Showing posts with label Regime Change. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Regime Change. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 28, 2017

A ‘New Approach’ to North Korea: It’s time to make regime change the explicit aim of U.S. policy.

Sigh...Bret, have you not been paying attention all these years?  Unification has been policy since 2009.  It will be interesting to see if President Trump and the new ROK President reaffirm the Joint Vision statement of 2009 as Presidents Obama and Park did in 2013 and 2015.  Also, is north Korea the most sanctioned country in the world?  

And China's strategy has long been to try to influence the Kim Family regime to implement Chinese style reforms.  We do have to wonder if the assassination of Kim Jong-nam who had long been under the nominal protection of China was the result of fears by Kim Jong-un that the Chinese would like to install him as the new leader as has been rumored.  But I am not sure the Chinese really want to take the risk of trying to implement regime change because they fear instability and collapse (and war) more than the status quo.

Excerpts:

The first type of regime change is pro-China. Beijing has little sympathy for Kim Jong Un, who brutally purged his regime of its China sympathizers after coming to power five years ago. But Beijing’s distaste is tempered by its interest in the existence of North Korea as an independent state, mainly because it has good reason to fear the strength and example of a unified, democratic Korea led from Seoul.

Pro-China regime change would take the form of a coup, in which Kim would be given the choice of exile or execution, to be replaced by a pro-Beijing figure willing to move the country from totalitarianism to authoritarianism—a Korean replay of the transition from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping. The U.S. would recognize the new government in exchange for verifiable nuclear disarmament, sealing the division of the peninsula.
...

And if the Chinese aren’t amenable to this strategy? In that case, the U.S. should support the anti-China model of regime change, aiming not only at the end of the Kim regime but of North Korea itself.

That would mean a formal U.S. declaration in favor of unification. Other steps might include cutting off Chinese banks and companies that do business with Pyongyang from access to U.S. dollars, undertaking a campaign to highlight Chinese mistreatment of North Korean refugees, and further speeding the deployment of antiballistic missile systems to South Korea. As another inducement, Donald Trump could return to his suggestion last year that the South should have an independent nuclear deterrent.


“Through our Alliance we aim to build a better future for all people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy. 

We will work together to achieve the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as ballistic missile programs, and to promote respect for the fundamental human rights of the North Korean people.”

If anyone wants any assistance on regime change I am happy to oblige.

An Information Based Strategy to Reduce Korea’s Increasing Threat
Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance
Beyond the Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula
Should The United States Support Korean Unification And If So, How?
Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula
Information and Influence Campaign in north Korea When, Why, and How?
The bottom line is that the only way we are going to see an end the nuclear program and threats and to the crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim Family Regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea(UROK) that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.



A ‘New Approach’ to North Korea

It’s time to make regime change the explicit aim of U.S. policy.

Rex Tillerson was widely criticized earlier this month when he suggested that “efforts of the past 20 years to bring North Korea to a point of denuclearization have failed.” The secretary of state then promised “a new approach” without offering details.
Perhaps he doesn’t yet know what that new approach is. But recognizing failure is the first step on the road to wisdom.
Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has pursued a three-pronged approach toward North Korea. First has been a policy of inducements aimed at getting Pyongyang to change its ways. These include the unilateral removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991, yearly shipments of heavy fuel for most of the 1990s, South Korea’s construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex inside North Korea in 2003, and the removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in 2008.
None of it worked. North Korea is too cynical, greedy and poor to stay bribed for long. And it knows it cannot abandon its nuclear program, lest it also forsake the only reason the West would pay bribes in the first place.
Then there are sanctions. North Korea may be the “most sanctioned” country on earth, as Barack Obama pointed out in 2015, but sanctions on North Korea tend to fail because China has generally been reluctant to enforce them. China last year imported $1.2 billion of North Korean coal, above the level allowed by U.N. sanctions. More recently, Beijing announced that it would cut off coal imports from Pyongyang, but only after it had already purchased its annual quota. And politically influential Chinese individuals continue to help the North evade sanctions through front companies.
Finally there is what the Obama administration called “strategic patience”—a policy of waiting for the regime to collapse or change course.
Continued at the link below:

Thursday, July 7, 2016

Video: Korea Conference 2016: Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

At the link below are the videos from the four panels from our recent Korea security conference.  Also below is the complete speaker's list for each panel.


