Showing posts with label JSOC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label JSOC. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 2, 2015

How Joint Special Operations Command Became America’s ‘Perfect Hammer’

I wonder if Sean has public sources for all the people named in the book.  I received the book last night and though I have not read it all yet there is a tremendous amount of information that I do not think has been publicly acknowledged and I suspect a large number of the personnel named in the book probably to did not give permission to be named but were likely named by the apparently many anonymous sources who provided such information.  I am of course not surprised that all the senior officers were named who have been in the public domain but there are a lot of lower ranking personnel whose names I was very surprised to see.  I think some of the "sources" might become obvious because some of them are now television news commentator personalities and their "stories" are treated well.  Also there are quit a few interesting insights about the senior leadership that might come from disgruntled junior members (though there are many lessons that can be learned especially how operations in Afghanistan unfolded from a JSOC/CIA perspective (and Sean does acknowledge that there are differing view points regarding Karzai between JSOC, the CIA and Special Forces.

I wonder where Sean got the definition of Unconventional Warfare: "The use of proxy forces to foment rebellion against an enemy state.  In the U.S. Military it is the primary mission of Special Forces."  Needless to say I am not named in the book and Sean did not ask for my opinion on UW.

But my favorite excerpt (so far) is this on page 162:

But despite - or perhaps because of - his repeated exposure to briefings on the high-end counterterrorism that was JSOC's forte, Rumsfeld's understanding of special operations remained superficial and unbalanced.  He did not recognize the value of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense (helping an ally defeat an insurgency), which were the specialties of Special Forces as well as SOCOM's psychological operations and civil affairs units.  To Rumsfeld, the value of special operations lay only in the spooky and lethal activities JSOC exemplified, not in training foreign militaries or standing up local militias.  "There were some things that Rumsfeld said and did that indicated that we, his staff, had not fully and well explained to him the nature of special operations forces," said Andrews, a former Special Forces Officer. "He didn't understand and we didn't beat into him an appreciation of counterinsurgency as foreign internal defense, UW [unconventional warfare], the 'white' stuff.

"Rumsfeld ... didn't care about setting up networks, he didn't care about establishing forward operating bases, he didn't want to hear all that shit."  said a Special Forces officer who briefed the secretary frequently.  "He just wanted a way for bodies to show up."  The result was Rumsfeld's almost blind faith in JSOC.  "He didn't truly understand us, but he trusted us," Hall said.   (yes, that is CSM(R) Mike Hall)

I will be using that quote in my next class on Unconventional Warfare for Policy Makers and Strategists. Thank you Sean.

How Joint Special Operations Command Became America’s ‘Perfect Hammer’

  • by Christian Beekman 
  •  Sept. 2, 2015 
  •  3 min read 
  •  original
America’s most elite special operations units have increasingly found themselves in the spotlight. After the rescue of Captain Richard Phillips from Somali pirates and Operation Neptune Spear, the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, colloquially known as DEVGRU or SEAL Team 6, became the subject of immense public interest. But many outside the military have never heard about the shadowy command that SEAL Team Six, Delta Force, and other special missions units answer to: the Joint Special Operations Command.
JSOC oversees planning for joint unconventional operations, and conducts much of the “black” side of special operations. A new book, “Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command,” from author and former Army Times journalist Sean Naylor aims to highlight JSOC’s history over the past 30 years. It also illustrates how JSOC moved to the forefront of combating insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.
“Relentless Strike” isn’t the first time Naylor has covered the units under JSOC. His previous book, “Not a Good Day To Die:The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda” is a quintessential account of the March 2002 battle in Afghanistan’s Shahikot Valley, an operation that Naylor was present for as an embedded reporter. Operators from Delta Force, SEAL Team 6, and other JSOC units played a pivotal role in Anaconda, so Naylor is covering some familiar ground. Much like his previous book, Naylor explores the full breadth of the units and personnel involved. From the high-level politicking surrounding JSOC’s formation to the individual operators kicking doors in Iraq, “Relentless Strike” isn’t daunted by the scale of JSOC’s operations.
At the center of the book is the narrative of how JSOC evolved from a small organization with a highly specific counterterrorism mission to the the direct-action juggernaut it is today. The first part of “Relentless Strike” deals with JSOC’s genesis in the wake of the failed Operation Eagle Claw, the disastrous attempt to rescue American hostages held in revolutionary Iran in April 1980. Then, JSOC was mainly focused on a limited set of counterterrorism missions, like the rash of the airplane hijackings and hostage takings during the 1980s. While Delta and the rest of JSOC came close to actually getting the green light on various rescues during their two decades of operational status, their first operations successes came in support of more conventional operations in Grenada and Panama.
The book’s other narrative thrust starts here: the tendency of JSOC being handed difficult mission sets, regardless of whether JSOC was really suited for the problem; highlighting the missions given to SEAL Team 6 in Grenada in 1983, and a regular SEAL team’s airfield assault in Panama in 1989. The book also delves into some of the inauspicious details of JSOC’s birth; such as the fly-by-night antics of SEAL Team 6 founder Richard Marcinko, whose hard-drinking training regimen and unauthorized unit expenditures tainted the unit’s reputation to the point that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Colin Powell considered disbanding the unit all together in the early 1990s.
(Continued at the link below)

