Aspen Security Forum: Peace on the Korean Peninsula?

An hour and 20 minute video on the Korean Peninsula with the first part featuring a discussion between GEN Brooks in Seoul via video and Gordon Chang followed by a panel discussion with some critical commentary.

GEN Brooks' remarks are an example of a general officer who knows how to speak to the media.  They should show this video at the Capstone course for new general officers.  He faced one of the most complex problems to discuss in public and I think he was masterful.

https://youtu.be/ttcK6zDpNxg

3:30 – 4:50 PM MDT
Peace on the Peninsula?
Is peace at hand on the Korean Peninsula? Denuclearization and reunification, miraculously, now seem possible. Is this prospect real or a mirage?

Vincent Brooks, Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, United Nations
Command; Commander, ROK-US Combined Forces Command
Suzanne DiMaggio, Senior Fellow and US-Iran Initiative Director, New America Foundation
Woongsoon Lim, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of South Korea to the United States
Michael McCaul, Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security
Sue Mi Terry, Senior Fellow and Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Moderator: Gordon Chang, Columnist, The Daily Beast

S. Korea, China confirm joint stance on N.K. nuclear issue

Excerpt:

The aid-for-disarmament talks, which involve the two Koreas, China, the U.S., Japan and Russia, were last held in late 2008 before Pyongyang dropped out in protest of U.N. sanctions levied against it.

If that is all the 6 party talks are about (aid for disarmament) it is no wonder that there has been no return to the table.  The north has shown that it can continue to survive without aid.  Sure it would like the sanctions dropped but it will not give up the only security guarantee that it controls - its nuclear weapons.  We are not going to be able to bribe north Korea with humanitarian aid because it does not care about what happens to its people and frankly the people have been demonstrating a very high level of resilience as they have had to cope with the failed public distribution system and very little international aid for some years now.  The conundrum for the nuclear negotiations is that the north will not sacrifice its security by giving up its nuclear weapons and there is no guarantee by the US, the ROK, and the international community that the north will believe and trust save perhaps a complete withdrawal of US forces from the peninsula (and the regime will always consider what has happened to Saddam, Qaddafi, and Ukraine and their nuclear programs - and weapons in the case of Ukraine) .  Leaving the peninsula of course is a non-starter because the security of the ROK could not be guaranteed without the deterrent capability of the ROK/US military alliance because the north is much more likely to attack the ROK when US forces leave.  We have more than sixty years of evidence that that is its intent.  This is perhaps a diplomatic and security Catch-22. 

(LEAD) S. Korea, China confirm joint stance on N.K. nuclear issue

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/01/23/27/0301000000AEN20150123007951315F.html

2015/01/23 19:45Twee

SEOUL, Jan. 23 (Yonhap) -- South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang met in Seoul Friday, agreeing that the two countries will continue working closely on the resumption of multilateral talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program, Park's office said.

Wang, who arrived in Seoul Thursday for a three-day visit, also delivered a message from Chinese President Xi Jinping, saying the neighbors should deepen their strategic partnership and make efforts to revive the stalled six-party denuclearization talks, it said.

The aid-for-disarmament talks, which involve the two Koreas, China, the U.S., Japan and Russia, were last held in late 2008 before Pyongyang dropped out in protest of U.N. sanctions levied against it.

Park said she hopes Seoul and Beijing will continue to seek "creative and varied" means to resume the talks and work closely to form a "virtuous circle" involving North Korea's denuclearization and improved inter-Korean ties.

China is North Korea's largest political ally and economic benefactor.

Touching on inter-Korean relations, Park's office said that Xi "positively evaluated reciprocal offers" for dialogue that the two Koreas have recently made.

South Korea is waiting for a response from the North over its December proposal to hold high-level talks on pending issues such as a reunion for families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War.

The North has yet to officially respond to that overture, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said in his New Year address that he is open to holding a summit with Park this year if conditions are met.

Park and Wang also exchanged views on economic and cultural ties between South Korea and China, as the sides have yet to sign a bilateral free trade agreement reached last November and 2015 has been named the "Year of Visit to China." the presidential office said in a news release.

Wang visited Seoul to attend the launch ceremony for the tourism campaign.

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

FINAL UN REPORT ON N. KOREA SANCTION VIOLATIONS

This is a very comprehensive report detailing everything from the north's nuclear and missile program to its illicit activities and how it gets around sanctions.

If I were planning a comprehensive global campaign against north Korea's global illicit activities network, this document would contribute to the targeting process (my apologies to the UN who would probably not be pleased to read that).

The entire report can be downloaded here:  http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/147&referer=/english/&Lang=E

Summary 

 There have been no signs that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

intends to respond to the Security Council’s calls to abandon its nuclear, ballistic 

missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes. On the contrary, it is 

persisting with its arms trade and other prohibited activities in defiance of Security 

Council resolutions, while activities related to its nuclear and ballistic missile 

programmes continue. 

