Make North Korea ‘stare into the abyss’

I received the following comment from a friend and below is my response that I thought I would share.

I wonder if this "putting at risk" might be a problem, wherein what looks like deterrence ends up just being an aggressive move toward regime collapse, and thus not deterrence at all?

​My response:

This is what leads to our strategic decision making paralysis.

First thing is we should remember that the Kim Family Regime views every action by the US as a threat to its survival to include the very presence of US troops on the peninsula as well as nuclear umbrella of extended deterrence.

Second, the north expects us to support destabilization efforts even if we never in fact have.

Third, in conjunction with a strategic strangulation campaign (and remember that nK is not the most sanctioned regime in the world) that cuts of the flow of hard currency and luxury goods as well as proliferation activities, a campaign that supports internal resistance (and of course one of the best ways to support internal resistance is through a sophisticated and aggressive information and influence activities campaign and it does not require putting US or ROK personnel on the ground at all in nK), this could provide a real coercive threat that might just cause Kim Jong-un to rethink his position.  Since we have tried the Sunshine policy, conventional engagement, (e.g., 1992 ARNE, 1994 Agreed Framework, 1999 Perry Policy, SEP 2005 Joint Statement, and the Leap Day Agreement, among others,  none of which have been successful) and the current unofficial administration policy of strategic patience (the administration does not use that name for its policy but the pundits do) perhaps a policy of coercion may be effective in influence the regime.  We will not know unless we try and to date we have been unwilling to try.

And of course the drawbacks are two threats:  War and regime collapse.  We should consider that both of these could happen without our attempt at a policy of coercion due to conditions and decision making inside north Korea and therefore we need to plan and prepare for both.  Deterring war has been one of the alliance's great strengths and successes but the decision to go to war will be Kim Jong-un's alone and we cannot predict how he will act or react in any situation (though if he is a rational actor and gets sound advice from his military experts he has to know that the ROK/US alliance has far superior military capabilities, less quantity).  Therefore, the foundation for any policy must rest on our deterrence and defense capabilities.   In terms of regime collapse, we can track the indicators of the seven phases of regime collapse as postulated by Robert Collins and we should know that the conditions leading to collapse will be as much if not more so dependent on internal conditions than external actions.  In any case we have to prepare and not simply plan for the potential of regime collapse.

The bottom line is we have never really executed a policy and strategy based on coercive diplomacy that is backed up by putting real pressure on what really motivates the regime: internal stability and regime survival (of course our declaratory policy is a threat to regime survival but only if we use our nuclear weapons or have a conventional war).  Evans Revere, a lifelong engager now sees the need for trying something different which i think is quite significant.

​

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David Maxwell <David.Maxwell@georgetown.edu>
Date: Mon, May 30, 2016 at 8:49 AM
Subject: Make North Korea ‘stare into the abyss’
To: 

Quote a turnaround.  Holding something at risk is a key element of a coercive policy.  Evans Revere wants to put something near and dear to the regime at risk; namely internal stability and regime survival.  It is quite a change for the engagers to become regime changers.  One of the ways to put internal stability and regime survival at risk is through support to internal resistance as I wrote here "Korean Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance."    I think he is also advocating a policy of "strategic strangulation" and I have written about ways to support such a campaign here "Can South Korean-made TV dramas prepare the North for reunification?" and here"The North Korean Threat: Where Do We Go From Here?"  But Evans is right that we have not tried sometime different and perhaps it is time to consider something different.

Key excerpt below.  

Revere: The policy the United States has begun to implement in recent weeks, especially since the nuclear test, is essentially the policy I have been advocating for the last several years.

I have long since come to the conclusion – after seeing everything else we have tried fail to achieve the objective of freezing and then eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons program – that we need to try something different.

And that “something different” is to begin to put at risk the one thing that the North Koreans treasure more dearly than their nuclear weapons, which is the stability and the future prospects for survivability of the regime.

Now I know that sounds very ominous, but we have tried engagement, we have tried removal of sanctions, we have tried commitments to normalize relations, we have tried the establishment of liaison offices. On the dark side we’ve tried threats and sanctions and pressure, etc., and none of this has worked, except on a temporary basis.

So I have come to believe over the years that the only thing that is likely to get the North Koreans to focus on the importance and the necessity of denuclearization is to convince them that if they do not return to serious denuclearization discussions, they are putting at risk the survivability of their regime.

Make North Korea ‘stare into the abyss’

Evans Revere says he is more pessimistic than ever about the future of U.S. - DPRK relations

https://www.nknews.org/2016/05/make-north-korea-stare-into-the-abyss/

Chad O'Carroll 

May 30th, 2016

When a former negotiator once known for advocating dialogue with North Korea says it’s time to force the Pyongyang regime to ponder its own demise, it’s hard not to pay attention.

But that’s exactly what Evans Revere, one of the State Department’s former top Asia hands and a long-time Korea watcher, is saying today with increasing urgency.