  • Korea Conference 2016

The Annual Conference
of
The International Council on Korean Studies
and
The Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies
Co-sponsored by
Korea Institute for National Unification,
Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy,
The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,
The Korea Economic Institute of America,
The One Korea Foundation, The Korea Foundation,
The Hwajong Peace Foundation & Institute 21C for Peace Studies,
The Dong-A Ilbo, and Delta Air Agency, Korea
and
The Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University
Partially funded through generosity of the
Philip and Patricia Bilden Asian Security Studies Fund
June 29-30, 2016
Georgetown University
Copley Formal Lounge, 37th  and O Street NW, Washington, DC 20007

SECURITY CHALLENGES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN 2016:
ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES

June 29, 2016, Wednesday
08:15 AM        Registration
08:45 – 09:15 AM    Opening Remarks
    Speakers    General Jae-Chang Kim, ROKA (Retired), Co-Chairman
                         Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (ROK Council)
            General John H. Tilelli, Jr., USA (Retired), Co-Chairman
                         Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (U.S. Council)
            Dr. Jinwook Choi, President
                Korean Institute for National Unification
            Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., President
                International Council of Korean Studies and Angelo State University
            Professor David S. Maxwell, Associate Director,
                Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University
09:15 – 11:15 AM    Panel I. Four Power Relations on the Korean Peninsula
    Moderator    Dr. Seo-Hang Lee, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy
    Papers:     
 "Japan’s Role in Korean Security Issues"
            Mr. James F. Durand, International Council on Korean Studies
            "Will China Allow North Korea to Collapse?"
            Mr. Gordon Chang, Nuclear Showdown
            "Strength and Consistency: A Key to North Korean Nuke Sanction"        
   Dr. Taewoo Kim, Konyang University
    Discussants    Dr. Andrew Scobell, Senior Fellow, RAND Corporation Washington
            Dr. Ki-Young Sung, Korea Institute for National Unification
            Dr. Daesung Song, Kunkuk University
11:30 AM – 12:45 PM  Luncheon and Luncheon Speech
    Speaker        “Security and Unification Issues on the Korean Peninsula”
            To be announced
    Introducer    General John H. Tilelli, Jr., USA (Retired), Co-Chairman
            Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (U.S. Council)

1:00 – 3:00 PM    Panel II: The Political Economy of the Two Koreas
    Moderator    Mr. Robert M. Collins, U.S. Committee for Human Rights for North Korea
    Papers     
 “The North Korean Economic System: Challenges and Issues"
            Mr. Bradley Babson, US-Korea Institute
            “U.S.-Korea Economic Relations and the Next U.S. Administration?”                 
 Mr. Troy Stangarone, Korea Economic Institute of America
     “North Korea and Economic Security”
             Dr. Sang Sin Lee, Korea Institute for National Unification
    Discussants    Dr. Tara O, Pacific Forum CSIS
            Dr. Soon Paik, Washington University of Virginia and ICKS
            Dr. Namsung Huh, Council on Korea-US Security Studies

3:00 – 5:00 PM    Panel III:  The US-Korea Security Alliance
    Moderator    General John H. Tilelli, Jr., USA (Retired), Co-Chairman
            Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (U.S. Council)
    Papers    
 "North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test and the U.S.-ROK Alliance"
            Mr. Yonho Kim, US-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University
            "The ROK-US Alliance and Third Offset Strategy"
            Dr. Patrick M. Cronin and Mr. Seongwon Lee
             The Center for New American Security
            "North Korea's nuclear Threats and Counter-Strategies?”
            Dr. Samman Chung, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy
    Discussant    Mr. Mark Tokola, Korea Economic Institute of America
            Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Angelo State University
            Dr. Ilhwa Jung, Council on Korea-US Security Studies
June 30, 2016, Thursday
9:30 – 11:30 AM    Panel IV: Korean Unification and Human Rights
    Moderator     Lieutenant General Raymond P. Ayres Jr., USMC (Retired)
            Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (U.S. Council)
    Papers      
"Romanian Reflections on Korean Unification"
            Mr. Greg Scarlatoiu, Exe. Director, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
            “US-ROK Alliance: Issues and Opportunities for Korean Unification.”
            Dr. Jai P. Ryu, President, One Korea Foundation 
            “ROK’s Wishful Thinking of Peaceful Reunification”
            Dr. Ryang Kang, Korea Institute for National Security Studies
    Discussants    David Maxwell, Ass. Director, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown Univ.
            Dr. Hugo Kim, Washington University of Virginia and ICKS
            Dr. Jae-Kap Ryoo, Council on Korea-US Security Studies
11:45 – 12:00 PM    Closing Remarks
    Speakers    General Jae-Chang Kim, ROKA (Retired), Co-Chairman
                Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (ROK Council)
            General John H. Tilelli, Jr., USA (Retired), Co-Chairman
                Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (U.S. Council)
            Dr. Jinwook Choi, President
                Korean Institute for National Unification
            Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., President
                International Council of Korean Studies and Angelo State University
            Professor David Maxwell, Associate Director
                Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University
12:00 PM        End of the Conference

Monday, May 30, 2016

Make North Korea ‘stare into the abyss’

I received the following comment from a friend and below is my response that I thought I would share.