 At the present time, the Panel does not see new measures as necessary in order 

to further slow the prohibited programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea, to dissuade it from engaging in proliferation activities or to halt its trade in 

arms and related materiel. Rather, the Panel believes that Member States already 

have at their disposal adequate tools. 

 The example of Panama with the Chong Chon Gang shows that determined 

action can thwart prohibited activities on the basis of existing measures. 

Nonetheless, the Panel strongly believes that overall implementation of existing 

sanctions should be significantly improved. In the present and prior reports to the 

Security Council, the Panel has made recommendations to help address identified 

shortcomings. 

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea presents a stiff challenge to 

Member States. It is experienced in actions it takes to evade sanctions. From the 

incidents analysed in the period under review, the Panel has found that it makes 

increasing use of multiple and tiered circumvention techniques. Access to the Chong 

Chon Gang provided the Panel with an unrivalled insight into some of the ways used 

to circumvent sanctions. This incident is also a reminder to Member States that, 

besides trade in arms and related materiel, the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea is forbidden to provide services or assistance on the manufacture, maintenance 

or use of arms. 

 Other incidents show that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remains 

dependent on foreign procurement for certain items, especially some that figure in 

nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. In particular, it lacks sufficient domestic 

precision machine tool manufacturing capability and it purchases off-the-shelf items 

for its ballistic missile-related programmes. The Panel also assesses that it will likely 

seek out foreign suppliers for components it will need to fabricate fuel rods for its 

reactors. 

 A study commissioned by the Panel provided valuable insights into its overseas 

commercial presence, part of which is utilized to find alternative and willing 

suppliers and acquire technology and products it needs for prohibited programmes. 

The study also shows that individuals and entities operating abroad, particularly 

those it identified as working in the shipping industry, could be viewed as belonging 

to interconnected networks, useful in the conduct of legitimate and illicit trade. 

The Nuclear Roadblock to NK Development [Saturday Interview: L. Gordon Flake]

Excerpts:

Why would we want to recognize them as a nuclear power? Why would we want to give them that credibility? We don’t. We will not have a general meeting about the Six-Party Talks until North Korea agrees on what we’re talking about. And the focus and topic of the talks is denuclearization. 

There is no other topic. The problem with North Korea today is they don’t want to talk about denuclearization. What does “denuclearization” mean? By North Korea’s definition, it means a peace treaty, the end of hostile behavior, then Russia, China and the U.S. abandoning nuclear weapons all together. That’s what it means. 

When we say denuclearization, we mean the fulfillment of the 2005 joint statement, which says, “You will unilaterally abandon your nuclear weapons and return to compliance with those peaceful agreements, just like South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and 180 other countries have done.” That’s what it means for us.

Conclusion:

GF: As long as North Korea has nuclear weapons, the U.S. and the UN will actively oppose the success of the Byungjin Line of simultaneous nuclear and civilian economic development. Before they had nuclear weapons, we would have supported economic development. 

We do not support the economic development of North Korea because we do not want a scenario in which North Korea succeeds with its nuclear weapons program, and that’s a congruency of time. Obviously there are many other obstacles as well; human rights are one of them. The basic political system and the free flow of information are similarly problematic, but the number one problem now is the nuclear weapons program. Until they abandon their nuclear weapons program, they will not have economic development. 

The North Korean regime has three key pillars: control over the flow of information, control over the movement of people, and control over the means of production. We tell North Korea, “We want you to open and reform,” but if you open and reform, you lose control of the movement of the people, you lose control over the flow of information, and you lose control over the means of production. This is why North Korea is so hesitant to reform because it’s dangerous. 
The greatest obstacle is the nature of the North Korean regime. If they want to reform and open, they must change the nature of their regime, and that is very difficult.

Gordon's seven paragraphs above do more to succinctly, simply, and clearly explain the nature of the Kim family regime and the nuclear issue than other essay or report.  I wish that policy makers and pundits would commit them to memory.

V/R

Dave

The Nuclear Roadblock to NK Development [Saturday Interview: L. Gordon Flake]http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02500&num=11071

By Oh Se Hyeok [2013-10-13 03:53 ]

▲ L. Gordon Flake of the Mansfield Foundation (ⓒDailyNK) In late September, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies held its annual conference on North Korea in Seoul, bringing expert voices from South Korea and around the world to discuss a multitude of policy issues pertaining to North Korea and the wider region.  One of the U.S.-based experts taking part in the event, L. Gordon Flake of the Mansfield Foundation subsequently met with Daily NK reporter Oh Se Hyeok to discuss a range of subjects, including international coordination on North Korea and the reality that for as long as North Korea opts to pursue nuclear weapons, there is no way for the international community to embrace the countrty's attempts to bring about substantive economic development.