Having watched “everything else we have tried fail” over recent decades, Revere said that following May’s Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in Pyongyang he is now more pessimistic than ever about the future of U.S.-North Korea relations.

As a result, Revere says only an “unprecedented” level of sanctions designed to threaten the very system Kim Jong Un defends through nuclear weapons can have any chance of bringing about denuclearization.

And without credible efforts toward denuclearization, Revere thinks “serious dialogue” is all but impossible with North Korea, meaning there is little way to see any path to an improvement in relations between the U.S. and North Korea.

Evans Revere in Seoul. | Picture: NK News

---

NK News: North Korea has recently indicated an increased willingness for discussions with both the U.S. and South Korea. What is your reading of this?

Revere: Behind all of this “openness” and willingness to “engage” is a presumption on the part of the North Koreans that any future dialogues that take place with either the United States or other parties will be based on an acceptance of North Korea’s status as a de facto nuclear weapons state.

That is obviously not acceptable to the United State and is unlikely to be acceptable to the ROK. Accepting the goal of denuclearization is a prerequisite to improvement in relations between North Korea, South Korea and the United States.

So the idea that somehow we can have a serious dialogue with North Korea that doesn’t touch on the nuclear issue – that doesn’t address the specific issue of denuclearization – is just not on.

… the idea that somehow we can have a serious dialogue with North Korea that doesn’t touch on the nuclear issue … is just not on

And so I think our friends in Pyongyang are seeking to gain tacit acceptance of this new status. Indeed, one of the central outcomes of the Party Congress was their self identification as a de facto nuclear weapons or nuclear-armed state, and that’s just not acceptable for the United States and others.

NK News: It appears we have a situation in which North Korean long-term objectives and U.S. long-term objectives really couldn’t be further apart. What will be the impact of this contradiction?

(Continued at the link below)

https://www.nknews.org/2016/05/make-north-korea-stare-into-the-abyss/

Conclusion.  And as always we must know (and understand) our enemies and know what will deter them.  But knowing our enemies has to be more than a pithy phrase from Sun Tzu that we toss about.

In general, it is always better to deter aggression and prevent conflict than to reverse aggression and engage in conflict. But deterrence is difficult because it is a psychological effect, built on a foundation of beliefs and expectations. To make it work, the United States must understand what potential enemies think they can handle and what they fear most. To prevent war and deter aggression in this time of technological proliferation and budgetary constraints, American military leaders and defense policymakers must get in the heads of adversaries and exploit their fears.

Can unconventional warfare have a deterrent effect?  (Yes, of course it could if we have the demonstrated capability and the demonstrated will to conduct such a campaign.  The problem is the lack of demonstrated political will to do so).

At the same time, potential enemies must believe that the U.S. can strike at things they value. There are many ways to do this beyond the traditional use of bombers, drones and missiles. One would be having the ability to surge support for local allies, including national armed forces like the Ukrainian military as well as militias. The last thing that potential enemies—whether states like China, Iran, North Korea and Russia or organizations like the so-called Islamic State—want is to be forced to conduct their own counterinsurgency or counterguerrilla campaigns. The thought of having to do so might give them pause as they plan aggression.

We have to be willing to operate in the gray zone between peace and war where revolution, resistance, and insurgency take place and by doing so we can demonstrate not only our capabilities but our will to operate in this area that we have long ceded to our enemies who have sought asymmetric advantages over us and our friends, partners and allies to neutralize our technological dominance.  In short we need to be able to conduct political warfare. (

http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/03/sof-support-to-political-warfare-white.html)

Political Warfare is a strategy suited to achieve U.S. national objectives through reduced visibility in the international geo-political environment, without committing large military forces. Likewise, Political Warfare can function as a critical, integrating element of U.S. national power against non-state adversaries such as the current Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Most often, the Department of Defense role in Political Warfare will be one of supporting other U.S. Government agencies that are more likely to lead strategy and planning development. 

Political Warfare emerges from the premise that rather than a binary opposition between “war” and “peace,” the conduct of international relations is characterized by continuously evolving combinations of collaboration, conciliation, confrontation, and conflict. As such, during times of interstate “peace,” the U.S. government must still confront adversaries aggressively and conclusively through all means of national power. When those adversaries practice a form of Hybrid Warfare employing political, military, economic, and criminal tools below the threshold of conventional warfare, the U.S. must overmatch adversary efforts—though without large-scale, extended military operations that may be fiscally unsustainable and diplomatically costly. Hence, the U.S. must embrace a form of sustainable “warfare” rather than “war,” through a strategy that closely integrates targeted political, economic, informational, and military initiatives in close collaboration with international partners. Serving the goals of international stability and interstate peace, this strategy amounts to “Political Warfare.”

