Restoring American Power by Senator John McCain

The 33 page report can be downloaded at the link below.  I have pasted the table of contents as well as the three paragraphs on SOF since that is my focus (along with north Korea of course and I am even happy to see that north Korea is mentioned even in the SOF section.  Although the first and third paragraphs focus on SOF and counterterrorism for the most part the second paragraphs address special warfare.  I am gratified to see Senator McCain address that aspect of SOF since so many in government overlook it.  It is in keeping with my major talking points on Special Operations:

1. The future is characterized (not exclusively of course)​ by states and non-state actors conducting UW (exploiting revolution, resistance, insurgency, terrorism, and civil war (RRIT & CW)) and thus there is a requirement to conduct​ Counter-UW. ​SOF is organized, educated, trained, equipped and optimized for both (but does not conduct them unilaterally or in a vacuum but as one element of the means in support of a joint campaign and national strategy)​

2. We have the greatest Surgical Strike capability in the world but we need to prioritize and resource correctly (but not necessarily equally) our Special Warfare capabilities.  - But we have to be careful of Anthony Cordesman’s “Strategic Tokenism.”

3. We need Strategists and Policy M​akers who have a deep (or at least sufficient) understanding of and value the strategic options of  offered by ​UW and Counter-UW. 

4. Effective Special Warfare (which includes UW and counter-UW and supports Political Warfare)​ is counter-intuitively characterized by slow and deliberate employment – long duration actions and activities, relationship establishment, development, and sustainment. 

5. SOF will have always have a role in hybrid conflict and major combat operations.

​

V/R

Dave​

RESTORING AMERICAN POWER

Recommendations for the FY 2018-FY 2022 Defense Budget By Senator John McCain, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/25bff0ec-481e-466a-843f-68ba5619e6d8/restoring-american-power-7.pdf

Executive Summary 2 

The Failure of the Budget Control Act 3 

A Better Defense Strategy 5 Beginning to Rebuild the Military 8 

Navy 9 

Marine Corps 11 

Air Force 12 

Army 14 

Special Operations Forces 15 

Nuclear Forces 16 

Missile Defense 17 

Space 17 

Cyber 18 

Force Posture 18 

New Technologies 19 

Actions for Congress 20 

Appendix 22

Special Operations Forces.

For the last 15 years, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) have been a critical component of the fight against global terrorist groups. These highly innovative and agile units are organized with a global outlook and able to conduct operations in austere and complex environments with a relatively small footprint, making them a logical leading element of the global counterterrorism mission. SOF have increasingly been optimized for that mission over the past 15 years, while high operational tempo and repeated deployments have put real strains on SOF operators and units, despite the growth in their ranks that has occurred in recent years. Because the global counterterrorism mission shows no sign of diminishing in the foreseeable future, SOF will continue to play an outsized role in that effort. 

At the same time, SOF must increasingly perform critical missions within the broad discipline of irregular warfare beyond counterterrorism. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are increasingly competing with the United States below the threshold of major conflict in what has been called “hybrid warfare” or “gray zone” operations. These threats across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia are aimed at challenging U.S. interests and partnerships and destabilizing regional order. Put simply, SOF has an indispensable role to play in great power competitions and global counterproliferation. This reality demands a greater employment of the broad spectrum of U.S. special operations capabilities. SOF’s ability to conduct low-visibility, special warfare operations in politically sensitive environments makes them uniquely suited for this mission. 

An even greater reliance on SOF beyond counterterrorism will likely require further investments in new special operations capabilities and some additional force structure. The challenges posed by militarily advanced great powers, in particular, will require the development and employment of new technologies and capabilities. At the same time, the readiness of the force should remain a priority, which will likely necessitate additional capacity. The growth in SOF end-strength called for in the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews never fully materialized because of budget constraints. Any growth now will depend on increases in the size of our conventional forces, since they will be the sources from which SOF operators are assessed and selected, as well as the dominant providers of enabling support.