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Special Operators and Intelligence Analysts: the 21st Century’s Lead Warriors

1 hour panel at the link below.

Special Operators and Intelligence Analysts: the 21st Century’s Lead Warriors


Streamed live on Jul 23, 2015
Huge ground invasions and indefinite occupation forces are so last decade. Today’s wars, big and little, are being fought largely by the strategic deployment of limited Special Operators on the ground and intelligence analysts back stateside who dispatch them and drones to the world’s hot spots for quick “in and out” operations. Experts in this kind of 21st century warfare discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this approach to global crises.

Kathleen Hicks, Senior Vice President, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and Director, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Eric Olson, former Commander of US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and a member of the Aspen Institute Homeland Security Group

Michael Vickers, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Moderator: Kim Dozier, Contributing Writer, The Daily Beast; Global Analyst, CNN

Saturday, November 15, 2014

Defeating ISIS by Max Boot

Excerpt:

To defeat ISIS, the president needs to dispatch more aircraft, military advisors, and special operations forces, while loosening the restrictions under which they operate. The president also needs to do a better job of mobilizing support from Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, as well as from Turkey, by showing that he is intent on deposing not only ISIS but also the equally murderous Alawite regime in Damascus. Specific steps include:
...
Send in the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Between 2003 and 2010, JSOC—composed of units such as SEAL Team Six and Delta Force—became skilled at targeting the networks of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Its success was largely due to its ability to gather intelligence by interrogating prisoners and scooping up computers and documents—something that bombing alone cannot accomplish. JSOC squadrons should once again be moved to the region (they could be stationed in Iraq proper, the Kurdistan Regional Government, Turkey, and/or Jordan) to target high-level ISIS organizers.

Max calls for the silver bullet.  Somehow I think operations in Syria will be much different than were operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Syria will be the most sustained denied area in which they would ever have to operate and to conduct the level of operations that were conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan will require even greater conventional support (and not just air support).  I do not mean this at all to disparage JSOC and the great missions they have conducted and the important contributions they have made but we should remember the 5th SOF truth about most special operations requiring non-SOF support.  Without the ground combat capability provided by conventional ground combat forces JSOC will not be able to sustain the level of operations (OPTEMPO - operational tempo) that was sustained in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This is the catch 22 in Syria and even to a certain extent in Iraq though it is possible that a well advised Iraqi force could provide some capability to support JSOC operations in Iraq (if approved by the sovereign Iraqi government assuming we still consider Iraq a sovereign nation)  but of course not nearly to the level of US ground combat forces.