Oh Se Hyeok (Oh): Despite international pressure, North Korea seems determined to develop its nuclear capabilities. Therefore, how should the international community deal with North Korea going forward? L. Gordon Flake (GF): It really depends on what North Korea does. If they test another nuclear weapon, there is a well-established series of responses by the United Nations Security Council that will take place. As per the character of the United Nations Security Council, if they pass a sanctions resolution and North Korea ignores it, then the issue again goes back to the Security Council.  So there’s no question about that particular issue. If North Korea tests another long-range missile, if they test another nuclear weapon, we know that the issue will be referred back to the UN Security Council.  There is not a lot of new action we can take, frankly, but each time North Korea does something we can become a little more focused. There are no other new options; we will just continue to tighten up international pressure in response to their provocative acts. Oh: That means that even if we don’t anticipate a positive response from North Korea, we still have to go on the offensive. GF. Once sanctions are in place, it is hard to take them off. In other words, if sanctions come about after a nuclear or long-range missile test, you’re not going to change North Korea by ceasing the punishment. So really, the only way to go is to do more. There is no option to reduce sanctions. As long as they continue to pursue their long-range missiles and nuclear program, the level of sanctions will only increase.  Oh: That’s a very clear message. But what if the Six-Party Talks take place in Pyongyang? So far all the meetings have been held in Beijing. GF: The location doesn’t matter. It’s in China because China has been able to take the lead on that, and we like China taking the lead. The reason the U.S. has not come back to the Six-Party Talks is not related to the location. It has everything to do with the fact that North Korea is not willing to discuss giving up its nuclear weapons.  They are not willing to abide by their previous agreements, and their basic position now is, ‘Look, I made a promise. I broke that promise. Let’s talk about making a new promise.’ It just doesn’t make sense. First, you have to re-establish credibility. As long as North Korea continues to assert that they are a nuclear power, that they will not abandon their nuclear ambitions, there’s nothing to talk about. So the location of the talks does not matter. Oh: But if the delegates were to gather in Pyongyang, then that would give an indirect message to the North Korean people and their leaders. GF: But there is also a risk. The delegates gather in Pyongyang and North Korea just tells its people, “We are a nuclear power, and these other countries have all come to recognize us as a nuclear power.”  Why would we want to recognize them as a nuclear power? Why would we want to give them that credibility? We don’t. We will not have a general meeting about the Six-Party Talks until North Korea agrees on what we’re talking about. And the focus and topic of the talks is denuclearization.  There is no other topic. The problem with North Korea today is they don’t want to talk about denuclearization. What does “denuclearization” mean? By North Korea’s definition, it means a peace treaty, the end of hostile behavior, then Russia, China and the U.S. abandoning nuclear weapons all together. That’s what it means.  When we say denuclearization, we mean the fulfillment of the 2005 joint statement, which says, “You will unilaterally abandon your nuclear weapons and return to compliance with those peaceful agreements, just like South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and 180 other countries have done.” That’s what it means for us. Oh: What motivated North Korea to postpone the recent round of family reunions?  GF: Most likely, it has to do with an internal debate inside North Korea, but we cannot be sure. There are clearly some people in North Korea who want economic opening and development, and there are military or other forces who are very skeptical about it. There are clearly people who like Kaesong and others who don’t like Kaesong. I don’t think this has anything to do with South Korea or other foreign policy elements. It has to do with domestic issues inside North Korea. Oh: How can South Korea promote a constructive relationship with North Korea, given recent developments? (Continued at the link below) http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02500&num=11071

A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE ON NORTH KOREA? Does it make sense? What comes after? What comes before?

My first piece on the new "War on the Rocks"  web publication.

V/R

Dave

A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE ON NORTH KOREA?

July 16, 2013 · by David Maxwell · in Commentary and Analysis

Does it make sense? What comes after? What comes before?

http://warontherocks.com/2013/07/a-preemptive-strike-on-north-korea/

In the spring of 2013, former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey raised the specter of North Korea developing the capability to use an electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) weapon against the United States with the prospect that it would destroy vast amounts of infrastructure that relies on access to electricity.   He called on the U.S. to prepare for a preemptive strike against North Korea to prevent it from developing this capability, just as former Secretary of Defense William Perry and current Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter argued for a preemptive strike in a 2006 Time editorial to prevent the North from developing an ICBM and nuclear capability that could threaten the United States.

None of these three distinguished leaders were making these calls lightly and each knew full well the potential consequences.  What comes after a preemptive strike must be considered and with this consideration important preparation can be conducted beforehand to either deter or defend against what comes in the aftermath.  The purpose of this essay is not to argue for or against a preemptive strike because that decision will be made by the President who has to weigh the cost in blood and treasure of such a decision.  It is solely to provide military advice and recommendations on the preparations necessary should the decision be made to conduct such a strike.