We know what Russia did. But what we really need to understand is why. by Fareed Zakaria

As Frank Hoffman has been trying to hammer home to us the first principle is to understand.  There have been a number of scholars and experts advocating that we understand where Putin and Russia are coming from and why they are acting the way they do. Perhaps pundits such as Fareed Zakaria will wake people up with his article below.  Yes, the democracy movements around the world are a threat to Russia and democracy overall is a threat to Putin and Russia.  I think this is the fundamental reason why Gerasimov created his so-called Gerasimov doctrine (see Charles Bartles) that has come to be known as non-linear warfare or new generation warfare which in my opinion is modern unconventional warfare with Russian characteristics that is a holistic approach designed to influence political action at all levels from non-violence influence operations to political mobilization, to sabotage and subversion, support to terrorist activities to the integrated activities of all the elements of national power to the select application or threat of application of violence by the full range of military forces (both special and conventional) to achieve national objectives. Unconventional warfare is the most political of all forms of warfare since the focus is on exploitation of resistance movements that seek to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow...

Russia is a revisionist power seeking to undermine the legitimacy of opposing political systems and undermine the dominant international systems and institutions and make them function in its favor and interests in order to protect himself and the Russian leadership from the loss of political power at home and abroad.  China is another revisionist power.   And of course AQ and ISIS are revolutionary who seek to destroy the international system and replace nations with their ideological systems.  The question for the US and like minded nations of the world is whether it is in our interest to protect the international system that we have created since WWII and whether we will the will to commit to the defense of that system or should we let the revisionist and revolutionary powers to have their way?

I would commend everyone to read Charles K. Bartles' Military Review article on "Getting Gerasimov Right" from January 2016. (and we should all learn from the discussion of "foresight" in his article on page 31).

For U.S. readers, Gerasimov’s linking of the Arab

Spring and “color revolutions” (and in later comments,

the Maidan Movement) with military capability development

may seem odd. In order to put his comments

in context, it is necessary to look at the Russian view of

warfare and forced regime change as it has developed

since the end of the Cold War.

...

In the Russian view, the pattern of U.S.

forced regime change has been as follows:

deciding to execute a military operation;

finding an appropriate NATO’s Yugoslavia intervention is one of military

action to prevent mass genocide, Russia has a much different

view. Most Russians generally view the NATO

bombing campaign as having been illegal because it was

conducted without the approval of the UN Security

Council and believe that Serbia was simply being

punished for engaging in counterterrorism operations,

albeit with some excesses. The most egregious sin, from

the Russian view, was the partitioning of Yugoslavia.

This action set a precedent for external actors to make

decisions about the internal affairs and territorial integrity

of sovereign nations alleged to have committed

some wrong. It is important to note that Russia was

dealing with its own Islamic insurgency at the same

time in the North Caucasus. This may have caused

Russian concern about a similar NATO action taking

place inside Russia. One consequence of Western

intervention resulting in the destruction of Yugoslavia 

pretext such as to prevent genocide or seize weapons

of mass destruction; and finally, launching a military

operation to cause regime change (figure 1).

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art009.pdf

We should also go back to Anthony Cordesman's CSIS report on the "Color Revolutions" written in 2014.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-and-%E2%80%9Ccolor-revolution%E2%80%9D

Here is a summary of Russia's new generation or non-linear warfare from the Latvian Defence Academy.

Russian New Generation Warfare and the Future of War (link to the full report below - and the Poles and Finns have produced some excellent analysis of Russia's UW as well): 

As a result, it follows that the main guidelines for developing Russian military capabilities by 2020 are:

i. From direct destruction to direct influence;

ii. from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay;

iii. from a war with weapons and technology to a culture war;

iv. from a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings;

v. from the traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare and war of perceptions;

vi. from direct clash to contactless war;

vii. from a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy’s internal side and base;

viii. from war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyberspace;

ix. from symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns;

x. From war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life.

Thus, the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population. The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country. It is interesting to note the notion of permanent war, since it denotes a permanent enemy. In the current geopolitical structure, the clear enemy is Western civilization, its values, culture, political system, and ideology.

http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx

We know what Russia did. But what we really need to understand is why.

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · January 5, 2017

I’m glad that Donald Trump will finally get a briefing on the unanimous conclusion of America’s intelligence agencies that the Russian government was behind the hacking of the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton’s campaign chairman. But he should also request and receive a political briefing on Russia that can shed light on the backdrop to Russia’s actions. We need to understand why Russia behaved the way it has.