Defeating ISIS

Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 51

Author: , Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies
Defeating ISIS - max-boot-defeating-isis
PublisherCouncil on Foreign Relations Press
Release DateNovember 2014
Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 51

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Overview

President Barack Obama's strategy in Syria and Iraq is not working. The president is hoping that limited air strikes, combined with U.S. support for local proxies—the peshmerga, the Iraqi security forces, the Sunni tribes, and the Free Syrian Army—will "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). U.S. actions have not stopped ISIS from expanding its control into Iraq's Anbar Province and northern Syria. If the president is serious about dealing with ISIS, he will need to increase America's commitment in a measured way—to do more than what Washington is currently doing but substantially less than what it did in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past decade. And although President Obama will probably not need to send U.S. ground–combat forces to Iraq and Syria, he should not publicly rule out that option; taking the possibility of U.S. ground troops off the table reduces U.S. leverage and raises questions about its commitment.

A Big Threat

A reasonable goal for the United States would be neither to "degrade" ISIS (vague and insufficient) nor to "destroy" it (too ambitious for the present), but rather to "defeat" or "neutralize" it, ending its ability to control significant territory and reducing it to, at worst, a small terrorist group with limited reach. This is what happened with ISIS' predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, during 2007 and 2008, before its rebirth amid the chaos of the Syrian civil war. It is possible to inflict a similar fate on ISIS, which, for all of its newfound strength, is less formidable and less organized than groups like Hezbollah and the Taliban, which operate with considerable state support from Iran and Pakistan, respectively. Although not as potent a fighting force as Hezbollah or the Taliban, ISIS is an even bigger threat to the United States and its allies because it has attracted thousands of foreign fighters who could return to commit acts of terrorism in their homelands.

What It Will Take to Defeat ISIS

To defeat ISIS, the president needs to dispatch more aircraft, military advisors, and special operations forces, while loosening the restrictions under which they operate. The president also needs to do a better job of mobilizing support from Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, as well as from Turkey, by showing that he is intent on deposing not only ISIS but also the equally murderous Alawite regime in Damascus. Specific steps include:
Intensify air strikes. So far, the U.S. bombing campaign against ISIS has been remarkably restrained, as revealed by a comparison with the strikes against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan after 9/11. When the Taliban lost control of Afghanistan between October 7, 2001, and December 23, 2001—a period of seventy-five days—U.S. aircraft flew 6,500 strike sorties and dropped 17,500 munitions. By contrast, between August 8, 2014, and October 23, 2014—seventy-six days—the United States conducted only 632 airstrikes and dropped only 1,700 munitions in Iraq and Syria. Such episodic and desultory bombing will not stop any determined military force, much less one as fanatical as ISIS.
(Continued at the link below)

Friday, April 4, 2014

Army and SOCOM Add Training, UAVs and Tech to Unfunded Lists

I would think that JSOC would be fully funded for training.  A $25 million training shortfall for the best resourced military unit in DOD seems like quite a problem. (but maybe that means that all the special warfare training capabilities are fully funded)

Excerpts:

In a related request, the Special Operations Command requested $400 million in funds, most of it tabbed to training and construction needs, including $95 million for more aircrew training and $47 million of processing, exploitation and dissemination capabilities for the “SOF ISR Enterprise.” That money would also be directed to enhancing the “reach back network” for SOCOMs MW-9 Reaper UAV fleet. There is also a request for $25 million for further training of JSOC elements, and about $175 million more to fund further training and communications upgrades for the command’s Theater Special Operations Command offices that work with Combatant Commanders around the globe.

Interestingly, the request also asks for $3.5 million for the construction of a Stryker Maintenance Area at Ft. Lewis, Wash. While not widely publicized, Army SOF has been using the fast, eight-wheeled Stryker in combat since 2005 when a unit of the 75th Ranger Regiment operated sixteen of the vehicles in Afghanistan, and then again in 2012 when the 2nd Battalion, 75th Rangers from Ft. Lewis deployed to Afghanistan’s Helmand province.