A preemptive attack against North Korea is not a simple operation.  It is not the same as the attack on Libya in 1986, nor will it be like the air operations over Kosovo and the Balkans or even cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan in the 1990s.  It is not the same as Israel attacking nuclear facilities in Osirak in 1981 or Syria in 2007.  There will be much more at stake.

As most know, the vital national interest of North Korea is the survival of the Kim family regime.  The military is key to this regime’s survival and its nuclear and missile capabilities are critical not only for deterrence and defense, it is also crucial to North Korea’s “blackmail diplomacy” that relies on threats and provocations to gain political and economic concessions.  An attack against these critical capabilities would likely be interpreted as an existential threat to the regime and could result in a major attack on the Republic of Korea.  While this may seem like an irrational response from a U.S. and South Korean perspective because the North is unlikely to achieve victory against the ROK-U.S. alliance, we should recall Robert Jervis’ wise words from 1988: “It is rational to start a war one does not expect to win (to be more technical, whose expected utility is negative), if it is believed that the likely consequences of not fighting are even worse.”  The consequences of the loss of its nuclear and missile capabilities may be worse in the calculus of the Kim family regime.  Therefore, we must assume that what comes after a preemptive strike could very well be an attack by the North and we must plan accordingly.

A question we should ask ourselves before we conduct a preemptive strike is what actions would the ROK-U.S. alliance take if it knew the exact day that the North was to execute its campaign plan against the South in an attempt to unify the peninsula?  If we had such perfect intelligence then the obvious answer is that we would take every action possible to deter such an attack and at the same time we would bring the ROK-U.S. military forces to the highest state of readiness in order to defend against such an attack.  So what are those actions and how would we raise our readiness posture?

Once the decision is made by the U.S. President to conduct a preemptive strike, the first step is to consult our Korean allies to ensure we can initiate the full range of combined military preparations.  These will include raising the defense readiness condition to the appropriate levels, deploying in-country forces to defensive positions, and initiating ROK reserve mobilization.  In addition, the U.S. will need to deploy reinforcements from Japan, Guam, Okinawa and the continental U.S.; position the 7th Fleet for operations in the Korean Theater of Operations; and establish an air bridge in order to support flights of strategic aircraft conducting long distance strikes.  Most significantly, the U.S. will have to initiate a non-combatant evacuation order to move American citizens out of harm’s way.

While these may seem like extreme preparations, they are some of the most critical requirements that must be in place to support the strike, as well as to deter North Korea’s response.  All ROK and U.S. assets must be able to effectively defend against the so-called counter-fire fight, or the attack by the North Korean military that will fire thousands of rounds from hundreds of artillery and rockets systems capable of reaching Seoul.  Missile defense systems will need to be in place to defend key population centers and military installations from the North’s long-range missiles.  Finally, ROK and U.S. air forces will need to be prepared to attack and destroy the North Korean integrated air defense system to provide the freedom of action to conduct a preemptive strike and support defensive operations should the North retaliate.

Many will argue that making such preparations prior to a preemptive strike will take away the element of surprise.  That is true.  We will surely be showing our hand.  While this may seem counter-intuitive, these preparations also take away the element of surprise that the North needs to initiate its own campaign plan.  North Korea requires both surprise and an unprepared ROK-U.S. military alliance in order to have any chance of achieving success.  Denying the North these advantages may be a greater deterrence than any rhetoric from the South, U.S., or the international community. Further, ROK-U.S. military capabilities are so superior that the alliance can conduct a preemptive strike at the time and place of its choosing even without the element of surprise.

The decision to conduct a preemptive strike is not a simple matter.  The conditions on the peninsula must be taken into account with proper and prudent preparations executed.  We must also anticipate the North Korean response.  However, if policymakers consider these preparations to be too extreme, then the recommendation to conduct a preemptive strike should be re-evaluated.  If the assessed threat from North Korea does not warrant such military preparations, then the threat may not be dangerous enough to require a preemptive strike.  This is a decision for policymakers to recommend and for the President to make.  Before a decision is made, the best military analysis should be solicited.   The bottom line is if we are not willing to expend the treasure to conduct prudent preparations to reduce the chances of spilling military and civilian blood, then perhaps a preemptive strike is not appropriate.

David S. Maxwell is the Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University. He is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel with 30 years of service.