It all started with the Arab Spring. The sudden mass demonstrations and demands for democracy took most of the world by surprise. In particular, they rattled Moscow at a precarious moment. The Kremlin was in the midst of managing the country’s political future and worried about opposition at home. Parliamentary elections were scheduled in less than a year, to be followed by a presidential election. Vladimir Putin was not then president, having stepped aside in keeping with the Russian constitution, allowing Dmitry Medvedev to ascend to the office.

Roland Dannreuther of the University of Westminster in London points out that the “crises in both Libya and Syria coincided with the rise of opposition to the re-election of Putin, with unprecedented large opposition rallies in Moscow and other cities in Russia during 2011-12.” He argues that the Kremlin watched these countries as street protests morphed into broader opposition, created instability, and then attracted the attention and intervention of Western powers. Moscow was determined that no such scenario would play out in Russia or in any of its close neighbors, such as Ukraine.

In fact, there was a rare disagreement between Putin and Medvedev on how to respond to Libya. Putin bitterly attacked his own president for not vetoing a U.N. Security Council resolution sanctioning an intervention in Libya and lambasted the West for launching a “crusade” against a Muslim country. Medvedev, who was technically in charge of foreign policy, flatly contradicted him, calling his rhetoric “inexcusable.” Some Russia hands believe that this disagreement might have sealed Medvedev’s fate, ensuring that he served just one term and then made way for Putin’s return to the presidency. In any event, as Dannreuther writes, “for conservative Russian elites, the evidence of the Arab Spring confirms that such factional divisions in the guise of democracy promotion only lead to internal disorder, societal conflict and the loss of the sovereign integrity of the state.” (The fact that Clinton encouraged Russian democracy protesters at this sensitive moment branded her an archenemy in the eyes of the Kremlin elite.)

About a year later, in 2013, the chief of staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, wrote an article suggesting that Russia’s key challenge was responding to the underlying dynamics of the Arab Spring and North Africa’s “color revolutions.” He urged that these not be viewed as non-military events because “a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.” He advocated that Russia better understand and develop the non-military and asymmetrical methods, including special operations, information warfare and the use of internal opposition to cripple a society.

Since then, Moscow has made information and asymmetrical warfare central to its foreign and military policy. When asserting itself in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has used a hybrid strategy that involves the funding of local politicians and militias, fake news and cyberattacks. Leading German and Polish politicians assert that Russia has engaged in some such activities in their countries as well. And now there is the apparent involvement in America’s election.

The idea of information warfare is not new. The Soviet Union developed and practiced a strategy of “disinformation” throughout the Cold War, complete with fake news and the penetration of Western political parties and media organizations. But the revival of this approach and the aggressive and sophisticated manner in which it is now being used in a social media landscape mark a new and dangerous trend in geopolitics.

This is the political backdrop behind the technical evidence that Russia interfered in November’s election. It needs to be moved out of a partisan framework and viewed in a much broader context. Since the end of the Cold War, no major country has challenged the emerging international system. But now, a great-power strategy, designed to work insidiously, could well succeed in sowing doubt, division, discord — and ultimately destruction — within the West.

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · January 5, 2017

Have we forgotten about Ukraine?  There should be no doubt that Russia is conducting unconventional warfare in Ukraine but on a much grander scale.  They are exploiting a resistance movement (even a fabricated one) but employing military and non-military instruments of power and from a military perspective not relying solely on special operations forces but a selective use of its conventional military power.  This is why I say that unconventional warfare does not solely belong to special forces or even the military writ large.  (http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/unconventional-warfare-does-not-belong-to-special-forces/)

We should pay attention to Nate Freier and his Army War College writing team and their report called Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1325 and these words:

Joint ground force commanders—but especially the U.S. Army—will benefit from a thorough reimagining of the potential of expeditionary forces and operations. As it ap­plies to the gray zone, U.S. ground forces need the capability to deploy in large numbers to perform a wide range of missions: enable and support allies, partners, and sister U.S. joint forces; build foreign partner capacity; counter adversary unconventional warfare (UW) campaigns; and perform more traditional offensive and defensive operations (of­ten against hybrid opponents). This requires examining and developing capabilities to defeat A2AD and rapidly delivering ground capabilities on short notice and limited advanced planning. 