As will be described here, Political Warfare encompasses a spectrum of activities associated with diplomatic and economic engagement, Security Sector Assistance (SSA), novel forms of Unconventional Warfare (UW), and Information and Influence Activities (IIA). Their related activities, programs, and campaigns are woven together into a whole-of-government framework for comprehensive effect. In this regard, Support to Political Warfare is a novel concept in comparison to the last generation of national security thinking and military operational concepts. Yet, Political Warfare is not without recent precursors in U.S. policy and strategy, with the Cold War being a prime example of approaches foreshadowing the current conception.

To Deter Adversaries, U.S. Military Must First Understand Their Fears

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15553/to-deter-adversaries-u-s-military-must-first-understand-their-fears

Soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division gather their equipment before boarding a CH-47F Chinook, Nawa Valley, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, May 25, 2014 (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Whitney Houston).

By Steven Metz, April 17, 2015, Column

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For American defense professionals, the 1990s now seem like a distant dream. The United States was fresh off a stunning military victory over Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s forces in Kuwait. The Soviet Union, long Washington’s bête noire, had crumbled. The American economy was robust, churning out important technological innovations one after another. In these halcyon times, U.S. military leaders and defense officials predicted that they would master what they called the “revolution in military affairs,” thereby attaining battlefield superiority over every possible enemy. Since the U.S. would be able to impose its will on opponents, there was little need to consider how enemies thought or what they intended to do.

A decade later, however, the slogging, bloody counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that technology could not solve every security problem. Ideas and concepts, not to mention will and perseverance, mattered greatly. Then, just as the U.S. extricated itself from the counterinsurgency morass, the American economy tanked, taking the defense budget with it. The dreams of the 1990s had given way to nightmares.

Now military leaders and defense policymakers believe that America’s military superiority is shrinking and might someday evaporate entirely. In speech after speech, interview after interview, defense officials list the things that “keep them up at night.” At times, the cause of concern is China’s growing military power, at others it is what are called “hybrid threats,” or enemies that combine increasingly advanced conventional weapons, political action, irregular warfare, terrorism and criminal behavior to achieve political objectives.

Unfortunately, recognizing these potential threats does not automatically produce solutions. To address evolving threats within the strict budgetary constraints of sequestration, the Pentagon has developed what it calls the “third offset strategy” to pursue new technologies, organizations and operational concepts that can offset potential adversaries’ advances in technological and asymmetric capabilities. This is important but may not be enough: American strategists also must get inside the heads of existing or potential enemies, asking not only what they might do to the U.S., but also what the U.S. can do to keep them up at night, exploiting their fears to constrain them.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15553/to-deter-adversaries-u-s-military-must-first-understand-their-fears

The ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty at 60 Years: Relevant Now and in the Future

My latest essay published on The Peninsula blog at the Korea Economic Institute.

V/R

Dave

The ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty at 60 Years: Relevant Now and in the Future

Posted on 01 October 2013. Tags: military affairs, US - ROK Relations

http://blog.keia.org/2013/10/the-rok-u-s-mutual-defense-treaty-at-60-years-relevant-now-and-in-the-future/

By David S. Maxwell

As we celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the 1953 ROK/U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty we should keep in mind that celebrate is the right word for Koreans and Americans to attach to this milestone.  We can proudly look back on its success. In so doing we should realize that it remains relevant today and the six articles with just 460 words (in the English translation) that make up the treaty remain necessary to support the strategic interests of the ROK and U.S. for the foreseeable future (and per Article VI, indefinitely unless terminated by either party with one year’s notice).

The treaty’s most important contribution is that it has allowed the ROK and U.S. to institute an evolving security arrangement that has deterred war for the past sixty years.  While North Korea and the Kim family regime built a huge military, sought nuclear weapons, and conducted numerous provocations to undermine the ROK, the ROK/U.S. alliance developed superior capabilities that have effectively prevented a resumption of hostilities that were temporarily suspended with the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

The treaty bought time and provided space for the Republic of Korea to create and the world to experience the “Miracle on the Han” with Korea becoming one of the leading economies in the world, with a highly developed industrial base providing innovative technology, goods and services as well as making cutting edge cultural contributions to the global community. Perhaps most important it provided the opportunity for the ROK to develop politically into one of the most vibrant democracies in the free world.

The ROK and U.S. militaries’ combined operational capabilities have evolved over the past sixty years.  There is no bi-lateral alliance in the world with a more interoperable military force and a more integrated command and control organization than the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command.  ROK and U.S. forces have served together in off-peninsula locations as well from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan further enhancing the strength of the alliance.

The past 60 years have not been without difficulty and controversy.  From a long history of North Korean provocations to incidents that caused alliance friction from Kwangju to the tragic Highway 56 incident to perceptions of the United States military dominating the military command and occupying Korean territory, all have tested the alliance and helped make the alliance stronger than ever today.  Currently there are complex ongoing negotiations regarding burden sharing and the so-called OPCON transfer.  In order to achieve OPCON transfer the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command must be dissolved and two separate national war fighting commands must be established.   However, in July the ROK Minister of Defense requested a second delay to the 2015 date.

