Aspen Security Forum: Peace on the Korean Peninsula?

An hour and 20 minute video on the Korean Peninsula with the first part featuring a discussion between GEN Brooks in Seoul via video and Gordon Chang followed by a panel discussion with some critical commentary.

GEN Brooks' remarks are an example of a general officer who knows how to speak to the media.  They should show this video at the Capstone course for new general officers.  He faced one of the most complex problems to discuss in public and I think he was masterful.

https://youtu.be/ttcK6zDpNxg

3:30 – 4:50 PM MDT
Peace on the Peninsula?
Is peace at hand on the Korean Peninsula? Denuclearization and reunification, miraculously, now seem possible. Is this prospect real or a mirage?

Vincent Brooks, Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, United Nations
Command; Commander, ROK-US Combined Forces Command
Suzanne DiMaggio, Senior Fellow and US-Iran Initiative Director, New America Foundation
Woongsoon Lim, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of South Korea to the United States
Michael McCaul, Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security
Sue Mi Terry, Senior Fellow and Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Moderator: Gordon Chang, Columnist, The Daily Beast

Voice of America: [Washington Talk] North Korea slows to follow up ... Impact of China and Russia on denuclearization

On June 30, 2018,  VOA broadcast journalist Connie Kim hosted Frank Jannuzi and myself for the weekly talk show Washington Talk for broadcast into Korea to including the target audience of the Pyongyang elite.  you can access the 20 minute video at the link below.

[Washington Talk] North Korea slows to follow up ... Impact of China and Russia on denuclearization

https://www.voakorea.com/a/4461203.html

Washington tackles a weekly analysis of North Korean hot issues with Washingtonexperts. This week, we will look at why North Korea slows down its response to the follow - up promises made at the US - North Korea summit and the impact of China and Russia on the denuclearization process in North Korea. Progress: Connie Kim Dialogue: Frank Jannuzi, President, Mansfield Foundation, David Maxwell, ICAS Senior Researcher.

The Korean Armistice, ROK/US Mutual Defense Treaty and A Declaration of the End of the Korean War

As we speculate about the possibility of a declaration of the end of the Korean War at the June 12th summit in Singapore I was asked what may be the outcome and effects of such a declaration.  So i thought I would provide some background along with my layman's analysis.  I am not legally trained or an international lawyer but I did once stay at a Holiday Inn Express so please take this with a grain of slat. I expect that there could be a number of different perspectives on these issues.

Specifically I was asked what will this mean for the United Nations Command (UNC) , the ROK/US Combined Forces Command (ROK/US CFC) , and United States Forces Korea (USFK)?  Will any or all commands be disbanded and will any or all US forces leave the ROK?

I think we should acknowledge that such a declaration will not have the force of international law as in a treaty or peace agreement.  While a declaration would be good symbolically and for the start of a process there will be a lot of work that will need to be done to put into place mechanisms that will ensure the peace and specific agreements negotiated that will allow the political leaders (heads of state/government and their legislatures) to get approval in accordance with their national processes.

In regards to the Korean situation this is untested international law.  It will be interesting to see how all this plays out.  

The Armistice:

Note that Nam Il signed for nK and for the CPV and Harrison for the UN.  They were the signatories present at the signing.  Kim, Peng, and Clark signed later.  However, these are all military leaders signing a military agreement to suspend hostilities.  The armistice is not a political document.  Also note that neither China nor north Korea were members of the UN (neither was the ROK but the UN intervened to stop aggression against the South)

Note also that all electronic versions of the Armistice at State or at Yale or Cornell in their legal repositories only have Nam Il's  and Harrison's signature blocks.  See the State Department version here: https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31006.htm As noted Kim, Peng, and Clark all signed at a later time.  But again this was a military document between two sides fighting the war and not a political document.

So we should remember that the Armistice was an agreement between military commanders and only covered a handful of actions or conditions:

* A suspension of open hostilities

* A fixed demarcation line with a 4km (2.4 miles) buffer zone - the so-called demilitarized zone (DMZ)

* A mechanism for the transfer of prisoners of war

Both sides pledged not to "execute any hostile act within, from, or against the demilitarized zone", or enter areas under control of the other.