This study found UW to be a final area of unique ground force vulnerability for the United States and its partners as they assess and contend with gray zone challenges. As currently defined by American Joint military doctrine, UW is the collection of activi­ties that enable the overthrow of a government through proxy actors in overtly denied areas.  U.S. UW vulnerability emerges in both an offensive and defense context. Offensively, UW provides U.S. decision-makers with a baseline capability for covert degrada­tion of an adversary’s control over contested territory. Defensively, Russian and Iranian UW efforts are currently presenting U.S./partners thorny challenges in Europe and the Middle East. In both instances, U.S. forces are increasingly unfamiliar with the associ­ated ground force demands that might result.

For example, SOF UW competency has atrophied with the substantial counterinsur­gency and counterterrorism demands of the last decade and a half. For their part, GPF have never been required to understand UW as a concept. Improvement is essential on both counts. 

 A sharper offensive UW instrument will be an important tool for pressuring active gray zone revisionist powers who themselves employ UW to aggressively undermine U.S. partners. Likewise, deep understanding of UW on the part of GPF forces will en­able them to engage in defensive UW activities to generate greater resilience among the same at risk partners. Finally, a more robust ground force UW capability that can understand, prosecute, and defend against it, employing the widest set of military and non-military tools, may require a new military competency in “political warfare.” This specific focus would enable both conventional and SOF to grasp the underpinnings and requirements necessary for prosecuting offensive and defensive UW activities against sophisticated gray zone actors.

Excerpt:

While Russia continues to support the separatists, the West has buttressed the Ukrainian war effort through training programs and nonlethal aid that includes vehicles, counter-artillery radar, body armor and night-vision equipment. The most recent defense bill passed by the U.S. Congress allocated an additional $50 million for Ukrainian military assistance in 2017, bringing the total to $350 million.

2,900 explosions in a day. Heavy artillery and tank fire returns to the front lines in Ukraine.

The Washington Post · by Thomas Gibbons-Neff · December 20, 2016

A soldier of the separatist self-proclaimed Lugansk People’s Republic walks in a field near the line of contact with the Ukrainian army at the so-called Svitlodarsk bulge in the Luhansk region. (Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters)

An early morning artillery barrage started the latest bloody scrap in eastern Ukraine Sunday as Russian-backed militants and government troops clashed near the town of Svitlodarsk.

A spokesman for the Ukrainian military, Col. Andriy Lysenko, said that five soldiers were killed and 16 wounded during the day-long battle and that Russian-backed separatist forces had attempted to break through government lines. It was the largest single loss of life for Ukrainian troops in five months.

A resident in a nearby separatist-controlled town, who asked not to be identified for personal security reasons, dismissed the idea that any separatist troops had attempted to attack and said the fighting was merely “rocket-tennis” between the two sides.

Lysenko said the Russian-backed fighters suffered about 50 casualties, but that figure could not be independently confirmed.

The site Censor.net, quoting an unnamed Ukrainian defense official, said that four bodies held by Ukrainian authorities were not claimed by the militants, suggesting that the deceased were either Russian soldiers or citizens.

An international monitoring group documented almost 3,000 explosions in the region Sunday — up from 700 on Saturday and 100 on Friday. The majority of Sunday’s detonations were recorded around Svitlodarsk. Despite multiple cease-fire attempts and efforts to remove heavy weapons from the front lines, the day-long bombardment, which included tanks, rocket artillery and howitzers, laid bare the shortcomings of international efforts to quell the conflict.

The fighting sent the residents of Svitlodarsk to their basements, and around nightfall, as temperatures dipped below freezing, the town lost power and gas. Utilities were restored around midnight, according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has observers on the ground.

Social media accounts that follow the conflict indicated that shelling in the area started again Monday night.

Since summer 2014, the front line in eastern Ukraine has been mostly static, and both sides have been relegated to exchanging artillery and machine-gun fire across a heavily mined no man’s land. Svitlodarsk is near the border between the two breakaway territories known as the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic and represents a Ukrainian-controlled bulge along the front line.

