Collapse of the North Korean regime appears inevitable, and the world needs to prepare for it (From Chinese Scholars)

In the South China Morning Post from two Chinese scholars.  I am somewhat optimistic that we are finally seeing so many people acknowledging the need to PREPARE for north Korean regime collapse.

 

Pretty strong words from China.

 

Excerpts:

 

Thus, while it is still hard to judge North Korea in full, there remains a high probability of regime collapse.

 

Unless Pyongyang gives up its nuclear programme, the byungjin strategy is bound to fail.

 

Even an economic recovery and improvement in people's livelihoods is unlikely to change this trend. Harsh sanctions have left many from the upper classes at odds with the leadership and led to a growing number of defectors. In the most recent case, 13 employees of a North Korean-run restaurant in Ningbo (寧波) defected to the South – the largest single group in the past decade.

 

Meet the North Korean defector and restaurateur who believes 'reunification of our country starts at the table'

Trouble usually arises within one's own boundaries. Once those who have benefited from the regime in the past start to become dissatisfied with the government and seek an escape route, the collapse of the Kim dynasty, built on the basis of lies and repression, is just around the corner. There may only be 10 to 15 years left for the Kim family to govern, and a collapse could begin at any time. So, how would such a scenario play out?

 

​I have pasted my thoughts on collapse below.  I would love to host a working group of military planners from the US. ROK. China, Russia, and Japan​ and put together a plan for each of the military contingents to present to their political leaders.

 

 

scmp.com

Collapse of the North Korean regime appears inevitable, and the world needs to prepare for it

Deng Yuwen and Huang Ting say the flimsy economic plan unveiled at the Workers' Party congress will do little to alleviate the country's crippling problems, which include severe food shortages and growing discontent

PUBLISHED : Wednesday, 18 May, 2016, 5:25pm
UPDATED : Wednesday, 18 May, 2016, 5:25pm 

3 min read 

 original

The seventh ruling Worker's Party congress in North Korea, the first in 36 years, turned out to be a coronation for Kim Jong-un, formalising the system centred on the young leader and promoting the party's status vis-à-vis the army's.

North Korea's 'rare' party congress only shows a country at a standstill

The national byungjin strategy, which calls for securing a nuclear arsenal while seeking to develop the economy, was re-emphasised.

A five-year plan was put forward to show the government's commitment to economic problems, especially the supply of electricity, as Kim admitted that a lack of power has affected economic development and improvement of people's living standards.

The general idea from the congress was thus that Pyongyang would devote greater efforts to economic reform, pay more attention to developing its economy and improve people's lives.

However, in reality, the plan merely opens the door to reform just a crack instead of pushing hard. Without such opening up, reforms will not make significant progress. So there is still much uncertainty over North Korea's future.

Improved access to education, health care and food in North Korea but right to freedom of movement and the right to life worsen, says new report

With the significant drop in grain output and reduction of food aid as a result of increased international sanctions, North Korea is this year facing the most serious food problem in recent years. According to the UN World Food Programme, there is already a shortfall of 1.1 million tonnes of food, and a quarter of children are severely malnourished.

There have been signs that Pyongyang is preparing to test a fifth nuclear weapon and more missiles. If Kim goes his own way, regardless of opposition from the international community, he will surely bring harsher sanctions upon his nation, which will affect his plan to build North Korea into economic power.

Thus, while it is still hard to judge North Korea in full, there remains a high probability of regime collapse.Unless Pyongyang gives up its nuclear programme, the byungjinstrategy is bound to fail.

Even an economic recovery and improvement in people's livelihoods is unlikely to change this trend. Harsh sanctions have left many from the upper classes at odds with the leadership and led to a growing number of defectors. In the most recent case, 13 employees of a North Korean-run restaurant in Ningbo (寧波) defected to the South – the largest single group in the past decade.

Meet the North Korean defector and restaurateur who believes 'reunification of our country starts at the table'

Trouble usually arises within one's own boundaries. Once those who have benefited from the regime in the past start to become dissatisfied with the government and seek an escape route, the collapse of the Kim dynasty, built on the basis of lies and repression, is just around the corner. There may only be 10 to 15 years left for the Kim family to govern, and a collapse could begin at any time. So, how would such a scenario play out?