U.S. should consider striking North Korea – former CIA Chief

I was a discussant on a panel recently when Ambassador Woolsey was speaking and he actually invoked the OpEd written a few years ago by former SECDEF William Perry and current DEPSECDEEF Ashton Carter (written prior to his current position) calling for a pre-emptive strike on north Korea.  My response was twofold.  One I am not smart enough to judge the efficacy of a north Korean EMP strike on the US but (with only slight tongue in cheek) if it gets people concerned and thinking about the "Korean question" then the discussion could be useful.  My real point about a pre-emptive strike was that for us to consider such an action prior to initiation we should ensure that ROK and US military forces on the highest alert, we should initiate a non-combatant evacuation order for US personnel in South Korea, and we must begin deployment of reinforcing US forces to the Peninsula as well as ROK military mobilization because we must be prepared for war in response to the pre-emptive attack.  A pre-emptive attack in north Korea is not a simple operation.  It is not Libya in 1986 nor will it be Kosovo and the Balkans.  There will be much more at stake. It would require suppression of enemy air defenses that could be perceived as not only an attack on the north's nuclear/missile capabilities but as the initiation of a broader ROK/US attack.  Furthermore, an attack on what the north considers vital to its survival would be a direct threat to its survival and the north would likely have but one option: to execute its campaign plan to unify the peninsula.  So if we are going to consider a pre-emptive attack we must prepare for war.

V/R

Dave

U.S. should consider striking North Korea – former CIA Chief

Preemptive strike plans “ought to be on the agenda for very serious consideration”

http://www.nknews.org/2013/06/u-s-should-consider-striking-north-korea-former-cia-chief/

BY CHAD O’CARROLL , JUNE 24, 2013

LONDON – The U.S. should “seriously consider” a surgical strike to prevent North Korea from further developing its long-range missiles and mounting an electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) attack on America, former CIA director James Woolsey said Sunday.

Talking on a WABC radio show, Woolsey said that policies laid out by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and now-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter recommending preemptive counter-strikes against North Korean ballistic missile assets “ought to be on the agenda for very serious consideration.”

“Once you can launch a satellite into orbit, any country would be capable, if it had a nuclear weapon, of detonating the nuclear weapon while on the satellite, while the satellite is in orbit and unfortunately that is a rather easy way to create an electromagnetic pulse,” Woolsey said according to a transcription published by WND Politics.

It was not the first time the former CIA director warned of the threat of a potential North Korean EMP attack. In May, Woolsey argued in the Wall Street Journal that Obama should consider preemptive strikes against North Korean missile assets to help avert “catastrophic” EMP attacks.

But although Woolsey argues the risk of a crippling North Korean EMP attack is increasing, other experts disagree that North Korea poses much of a threat in this area.

“Yes, a North Korea nuclear weapon that detonated in space would create an EMP.  But North Korea is far away from being  able to do that,” Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told NK News.

“To posit this as a reason to launch a pre-emptive war against North Korea is balmy.”

“The small satellite that North Korea put into space in December – and failed to stabilize – does not mean that North Korea could put a nuclear weapon into orbit. A much more powerful launcher would be needed, and much, much better electronics. North Korea may be able to do it someday, but there is plenty of time to pursue other options for halting the missile program,” Fitzpatrick added.

While Woolsely warned that an EMP attack could “take out a huge share of the United States’ electricity grid,” others dispute whether or not an EMP attack would ever be able to disrupt electricity grids in the way he suggests.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nknews.org/2013/06/u-s-should-consider-striking-north-korea-former-cia-chief/

A Route to Reining in North Korea The South Korean president's Washington visit is a good time to define a firm policy regarding Pyongyang. By NICHOLAS EBERSTADT

Probably one of the most succinct descriptions of the Kim Family Regime's methods and objectives.

Excerpts:

There is one huge problem with this "engagement" game plan: North Korea has no interest in granting America or its allies a lasting regional peace. Understanding this unwelcome but critical fact is the first step toward a strategy that could make the North Korean problem smaller, not larger, over time.
…
These quintessential features of the regime help explain why all of the many Western diplomatic initiatives over the past two decades have failed: the Agreed Framework of 1994, the Perry Process of 1999, South Korea's "Sunshine Policy" of 1998 to 2008, the intermittent six-party talks since 2003 and others less well remembered. It also explains why future diplomatic overtures will fail. There can be no "getting to yes" with a regime that regards its negotiating partners as fundamentally illegitimate, no matter what diplomatic eminences may otherwise counsel.
…
The best response to North Korea's shakedown diplomacy is a threat-reduction strategy: a coherent long-term plan to reduce the regime's capabilities for extortion and the dividends it can expect to reap from predation. The heart of such an approach must be deeds not words—sustained actions, and credible responses, in both military and nonmilitary arenas. 

Such a threat-reduction strategy requires all of the deterrence policies currently in force—and more. Militarily, a threat-reduction strategy means steadily implementing countermeasures to deny Pyongyang's ability to inflict damage on other countries. These countermeasures include broadly enhanced missile defense, big improvements in the "counter-battery systems" for suppressing the thousands of artillery tubes trained on South Korea from just across the Demilitarized Zone dividing the countries, and a civil-defense system worthy of the name for South Korea's capital city, Seoul. 