In talks brokered by France and Germany, Ukraine and Russia agreed upon a series of cease-fires known as the Minsk Agreements to stop the conflict, but both sides continue to clash daily. Earlier this month, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg encouraged allies to maintain economic sanctions on Russia until there is a lasting cease-fire.

While Russia continues to support the separatists, the West has buttressed the Ukrainian war effort through training programs and nonlethal aid that includes vehicles, counter-artillery radar, body armor and night-vision equipment. The most recent defense bill passed by the U.S. Congress allocated an additional $50 million for Ukrainian military assistance in 2017, bringing the total to $350 million.

It is unclear how President-elect Donald Trump will approach the conflict. His pro-Russian statements have put both NATO allies and the Ukrainian government on edge.

Since the conflict in Ukraine began in April 2014, nearly 10,000 people have been killed and more than 20,000 wounded, according to a United Nations report in June. More than 1.6 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced by the conflict.

The Washington Post · by Thomas Gibbons-Neff · December 20, 2016

SSP Podcast - Episode 7 - Col. (Ret.) David Maxwell- discuss unconventional warfare (UW), the “gray zone,” and strategy

In case anyone is bored on election day or needs a sleep aid.

Thanks to SSP Alum Jeff Palmer for putting together the SSP Podcast program.  I was honored to join the members of our distinguished SSP faculty and friends of SSP (Professor Richard English) and participating in Jeff's latest podcast episode.  All the podcast episodes can be accessed through iTunes at the link below or from the Center for Security Studies Web page at this link: https://css.georgetown.edu/podcast  These include Bruce Hoffman, Richard English, Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault, Ariane Tabatabai, Elizabeth Stanley, and Dan Byman.

Security Studies Podcast - Episode 7 - Col. (Ret.) David Maxwell

ReleasedNov 08, 2016

Episode 7 of the Security Studies Podcast features Col. David Maxwell (Ret.), Associate Director of Georgetown’s Security Studies Program, to discuss unconventional warfare (UW), the “gray zone,” and strategy. We define and conceptualize these terms, cover current examples of the use of UW, discuss the need for the U.S. to develop counter-UW capabilities, and talk about his inspiration to do strategy. Col. Maxwell also shares stories of how his blog came to be (www.maxoki161.blogspot.com) and of a special memento in his office. The Security Studies Podcast is produced by Jeffrey Palmer. Music: www.bensound.com/royalty-free-music

https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/security-studies-podcast-episode/id1110393903?i=1000377620329&mt=2

THE SECURITY STUDIES PODCAST

The Security Studies Podcast invites SSP faculty to discuss the most pressing and complex global security issues of today.

Subscribe to The Security Studies Podcast on iTunes here.

Produced by Jeffrey Palmer

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​

​

U.S. Army Special Operations Command Primer on Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine 2013-2014

Page Count: 78 pages
Date: June 2015
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: U.S. Army Special Operations Command
File Type: pdf
File Size: 8,767,432 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):2F98D69E0550FB86FB8820C6C936948C0B6B0E3B81C788C4B061A2B6244D93AA

 Download the full PDF file (~8mb) here: https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-little-green-men/

---

This document is intended as a primer—a brief, informative treatment—concerning the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It is an unclassified expansion of an earlier classified version that drew from numerous classified and unclassified sources, including key US Department of State diplomatic cables. For this version, the authors drew from open source articles, journals, and books. Because the primer examines a very recent conflict, it does not reflect a comprehensive historiography, nor does it achieve in-depth analysis. Instead, it is intended to acquaint the reader with the essential background to and course of the Russian intervention in Ukraine from the onset of the crisis in late 2013 through the end of 2014. The document’s key points are summarized below.