There are several possibilities. First, if the economy fails to pick up in the long term, more people will be pushed into extreme poverty, causing general dissatisfaction with the government, leading to more and more people from all classes seeking to flee the country. Under such circumstances, the collapse only needs a catalyst.

With UN sanctions biting, it is impossible for Pyongyang to quickly solve the problems of food and electricity shortages.

Kim gets the party started, but will economic reforms follow?

Sanctions will increasingly isolate North Korea, preventing it from gaining the necessary funds, technology and assistance to spur growth. Thus, in the long term, with no economic recovery, dissatisfaction will grow among the people. With widespread poverty and general social discontent, it would be increasingly hard for the government to deal with any emergency caused by policy mistakes, something which is common in a totalitarian regime.

Second, in order to solve the problem of a lack of food to support a large army, Pyongyang would have to promote self-reliance among its citizens, relax control over the economy in a limited way and, to some extent, even allow some form of capitalism.

In its fragile state, North Korea would also be increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters. Without external aid, which has shored up the government in the past during such calamities, Pyongyang would find it difficult, if not impossible, to handle any natural or man-made disaster on its own.

Ordinary North Koreans are the true audience for Pyongyang's nuclear weapons tests

The possibility of an internal coup also exists; the moody and unstable nature of the totalitarian regime leads to fear and insecurity that could bubble over into a bloody internal power struggle.

It is believed that it was fear of a coup that prompted Kim to execute his uncle, Jang Song-taek, and other veterans. The congress seemed to further consolidate Kim's power, but its stability is very superficial and new dissenters could be created by the regime's actions at any moment.

Lastly, outside intervention, including a targeted assassination and military strikes, is possible. In terms of its capabilities, there would be little North Korea could do if the US decided to press ahead with such an option.

In such circumstances, it would be difficult for Kim and his family to survive challenges at home and abroad.

In any of the above scenarios, great calamity would befall a Pyongyang that is already suffering much stress and danger.

The collapse of North Korea is just a matter of time; it is important for the international community to realise this, explore the issue and be prepared for the inevitable chain reactions.

Deng Yuwen is a researcher at the Charhar Institute think tank. Huang Ting is a researcher at the Innovation and Development Institute, Shenzhen

​My thoughts as an outline/start point to begin planning discussions:

 

Korea and the future:  Some Thoughts

The "Big 5"

1. War

2. Regime Collapse

3. Human Rights Atrocities/Crimes Against Humanity

4. Nuclear and Missile Delivery Programs

5. Unification

Big 8 Contingencies

1. Provocations to gain political and economic concessions

2. nk Attack – execution of the nK campaign plan to reunify the peninsula by force

3. Civil War/Chaos/Anarchy

4. Refugee crisis

5. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster relief

6. WMD, loss of control – seize and secure operations

7. Resistance to foreign intervention (e.g., insurgency)

8. How to handle the nKPA during regime collapse short of war

7 Steps of Preparation

1. Shared vision – a new durable political arrangement** (see below)

2. Roles & Missions  - national responsibilities for action

3. Organizational Framework for operations  (UNC/ROK/US CFC, independent operations, other)

4. Command, Control, Coordination, and liaison processes & methods (including information sharing)

5. Concept of operations for deploying required forces (air, land, and sea)

6. Resource commitment – which countries provide what

7. And most important  - information/psychological preparation of the environment – a sophisticated and aggressive information and influence activities campaign focused on the population to prepare then for the future (e.g., unification) and the "2d tier leadership" by using a combination of coercion and co-option.  – An "exit strategy" for 2d tier military leaders and party members outside the core elite.

Guiding Principles:

1.  Defense of ROK is paramount – all decisions must support defense of ROK against the full range of threats from the north.

2.  Must provide options to national policy makers – early decisions required to overcome the law of physics: time, distance, and space.  Must have the right capabilities in the right place for employment at the right time.