As we look at the current state of the alliance and think about the way ahead we should consider just what the ROK and U.S. militaries must prepare for and be able to do in order to continue to support the Mutual Defense Treaty:

1.  Deter attack from North Korea and if deterrence fails fight and win.

2.  Prepare for war and North Korean regime collapse.

3.  Maintain a combined readiness posture to respond to North Korean provocations as well as deter and defend against war and deal with regime collapse.

4.  Support the unification of Korea.

Given the threats from the North, the fiscal realities facing both the ROK and U.S., and the tasks required to support the Mutual Defense Treaty the question is how should the military alliance transform to best support the strategic objectives of the ROK and U.S.?

First, in order to maintain the most effective and efficient military capability I recommend that the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command not be dissolved in 2015 or until there is no longer a threat from the North.  However, in 2015 command should shift to a ROK general officer with a U.S. general officer as the deputy.  We should recall that Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty does not specify command relationships or structure, but provides wide latitude so that military professionals may recommend to the political leaders of both nations the best way to organize military forces to achieve mutual objectives:

“Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes…” (emphasis added)

Under the treaty the command can be dissolved, the status quo can be maintained, or a ROK general officer can be put in command if both nations agree.  I would argue that the most appropriate means include maintaining the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command.

(Continued at the link below)

http://blog.keia.org/2013/10/the-rok-u-s-mutual-defense-treaty-at-60-years-relevant-now-and-in-the-future/

US Warns of North Korean Chemical Weapons Threat

If chemical weapons are an integral part of the north Korean war plan (which I think they are) then there is little that can be done to deter Kim Jong-un's decision to use them.  They believe it will help them achieve victory so they will do whatever they think necessary to win.  They will not limit themselves based on any deterrent actions by the US or international community.  We are going to have to be prepared to fight and win in a chemically contaminated environment.  

But in my opinion it is difficult to compare the two because north Korea is not fighting an internal civil war so it is difficult to make a fair comparison.  But in terms of control and command which my Korean mentors emphasize is the correct way to describe the north Korean C2 system, nothing happens in the north in terms of military actions and provocations that is not controlled and commanded by Kim Jong-un.  Therefore deterrence has to be focused on influencing him. 

But the north's use of chemical weapons will be very different than Syria's as I said. It will use them in wartime with the expectation that they will support successful military operations and it is unlikely that our actions in Syria will deter that kind of use by the regime.  It may very well be an integral part of their planning and it knows that it will be so pounded by ROK/US forced whether it  uses chemical weapons or not that I am sure the regime has determined that if there is a war it must use all means at its disposal in an attempt to be victorious.  To borrow and paraphrase from a former US SECSTATE "what good it is to have a military (capability) if you are not going to use it."  We have to expect that the north will use chemical weapons on the peninsula and whatever we do in Syria will not change that.

However, what does or does not happen in Syria will affect North Korean strategic decision making and it's broader reading of US will in terms of deterrence beyond the use of chemical weapons.  And I think that interpretation can be summed up as "dithering does not equal deterrence." If we were thinking of acting in Syria in order to have a deterrent effect on north Korea (in addition to achieving whatever our objectives are in Syria) we would have needed to have acted swiftly and decisively with no dithering.  While our political situation would not have supported that we have to try to understand how our actions (and inaction) are interpreted by the north.  We are fortunate however because the ROK, led by President Park,  has shown the will to respond to the north (which will be tested at the next provocation) so together the ROK/US Alliance is capable of deterring the north at this time (as long as we do not so something to weaken the Alliance).  As I have mentioned in previous posts, we are fortunate that President Park is in office because her leadership buys some time and space for our Administration in terms of strategy on the Korean Peninsula.

V/R
Dave

US Warns of North Korean Chemical Weapons Threat

BEIJING September 10, 2013 (AP)

By CHRISTOPHER BODEEN Associated Press

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/us-warns-north-korean-chemical-weapons-threat-20207811

The United States is trying to enlist Beijing's support for military action against Syria by arguing that it would help deter North Korea from using chemical weapons and threatening security in China's neighborhood, a U.S. official said Tuesday.

China expressed support, meanwhile, for a Russian plan to avoid military intervention in the Middle Eastern country by getting the Syrian government to agree to put its chemical weapons under international supervision and eventually destroy them.

"As long as it eases the tension and helps maintain Syrian and regional peace and stability, and helps politically settle the issue, the global community should consider it positively," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters in Beijing.

U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller, who was in Beijing to meet with Chinese officials, said earlier Thursday that a retaliatory strike against the Syrian government would uphold the international norm that chemical weapons must not be used.