The strategy also includes zero tolerance for international "crises" that the North Korean regime routinely manufactures. Pyongyang's inclination for adventurism will be smaller, not greater, if the leadership has to fear it may lose a little face the next time the regime stokes a foreign confrontation.

What Dr. Eberstadt leaves out is that this strategy must support attaining the ultimate end state of peninsula unification.

V/R
Dave

• OPINION
• May 5, 2013, 7:07 p.m. ET

A Route to Reining in North Korea

The South Korean president's Washington visit is a good time to define a firm policy regarding Pyongyang.

By NICHOLAS EBERSTADT

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324482504578453451317183488.html#printMode

When President Obama and South Korean President Park Geun-hye meet in Washington on Tuesday to consider how to deal with the latest North Korean crisis, some in policy circles will urge the leaders to undertake another round of diplomatic overtures.

In recent months, Pyongyang's adventure in brinkmanship has included launching a long-range ballistic rocket, conducting an underground nuclear test, and repeatedly threatening attacks against the U.S. and South Korea, including nuclear ones. In response to all this menace, Secretary of State John Kerry declared last month in Japan: "Our choice is to negotiate" with the Kim Jong Eun regime "and find a way to peace." Others close to Mr. Obama and Ms. Park likewise regard diplomatic "engagement" as the only viable option for reducing the North Korean threat.

There is one huge problem with this "engagement" game plan: North Korea has no interest in granting America or its allies a lasting regional peace. Understanding this unwelcome but critical fact is the first step toward a strategy that could make the North Korean problem smaller, not larger, over time.

International military extortion is an entirely logical policy for Pyongyang, indeed a practical necessity for state survival. Monumentally distorted by government planners, the North Korean economy today cannot operate without a steady flow of subsidies from abroad. Peaceful commercial trade could help revive the economy, but the North Koreans have long rejected that route—in 1998 the government news agency declared that "reform" and "opening" are "honey-coated poison" for "our own style of socialism." Consequently, for North Korean leadership, the solution to securing foreign resource transfers lies in the unending threat of international violence.

For similar reasons, the North Korean regime can never abide by any security deal it actually signs. Its leaders are firm believers in situational ethics: Whenever an international security treaty, agreement or promise looks to constrain the pursuit of their immediate interests, North Korean leaders will reject it as unacceptable—as they have since the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1948.

Pyongyang's officials regard such promise-breaking not just as moral but as positively patriotic. In the regime's view, the DPRK is the single true authority fulfilling the historical destiny of the Korean race; interference by any DPRK official with that mission would by definition be treason.

These quintessential features of the regime help explain why all of the many Western diplomatic initiatives over the past two decades have failed: the Agreed Framework of 1994, the Perry Process of 1999, South Korea's "Sunshine Policy" of 1998 to 2008, the intermittent six-party talks since 2003 and others less well remembered. It also explains why future diplomatic overtures will fail. There can be no "getting to yes" with a regime that regards its negotiating partners as fundamentally illegitimate, no matter what diplomatic eminences may otherwise counsel.

Of course, this reality should not mean cutting off official communication with the regime. Talking with Pyongyang can serve important if limited purposes—such as reducing the scope for needless misunderstanding, or the risk of miscalculation. But conferencing with blackmailers gains nothing.

The best response to North Korea's shakedown diplomacy is a threat-reduction strategy: a coherent long-term plan to reduce the regime's capabilities for extortion and the dividends it can expect to reap from predation. The heart of such an approach must be deeds not words—sustained actions, and credible responses, in both military and nonmilitary arenas.

Such a threat-reduction strategy requires all of the deterrence policies currently in force—and more. Militarily, a threat-reduction strategy means steadily implementing countermeasures to deny Pyongyang's ability to inflict damage on other countries. These countermeasures include broadly enhanced missile defense, big improvements in the "counter-battery systems" for suppressing the thousands of artillery tubes trained on South Korea from just across the Demilitarized Zone dividing the countries, and a civil-defense system worthy of the name for South Korea's capital city, Seoul.

The strategy also includes zero tolerance for international "crises" that the North Korean regime routinely manufactures. Pyongyang's inclination for adventurism will be smaller, not greater, if the leadership has to fear it may lose a little face the next time the regime stokes a foreign confrontation.

(Continued at the link below)

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324482504578453451317183488.html#printMode

World Affairs TODAY: Season 5: Episode 11: Are North Korea's Threats of War Real?

I was a panelist at this World Affairs Council event on April 16th.  One hour video is at the You Tube link below.