3.  Transparency is critical when dealing with the 5 Parties and international community.  Must have decisive and consistent themes and messages.  This is not the situation in which we should employ deception.  Only through clear articulation of alliance priorities and intent can we have a chancing at reducing the chance of conflict due to misunderstanding of intentions.  Examples for consideration (and these would be consistently expressed by the ROK/US Alliance.

            A.  Defense and Security of ROK is the number one priority.

            B. UNC and ROK/US CFC have the following priorities:

                        (1) Security of nuclear weapons, followed by chemical weapons and then the biological program

                        (2) Security, health, and welfare of the Korean people living in the north.

                        (3) UNC and ROK/US CFC desire to work with all interested nations to bring security, stability and long term peace to the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.

                        (4) UNC and ROK/US CFC will support the establishment of a unified peninsula – a United Republic of Korea.

**Proposed new durable political arrangement: A stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people:  A United Republic of Korea (UROK) orUnited Republic of Corea (UROC)

​

2 Koreas Have Little in Common After 70 Years

Yes there are many differences, more than just outlined below.  But that should not and will not deter unification.  I have told this story before but I think it is worth keeping in mind because it gives me optimism and illustrates that despite the differences there is an underlying "one Koreaness" and the spirit of the Han.

I was at a conference a few years ago in Korea and had lunch with a retired Korean Admiral.  He told me that there are two Korean miracles.  Of course I am familiar with the miracle on the Han; e.g., the rise of the ROK from the ashes of the Korean war to a nation that has between the 7th and 11th largest economy in the world, has evolved to a democratic nation and now is a great middle power make contributions around the world. Despite the hardship of the Japanese occupation officially from 1910 to 1945 (when the Japanese tried to smoother Korean culture, to include even the Korean language and individual Korean names even changing the spelling of Corea to Korea in English so Japan would come before Korea in the international English listing of countries) the Korean people, because of the spirit of the Han, survived. The Korean people when given the opportunity developed their entrepreneurial spirit and made their country thrive.   

But I could not imagine what was the second miracle.  He told me the other one is miracle on the Taedong (which, like the Han River, is the river that runs through Pyongyang).  I was surprised.  What kind of miracle could that be?  He said that despite the Japanese occupation, the Korean War and the continued suffering of 25 million Korean people living in the north under the criminal Kim Family Regime, the Korean people living in the north have continued to survive.  And when the yoke of oppression is removed from the shoulders of those people and they are given the opportunity they too will thrive just like their brothers and sisters in the South.  Yes there will be a lot of overcome to reach unification and despite the superficial differences that are a result of the environment, with the Korean people exists the spirit to both survive in severe hardship and thrive when provided even the slightest opportunity (and we are seeing that in the development and expansion of the black markets in the north).  

The bottom line is these types of articles should not cause people to think that the differences are too great between the Korean people living in the north and South.  The only reason there are differences is because of the existence of the Kim Family Regime.  At heart the Korean culture and the spirit of the Han is what unifies all Koreans and will be what allows the physical reunification of the nation.

2 Koreas Have Little in Common After 70 Years

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/07/11/2015071100572.html

North and South Koreans have grown so far apart during 70 years of separation that they share few common cultural traits and even look noticeably different.

Narrowing the wide sociocultural gap will be a prerequisite to reunification, because such sharp differences in thinking and lifestyles would make it virtually impossible for the two people to live under one government. The cost of bringing them together is likely to skyrocket. 

One NGO worker aiding North Korea said, "North and South Korea have been separated for 70 years and things are now completely different in the North and South." 

Even laughter is different. Kim Chol-jin (35), who defected to South Korea two years ago, said, "I still don't get the jokes when I watch [a famous TV comedy program]. I've shown North Korean comedy to my friends at work and they just looked puzzled."

People from the two sides also look different. According to a study by Mitsuhiko Kimura at Aoyama Gakuin University in Japan, the average height of a North Korean male in his 20s in 1940 was 163.4 cm, taller than his South Korean counterpart who stood 162.3 cm tall. But in 2010, the average height of the South Korean male was 174.2 cm compared to 165.4 cm in the North. 

South Koreans also live longer, with the average life span 13-20 years longer than that of North Koreans.

An even bigger problem is ways of thinking and values are changing. For instance, North Koreans are brainwashed since kindergarten to worship nation founder Kim Il-sung and his heirs. 