Miller said he emphasized to his Chinese counterpart that lowering the threshold for chemical weapons use could put U.S. troops at risk and threaten China's security and that of the entire globe.

"I emphasized the massive chemical weapons arsenal that North Korea has and that we didn't want to live in a world in which North Korea felt that the threshold for chemical weapons usage had been lowered," Miller told reporters at a briefing following his talks Monday with Wang Guanzhong, the Chinese army's deputy chief of staff.

It was strongly in China's interest that there be a "strong response to Assad's clear and massive use of chemical weapons," Miller said he told Wang.

China has joined with Russia in blocking action against Syria at the United Nations Security Council and strongly opposes strikes on Syria by the U.S. or its allies in response to an Aug. 21 chemical attack near Damascus that the U.S. says killed more than 1,400 people. Beijing has called for political talks to end the violence that has killed an estimated 100,000 people and displaced 2 million more.

Hong said China was hosting a visit starting Tuesday by Syrian opposition leaders for talks with Chinese officials. He said they were from the National Coalition for Dialogue, apparently one of a number of smaller opposition groups whose sizes, memberships and alliances are in constant flux.

China has hosted delegations from both the opposition and government since the start of the Syrian conflict nearly two years ago, telling both that it hoped for negotiations leading to a process of national reconciliation.

While China remains North Korea's most important ally, it has repeatedly expressed concerns about the regime's threat to regional stability and has sought to coax Pyongyang back to six-nation nuclear disarmament talks — so far unsuccessfully. Beijing joined the international community in tightening sanctions against the North over a banned missile launch and nuclear test that again raised the specter of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula just across the Yellow Sea from China.

(Continued at the link below)

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/us-warns-north-korean-chemical-weapons-threat-20207811

The Mirage of Peace in the DMZ A trip to the Korean border makes regime change in Pyongyang seem like the only effective option.

A few key points:

Mr. Kerry's lack of imagination bodes well for Pyongyang's goal of perfecting its nuclear and missile capabilities, and bodes ill for the security of northeast Asia. There can no longer be any realistic hope that the North will denuclearize. 

Moreover, China has refused to isolate the regime despite Washington's repeated pleas for joint action. Yes, some Americans with close ties to China now say that they've never seen Beijing so frustrated with Pyongyang. But there is no indication that new leader Xi Jinping is considering serious sanctions against the North or independent economic and political pressure. 

Committed to a failed negotiation strategy, the U.S. government has all but assured the Kim regime of its safety so long as it doesn't attack the South or Japan. That means negotiations are doomed from the beginning. 

The Obama administration's willingness to return to talks under the "right" conditions plays perfectly into this North Korean strategy of undermining collective resolve. The longer Washington sticks to a failed policy, the more confident Pyongyang grows in its survival. It will figure out a way to proliferate WMDs, likely with Beijing looking the other way.

But in this sentence lies a potential key:

The longer Washington sticks to a failed policy, the more confident Pyongyang grows in its survival.

If one wanted to truly undermine the regime and play three dimensional chess a combination of the status quo negotiating strategy with Pyongyang confident in its survival with a comprehensive psychological operations/ influence campaign targeting the second tier leadership and the population and global intelligence and law enforcement operations against Department 39 could simultaneously cause dissent and discord internally,  prepare for a post-regime Korea , prevent proliferation of WMD (before and after collapse) and set the peninsula on a path to unification.   The supposed "failed strategy" is one key element to this because as long as the regime is confident of its survival it remains one of the best ways to prevent a deliberate attack (but not a provocation) by the north.  But the question is can we and the Alliance operate on multiple levels orchestrating the instruments of national power to achieve the ultimate end state per the 2009 Joint Vision?

V/R
Dave

• OPINION ASIA
• May 1, 2013, 12:26 p.m. ET

The Mirage of Peace in the DMZ

A trip to the Korean border makes regime change in Pyongyang seem like the only effective option.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324266904578456570076166246.html#printMode

By MICHAEL AUSLIN

To understand how North Korea policy has become a diplomatic no-man's land—empty, hopeless and likely to stay that way, if recent pronouncements by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry are any indication—it helps to visit the physical no-man's land of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

The DMZ is not entirely devoid of life, of course, at least on its margins. Approaching from Seoul, only 50 kilometers from the armistice line, a single barbed-wire fence gives way to thicket of guard towers and other fortifications. Busloads of tourists give the scene a surreal commercial streak, while apartment blocks lend a domestic touch here and there.

At heart, however, the DMZ remains a place of limbo, frozen in time by the armistice of 1953. The four kilometers on either side of the border are crisscrossed only by small animals, and the absence of any human activity creates a false sense of calm.

That stillness reflects the diplomatic stasis of the defunct Six-Party Talks, and the inability of Washington to devise a new approach that could change North Korea's behavior. If anything, by focusing on denuclearization and encouraging greater Chinese pressure on Pyongyang—two strategies that have never worked—Mr. Kerry seems to have adopted an approach expressly designed to maintain the status quo.