The agreement also called for the establishment of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and other agencies to ensure the truce held.

The MAC, which comprises members from both sides, still meets regularly in the truce village of Panmunjom.

As a side note, but an important one, the Northern Limit Line (NLL) was established separate from the Armistice as a control measure for how far ROK vessels could go north.  It was established around the Northwest Islands which remained under UN Control after the war.  The NLL is not an internationally recognized boundary and is not part of the Armistice; however, the ROK has treated it as a de facto boundary and the north has also challenged it as a boundary.  As we all know this area has been the location for numerous naval conflicts between north and South.

It is only paragraph 60 of the Armistice that recommends that political parties resolve the "Korea question." (the division of the peninsula - remember at the time north Korea was not a legitimate nation).

Recommendations to the Governments Concerned on Both Sides

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

It is paragraph 62 that explains how it the Armistice is replaced:

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

(Note that per para 61 while in force it is the military commanders who must mutually agree to additions or amendments to the Armistice).

The United Nations Command:

Whether the UN Command continues to exist is up in the air.  I think that the UN Security Council resolutions 82-85 would have to be rescinded to dissolve the UN command (84 specifically established the UNC asked the US in command of the UNC).  There is nothing in the resolutions that calls for ending the UN Command.  I think the only thing that would logically happen is the Military Armistice Commission would be disestablished since that is an Armistice created organization.  Of course the ROK could ask for the UN Command to leave at any time for any reason simply by saying it no longer needs UN assistance (note that we (the US) always fight to maintain the UN command for a number of reasons, one of which are the 7 UN designated bases in Japan that will serve as ISBs and key to reinforcing the peninsula in wartime.  Another is the slippery slope that disbanding it could lead to - the dis-establishment of the ROK/US CFC and the redeployment of USFK back to the US.

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/82(1950)

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/83(1950)

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/84(1950)

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/85(1950)

We should keep in mind that the two belligerents are the north and South. The UN recognized the north's aggression against the South and called on member nations to come to its defense ("to assist the Republic of Korea" which I think is an important phrase).   The Chinese Peoples' Volunteers (an "unofficial" military organization) intervened to assist the north.

Of course if the north and South sign a peace treaty ending their hostilities it is logical to argue that the UN command should be dissolved.  But I do not think there is any international precedent for this.  Also, there is nothing in the Armistice that says the signatories of the Armistice must also sign a peace treaty.  Again international lawyers are going to hash this out but now we have two member nations of the UN (north and South) and if they choose to end the war who can stop them?  And of course once they do that all kinds of arguments will be made (like Moon Chung-in in his May 9 Foreign Affairs essay) that there is no more rationale for the UN command or US troops on the Korean peninsula.

Korea US Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953:

However, USFK and CFC exist and are present as a result of a bi-lateral agreement in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953. Note below that the MDT makes no mention of north Korea or the DPRK.  A peace treaty should technically have no impact on the presence of US forces and bilateral ROK/US agreements.  US troops are present by mutual agreement but if the South wants them to leave I expect we will immediately leave - we are not a nation that would occupy a sovereign country against its wishes - even if it were for its own good!! (there is also the ROK/US Terms of Reference and the Strategic Directive from the Military Committee but those are classified ROK/US only).  See the MDT below for details.  

So the jury is still out on all of this.  These are uncharted waters in my opinion. I go to the basics.  There are two belligerents, north and South, and they had a civil war wth the fighting temporarily suspended.  The UN and Chinese intervened to support the two sides.  The military commanders agreed to an Armistice to halt the fighting and to buy time for the political parties to find a resolution (Para 60).  We have been in suspended animation for almost 70 years and now we may see some kind of political movement.

