said that four bodies held by Ukrainian authorities were not claimed by the militants, suggesting that the deceased were either Russian soldiers or citizens.
An international monitoring group documented almost 3,000 explosions in the region Sunday — up from 700 on Saturday and 100 on Friday. The majority of Sunday’s detonations were recorded around Svitlodarsk. Despite multiple cease-fire attempts and efforts to remove heavy weapons from the front lines, the day-long bombardment, which included tanks, rocket artillery and howitzers, laid bare the shortcomings of international efforts to quell the conflict.
The fighting sent the residents of Svitlodarsk to their basements, and around nightfall, as temperatures dipped below freezing, the town lost power and gas. Utilities were restored around midnight, according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has observers on the ground.
Social media accounts that follow the conflict indicated that shelling in the area started again Monday night.
Since summer 2014, the front line in eastern Ukraine has been mostly static, and both sides have been relegated to exchanging artillery and machine-gun fire across a heavily mined no man’s land. Svitlodarsk is near the border between the two breakaway territories known as the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic and represents a Ukrainian-controlled bulge along the front line.
In talks brokered by France and Germany, Ukraine and Russia agreed upon a series of cease-fires known as the Minsk Agreements to stop the conflict, but both sides continue to clash daily. Earlier this month, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg encouraged allies to maintain economic sanctions on Russia until there is a lasting cease-fire.
While Russia continues to support the separatists, the West has buttressed the Ukrainian war effort through training programs and nonlethal aid that includes vehicles, counter-artillery radar, body armor and night-vision equipment. The most recent defense bill passed by the U.S. Congress allocated an additional $50 million for Ukrainian military assistance in 2017, bringing the total to $350 million.
It is unclear how President-elect Donald Trump will approach the conflict. His pro-Russian statements have put both NATO allies and the Ukrainian government on edge.
Since the conflict in Ukraine began in April 2014, nearly 10,000 people have been killed and more than 20,000 wounded, according to a United Nations report in June. More than 1.6 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced by the conflict.

Tuesday, August 2, 2016

U.S. Army Special Operations Command Primer on Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine 2013-2014



U.S. Army Special Operations Command Primer on Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine 2013-2014



Page Count: 78 pages
Date: June 2015
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: U.S. Army Special Operations Command
File Type: pdf
File Size: 8,767,432 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):2F98D69E0550FB86FB8820C6C936948C0B6B0E3B81C788C4B061A2B6244D93AA

 Download the full PDF file (~8mb) here: https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-little-green-men/


This document is intended as a primer—a brief, informative treatment—concerning the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It is an unclassified expansion of an earlier classified version that drew from numerous classified and unclassified sources, including key US Department of State diplomatic cables. For this version, the authors drew from open source articles, journals, and books. Because the primer examines a very recent conflict, it does not reflect a comprehensive historiography, nor does it achieve in-depth analysis. Instead, it is intended to acquaint the reader with the essential background to and course of the Russian intervention in Ukraine from the onset of the crisis in late 2013 through the end of 2014. The document’s key points are summarized below.