I wonder if this "putting at risk" might be a problem, wherein what looks like deterrence ends up just being an aggressive move toward regime collapse, and thus not deterrence at all?

​My response:

This is what leads to our strategic decision making paralysis.

First thing is we should remember that the Kim Family Regime views every action by the US as a threat to its survival to include the very presence of US troops on the peninsula as well as nuclear umbrella of extended deterrence.

Second, the north expects us to support destabilization efforts even if we never in fact have.

Third, in conjunction with a strategic strangulation campaign (and remember that nK is not the most sanctioned regime in the world) that cuts of the flow of hard currency and luxury goods as well as proliferation activities, a campaign that supports internal resistance (and of course one of the best ways to support internal resistance is through a sophisticated and aggressive information and influence activities campaign and it does not require putting US or ROK personnel on the ground at all in nK), this could provide a real coercive threat that might just cause Kim Jong-un to rethink his position.  Since we have tried the Sunshine policy, conventional engagement, (e.g., 1992 ARNE, 1994 Agreed Framework, 1999 Perry Policy, SEP 2005 Joint Statement, and the Leap Day Agreement, among others,  none of which have been successful) and the current unofficial administration policy of strategic patience (the administration does not use that name for its policy but the pundits do) perhaps a policy of coercion may be effective in influence the regime.  We will not know unless we try and to date we have been unwilling to try.

And of course the drawbacks are two threats:  War and regime collapse.  We should consider that both of these could happen without our attempt at a policy of coercion due to conditions and decision making inside north Korea and therefore we need to plan and prepare for both.  Deterring war has been one of the alliance's great strengths and successes but the decision to go to war will be Kim Jong-un's alone and we cannot predict how he will act or react in any situation (though if he is a rational actor and gets sound advice from his military experts he has to know that the ROK/US alliance has far superior military capabilities, less quantity).  Therefore, the foundation for any policy must rest on our deterrence and defense capabilities.   In terms of regime collapse, we can track the indicators of the seven phases of regime collapse as postulated by Robert Collins and we should know that the conditions leading to collapse will be as much if not more so dependent on internal conditions than external actions.  In any case we have to prepare and not simply plan for the potential of regime collapse.

The bottom line is we have never really executed a policy and strategy based on coercive diplomacy that is backed up by putting real pressure on what really motivates the regime: internal stability and regime survival (of course our declaratory policy is a threat to regime survival but only if we use our nuclear weapons or have a conventional war).  Evans Revere, a lifelong engager now sees the need for trying something different which i think is quite significant.


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David Maxwell <David.Maxwell@georgetown.edu>
Date: Mon, May 30, 2016 at 8:49 AM
Subject: Make North Korea ‘stare into the abyss’
To: 


Quote a turnaround.  Holding something at risk is a key element of a coercive policy.  Evans Revere wants to put something near and dear to the regime at risk; namely internal stability and regime survival.  It is quite a change for the engagers to become regime changers.  One of the ways to put internal stability and regime survival at risk is through support to internal resistance as I wrote here "Korean Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance."    I think he is also advocating a policy of "strategic strangulation" and I have written about ways to support such a campaign here "Can South Korean-made TV dramas prepare the North for reunification?" and here"The North Korean Threat: Where Do We Go From Here?"  But Evans is right that we have not tried sometime different and perhaps it is time to consider something different.

Key excerpt below.  

Revere: The policy the United States has begun to implement in recent weeks, especially since the nuclear test, is essentially the policy I have been advocating for the last several years.
I have long since come to the conclusion – after seeing everything else we have tried fail to achieve the objective of freezing and then eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons program – that we need to try something different.
And that “something different” is to begin to put at risk the one thing that the North Koreans treasure more dearly than their nuclear weapons, which is the stability and the future prospects for survivability of the regime.
Now I know that sounds very ominous, but we have tried engagement, we have tried removal of sanctions, we have tried commitments to normalize relations, we have tried the establishment of liaison offices. On the dark side we’ve tried threats and sanctions and pressure, etc., and none of this has worked, except on a temporary basis.
So I have come to believe over the years that the only thing that is likely to get the North Koreans to focus on the importance and the necessity of denuclearization is to convince them that if they do not return to serious denuclearization discussions, they are putting at risk the survivability of their regime.