One last thing. If on June 12th The US, nK and the ROK say that the war is officially ended I do not think that officially changes anything until there is a peace agreement negotiated between north and South with a mechanism put in place to ensure the peace.  I see the US and possibly the Chinese role as mere guarantors of security but I do not think they have to be signatories on a peace treaty since the US was acting for the UN and the Chinese only sent "volunteers."  The treaty obligations of both the US with the ROK and China with nK are separate agreements and do not necessarily impact on the peace treaty (they certainly do not become null and void because of a declaration of the end of the war or a peace agreement/treaty).  I also see no way for the US, China, or the UN to "veto" a peace treaty between the north and South.  I also think it would be political suicide for any party to do so.  I think a declaration of the end of the war would be symbolic only but would have tremendous political influence (and popular influence) and will likely be described by both sides as the start of the process toward CVID, normalization, lifting of sanctions, economic investment, etc.

This is my layman's analysis.  I will have to defer to the International lawyers and judges for interpretations and rulings!

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp

Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea; October 1, 1953(1)

Art 1

Art 2

Art 3

Art 4

Art 5

Art 6

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and an governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,

Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

ARTICLE III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

ARTICLE IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.(2)

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington, in the English and Korean languages, this first day of October 1953.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES (3)

[The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty subject to the following understanding:]

It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article III of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea.

[The United States communicated the text of the understanding to the Republic of Korea in a note of January 28, 1954, acknowledged by the Republic of Korea in a note of February 1, 1954. The text of the understanding was included in the President's proclamation of November 17, 1954.]

(1) TIAS 3097, 5 UST 23602376. Ratification advised by the Senate Jan. 26, 1954, and ratified by the President Feb. 5, 1954, subject to an understanding; entered into force Nov. 17, 1954. Back

(2) Ratifications were exchanged Nov. 17, 1954. Back

(3) TIAS 3097. Back

Thoughts on the Possible US-north Korea Summit on June 12th

I was asked for my thoughts on what would let me breathe a sigh of relief after the outcome of the summit.

In short, as long as there is no damage to the ROK/US alliance and there is no agreement that results in an order for immediate or near term withdrawal or significant reduction of US troops on the peninsula I will breathe a sigh of relief.  Another way to say it is I will breathe a sigh of relief if the US (and the ROK) does not fall prey to the north's charm offensive and give concessions with no substantive action from the north in return.

There are two sets of questions we should be asking going into the summit:

First,  we need to think deeply about this:  Has Kim Jong-un given up the foundational strategy of unification of the peninsula under the north's control through subversion, coercion, and use of force in order to ensure regime survival?  Has Kim given up the key supporting objective to split the ROK/US alliance to get US forces off the peninsula so that it can achieve unification? The answer to these questions should guide our strategy.

Second, what do we want to achieve in Korea? What is the acceptable durable political arrangement on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia that will serve and protect US and ROK/US Alliance interests?  Again the answer to these questions should guide our strategy.

Personally, I have seen no evidence that Kim has given up on the Kim Family Regime strategy. Therefore my personal assessment remains this: 

The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and threats and to the crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the North by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.

The only way we are going to achieve a unified Korea is through a ROK led effort with the full support of the United States.  And for every scenario short of unification from addressing provocations, deterring North Korean attack, to defeating an attack, to dealing with the myriad contingencies that will arise from North Korean instability and regime collapse a strong ROK/US alliance is necessary for a successful outcome.

​Therefore while we pursue diplomacy, which I believe must be the priority, we must keep in mind that the "Big Five​" will always be looming in the background and we cannot take our eyes of the ball in regards to security:

1. War - the ROK/US Alliance must deter, and if attacked defend, fight and win.

2. Regime Collapse - The ROK/US Alliance must prepare for the real possibility and understand it could lead to war and both war and regime collapse could result in resistance to unification within the north. (This would make the Iraq and Afghan resistance pale in comparison)

3. Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity - (gulags, external forced labor, etc) must focus on as it is a threat to the Kim Family Regime and undermines domestic legitimacy - and it is a moral imperative.  Human Rights is a national security issue because their denial keeps the regime in power and the denial of human rights is key to prioritizing resources for the nuclear and missile programs.

4. Asymmetric threats (provocations to gain political and economic concessions, nuclear program, missile, cyber, and SOF) and global illicit activities (Department 39) are all employed to gain hard currency for the regime and support the regime's conduct of political warfare on the peninsula, in the region, and on a global scale.

5. Unification - the biggest challenge and the solution to the Korea question, which is the unnatural division of the Korean peninsula.