PART I. CONTEXT AND THEORY OF RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
·         Key Principles
o    Strategy to deal with states and regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation
o    Primacy of nonmilitary factors: politics, diplomacy, economics, finance, information, and intelligence
o    Primacy of the information domain: use of cyberwarfare, propaganda, and deception, especially toward the Russian-speaking populace
o    Persistent (rather than plausible) denial of Russian operations
o    Use of unidentified local and Russian agents
o    Use of intimidation, bribery, assassination, and agitation
o    Start of military activity without war declaration; actions appear to be spontaneous actions of local troops/militias
o    Use of armed civilian proxies, self-defense militias, and imported paramilitary units (e.g., Cossacks, Vostok Battalion) instead of, or in advance of, regular troops
o    Asymmetric, nonlinear actions
·         For the purpose of clarity and uniformity within this study, the authors use the term unconventional warfare to embrace the wide variety of military, informational, political, diplomatic, economic, financial, cultural, and religious activities Russia employed in Ukraine.
·         Evolution of Russian unconventional warfare. Russian intervention in Ukraine has featured refined and modernized techniques evolved through observation and analysis of Western methods (the color revolutions, Arab Spring) and Russian experiences since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Specifically, they drew lessons from interventions in:
o    Lithuania, 1991
o    Transnistria, 1990–1992
o    Chechnya (and Dagestan), 1994–1996 (1999–2009)
o    Georgia, 2008
·         Russian information warfare has emerged as a key component of Russian strategy. Igor Panarin and Alexandr Dugin are the primary theorists.
·         Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov’s model for interstate conflict reflects the growing importance of nonkinetic factors in Russian strategy.
PART II. RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN UKRAINE, 2013–2014
·         Historical Context
o    Ukraine’s historical, cultural, religious, and economic ties to Russia make it a vital interest to Moscow.
o    Western encroachment into the Russian sphere of influence, primarily through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion and European Union (EU) economic ties, stimulated a reactionary movement among Russian conservatives to stop the loss of peripheral states to the West.
o    The Crimean peninsula, with a majority of ethnic Russians, includes Russia’s Black Sea naval base of Sevastopol and is a vital interest to Moscow.
o    The Maidan movement is viewed as a product of Western—especially American—conspiracy.
o    Vladimir Putin has boosted his popularity by portraying himself as the defender of Russian nationalism and Russian Orthodoxy in Ukraine.
·         Russian Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures in Ukraine, 2013–2014
o    Political organization within the conflict region to create and sustain pro-Russian political parties, unions, and paramilitary groups
o    Recruitment and support of regional SPETSNAZ
o    Importation of “little green men”—unidentified Russian agents (usually SPETSNAZ) to organize and lead protests and paramilitary operations
o    Importation of Cossack, Chechen, Serbian, and Russian paramilitary “volunteers”
o    Persistent (rather than plausible) denial of Russian operations, even in the face of photographic evidence and firsthand testimonials
o    Domination of television, radio, and social media through the use of highly trained operatives, including “hacktivists” and seemingly independent bloggers; use of Russia Today television as a highly effective propaganda tool; use of professional actors who portray themselves as pro-Russian Ukrainians
o    Use of blackmail, bribery, intimidation, assassination, and kidnapping against regional political opponents and government officials, including police and military officials
o    Use of “relief columns” to import weapons, soldiers, equipment, and supplies to pro-Russian forces
o    Small-scale invasion and precision operations by conventional Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) based along the Russian border
o    Issuing Russian passports to pro-Russian populations and touting Moscow’s need to defend the Russian diaspora against alleged abuses
CONCLUSION
·         Driven by a desire to roll back Western encroachment into the Russian sphere of influence, the current generation of Russian leaders has crafted a multidisciplinary art and science of unconventional warfare. Capitalizing on deception, psychological manipulation, and domination of the information domain, their approach represents a notable threat to Western security.
·         The new forms of Russian unconventional warfare challenge the structure of the NATO Charter, because they obviate the appearance of “armed invasion.”

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist

From one of our former students here at Georgetown from Finland.

The 101 page report can be downloaded directly at this link.  

There is some very interesting perspectives in this report upon first scan.  I think some of the best information that has come out on Russia's strategy and operations has been from the Finns, Latvians and Poles.


Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine:
Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist



Julkaistu 16.6.2015
András Rácz
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Lataa PDF (405 Kb)
Since the change of power in Ukraine in February 2014, Russia has been swift to occupy and annex the Crimean peninsula. In April 2014, separatist riots broke out in Eastern Ukraine, following a very similar pattern to those in Crimea. These actions were accompanied by a strong and intensive, well-coordinated diplomatic, economic and media campaign both in Ukraine and abroad, also supported by pressure exerted by the large Russian military units lined up along the border with Ukraine. 
The form of warfare Russia employed in Ukraine in 2014, often called hybrid war, has been aimed at defeating the target country by breaking its ability to resist without actually launching a full-scale military attack. In line with contemporary Russian military thinking on ‘new generation warfare’, hybrid war is built on the combined use of military and non-military means, employing basically the whole spectrum of a state’s policy inventory, including diplomatic, economic, political, social, information and also military means. 
This report aims to seek answers to two main research questions. First, what are the main features and characteristics of Russia’s hybrid warfare as conducted in Ukraine? Derived from the first, the second research question is focused on the operational prerequisites for the Russian hybrid war. In other words, is the Russian hybrid war a universal warfare method deployable anywhere, or is it more country or region-specific?