Army and SOCOM Add Training, UAVs and Tech to Unfunded Lists

Apr. 4, 2014 - 06:10PM   |  
By PAUL MCLEARY   |   Comments
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140404/DEFREG02/304040027?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter
 
    The Army is requesting $500 million for 28 Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as part of it's unfunded priorities list.
    The Army is requesting $500 million for 28 Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as part of it's unfunded priorities list. (Defense Department)
    • FILED UNDER
    WASHINGTON — Following the request of the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Buck McKeon (R-Ca.), the Army along with its sister services passed along its “Unfunded Priorities List” for fiscal 2015 this week. The $10.6 billion request includes the $7.5 billion Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative already put together by the White House, though it tweaks those numbers slightly.
    It tracks pretty closely to that previously publicized request which called for $600 million to buy 26 Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, $500 million for 28 Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters, and $100 million for two Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters, along with $1.8 billion to bolster Army training and readiness accounts.
    The latest unfunded request list wraps all that up into one big $1.3 billion pot that calls for 23 remanufactured Apache helicopters (along with training devices and cockpit displays), 28 Black Hawks, two Ch-47s, and upgrades for eighteen Gray Eagle UAVs.
    The Army also requested an additional $681 million to procure a fourth brigade of Stryker Double-V Hull vehicles and to buy an additional 23 M88 Hercules hauler trucks.
    According to long-term budgetary planning documents previously obtained by Defense News, the Army plans on transforming all nine of its Stryker brigades to the Double V Hull variant, though funding past the first three had not been identified until this latest request.
    The Army is also trying to buy back some of its earlier communications and tech modernization that had been curtailed in earlier base budget cuts.
    The service is asking Congress to find an additional $387 million to pay for a variety of commercial-off-the-shelf hardware to outfit and field the controversial Distributed Common Ground System-Army, and $405 million to fund mission command systems that would patch soldiers and their vehicles in to the WIN-T battlefield network that is currently fielded.
    (Continued at the link below)

    Wednesday, March 6, 2013

    Drones, Covert Action, and Counterterrorism: Why UAV Strikes should be Exclusively Military


    This should stir up some discussion.  I do not know how much experience Mr. Segalini has in the National Clandestine Service and whether he is qualified to make this analysis but it should provoke some debate and discussion.  But these two paragraphs are interesting:
    None of this is to say that any particular program of direct strikes caused the CIA to miss catching the Arab Spring.  It these sorts of programs, however, that form a larger trend of the Agency adopting “traditional military actions and operations” to an unprecedented degree, and it has been to the detriment of the Agency’s unique function and competence.  The Agency’s agility may have critical in bringing military assets rapidly to bear in the dynamic days immediately after September 11, 2001.  Long term, however, these programs are largely unnecessary.  The military is perfectly capable of operating these programs effectively while maintaining their security.  It has been reported extensively that JSOC maintains its own capabilities to conduct such actions and maintain OPSEC.  Indeed, according to Col. Charles Beckwith in his book about the founding of Delta Force, the constituent units within JSOC were originally stood up to conduct precisely these kinds of operations, such as the direct action raid in Abbottobad now so famous, and they were always understood to be operating under military authorities.  It is somewhat puzzling that after 30 years, it appears that someone only recently realized many central JSOC activities apparently need to “borrow” authorities from CIA. 
    Regardless of whether it is JSOC military activity under CIA authorities, or CIA seconding the military’s capabilities to conduct an operation, undoubtedly these practices have fueled the critics of the Agency who see it as becoming “too militarized”.  This is too clumsy a phrase to serve as effective critique.  The problem is really somewhat different. The war on terror has reportedly seen the CIA adopt a “plug and play” approach to its paramilitary operations, hiring large numbers of former military personnel of all stripes to do their job just as if they were still in uniform.  
    But this statement illustrates an age old debate and the tension between unconventional warfare and direct action or special warfare and surgical strike. In the context of philosophy this should not be an either/or construct but rather a both/and relationship.  Instead of arguing one is better than the other we need a strategy that employs the right ways and means to accomplish our ends - rarely are the ways exclusive but instead should provide the right mix to be most effective. It could be a combination of both below and of course the right strategy may employ neither as well. The key is balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means to support our national policy and protect our interests.
    Subversion, sabotage, psychological operations, the manipulation of our enemy’s perception of his world and even of his own organization, have all taken a back seat to kinetic strikes.  The results have been less than impressive, and the value added, arguably, has been nil.
    V/R
    Dave