Traditional customs have also changed. In North Korea, the biggest holidays are Kim Il-sung's birthday on April 15 and Kim Jong-il's birthday on Feb. 16. New Year's Day for North Koreans is just an ordinary day that marks the start of a new year. 

South Koreans eat songpyeon or crescent-shaped rice cakes during the Chuseok thanksgiving holidays, but North Koreans eat them on New Year's Day. 

Years of fuel shortages have virtually paralyzed railway transport in North Korea so people there do not travel en masse to their home towns during traditional holidays as South Koreans do. 

An aid worker who visited North Korea around 30 times since 1994 said, "I was surprised to see how male-dominated North Korean society is. Women are discriminated against in the North due to the strange combination of Confucianism and communism." 

North and South Koreans differ in the way they spend their free time. Farmers in agricultural cooperatives in the North rest once every 10 days. 

On their days off, North Koreans like to play cards but do not go out to eat or head to the countryside like South Koreans do.

Marriage customs, too, are different. In North Korea, brides wear hanbok or traditional Korean dress and hold the weddings in the groom's home. When the ceremony is over, North Korean newlyweds pay homage at the statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and have their photos taken there. There are no honeymoons. 

In the South, the dead are usually cremated, but North Koreans prefer burial.

An aid worker said, "When I go to North Korea, I realize that the only thing I have in common with people there is the language, but I wonder if we really are the same people. We need to re-establish common ground before the division becomes permanent."

englishnews@chosun.com / Jul. 11, 2015 08:09 KST

Gist of S. Korea's unification, foreign, defense policies for 2015

Good  talking points summery of the key policies of the ROK.

Gist of S. Korea's unification, foreign, defense policies for 2015

http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?domain=3&ctype=A&site=0100000000&cid=AEN20150116006200315&mobile

2015-01-19 10:00

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   The following is the gist of South Korea's major inter-Korean, foreign and defense policies for 2015 unveiled jointly Monday by the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense.


Inter-Korean relations
   -- Propose the blueprint for a unified peninsula in order to drum up public support for unification.

   -- Step up education for young students to better prepare them for future unification.

   -- Push for joint inter-Korean projects: a joint commemorative event marking the 70th anniversary of Koreas' independence from Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule and a trial-run of a train line linking the two Koreas.

   -- Push to set up Korean cultural centers in Seoul and Pyongyang and to jointly publish a handbook for Korean culture and living.

   -- Plan to advance the Kaesong Industrial Complex for further mutual benefits and build joint economic infrastructure for future unification.


Foreign affairs
   -- Strengthen strategic coordination to move forward N. Korea's nuclear and human rights issues.

   -- Push proactively for mini-lateral diplomacy within region.

   -- Make efforts to accelerate the realization of President Park Geun-hye's two visions for regional cooperation -- "the Northeast Asia Peace Cooperation Initiative" and "the Eurasia Initiative."

   -- Be actively engaged in diplomacy with the United Nations to improve situations on the peninsula to spearhead efforts to bring changes to geopolitical situations on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

   -- Promote international cooperation to ease pains resulting from the inter-Korean division.

   -- Pursue humanitarian diplomacy toward peaceful unification.

   -- Strengthen economic diplomacy that can contribute to inter-Korean unification.

   -- Broaden diplomatic networks with like-minded countries to help advance inter-Korean unification.

   -- Expand public diplomacy for unification.


Defense
   -- Maintain firm military readiness posture to guarantee strong foundation for national defense.

   -- Conduct practical-level education and training for service personnel.

   -- Improve welfare for servicemembers and reform barracks culture.

   -- Push for "creative national defense" to be fully prepared to meet future challenges.

   -- Strengthen defense capabilities to usher in the era of national reunification.

   SEOUL, Jan. 19 (Yonhap)

US Senate set to hold hearing on nominee for ambassador to Seoul (and his prepared testimony)

His prepared testimony is pasted below.

The reason the Koreans are happy about this nomination is this excerpt (the first sentence anyway):

Lippert is a close aide of Obama and often telephones the president.