Saturday, April 4, 2015

Weekend Reading April 4-5 2015





The Strategist's Mission Statement

I would say that the answer to Maj Cavanaugh's good question on what makes a good strategist lies in the 39 words at the end of his piece. (e.g., secure ... desired policy outcomes)   He or she is someone who can not only devise a strategy of balanced and coherent ends, ways, and means but is someone who can "do" strategy which is an iterative process (requiring agility to adapt and adjust)  based on continuously assessing the conditions and situation and challenging assumptions in order to achieve the policy objectives established by our political leadership.  The why is the policy objective and the definition of success is meeting the policy objective(s) (while knowing full well that political leaders can change the policy objectives at any time, or multiple times).    Another way to describe success is to achieve the "desired state".  I was at a conference this week and some very smart people discussed the idea (that I embrace) that we can never really achieve an end state but we can seek to achieve a desired state because the "willed enemy," other participants,  and the political and security situation are all constantly evolving.  This also necessitates the need to be able to do strategy (as the National War College teaches) vice just writing a single strategy and trying to execute that strategy while hoping that the conditions remain the same throughout the execution of the strategy.

Excerpt:
These are fine statements and descriptions for bureaucratic documents.  But here's my problem with them. They miss one essential cornerstone of strategy - the existence of a living, willed opponent.  There is no strategy with no "other."  And without this point of reference, how do I know how well I've done?  There is no such thing as a "good" strategist, precisely because "good" is an objective condition.  The only thing that matters in strategy is whether I'm relatively better than my opponent.  Thus, the one-eyed strategist succeeds in the caliphate of the blind. 
There is also no mention of an ultimate objective.  Some (particularly BHL Hart) say we fight to achieve "a better peace." In the documentation, I can't seem to find any mention of why the strategist plies their trade - a series of important tasks without an ultimate purpose.   




By Major Matt Cavanaugh

White House officials  defend Somalia strategy  as counterterrorism model

They doth protest too much.  We should not be defending models.  We should be understanding how the enemy adapts and the conditions change and then adapting our strategy instead of defending it as a model.  Yes models have value but I think the way they are applied in the national security space can be counterproductive and most important they can stifle creativity and critical thinking when our political leadership is more intent on defending its model than on "doing" effective strategy.  As an example our prevailing national security "model" is based on the concept of the "small footprint." Perhaps instead of being so self-limiting we should be seeking the "right" footprint (assuming we need a footprint at all).  If the right footprint is not feasible then perhaps we should reconsider the strategy altogether because if the small footprint is not feasible, suitable, or acceptable then perhaps we should not employ it.

Excerpt:

By some measures, it has paid dividends. U.S. drones have killed several of the Islamist group’s leaders, including two top planners in just the past month, a senior administration official said Friday. African Union troops backed by the United States have forced al-Shabab fighters to flee huge swaths of territory.
But this week’s massacre of 148 people at Garissa University College, the deadliest terrorist attack on Kenyan soil in two decades, demonstrates the limits of the administration’s approach and the difficulty of producing lasting victories over resilient enemies.
But we also have to realize that in doing strategy sometimes that ugly strategic concept comes into play:  "Sh*t happens" and that is why we need to be able to "do"strategy. (apologies to the horse for continuing to beat him).