PART I. CONTEXT AND THEORY OF RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

·         Key Principles

o    Strategy to deal with states and regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation

o    Primacy of nonmilitary factors: politics, diplomacy, economics, finance, information, and intelligence

o    Primacy of the information domain: use of cyberwarfare, propaganda, and deception, especially toward the Russian-speaking populace

o    Persistent (rather than plausible) denial of Russian operations

o    Use of unidentified local and Russian agents

o    Use of intimidation, bribery, assassination, and agitation

o    Start of military activity without war declaration; actions appear to be spontaneous actions of local troops/militias

o    Use of armed civilian proxies, self-defense militias, and imported paramilitary units (e.g., Cossacks, Vostok Battalion) instead of, or in advance of, regular troops

o    Asymmetric, nonlinear actions

·         For the purpose of clarity and uniformity within this study, the authors use the term unconventional warfare to embrace the wide variety of military, informational, political, diplomatic, economic, financial, cultural, and religious activities Russia employed in Ukraine.

·         Evolution of Russian unconventional warfare. Russian intervention in Ukraine has featured refined and modernized techniques evolved through observation and analysis of Western methods (the color revolutions, Arab Spring) and Russian experiences since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Specifically, they drew lessons from interventions in:

o    Lithuania, 1991

o    Transnistria, 1990–1992

o    Chechnya (and Dagestan), 1994–1996 (1999–2009)

o    Georgia, 2008

·         Russian information warfare has emerged as a key component of Russian strategy. Igor Panarin and Alexandr Dugin are the primary theorists.

·         Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov’s model for interstate conflict reflects the growing importance of nonkinetic factors in Russian strategy.

PART II. RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN UKRAINE, 2013–2014

·         Historical Context

o    Ukraine’s historical, cultural, religious, and economic ties to Russia make it a vital interest to Moscow.

o    Western encroachment into the Russian sphere of influence, primarily through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion and European Union (EU) economic ties, stimulated a reactionary movement among Russian conservatives to stop the loss of peripheral states to the West.

o    The Crimean peninsula, with a majority of ethnic Russians, includes Russia’s Black Sea naval base of Sevastopol and is a vital interest to Moscow.

o    The Maidan movement is viewed as a product of Western—especially American—conspiracy.

o    Vladimir Putin has boosted his popularity by portraying himself as the defender of Russian nationalism and Russian Orthodoxy in Ukraine.

·         Russian Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures in Ukraine, 2013–2014

o    Political organization within the conflict region to create and sustain pro-Russian political parties, unions, and paramilitary groups

o    Recruitment and support of regional SPETSNAZ

o    Importation of “little green men”—unidentified Russian agents (usually SPETSNAZ) to organize and lead protests and paramilitary operations

o    Importation of Cossack, Chechen, Serbian, and Russian paramilitary “volunteers”

o    Persistent (rather than plausible) denial of Russian operations, even in the face of photographic evidence and firsthand testimonials

o    Domination of television, radio, and social media through the use of highly trained operatives, including “hacktivists” and seemingly independent bloggers; use of Russia Today television as a highly effective propaganda tool; use of professional actors who portray themselves as pro-Russian Ukrainians

o    Use of blackmail, bribery, intimidation, assassination, and kidnapping against regional political opponents and government officials, including police and military officials

o    Use of “relief columns” to import weapons, soldiers, equipment, and supplies to pro-Russian forces

o    Small-scale invasion and precision operations by conventional Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) based along the Russian border

o    Issuing Russian passports to pro-Russian populations and touting Moscow’s need to defend the Russian diaspora against alleged abuses

CONCLUSION

·         Driven by a desire to roll back Western encroachment into the Russian sphere of influence, the current generation of Russian leaders has crafted a multidisciplinary art and science of unconventional warfare. Capitalizing on deception, psychological manipulation, and domination of the information domain, their approach represents a notable threat to Western security.

·         The new forms of Russian unconventional warfare challenge the structure of the NATO Charter, because they obviate the appearance of “armed invasion.”

The 185 page report can be downloaded directly here. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1236/RAND_RR1236.pdf

This excerpt can be summarized as Special Operations Forces simply doing their job by relying on their training, long term relationships with the host nation military, understanding of the operational environment because of continuous training in country for decades and most important employing the fundamental SOF doctrine as it existed at 9-11.