If confirmed, the 41-year-old would become the youngest U.S. ambassador to South Korea. It would also be unusual as Lippert is a non-career diplomat.

US Senate set to hold hearing on nominee for ambassador to Seoul http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/06/511_159251.html Mark Lippert, nominee to become the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, will testify this week at a Senate confirmation hearing, which would shed light on his views on the bilateral alliance and regional security issues. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations plans to open the session Tuesday afternoon to be presided over by Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD), according to its website. Lippert, currently Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel's chief of staff, will be joined by three other nominees at the hearing. In early May, President Barack Obama nominated Lippert as his new top envoy in Seoul to replace Sung Kim. Lippert is a close aide of Obama and often telephones the president. If confirmed, the 41-year-old would become the youngest U.S. ambassador to South Korea. It would also be unusual as Lippert is a non-career diplomat. He is also known for his expertise on Korea and broader regional security issues, having worked as assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs from April 2012 to May 2013. He previously worked as chief of staff for the White House National Security Council (NSC). (Yonhap)  Testimony of Mark Lippert Ambassador-Nominee to the Republic of Korea Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tuesday, June 17, 2014, 3 p.m. Chairman Cardin, Senator Rubio, distinguished Members of the Committee: I am deeply honored to appear before you as the President's nominee to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. I am humbled by the confidence the President and the Secretary of State have shown in putting me forward for this nomination. Having proudly served as a Personal Representative of the Member to this Committee, it is very meaningful to be back in this Committee room today. In large part through my service on Capitol Hill, which spanned nearly a decade, I am keenly aware that close partnership with Congress is critically important to success in diplomacy. And if confirmed, I pledge to always be a strong partner and friend to this committee. I would also like to thank my former boss, Senator Leahy, for his gracious introduction. I know just how busy he is juggling his many important responsibilities. Please let me also say a few words about my wife. As Senator Leahy mentioned, I met Robyn when we worked together on Capitol Hill. She has been the best partner that anyone could ask for and has patiently put up with years of military deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, long hours at the Pentagon and the National Security Council, and the intensity of work for the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees. Members of the Committee, simply put: the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is one of the most important relationships that we have in the world. Through my many visits to the Republic of Korea, I have come to greatly respect the people and culture of the Republic of Korea. Our two countries share deeply held values of free markets, democracy, and respect for human rights and the rule of law. And we share a common history of fighting together to uphold these values and to defend our security. I am proud to say that the ties between our two countries have never been stronger. If confirmed, I pledge to work tirelessly, in close partnership with this Committee, to make our Alliance even stronger. As the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Asia-Pacific, I have had the opportunity to work closely with our South Korean allies, Commanding Generals of United States Forces Korea, and senior members of our diplomatic team. I have seen the enduring strength of this alliance firsthand. I continue to be vigilant about the stark threat that North Korea poses the U.S. homeland, to security on the peninsula, in the region, and around the world - including through its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, its worldwide proliferation activities, and egregious human rights violations against its own citizens. If confirmed, I will work closely with the leadership of the Republic of Korea to ensure we are fully aligned in our efforts to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea and prevent proliferation of key technologies. I have built a good working relationship with General Scaparrotti, the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, and if confirmed, look forward to partnering closely with him and the Department of Defense as they work to strengthen our deterrence on the peninsula and ensure that the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed there are ready to "fight tonight," if necessary. Although our alliance was established with a mutual commitment to security, our nations have built deep and growing economic ties. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, or KORUS FTA, is now in its third year, and American and Korean consumers, businesses, and workers have benefited from it. Last year, the United States achieved a large investment surplus with the Republic of Korea, and U.S. goods exports are up 11.7 percent this year so far. That said, the full potential of the FTA has yet to be fully realized; more tariff cuts and additional provisions will come into force in the years to come. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the KORUS FTA is fully implemented so that American exporters, entrepreneurs, and workers can receive the benefits for which this Administration negotiated so hard. This alliance is also increasingly tackling global challenges as well. Our global partnership includes cooperation on everything from counter-terrorism and counter-piracy to climate change and development. The United States is also negotiating a successor 123 civil nuclear cooperation agreement with South Korea that will allow us to continue our cooperation in this field, while maintaining our strong non-proliferation standards. Finally, our strong people-to-people ties reinforce our shared values and interests. Each year, the Republic of Korea sends more university students to the United States per capita than any other major country. We have innovative exchange programs between our students and our science experts. If confirmed, I will make public diplomacy a top priority and work to foster these exchanges and bring more Korean education and tourism dollars to the United States. And if confirmed, I will be proud to also represent the over 1.7 million U.S. citizens that are of Korean descent and who contribute vitally to the deepening ties between our peoples. Our Embassy in Seoul has a talented team comprised of career diplomats, civil servants from a range of U.S. agencies, and local Korean staff who are dedicated to advancing U.S. interests every day. If confirmed, I will work to ensure my team has the resources, training, and guidance to strengthen and broaden our alliance with the Republic of Korea. Mr. Chairman, the U.S.-ROK alliance is the linchpin of security and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, in the Asia-Pacific, and around the world. Being nominated to represent the United States in Seoul is the honor of my lifetime, and if confirmed I will work night and day to advance this critical relationship. Thank you very much for your consideration of my nomination, and I look forward to taking your questions.