The challenge for the Republic of Korea (ROK), the US, the regional powers, and the international community is how to get from our current state of Armistice and the temporary cessation of hostilities to unification as the path most likely will involve some level of conflict ranging from war to civil conflict and potentially horrendous human suffering in the northern part of Korea. The ROK and its friends and allies face an extraordinary security challenge because of the "Big Five." War, regime collapse, and the nuclear and missile programs pose an existential threat. It is a moral imperative to work to relieve the suffering of the Korean people who live in the worst sustained human rights conditions in modern history. While unification is the desired and necessary "end state," or better yet the acceptable durable political arrangement, achieving it will be costly in treasure for sure and blood as well as there is likely no path to unification without some form of conflict, it may only be a question of scale.

​However, despite the above I think the summit will likely occur and success is a low bar with three simple objectives: 

1. “Meet and greet” to look KJU in the eye and allow the POTUS and Kim to lay out positions.

2. Agree to allow expert representatives to meet and work on a process for dismantlement of the north's nuclear program without ending sanctions until there is substantive and verifiable action by the north.

3. Agree to a follow-up meeting to discuss results of expert representative meetings (perhaps in 3 to 6 months)

Lastly, based on recent reporting in Washington and Seoul as well as the results of the 27 April Panmunjom Declaration I think it is possible that we will see a declaration to the end of the Korean War.  As long as we do not fall victim to the euphoria such a declaration will bring and keep the question of the north's foundational strategy in mind I will breathe a sigh of relief.  And if such a declaration is made there will need to be a parallel effort by the ROK, US, and north Korea to develop and implement a peace mechanism that will ensure the security of north and South.  A declaration of the end of the Korean War will be simple.  developing a peace mechanism and ensuring security and stability on the Korean peninsula while the Kim Family Regime remains in power will remain the most pressing. complex, and difficult challenge.

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani and I participated in a 20 minute talk show "Washington Talk" with host Eunjung Cho produced by the Voice of America.  This is broadcast in both South Korea and north Korea and the target audience is the elite in Pyongyang.  

Unfortunately I do not think we solved the denuclearization problem. :-)

The video is in English with Korean subtitles and is at this link:

https://www.voakorea.com/a/4336637.html

[Washington Talk] North Korea denuclearization solution ...

​​

Washington tackles a weekly analysis of North Korean hot issues with Washington experts. This week, we will examine whether the US and North Korea will be able to find contacts in the denuclearization law, and analyze the meaning of Korean art troupes' Pyongyang performances.

ICAS Event on C-SPAN: U.S.-North Korea Talks

This event for the Institute of Corean American Studies took place yesterday on Capitol Hill.  Dr. Taro O and I had to do an impromptu talk in place of the Honorable Mary Beth Long who could not make it at the last minute.  My remarks are first followed by Dr. O and the William Brown and Larry Niksch.  

Edward Luttwak followed with a talk (at the 1 hour mark) on how unprepared is the ROK government and military based on his four visits to the Peninsula since Jimmy Carter was President.  I have never heard such a disrespectful presentation that was extremely insulting to not only our allies but also to every US commander in Korea since Jimmy Carter.  Needless to say I was incredulous when I heard his presentation.

Last to speak is Tong Kim (at the 2:04 mark).  He is a career State Department translator who has spent decades translating for our senior most US officials to include our Presidents in north and South Korea.  He accompanied Secretary Albright to north Korea, among other trips to Pyongyang.  He has met more senior north Korean officials than any American.

https://www.c-span.org/video/?443161-1/forum-previews-upcoming-us-north-korea-summit

U.S.-North Korea Talks A group Korean Peninsula analysts shared their views and insights on the strategies President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un can bring to their meeting scheduled for later in the spring. The panelists also gave a historic perspective of previous U.S.-North Korean talks and what some of the drawbacks can be when negotiating with the North Korean regime. close 

PEOPLE IN THIS VIDEO

• William BrownFellowInstitute for Corean-American Studies
• Sang Joo KimSenior Fellow & Executive V.P.Institute for Corean-American Studies