Above all, Mr. Kerry seeks a return to fruitless disarmament talks. In his first trip to Tokyo last month, he told reporters, "Our choice is to negotiate, our choice is to move to the table and find a way for the region to have peace." He reiterated such sentiments throughout his Asia trip.

Mr. Kerry's lack of imagination bodes well for Pyongyang's goal of perfecting its nuclear and missile capabilities, and bodes ill for the security of northeast Asia. There can no longer be any realistic hope that the North will denuclearize.

South Korean soldiers patrol along a military fence near the DMZ.

Looking across the DMZ border from a high vantage point, one sees the desolate North Korean landscape and brutish buildings lying just outside the now-shuttered Kaesong Industrial Complex. The bleakness is a reminder that the Kim regime's strength is solely military, and that the nuclear trump card is the regime's lifeline.

Moreover, China has refused to isolate the regime despite Washington's repeated pleas for joint action. Yes, some Americans with close ties to China now say that they've never seen Beijing so frustrated with Pyongyang. But there is no indication that new leader Xi Jinping is considering serious sanctions against the North or independent economic and political pressure.

Instead, China seems to be betting that Washington's future of defense cuts will lead to a reduced American presence in Asia. President Obama's repeated invocation of the U.S.'s so-called strategic "pivot" to Asia may worry Beijing over the short term, but the Chinese believe the budgetary fundamentals are in their favor. And so they see no incentive to deal with the Americans over North Korea.

All of this leads to the question of what to do. Perhaps unexpectedly, a trip to the DMZ makes regime change in the North seem like the only thing that will alter Korea's destiny. Figuring out strategies to get rid of, or at least seriously undermine, the Kim family regime is something both the Bush and Obama administrations have studiously avoided talking about.

Committed to a failed negotiation strategy, the U.S. government has all but assured the Kim regime of its safety so long as it doesn't attack the South or Japan. That means negotiations are doomed from the beginning.

(Continued at the link below)

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324266904578456570076166246.html#printMode

The Failure of Deterrence in Korea

I have to take exception to the title.  There may be a failure of the perception of deterrence on the part of some, but we do continue to be successful in deterring the worst case and that is a deliberate attack by the north.

V/R

Dave

Around Asia

Gordon G. Chang

The Failure of Deterrence in Korea

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/failure-deterrence-korea?utm_source=World+Affairs+Newsletter&utm_campaign=00a9604cab-Blog_Chang_Kara_Murza_Bachrach_3_28_2013&utm_medium=email

In a poll released last month by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 66 percent of South Koreans said they wanted their country to develop nuclear weapons to ward off attacks from North Korea. In fact, only 48 percent of the population last year believed America would use nukes to retaliate against a North Korean nuclear strike against them, down 7 percent from 2011.

The survey by the private think tank in Seoul is a clear vote of “no confidence” in the US, which has, by treaty, since 1953, pledged to defend the South, with nukes if necessary. If the South Koreans trusted Washington, they would not want to have their own arsenal of the world’s most destructive weapons. 

And if this many South Koreans suspect Washington’s resolve, it’s a safe bet that many policymakers in Beijing and Pyongyang doubt America as well. China and North Korea have increased their war-mongering rhetoric conspicuously of late, and both are behaving arrogantly, as if they think they can push the US out of Asia.

In the Cold War, the Soviets—and the Western Europeans—believed America would counterattack a strike by the Warsaw Pact forces. That deterrent threat maintained an uneasy but enduring peace along the Iron Curtain. Now, it appears that South Koreans’ confidence in the US commitment is eroding, along with their confidence in the security guarantees of the American “nuclear umbrella.”

As local trust in the viability of the US nuclear deterrence has eroded, so has deterrence against conventional attacks. In 2010, the North killed 50 South Koreans in two horrific incidents, the sinking of the Cheonan in March—46 sailors dead—and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November—four killed, two of them civilians.

To prevent further attacks, Washington on Monday announced the signing of a “South Korean-led, US-supported” defense pact to counter hostile acts. Seoul and Washington think that reducing the “combined counterprovocation plan” to paper will help contain Pyongyang’s threat. The concept is that the US, by promising to act against even small provocations, will prevent the North from committing any assaults.  

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/failure-deterrence-korea?utm_source=World+Affairs+Newsletter&utm_campaign=00a9604cab-Blog_Chang_Kara_Murza_Bachrach_3_28_2013&utm_medium=email

America’s B-2 bomber ‘practice run’ may have also been about deterring South Korea

This is not helpful.  Speculation of any daylight in the Alliance is not good.

The message of the B-2's and the B-52's is simple and designed for two things deterrence and demonstration of US commitment and resolve - The US is committed to the ROK/US Alliance and if the ROK or US is attacked the US can and will inflict devastation on the north that it has not seen since 1950-1953 and will bring an end to the regime.