Time For US Strategy Review; Then Tackle Goldwater-Nichols


This will need to be done in the summer of 2017 and should be held at the National War Collage just as was done in 1953.  There are useful lessons fro history.  Excerpt:

The best model for such a review, Krepinevich says, would be President Eisenhower’s Project Solarium, a complex, focused and far-ranging strategic review performed in 1953. It included three different teams working from differing assumptions about US goals. They worked non-stop over six weeks, forcing participants to keep their eyes on the ball and lending impetus to the effort.

A useful overview of Solarium is at this link: http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/living_history/solarium_for_today.dot  

But such a project requires real leadership including leadership who will value the process and consider the recommendations.



FBI confirms death of suspect Marwan in ill-fated Philippines raid


China shutters golf courses, probes officials who play


Not all golf courses of course but an interesting perspective on China, the communist party and leadership views on corruption.


Life inside Islamic State’s Caliphate not all that it seems


Excerpt:

But peer through the spin and it is clear Islamic State is neither as powerful nor as omnipresent as it pretends. All the signs are the group has passed the high-water mark of its power. Airstrikes as well as resistance on the ground this week routed Islamic State ­forces in Tikrit, handing the anti-Islamic State coalition its first major victory over Baghdadi’s ­forces in Iraq. Islamic State’s army is overextended. Its supply lines are under threat. In January, it was defeated in the battle for Kobane, a Syrian town of no strategic importance but one whose capture had become a trophy for the group’s propaganda-obsessed leaders. It was the first time Islamic State squared off against a well-organised opposition backed by coalition air power. It lost badly.
“They’re very good at fighting and dying in a position, particularly in an urban environment,’’ says Jim Molan, a retired Australian army officer who from 2004 to 2005 was chief of operations for the coalition in Iraq. “But apart from that, you have to ask yourself, have they ever defeated a half-competent army? They stood and fought in Kobane and they were defeated at great cost to themselves.’’

Errant shell puts US military's lessons learned in Korea to the test


The 2002 history shaped the situation on the Korean peninsula in many ways.  It actually was the spark  for the OPCON transfer debacle (a waste of a decade plus of time and resources that could have been focused on effective alliance transformation and readiness), the Yongsan and 2d Infantry Division relocations plans, and a strain in the alliance that north Korea was able to exploit (and of course what really ignited the spark was Rumsfeld's desire to get US forces off the peninsula as those US forces were "wasted" because he could not use them in the war on terrorism).

The other mistake (and lesson to learn) is that the command did not listen to its experts who advised the command to take immediate action but instead approached the situation from a purely American perspective (to include a general officer saying that we would show then how a justice system works when the two soldiers were court martialed and then acquitted thus no one was held responsible for the death of the two school girls and that statement may have had as much influence on the outcome of the 2002 presidential election as any statement by a foreigner could have had).

It is good to see that the current US command knows how to respect Koreans and maintain the Alliance.  

Excerpts:

Although none of the more recent incidents has caused any deaths, the question remains: If another Yangju-type tragedy occurred, would the U.S. face the same severe backlash?
“There is such explosive power if the U.S. attitude ignores South Korean [opinion],” said Kim Joon-hyung, an international politics professor at Handong Global University in Pohang.
However, Kim and others don’t think the U.S. would make that mistake again.
“I really don’t think there would be a repeat of a 2002-type event,” said Moon Chung-in, a Yonsei University political science professor. “It was a total lack of sensitivity on the part of the U.S. command that fueled the discontent with American forces. American commanders in South Korea have been very attentive afterward.”



Russia outguns US in information war with record propaganda spending



Of course a dollar for dollar comparison is not really useful but it is an indicator of how important propaganda is to Russia and Putin.  They take it seriously and they achieve effects with specific target audiences.  We should not try to match them dollar for dollar but we should strive to make our psychological operations and strategic communications more effective with the target audiences we can affect.