• Synja KimPresidentInstitute for Corean-American Studies
• Tong KimFellowInstitute for Corean-American Studies
• Edward N. LuttwakConsultantDepartment of Defense->Office of Net Assessment
• David S. MaxwellFellowInstitute for Corean-American Studies
• Larry A. NikschFellowInstitute for Corean-American Studies
• Tara OSpecialistCenter for Strategic and International Studies->Pacific Forum Asia Policy

Fewer People 

HOSTING ORGANIZATION

• Institute for Corean-American Studies

We should remember that north Korea considers the ROK/US Combined Forces Command exercises a provocation while north Korea conducts provocations that includes shelling civilian and military personnel on islands and murdering 46 South Korean sailors when it sank the Cheonan.

north Korean propaganda has pundits, progressives (in the ROK) and the press (and those who sympathize with north Korea) calling for another postponement or even cancellation or a at least a reduction or scaling back of the upcoming exercises.  But we should ask ourselves objectively what do we think we will get from north Korea if we postpone, cancel, or scale back the exercises?  What do these people think the north will do in return?

• Will the north end its provocations to gain political and economic concessions?
• Will it end its winter and summer training cycles?
• Will it withdraw the thousands of artillery and rocket systems along the DMZ?
• Will it cease its infiltration of spies and SOF into the South?
• Will it cease its unification campaign using subversion, coercion, and if necessary force?
• Will it end seeking to split the ROK/US Alliance?
• Will it ends its global illicit activities (counterfeiting, drug trafficking, use of slave labor)?
• Will it end its proliferation activities around the world?
• Will it end its WMD cooperation with Syria and Iran?
• Will it end its human rights violations and crimes against humanity?
• Will it come to the negotiating table?
• Will it pledge to denuclearize?
• Will it denuclearize?

Does anyone think that postponement, cancellation or scaling back of the exercises will result in a reduction in tensions?

The only thing we will see happen if we postpone, cancel, scale back the exercises is that the regime will shift fires to new propaganda targets and continue all of the above.  The only thing we will get in return for postponing the exercises are:

• A reduction in ROK/US military readiness.
• A reduction in ROK/US deterrent capabilities.
• More emboldened north Korean propaganda as it will deem cancellation a success (and it will still focus on the exercises even if we scale it back to a one platoon, one aircraft, and one ship exercise)
• More demands on the ROK/US alliance that will not be reciprocated by the regime.

And of course all of the above is not all inclusive, the north will think of many more ways to benefit from our decision to cancel the exercises.

We should remember that the reason for the exercises is due to the stated and demonstrated threat to the very existence of our blood ally the Republic of Korea.

The bottom line is that we will get nothing in return for postponement or cancellation of the exercises. Some might feel good about doing it in the misguided idea that it will somehow change north Korean behavior and reduce tensions but I believe that they could not be more wrong.

N. Korea issues warning over U.S. military provocations

• english.yonhapnews.co.kr
• View Original
• March 3rd, 2018

SEOUL, March 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's representative told the United Nations-sponsored Conference on Disarmament in Geneva last month that Pyongyang stands ready to fight back against any military provocation from the United States, the North's official media reported Saturday.

The Korean Central News Agency quoted the North's representative to the U.N. office in Geneva as telling the plenary meeting of the U.N. disarmament conference on Tuesday that it is a legitimate right of a sovereign state to take measures to increase its national defense capability for coping with outside threats.

"(North Korea) was compelled to possess a nuclear deterrent in order to protect its sovereignty and the security of its nation from the harsh hostile policy and nuclear threat of the U.S. that have persisted for years," the unidentified representative was quoted as saying in English.

"However, the hostile forces led by the U.S. labeled the exercise of this legitimate right as a 'threat to global peace' and misused the voting mechanism of the U.N. Security Council to cook up several 'sanctions resolutions' in an attempt to deprive the DPRK of its self-defensive right." The DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.

The North's representative then accused the U.S. of "amassing huge strategic assets in and around the Korean Peninsula, and mulling staging joint military exercises aimed at a pre-emptive nuclear attack on North Korea."