S. Korean military vows to step up anti-drone measures

I hope people will think this through.  These small UAS/RPVs (or drones) are difficult to detect by anyone.  I remember the difficulties we had for year detecting the AN-2 Colts (canvas covered bi-plane that is a main nKPA SOF infiltration platform).

I think the most important thing the north might have done was to fly over the ROK and observe the action of the ROK military in response to the recent provocations.  But based on the photos that have been released it looks like all they are taking are rudimentary low quality still photos.  I do not think they were capable of streaming real time video.

The alleged photos of the Blue House were also of poor quality.  I compared them with Google Earth and Google Earth had much better resolution.  I wonder if the nKPA UAS/RPV operators are substituting Google Earth images for their images when they show them to Kim Jong-un.  I wonder if these overflights are for internal north Korean propaganda or perhaps the result of Kim Jong-un saying he wanted the "advanced capability" like modern nations have.  (Maybe they will halt their long range missile and nuclear weapons programs and shift to UAS/RPVs so they can move from these airplane toy systems to something more sophisticated).

On the other hand this could very well be psychological operations directed against the ROK.  It is easy to see the effects they might want to achieve - political problems for the President, undermining of confidence in the ROK military capabilities, a rapid shift of resources to develop the capabilities try to detect and defend against these systems.  

I think we should spend some time trying to understand the north Korean strategy (and in particular the psychological operations strategy) before we go overboard chasing these toy systems around.  And yes I know people fear that these will be loaded with explosives to attack target but they could probably carry perhaps a kilo of C4 and while that would do some damage it would be relatively minor and certainly have little military effect (so we again have to consider the psychological operations strategy of the north).

But the best immediate reaction to this is to prevent overreaction (which I know is difficult to prevent among ROK politicians and of course any politicians for that matter).

(2nd LD) S. Korean military vows to step up anti-drone measures

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/04/07/20/0301000000AEN20140407004052315F.html

2014/04/07 17:30

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, April 7 (Yonhap) - South Korea's defense minister ordered tighter vigilance against new threats of small unmanned aerial vehicles on Monday as a recent discovery of suspected North Korean drones has sparked concern over the nation's air defense system.

Kim Kwan-jin issued the order at a meeting of top military commanders convened to discuss anti-drone measures after South Korea collected three drones in less than a month near the western and eastern front and on a border island.

One was found in late March in Paju, just south of the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, and the other was retrieved from the front-line island of Baengnyeong during the North's live-fire drills near the western maritime border last week.

Most recently, the military on Sunday revealed a third drone similar to the other two drones, which a local resident found in a mountain on the east coast in early October.

"If (North Korea) developed the small unmanned aerial aircraft for reconnaissance purposes to enhance its relatively weak surveillance capability, it is expected to develop drones for secret infiltration and terrorism purposes in the future," Kim said during the video conference held at the Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters in Seoul.

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin convenes a meeting of top commanders to discuss anti-drone measures at the Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters on April 7, 2014. (Yonhap)

"We should strengthen our military readiness to be able to monitor, detect, identify and strike (the drones) with existing military assets along the border."