Make North Korea ‘stare into the abyss’
Evans Revere says he is more pessimistic than ever about the future of U.S. - DPRK relations


Make North Korea ‘stare into the abyss’
Chad O'Carroll 
May 30th, 2016

When a former negotiator once known for advocating dialogue with North Korea says it’s time to force the Pyongyang regime to ponder its own demise, it’s hard not to pay attention.
But that’s exactly what Evans Revere, one of the State Department’s former top Asia hands and a long-time Korea watcher, is saying today with increasing urgency.
Having watched “everything else we have tried fail” over recent decades, Revere said that following May’s Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in Pyongyang he is now more pessimistic than ever about the future of U.S.-North Korea relations.
As a result, Revere says only an “unprecedented” level of sanctions designed to threaten the very system Kim Jong Un defends through nuclear weapons can have any chance of bringing about denuclearization.
And without credible efforts toward denuclearization, Revere thinks “serious dialogue” is all but impossible with North Korea, meaning there is little way to see any path to an improvement in relations between the U.S. and North Korea.
evans-revere
Evans Revere in Seoul. | Picture: NK News

NK News: North Korea has recently indicated an increased willingness for discussions with both the U.S. and South Korea. What is your reading of this?
Revere: Behind all of this “openness” and willingness to “engage” is a presumption on the part of the North Koreans that any future dialogues that take place with either the United States or other parties will be based on an acceptance of North Korea’s status as a de facto nuclear weapons state.
That is obviously not acceptable to the United State and is unlikely to be acceptable to the ROK. Accepting the goal of denuclearization is a prerequisite to improvement in relations between North Korea, South Korea and the United States.
So the idea that somehow we can have a serious dialogue with North Korea that doesn’t touch on the nuclear issue – that doesn’t address the specific issue of denuclearization – is just not on.
… the idea that somehow we can have a serious dialogue with North Korea that doesn’t touch on the nuclear issue … is just not on
And so I think our friends in Pyongyang are seeking to gain tacit acceptance of this new status. Indeed, one of the central outcomes of the Party Congress was their self identification as a de facto nuclear weapons or nuclear-armed state, and that’s just not acceptable for the United States and others.
NK News: It appears we have a situation in which North Korean long-term objectives and U.S. long-term objectives really couldn’t be further apart. What will be the impact of this contradiction?
(Continued at the link below)

Monday, February 22, 2016

U.S. to fund North Korean groups working toward regime change

Good news here.  Just hope we do not leave people hanging as in Syria and I hope we are in lock-step with our ROK allies.

I sure wish State had an Ambassador for Unconventional Warfare to complement its Ambassador for Counterterrorism.  I would direct him or her to apply the playbook outlined by George Kennan for political warfare here (http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm)  and apply it to the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim Family Regime.  The would be a great first project for State's Ambassador for UW.

Perhaps now everyone is coming to the conclusion that it is time to help the Korean people from and still living in the north to help themselves.  Will we decide to provide concrete support to resistance? http://www.kinu.or.kr/servlet/Download?num=1001&fno=1049&bid=DATA03&callback=http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_03_01.jsp&ses=

U.S. to fund North Korean groups working toward regime change

  • Feb. 22, 2016 
  •  1 min read 
  •  original
SEOUL, Feb. 22 (UPI) -- The U.S. State Department has promised substantial financial support for North Korean defector organizations in South Korea, sending a strong message to Pyongyang as North Korea continues to crack down on migrants.
Defector representatives who had attended the closed-door meeting held in January at the State Department said Washington is to commit significant funds to defector organizations that can work toward internal regime change in the North, Yonhap reported Sunday.
Projects that meet U.S. requirements include information dispatches to North Korea – which has usually taken place across the demilitarized zone with helium balloon launches. The balloons typically carried flash drives with information denouncing the Kim regime, as well as South Korean media content and entertainment.
Other groups that could get funding include clandestine activist networks operating inside North Korea and organizations that promote North Korea human rights issues.
The new policy is to send a strong message to the North – that the United States is separating its target of the regime from the welfare of ordinary North Koreans, who are often susceptible to human rights abuses.
But South Korean analyst Yang Moo-jin of the University of North Korean Studies said working toward regime change or reform through defector organizations won't be easy, and "change will take time."
North Korea has increased border controls since Kim Jong Un fully assumed power, and the average inflow of North Koreans into South Korea has dropped sharply from an annual average of 2,500 to about 1,000.
Sources on North Korea also told Radio Free Asia that Pyongyang has launched a propaganda war against defections – a sign that the regime is struggling with the rising number of people leaving the country.
Jiro Ishimaru, the Japanese editor of Asia Press, a North Korea-focused news service, said North Korea recently aired footage of what it claims are images of North Korean defectors starving on the streets of South Korea.
The propaganda was aimed at discouraging defections, and according to eyewitnesses, drew tears from some North Koreans who lack information outside government propaganda.
Other spectators, however, said they knew the images were lies, according to sources.

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