    Drones, Covert Action, and Counterterrorism: Why UAV Strikes should be Exclusively Military

    Journal Article | March 6, 2013 - 3:30am

    The recent confirmation hearings for John Brennan’s nomination as CIA director occasioned an extended discussion--and unusually a rather public one at that--on the role and organizational identity of the CIA.  Brennan’s predecessor General Petraeus was a military man, perhaps the consummate military man of the age in terms of bearing, demeanor and vision; but he was sent to run a place which has always held itself apart from the military in its conventions and mission.  Yet the tension between the proximity of the CIA to military matters, and its inherent “otherness” has given rise to a debate amongst practitioners and observers alike, and has adopted as shorthand for the CIA’s various roles the idea that paramilitary operations and covert action are the central matter in dispute.  The most visible manifestation of these activities are the activities surrounding counterterrorism, and the most visible example of those are a supposed program run by CIA to conduct UAV strikes against terrorist targets outside of active combat zones. 

    So much more the case recently, as memoranda from the Department of Justice have reached media outlets, laying down the rationale behind the use of UAV strikes even against U.S. citizens, presumably in operations conducted by the Department of Defense, whose program is acknowledged.  But more than that has been the confirmation hearing for Brennan, a former CIA officer whom President Obama nominated to become the Agency’s 21st Director.  During the Senate confirmation hearings, many questions from the Senators had to do with the practice of targeted killings and other CIA activities that are essentially military in nature.  Mr. Brennan was very careful not to confirm or deny any supposed covert action operations, but the questions from the Senators on the Senate’s Select Intelligence Committee made it seem to the even the casual observer that they were talking about the alleged Drone program, and some of the very serious issues surrounding it.

    One of the more interesting dimensions to this issue has been reported by both the Washington Post, several weeks ago, and more recently by Michael Hirsh of the National Journal on February 7, which is the notion that Brennan feels “the [drone] program has run its course as a CIA operation” and that moving such a program to the Defense Department is the way forward in the future.  If true, this would be an important idea worth exploring, not least because it comes to us from a career CIA man.  Such men are not known for being eager to give away programs to the Defense Department.  It is also worth exploring because when the whole matter is considered, Brennan’s position would absolutely be the right one.  Any program of UAV strikes against high value targets being run from CIA is bad for covert action, bad for the CIA, bad for counterterrorism operations, and none too good either for war policy or the Law.

    It is important to acknowledge from the outset that some very relevant practical questions are involved.  Recent articles in the Washington Post and in syndicated wires reported that the CIA’s supposed use of UAV strikes is meant to be exempted for two years from new restrictions and procedures in the “Counterterrorism Playbook”. For the time being at least, it appears that policymakers are not willing to transfer the program.  The reasoning goes that such supposed operations are too expedient to be stopped now or transferred immediately to a more structured program with greater oversight.  It is an argument with powerful momentum.  It will be difficult to overcome.  It may also be the case that Brennan’s priorities upon assuming the Directorship of the CIA will not at first include laying the groundwork for such a transfer.  Directors who arrive at Langley with major shifts in mind about how the Agency does its business tend not to last very long.  Even those who do, often run up against great amounts of bureaucratic inertia in trying to accomplish their goals.  All that aside, however, Brennan did remark at his hearing that “The CIA should not be doing traditional military activities and operations”, so at least he appears to have the right intentions, and the goal of placing a UAV strike program entirely within Defense is entirely right and worth pursuing. 

    Why such a program is bad Covert Action--Many writers have either defended or attacked the the idea of CIA UAV strikes based on their support (or not) for a “paramilitary CIA”, a “wartime Agency” or a “militarized CIA”, as if the CIA’s authorities to conduct covert action mean precisely UAV strikes.  In reality, equating Drone strikes with paramilitary operations or covert action (CA) is a fallacy.  Most people, a surprising number of whom work in intelligence and special operations, don’t know what covert action is, and no doubt this contributes to the poor reasoning.  Yet any examination of the history of covert action, or even of what the term means, would clearly show that a drone strike program would be so far removed from the law, spirit and tradition of covert action that it strains the idea to the very limit. 