APRIL 03, 2015 4:48 PM ET

The Iran Nuclear Deal, in 3 Charts


By eliminating 12,000 centrifuges and five bombs’ worth of low-enriched uranium, the accord extends the breakout timeline for Iran to produce the highly enriched uranium core of a bomb to one year. By requiring the reconfiguration of Iran’s planned plutonium-producing reactor at Arak, the accord essentially closes this door to a bomb. And by agreeing to establish a new mechanism that will allow unprecedented access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (
IAEA) to suspicious nuclear sites anywhere in Iran, the accord makes it much more difficult for Iran to cheat.


Thursday's framework agreement was a start, but there are hundreds of areas where a final deal could be derailed. 

Saudi Air War Over Yemen Leaves U.S. on Sidelines


Excerpts:

Washington shouldn’t feel left out, according to Anthony Zinni, the retired four-star Marine who headed U.S. Central Command, which oversees the region, from 1997 to 2000. “Ever since the first Gulf War in the early 1990s, we’ve been pushing to get some sort of alliance in the region,” he says. “We wanted them to come together and basically find a way where we could support them but not have to lead them all the time.”

Zinni says the Saudis have acted because they hate the Houthis, hate the Iranians, and hate the idea of an ungoverned state next door. “They will not tolerate a Houthis-led Yemen on their southern border,” he adds. “And they’re pissed that the Iranians support them.” Saudi Arabia has attacked the Houthis before, he notes, but never this extensively.

A Funny Thing Happened When These Military Officers and Academics Got Together


Excerpts:

This exercise suggests, first, the importance of building personal relationships earlier in a career. If this is left until they are full professors, general officers or assistant secretaries of defense, it is too late; they will have less time to learn and will tend to be more certain in their views. Second, it highlighted the importance of a safe learning environment where ignorance can be disclosed, questions asked and mistakes made. This can be done intensely through an immersion process over the course of a few days, but it requires personal, professional and intellectual commitment. And third, it revealed the importance of informal conversations based on mutual respect during the inevitable down times of a tabletop exercise. Trust and reliance seemed to follow in short order.
The limitations to this approach are important to note. It is built around small groups; it is labor intensive; and it requires civilian and military participants to devote some of their valuable professional time to it. But even with these limitations the effort is worthwhile. National defense is a team endeavor; it requires the trust, devotion, and expertise of military and civilian leaders at many levels to make it work.

The Obama Doctrine: Let the Mideast Fight Its Own Wars


Excerpts:

U.S. officials have also expressed concern about Saudi Arabia’s ability to operate with the kind of sophistication that avoids collateral damage, negative headlines and fodder for enemy recruitment. Despite nationalistic swagger, many allies who have fought with the U.S. admit that no other country can compare with its ability to perform command-and-control, to find targets and hit them precisely and to oversee battle spaces to ensure all parties are coordinated.
Inexperience with that kind of discretion is already beginning to show in Yemen, following reports Monday that an apparent airstrike killed 20 civilians at a United Nations refugee camp there. Iranian media also bragged Monday that Houthi rebels in Yemen were able to shoot down a Saudi F-15 fighter jet, forcing its crew to eject into the Gulf of Aden where American airmen rescued them in international waters. U.S. defense officials confirmed the mission, but would not say what caused the pilots to eject or why the plane went down.
A situation as complex as Yemen is rife with opportunities for misunderstanding. BBC Arabic tweetedthen later retracted reports that the elusive Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani had been photographed at a Yemeni market. The leader of Iran’s hyper-zealous Revolutionary Guard Quds Force was previously reported to have been in Tikrit overseeing Shiite militias fighting the Islamic State.
Were Saudi Arabia to attack and kill a high profile Iranian officer, even accidentally, it may provoke a some form of war of retribution.
Even if the U.S. can secure a nuclear deal with Iran, the cryptic Shiite nation’s desire to assert power in the Middle East, and its Sunni foes’ retaliation, all but guarantees conflicts in this region for many years.


The White House has pushed Arab nations to start securing their neighborhood on their own, but the U.S. might not like the result.

Giving Tuesday Recommendations

  Dear Friends,  I do not normally do this (except I did this last year and for the last few years now, too) and I certainly do not mean to ...