V/R

Dave

World Affairs TODAY: Season 5: Episode 11: Are North Korea's Threats of War Real?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8WYS-LyppE

worldaffairsdc·280 videos

Published on Apr 22, 2013

The recent threats of war by North Korea's Kim Jong-un have caused serious alarm in the international community and ten-sions to rise on the Korean peninsula. This is not the first time such threats have been made. Should they be taken seriously, or are they part of a pattern of diplomatic strategy? How real is the threat of war from North Korea? Panelists: Hon. Joseph DeTrani is President of Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) and former US Special En-voy for the Six-Party Talks with North Korea. Ms. Bonnie S. Glaser is Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China Studies and Senior Associate, Pacific Forum at CSIS. Mr. David Maxwell is Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. Moderator is Dr. Jae Jung Suh, Associate Professor of Korea Studies at Johns Hopkins University SAIS

N. Korea says may hold arms reduction talks with U.S., but no denuclearization dialogue

This is exactly what we have expected and this is the regime's near term end game:  a self declared nuclear power that demands to negotiate as one.

V/R

Dave

2013/04/20 11:01 KST

N. Korea says may hold arms reduction talks with U.S., but no denuclearization dialogue

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/04/20/56/0401000000AEN20130420001200315F.HTML

SEOUL, April 20 (Yonhap) -- North Korea may hold arms reduction talks with the United States, but there will never be any dialogue with Washington on ending the communist nation's nuclear programs, Pyongyang's main newspaper said Saturday.

   The Rodong Sinmnun newspaper accused the U.S. of suggesting its willingness for dialogue with Pyongyang is an attempt to unilaterally disarm the country. The North won't give up its nuclear program until the entire world is denuclearized, it said.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/04/20/56/0401000000AEN20130420001200315F.HTML

Kerry: 'U.S. will defend its allies'

I just watched Secretary Kerry's remarks from Seoul.  He emphasized the critical points – strength and resolve of the alliance, defense of our allies and ourselves, unification, and President Park's "trustpolitik" and US support to it.  I was happy to hear he mentioned unification.  (side note: I remain perplexed and disappointed that retired General Spider Marks would say on one of his CNN briefings that the ROK and US have no plans to unify Korea and that the UN Command exists to maintain the Armistice and maintain both a north and South Korea.  He later toned down his remarks and has not repeated that and CNN has not posted that specific podcast but I almost fell out of my chair when I heard him say that)

However, one of the most telling comments that puts the Secretary's personal priorities in perspective is that he noted that (I am paraphrasing) "..in 30, no 45 years, of traveling to Asia this is the first trip he has ever made to Seoul."
V/R
Dave

Kerry: 'U.S. will defend its allies'

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/04/12/kerry-south-korea-visit/2076597/

Staff and wire reports 6:34 a.m. EDT April 12, 2013

(Photo: Lee Jin-man, AP)

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

• Kerry kicked off his Asian tour Friday
• Threats of missile tests from North Korea loom
• His trip coincides with disclosure of a new U.S. intelligence report

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in South Korea on Friday on an unusual diplomatic journey, traveling directly into a region bracing for a possible North Korean missile test and risking that his presence alone could spur Pyongyang into another headline-seeking provocation.

In a news conference in Seoul, Kerry said North Korea would not be accepted as a nuclear power and that the current rhetoric from the nation is "unacceptable."

"The U.S. will defend its allies if necessary," Kerry said. He said that the U.S. was prepared to engage in talks with North Korea but only if the nation was serious about denuclearization.

Kerry was kicking off four days of talks in East Asia amid speculation that the North's unpredictable regime would launch a mid-range missile designed to reach as far as the U.S. territory of Guam. Kerry also planned to visit China and Japan.

Kerry said that China has the ability to make an enormous difference to the situation by applying pressure to Pyongyang.

North Korea often times its provocations to generate maximum attention, and Kerry's presence in Seoul will provide plenty of that, even if the United States is engaged in intense diplomacy with China, the North's benefactor, in an effort to lower tensions. Another dangerous date on the calendar is April 15, the 101st birthday of North Korea's deceased founder, Kim Il Sung.

Kerry's trip coincides with the disclosure of a new U.S. intelligence report that concludes North Korea has advanced its nuclear knowhow to the point that it could arm a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead. The analysis, disclosed Thursday at a congressional hearing in Washington, said the Pentagon's intelligence wing has "moderate confidence" that North Korea has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles but that the weapon would be unreliable.

Pentagon spokesman George Little said afterward that "it would be inaccurate to suggest that the North Korean regime has fully tested, developed or demonstrated the kinds of nuclear capabilities referenced" at the congressional hearing.

James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, said he concurred with Little and noted that the report alluded to at the hearing was compiled by the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency and was not an assessment by the entire U.S. intelligence community. "Moreover, North Korea has not yet demonstrated the full range of capabilities necessary for a nuclear armed missile," he said.
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http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/04/12/kerry-south-korea-visit/2076597/

Fidel Castro urges North Korea to avoid nuclear warfare

I never thought I would be saying that I agree with Fidel Castro.