This is important for two reasons.  The north only respects one thing: strength and power.  It is important to demonstrate that strength and will.  Second, the north will not attack in the face of strength and readiness.  It needs to attack a weak force, preferable after there is a split in the Alliance which is part of its long term strategy.  It also requires surprise and therefore demonstrated Alliance readiness through exercises and a reinforcement of the peninsula with elements such as the B-52s and B-2s shows that at this time the north cannot achieve surprise.  

I would be worried if the north went silent as they did in 1950 and stopped their propaganda and rhetoric and then made overtures for talks as they did in May 1950. Analysts thought they wanted to have a peaceful settlement to the division of the peninusla.  And we know what happened on the June 25, 1950.

To summarize:

The north's strategy for 60 years has included the important component of trying to split the ROK/US Alliance. Many of the north's actions are designed for that. One thing the Alliance must do is to attack that strategy and it can do that by responding to nK rhetoric and provocations by demonstrating Alliance strength.  Continued combined exercises and training to enhance readiness and deployment of advanced capabilities such as the B-2 demonstrate US commitment to the Alliance and the defense of the ROK.  And most important this demonstrates a failure of the nK strategy.  It is critical that we respond to the north with demonstrated strength and resolve.  I cannot emphasize that enough.  Ironically the stronger we are the less there is a chance of miscalculation by the regime.  If we show daylight in the Alliance they will try to exploit that and then we are going to have trouble. The Alliance is the key to stability as long as the Kim Family regime continues to exist.

V/R
Dave

America’s B-2 bomber ‘practice run’ may have also been about deterring South Korea

Posted by Max Fisher on March 28, 2013 at 11:17 am

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/28/americas-b-2-bomber-practice-run-may-have-also-been-about-deterring-south-korea/

(Cherie A. Thurlby/U.S. Air Force/Getty Images)

Two B-2 “Spirit” aircraft, nuclear-capable stealth bombers that are as wide as a 17-story building is tall, took off early on Thursday from an air force base just outside of Knob Noster, Mo. They flew across the Pacific Ocean, past the Korean peninsula, to a small island in the Yellow Sea, where they dropped some inert munitions before flying all the way back to Missouri.

Such exercises are rare, or at least rarely publicized: after it was over, the U.S. military announced the practice bombing run, the first time it has ever acknowledged a B-2 mission over the Korean peninsula, according to a New York Times story.

Why conduct such an elaborate exercise? A big part of the answer is, of course, as a deterrent to North Korea’s recent provocations, which have included severing emergency communication lines with the South, announcing a state of readiness for war and threatening “pre-emptive” nuclear strikes on the U.S.

But there may be something more going on here. Pyongyang’s latest threats are not new; although U.S. shows-of-force are part of the routine, this was an unusually dramatic way to demonstrate American deterrent capability. It’s possible that the bombing test run was also meant as a message to South Korea. That would be a deterrence of a very different sort: not from war, but from the possibility that this long-reliant American ally might seek to develop its own nuclear weapons program.

South Korea has long been under the American nuclear “umbrella,” meaning that the U.S. extends its nuclear deterrent to South Korean soil. But, over the last year, a small group of right-leaning South Korean politicians and opinion-makers have been arguing that their country should develop its own “indigenous” nuclear weapons. And South Koreans appear to be increasingly persuaded: a recent poll estimated that two thirds of the country supported the plan.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/28/americas-b-2-bomber-practice-run-may-have-also-been-about-deterring-south-korea/

B-2s fly nonstop from US to Korea for exercise mission Stars and Stripes

This is important for deterrence.  B-52's and B-2's along with carrier battle groups send a strong message to the generals surrounding Kim Jong-un.

B-2s fly nonstop from US to Korea for exercise mission

Stars and Stripes

Published: March 28, 2013

http://www.stripes.com/news/b-2s-fly-nonstop-from-us-to-korea-for-exercise-mission-1.213833

A U.S. Air Force B-2 from the 509th Bomber Wing flies over the flightline during the 2011 Aviation Nation Open House Nov. 13, 2011, at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

BRETT CLASHMAN/USAF

OSAN AIR BASE, South Korea — A pair of Air Force B-2 stealth bombers flew a mission from Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., to South Korea on Thursday as part of the annual Foal Eagle joint exercise, making the long round trip without stopping.

“This mission by two B-2 Spirit bombers assigned to 509th Bomb Wing, which demonstrates the United States’ ability to conduct long-range, precision strikes quickly and at will, involved flying more than 6,500 miles to the Korean Peninsula, dropping inert munitions on the Jik Do Range, and returning to the continental U.S. in a single, continuous mission,” according to a U.S. Forces Korea statement.

The B-2 is a nuclear-capable intercontinental bomber that can fly long non-stop missions by using in-flight refueling.