   The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Choi Yun-hee, talked with the commander of U.S. Forces Korea, Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, via the video conference system to discuss ways to cooperate in dealing with North Korean drones, as well as threats posed by its missile and nuclear weapons, his office said. Scaparrotti is now in the U.S. to attend a congressional panel meeting on security situations on the Korean Peninsula.

Rudimentary drones have existed for almost as long as aircraft themselves for reconnaissance and surveillance missions have, but the drone incursions have raised concerns over more sophisticated, armed UAVs that can launch attacks on military assets and major facilities.

Seoul officials have discussed anti-UAV measures in the past years, but so far, defenses against drones mostly consist of signal jamming, radar detection and conventional counterattack used against other types of aircraft.

In light of the drone incursions, Seoul's defense ministry said it is considering purchasing advanced low-altitude surveillance radars and anti-aircraft guns to better guard against infiltration by small aircraft.

With an in-depth analysis current underway, the three sky blue drones equipped with cameras, which crashed either due to engine failure or lack of fuels, showed Pyongyang's UAV technology to be at a rudimentary level.

In light of the drone discovery made by reports from local residents, military units across the country began searching for other drones that may have crashed in South Korea.

During the meeting, the defense chief also pledged to cooperate with related government agencies and civilians to better spot the small aircraft, which are hard to detect with the existing radars.

As part of the measures, the military is considering giving a monetary reward to any informant who reports the existence of a drone, according to officials.

The latest details from the investigation showed that the drones found in Paju and Samcheok may have extended their flight range by having had their glow engines modified to run on a more effective gasoline fuel, said a military official with knowledge of the ongoing investigation. The glow engine is a small internal combustion engine typically used in model aircraft.

While the triangle-shaped drones with an average speed of 100-120 km per hour are believed to have flown as far as 200 km, the Samcheok drone was discovered 130 km south of the military demarcation line. It is a strong indication that the engine may have used more cost effective gasoline fuel as it is designed to fly a round trip covering a distance of over 260 km, the official said.

"The joint investigation team has assembled the drones to look into engines to figure out whether they were modified to gasoline engines to extend their flight range," the official said. "An in-depth analysis of the engine structure would provide (knowledge about the North's) technology to make drones that can fly according to prearranged coordinates unaffected by wind."

   If the North successfully modified the glow engine to run on gasoline mix, it could conduct spy missions farther south, he added.

Experts say North Korea is believed to have deployed about 100 attack drones it unveiled last March during military drills, which was lauded by leader Kim Jong-un.

The range of the drones is estimated at up to 800 kilometers, sufficient to strike major South Korean and U.S. military targets in South Korea.

The North on Saturday derided the discovery of the drones that flew undetected over key areas in Seoul that tarnished the image of the South Korean forces, but made no mention of its involvement.

If the ongoing probe confirms that the drones were sent by the North, the spokesman for Seoul's defense ministry said it would constitute a violation of the Armistice Agreement of the 1950-53 Korean War and international regulations, and vowed to take "relevant actions" without elaborating on the details of potential measures.

The JCS said Sunday it will take necessary "military and legal actions" over the North's violation of its airspace if the drones are found to have come from the country.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