    Covert Action (CA) is defined in Executive Order 12333, the latest version of which was amended in 2008.  It is available in full online and I encourage anyone wishing to learn more about CA to read it.  The definition of covert action is as follows:
    (B)Covert action  means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include:
    (1) Activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities;
    (2) Traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;...
    The definition goes on to list other exceptions, but what primarily concerns us are the main definition and the first two exemptions.  It is also noteworthy that only the CIA, unless during a time of declared war, or under jurisdiction The War Powers Act, can perform covert action. 
    (Continued at the link below)
    http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drones-covert-action-and-counterterrorism-why-uav-strikes-should-be-exclusively-military

    Saturday, December 1, 2012

    DIA sending hundreds more spies overseas


    Excerpts (Nice to see north Korea on the priority list.):

    The total includes military attachés and others who do not work undercover. But U.S. officials said the growth will be driven over a five-year period by the deployment of a new generation of clandestine operatives. They will be trained by the CIA and often work with the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, but they will get their spying assignments from the Department of Defense. 
    Among the Pentagon’s top intelligence priorities, officials said, are Islamist militant groups in Africa, weapons transfers by North Korea and Iran, and military modernization underway in China.
    … 
    The DIA has also forged a much tighter relationship with JSOC, the military’s elite and highly lethal commando force, which also carries out drone strikes in Yemen and other countries. 
    Key aspects of the DIA’s plan were developed by then-Director Ronald L. Burgess, a retired three-star general who had served as intelligence chief to JSOC. 
    The DIA played an extensive and largely hidden role in JSOC operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, sending analysts into war zones and turning a large chunk of its workforce and computer systems in Virginia into an ana-lytic back office for JSOC. 
    The head of U.S. Special Operations Command, Adm. William H. McRaven, who directed the operation that killed Osama bin Laden, has pledged to create between 100 and 200 slots for undercover DIA operatives to work with Special Forces teams being deployed across North Africa and other trouble spots, officials said. 
    “Bill McRaven is a very strong proponent of this,” the senior Defense official said.
    V/R
    Dave
    DIA sending hundreds more spies overseas
    By Greg Miller, Saturday, December 1, 8:36 PM


    The Pentagon will send hundreds of additional spies overseas as part of an ambitious plan to assemble an espionage network that rivals the CIA in size, U.S. officials said.
    The project is aimed at transforming the Defense Intelligence Agency, which has been dominated for the past decade by the demands of two wars, into a spy service focused on emerging threats and more closely aligned with the CIA and elite military commando units.

    When the expansion is complete, the DIA is expected to have as many as 1,600 “collectors” in positions around the world, an unprecedented total for an agency whose presence abroad numbered in the triple digits in recent years.

    The total includes military attachés and others who do not work undercover. But U.S. officials said the growth will be driven over a five-year period by the deployment of a new generation of clandestine operatives. They will be trained by the CIA and often work with the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, but they will get their spying assignments from the Department of Defense.

    Among the Pentagon’s top intelligence priorities, officials said, are Islamist militant groups in Africa, weapons transfers by North Korea and Iran, and military modernization underway in China.
    “This is not a marginal adjustment for DIA,” the agency’s director, Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, said at a recent conference, during which he outlined the changes but did not describe them in detail. “This is a major adjustment for national security.”

    The sharp increase in DIA undercover operatives is part of a far-reaching trend: a convergence of the military and intelligence agencies that has blurred their once-distinct missions, capabilities and even their leadership ranks.

    Through its drone program, the CIA now accounts for a majority of lethal U.S. operations outside the Afghan war zone. At the same time, the Pentagon’s plan to create what it calls the Defense Clandestine Service, or DCS, reflects the military’s latest and largest foray into secret intelligence work.

    The DIA overhaul — combined with the growth of the CIA since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks — will create a spy network of unprecedented size. The plan reflects the Obama administration’s affinity for espionage and covert action over conventional force. It also fits in with the administration’s efforts to codify its counterterrorism policies for a sustained conflict and assemble the pieces abroad necessary to carry it out.
    (Continued at the link below)

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