At least one of the two B-2s was seen flying with an F-16 escort over Osan Air Base on Thursday.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.stripes.com/news/b-2s-fly-nonstop-from-us-to-korea-for-exercise-mission-1.213833

North Korea warns that U.S. bases in Guam, Japan are within range

A few comments on deterrence because some have mentioned that perhaps we should put Patriots on Guam to protect the bases and deter north Korea just as we are increasing the interceptors in Alaska to deter north Korea.

I would not think of defensive weapons as a deterrent to north Korea in the same sense that anti-ballistic missile defense would be a deterrent in the Cold War and as part of the nuclear stand off with the USSR.  I am not knowledgable enough to judge the efficacy of using Patriots to defend Guam against north Korean missiles.  However, I think neither Patriots in Guam nor interceptors in Alaska do much for deterrence against the north.  What deters the north is offensive military power (and I use power vice capabilities deliberately).  Defensive measures, while prudent of course from a military standpoint for protecting our forces and the ability to conduct operations, do not alone deter the north.  Demonstrated power and commitment to the Alliance are what deters the north and I am very confident that our B-52 overflights had a very powerful effect on the north's thinking.  Patriots in Guam and interceptors in Alaska can never have the same effect by themselves.

As an aside, I think the north is probably having a chuckle about the controversy it has read about regarding the amount of money spent on the stationing of the interceptors as well as the criticism of the system and the idea that it is not proven and may have little effect.  But more importantly the north looks at our defensive measures (and some might interpret them as desperate defensive measures because we are willing to spend a huge amount of money on a not fully proven system) as a sign of our fear of the north's capabilities.  They think they are they ones deterring us and that their actions are having a positive effect for their strategy.  And our defensive reaction is very important to support their internal domestic propaganda because of course they spin this as the north's nuclear and missile capability is making America tremble.

We should take defensive measures that we judge to be prudent to protect our interests and our forces but we should not consider those defensive measures by themselves as a deterrent.  For deterrence we need to demonstrate offensive military power.  And I would recommend that whenever we judge it necessary to take defensive measures we need to demonstrate offensive military power (and this needs to include Alliance military power so that the Alliance is shown to be strong and not being weakened by the north's actions which is a key part of its strategy) so as to strengthen our position, provide a credible deterrent, and undercut the legitimacy of the regime and the regime's actions.

I would add that where I would really like to see more Patriots is in Korea.  I would like the ROK military to buy Patriot PAC 3's to defend their bases.

V/R
Dave

North Korea warns that U.S. bases in Guam, Japan are within range By Jethro Mullen , CNN updated 8:41 PM EDT, Thu March 21, 2013

CNN.com

(CNN) -- The North Korean military issued a fresh burst of ominous rhetoric Thursday, warning that U.S. bases in Guam and Japan are within its "striking range."

The statement from the Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army, carried by the North's state-run news agency, follows the announcement by the United States this week that its B-52 bombers were making flights over South Korea as part of annual military exercises.

"The U.S. should not forget that the Andersen Air Force Base on Guam where the B-52s take off and naval bases in Japan proper and Okinawa where nuclear-powered submarines are launched are within the striking range of the DPRK's precision strike means," the North Korean military said Thursday.

Despite Pyongyang's rhetoric, no U.S. Navy submarines are based in Okinawa or anywhere else in Japan, although they may make calls at U.S. bases there. DPRK is short for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.

Interactive: Nuclear weapons: Who has what?

Citing what it called the United States' "nuclear blackmail and threat," the North said it that it, too, would "take corresponding military actions."

Pyongyang had already reacted angrily to the B-52 flights, warning Wednesday of "strong military counteraction" if the planes made more sorties over the Korean Peninsula.

Angry words after new sanctions

Tensions have spiked in the region since North Korea carried out its latest underground nuclear test last month, the first under its new young leader Kim Jong Un, prompting the United Nations Security Council to respond by toughening sanctions on the secretive regime.

The sanctions enraged the North further, and during the week when the Security Council was voting on them, it ratcheted up its threats, suggesting it could carry out a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the United States and South Korea.

Although analysts and American officials say Pyongyang is still a long way from being able to carry out such an attack on the U.S. mainland, the United States' bases in Japan and Guam appear to be within range of the North's conventional weapons.

In its comments Thursday, "the Kim Jong Un regime is just firing back" at its enemies in response to the B-52 flights and the military exercises of which they're a part, said Lee Jung-hoon, a professor of international relations at Yonsei University in Seoul.

He said that the U.N. sanctions were also likely to be fueling the North's ire, but that the regime's threats were largely driven by domestic concerns.

"They're doing all this to prop up the regime," Lee said.

The military first strategy

Since Kim took over from his father as the head of the North Korean government in late 2011, he appears to have maintained the pursuit of a stronger military deterrent rather than adopting a more conciliatory approach to relations with South Korea and the United States.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/20/world/asia/north-korea-threats