"In order to defend itself from such threats, the DPRK had access to nuclear weapons, treasured sword of justice. As we have stated on numerous occasions, we will consider any type of blockade as an act of war against us, and if the U.S. has indeed the guts to confront us in any 'rough' manner, we will not (hesitate) to respond to it," the representative said.

A Reuters photo taken Feb. 27, 2018, shows Han Tae-song, North Korea's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, speaking at the U.N.-sponsored Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.Photo by: Yonhap

(END)

Why does the Kim Family Regime have nuclear weapons?

There are six purposes for the KFR’s nuclear weapons. 

The first is survival. We know from Hwang Jong Yop (1997) that the regime believes the US will not attack a nuclear armed nation but if there was a war on the Korean Peninsula they believes that if it did not have nuclear weapons that the US would use them on the north. So the first purpose is for survival. 

Second, nuclear weapons support its unification strategy which is three fold: subversion of the ROK, coercion of the ROK, and if necessary by force and nuclear weapons directly support the second two. And we should keep in mind that the KFR believes unification is key to its long term survival. 

The third is enhanced reputation and legitimacy - in the KFR mind nuclear weapons make it a power that should be treated like Pakistan and of course it is believed to enhance domestic political legitimacy the elite and with the people. 

Fourth they support the seven decade plus blackmail diplomacy strategy to conduct threats and provocations to gain political and economic concessions. 

Fifth similar to enhanced reputation it supports the regime’s “business” as a proliferator. It has proliferated nuclear technology to Syria (why did the the Israelis bomb the nuclear site in Syria? Although we have not seen much nuclear proliferation they are proliferating missile capabilities and developing those missiles with a nuclear capability makes them more marketable. 

Sixth is that if war does take place they will employ them and employ them quickly. The success of their campaign plan is dependent on rapid occupation of the peninsula before the US can reinforce it so I expect they will use nuclear weapons against Korean port facilities (e.g., Pusan) and the 7 UN based in Japan that are critically important ISBs for the flow of US forces. And if the alliance conducts a counter attack into the north I would expect they would use nuclear weapons on their own soil. A target would likely be an amphibious landing on the north’s east coast. 

So if we think about it there are a lot of reasons why the KFR believes nuclear weapons are in its interest and there is not much anyone can entice them with to give them up. Food aid? Diplomatic recognition and normalization? Security guarantees (like the US and Russia have to Ukraine in return for them giving up nuclear weapons)? There is no good reason why they should give them up. That is why I always say that the only way we will see an end to the nuclear program and the crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim Family Regime is through the establishment of a unified United Republic of Korea (UROK) that is non-nuclear, economically vibrant, secure and stable with a liberal constitutional government determined by the Korean people. 

Of course that cannot happen until there is no more KFR. There are only four paths to this. 

Peaceful, which is most complex and hardest to achieve but should be the basis for all unification planning. 

Second is war because that will destroy the regime but of course we do want to expend the blood and treasure that will cost. 

Regime collapse- also complex and dangerous and could lead to war or at least some level of conflict that will cause huge suffering. 

And fourth is the outlier: internal dynamics lead to the fall of the regime that is replaced by new leadership that if nurtured and encouraged could seek peaceful unification. 

That is a long shot but it is also why we need to continue the strategic strangulation campaign (as the administration calls it extreme pressure) while we cope, contain, and manage the situation to allow internal dynamics to cause change (and of course all this must rest on a combined alliance military capability that can deter, defend, fight, and win). 

Beyond Nuclear Diplomacy: A Regime Insider's Look at North Korea (Video of talk by Thae, Yong-ho)

I attended this event today.  Thae Yong-ho makes some very good points.  I am about to go participate in a dinner with him this evening so I hope to dive deeper into some of his ideas on information and influence activities in the north.

Beyond Nuclear Diplomacy: A Regime Insider's Look 

at North Korea

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9mhId6WHKhE&feature=youtu.be

Streamed live 8 hours ago

Please join us for a special event featuring a keynote address and discussion with Mr. Thae, Yong-ho, former Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the United Kingdom. Mr. Thae will discuss the current situation in North Korea and the issues of importance regarding the security environment in the region.

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  • Standard YouTube License