We have been trying to discuss contingency issues since at least 1997 that I am personally aware of.   I think the report Yonhap is referring to is the one "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass  Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues"  at this link:  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf  (I have pasted the table of contents of the report below the Yonhap Article) There is a paragraph on page 26 that quotes Kurt Campbell as "acknowledging talks about 'every' aspect" with the Chinese.  No more detail than that. This 76 page report contains a lot of information about a wide range of security issues such proliferation to include the A.Q. Khan network and Syria as well. U.S., China discussed contingencies in N. Korea: report 2014/01/13 07:40 http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/01/13/26/0401000000AEN20140113000200315F.html   By Lee Chi-dong WASHINGTON, Jan. 12 (Yonhap) -- The United States and China had discussions on the possibility of a regime collapse in North Korea and other contingencies well before the death of former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, according to a U.S. congressional report. But it remains unconfirmed whether the two global powers are continuing such sensitive consultations. "When asked on Oct. 4, 2009, whether the United States and China discussed contingencies in North Korea, (then) Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell acknowledged talks about "every" aspect," the Congressional Research Service, a think tank affiliated with the U.S. Congress, said in a recent report. It did not elaborate. Washington and Beijing are working together for the denuclearization of North Korea but talking formally on contingencies in Pyongyang is apparently tabooed. China is North Korea's largest benefactor and top communist ally. Since North Korea purged and executed Jang Song-thaek, the uncle of leader Kim Jong-un, regional powers have faced increasing calls for drawing up concrete contingency plans on the communist regime. Jang was known as a regent for Kim who took power shortly after the death of his father in December 2011. South Korea and the U.S. emphasize the importance of China's support in dealing with North Korea issues. "We share the view that it is important to keep China and other related parties closely engaged to achieve substantial progress in the denuclearization of North Korea," South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se told reporters here after talks with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry last week. "In this regard, we agreed to place this issue at the top of our agenda so that we can better cope with the increasing volatility of the nuclear issue arising from the evolving political situation in North Korea," Yun added. A senior South Korean official said later that Seoul and Washington will deepen consultations on every possibility that could happen in North Korea. China would be welcome in the talks, the official said. The CRS quoted a Peking University professor well versed in China's policies as saying, "Beijing would not accept an implosion in Pyongyang or watch passively if other countries gain political and military control in North Korea."    lcd@yna.co.kr leechidong@gmail.com (END)   Congressional Research Service  Contents  Purpose and Scope ........................................................................................................................... 1  PRC Proliferation Challenges .......................................................................................................... 1  Partial Nonproliferation Commitments ..................................................................................... 1  Continuing Concerns and Intelligence Report ........................................................................... 2  Nuclear Technology Sales to Pakistan ....................................................................................... 3  Overview ............................................................................................................................. 3  Nuclear Cooperation ........................................................................................................... 3  A. Q. Khan’s Nuclear Network ........................................................................................... 5  Missile Technology Sales to Pakistan ........................................................................................ 6  Overview ............................................................................................................................. 6  Nuclear Technology Sales to Iran .............................................................................................. 7  Overview and Policy Approaches ....................................................................................... 7  Uranium Enrichment ........................................................................................................... 8  Dual Approach and Energy-related Oil and Gas Deals ....................................................... 9  UNSC Resolutions and Sanctions ..................................................................................... 14  Missile Technology Sales to Iran ............................................................................................. 18  Overview ........................................................................................................................... 18  Obama Administration ...................................................................................................... 19  North Korea’s Missile and Nuclear Weapons Programs.......................................................... 19  Suspected Missile Supplies ............................................................................................... 19  Secret Nuclear Programs ................................................................................................... 21  PRC Border, Ports, and Airspace ...................................................................................... 22  PRC-DPRK Military Relationship .................................................................................... 24  Trilateral and Six-Party Talks in Beijing ........................................................................... 26  Missile Technology Sales to Syria ........................................................................................... 50  Policy Issues and Options .............................................................................................................. 50  Issues for Policy ...................................................................................................................... 50  Debate ............................................................................................................................... 51  The PRC Government’s Role ............................................................................................ 51  Foreign and Defense Policies .................................................................................................. 52  Summits ............................................................................................................................. 52  Counter-Terrorism Campaign ............................................................................................ 53  Missile Defense ................................................................................................................. 53  Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and 9/11 Commission ............................................ 53  Export Control Assistance ................................................................................................. 54  Linkage to the Taiwan Question ........................................................................................ 54  Economic Controls .................................................................................................................. 55  Satellite Exports ................................................................................................................ 55  Sanctions and the “Helms Amendment” ........................................................................... 56  Capital Markets ................................................................................................................. 58  Nuclear Cooperation and U.S. Export of Reactors ........................................................... 59  U.S. Import Controls ......................................................................................................... 60  U.S. Export Controls ......................................................................................................... 60  Nonproliferation and Arms Control ......................................................................................... 60  Nonproliferation Regimes (MTCR, NSG, etc.) ................................................................. 60  CTBT, Fissile Materials, and Nuclear Security ................................................................. 62