• U.S. counterterrorism policy in recent years has sought to rely increasingly on indigenous forces. Some efforts have enjoyed greater success than others, including this Philippine example. The study found that key factors that contributed to success in this case were: 1) maintaining the sovereign government lead, which avoided U.S. dependency; 2) adjusting plans through regular assessments; 3) employing SOF and other capabilities in a synergistic way; and 4) creating and maintaining interagency coordination. These findings may be useful in developing policy options and plans for other long-term SOF and partner building missions.

U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014

by Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, Gillian S. Oak

http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1236.html

This report examines the 14-year experience of U.S. special operations forces in the Philippines from 2001 through 2014. The objective of this case history is to document and evaluate the activities and effects of special operations capabilities employed to address terrorist threats in Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines through (1) training and equipping Philippine security forces, (2) providing operational advice and assistance, and (3) conducting civil–military and information operations. The report evaluates the development, execution, and adaptation of the U.S. effort to enable the Philippine government to counter transnational terrorist groups.

An average of 500 to 600 U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps special operations units were employed continuously under the command of a joint special operations task force. They provided training, advice, and assistance during combat operations to both Philippine special operations units and selected air, ground, and naval conventional units; conducted civil–military and information operations on Basilan, in the Sulu archipelago, and elsewhere in Mindanao; provided intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and emergency care; aided planning and intelligence fusion at joint operational commands and force development at institutional headquarters; and coordinated their programs closely with the U.S. embassy country team. The authors conclude that Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines contributed to the successful degradation of transnational terrorist threats in the Philippines and the improvement of its security forces, particularly special operations units. It identifies contributing and limiting factors, which could be relevant to the planning and implementation of future such efforts.

Research Questions

1. What effect did U.S. special operations forces' activities have on the transnational terrorist threat?
2. What effect did those activities have on the Philippine security forces' capabilities at the tactical, operational, and institutional levels?

Key Findings

U.S. Special Operations Forces' Activities in the Philippines Between 2001 and 2014 Contributed to a Reduced Transnational Terrorist Threat and Support for Threat Groups

• The number of enemy-initiated attacks has dropped, the number of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militants has decreased, and polls show reduced support for the ASG and a substantial majority reporting satisfaction with Philippine security forces.

U.S. Special Operations Forces' Activities in the Philippines During That Period Also Increased Philippine Security Forces' Capabilities at the Tactical, Operational, and Institutional Levels

• At the tactical level, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) provided training, advice, and assistance to conventional Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units at all echelons throughout Mindanao, including Philippine Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force units. In the later years of Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines, U.S. SOF also provided training, advice, and assistance to the PNP Special Action Forces. U.S. SOF interviewees judged that Philippine SOF are among the most proficient of those Asian SOF units with which they had worked.
• At the operational level, U.S. SOF advised and assisted the AFP headquarters to improve its joint processes and integrate command and control, planning, and intelligence functions.
• At the institutional level, U.S. SOF contributed somewhat to strategy, planning, and coordination at the AFP national headquarters, and they helped Western Mindanao Command develop its plans and intelligence analysis and fusion capabilities.

Activities During That Period Had Other Effects as Well

• The activities enhanced the bilateral defense ties between the United States and the Philippines.

Recommendations

• U.S. counterterrorism policy in recent years has sought to rely increasingly on indigenous forces. Some efforts have enjoyed greater success than others, including this Philippine example. The study found that key factors that contributed to success in this case were: 1) maintaining the sovereign government lead, which avoided U.S. dependency; 2) adjusting plans through regular assessments; 3) employing SOF and other capabilities in a synergistic way; and 4) creating and maintaining interagency coordination. These findings may be useful in developing policy options and plans for other long-term SOF and partner building missions.

Table of Contents

• Chapter One
  Introduction
• Chapter Two
  U.S.-Philippine Relations in Historical Perspective
• Chapter Three
  2001–2004: The Initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines
• Chapter Four
  2005–2007: The Move to Jolo and Operation Ultimatum
• Chapter Five
  2008–2010: Expansion of Effort
• Chapter Six
  2010–2012: Transitioning Up
• Chapter Seven
  2012–2014: Zamboanga Siege and Transitioning Out
• Chapter Eight
  Conclusion
• Appendix A
  Balikatan 02-1 Terms of Reference
• Appendix B
  Plan Analysis Tool