“If war breaks out there, the people on both sides of the [Korean] peninsula will be terribly slaughtered, without any benefit for either of them,” Castro wrote in the Cuban Communist Party newspaper Granma. 

Furthermore, “it would not be just to forget that such a war would affect, in a special way, more than 70% of the world's population," he said.

Fidel Castro urges North Korea to avoid nuclear warfare

http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-fidel-castro-north-korea-nuclear-war-20130405,0,2215182.story

By Emily Alpert

April 5, 2013, 12:54 p.m.

Former Cuban President Fidel Castro urged North Korea to steer clear of atomic warfare, saying Koreans faced “one of the most grave risks of nuclear war” since the Cuban missile crisis half a century ago.

North Korea has stepped up its belligerent talk, recently declaring it had entered a state of war with South Korea and threatening a nuclear attack on the United States. Analysts say North Korea is not yet capable of carrying out such a strike, but the escalating threats have grabbed global attention

.

Castro said he delivered his message as a friend, recalling “the honor of knowing” former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, “a historic, strikingly valiant and revolutionary figure” and the late grandfather of current leader Kim Jong Un.

The impassioned message is the first Castro has written in Cuban state media since June 2012, according to the Associated Press.

“If war breaks out there, the people on both sides of the [Korean] peninsula will be terribly slaughtered, without any benefit for either of them,” Castro wrote in the Cuban Communist Party newspaper Granma.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-fidel-castro-north-korea-nuclear-war-20130405,0,2215182.story

North Korea: Nuclear weapons are a 'treasure'

Nuclear weapons are probably the most important thing to the Kim Family Regime.  In the regime's calculus they are key to deterring outside attack, the provide the foundation for blackmail diplomacy, and the can be the source of hard currency.  In my opinion there is almost no hope of coercing or co-opting the Kim Family Regime to give up their nuclear program (and missile as well).  As long as there is a Kim Family Regime we will have a problem with a nuclear capability on the Peninsula.   Excerpt:

North Korea's nuclear weapons are a "treasure" not to be traded for "billions of dollars," the statement said. They "are neither a political bargaining chip nor a thing for economic dealings to be presented to the place of dialogue or be put on the table of negotiations aimed at forcing (Pyongyang) to disarm itself," it said. 

North Korea's "nuclear armed forces represent the nation's life, which can never be abandoned as long as the imperialists and nuclear threats exist on earth," the statement said.

V/R
Dave 

North Korea: Nuclear weapons are a 'treasure'

Foster Klug, Associated Press 11:31a.m. EDT March 31, 2013

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/03/31/north-korea-nukes/2039783/

North Korea has called the U.S. nuclear arsenal a threat to its existence since the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended in a truce, not a peace treaty, leaving the peninsula still technically at war. Pyongyang justifies its own nuclear pursuit in large part on that perceived U.S. threat.

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

• North Korea's 'nuclear armed forces' represent 'nation's life,' statement says
• Kim Jong Un presided over meeting that called for stronger nuclear arsenal
• North Korea issued a warning Saturday that Korean Peninsula was in 'state of war'

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — A top North Korean decision-making body issued a pointed warning Sunday, saying that nuclear weapons are "the nation's life" and will not be traded even for "billions of dollars."

The comments came in a statement released after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un presided over the plenary meeting of the central committee of the ruling Workers' Party. The meeting, which set a "new strategic line" calling for building both a stronger economy and nuclear arsenal, comes amid a series of near-daily threats from Pyongyang in recent weeks, including a vow to launch nuclear strikes on the United States and a warning Saturday that the Korean Peninsula was in a "state of war."

Pyongyang is angry over annual U.S.-South Korean military drills and a new round of U.N. sanctions that followed its Feb. 12 nuclear test, the country's third. Analysts see a full-scale North Korean attack as unlikely and say the threats are more likely efforts to provoke softer policies toward Pyongyang from a new government in Seoul, to win diplomatic talks with Washington that could get the North more aid, and to solidify the young North Korean leader's image and military credentials at home.

North Korea made reference to those outside views in the statement it released through the official Korean Central News Agency following the plenary meeting.

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http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/03/31/north-korea-nukes/2039783/

The Saturday Special with Michael Zwerling- Guest Host: Rebecca Costa- Dealing with a Rogue Nuclear Threat- Colonel David S Maxwell- Guest

My first talk radio interview (case of beer for all my SF brothers I know). I discussed north Korea in some depth for an hour with Rebecca Costa. You can download the podcast at this link.

http://ksco.com/saturday-special-2/33338-the-saturday-special-with-michael-zwerling-guest-host-rebecca-costa-dealing-with-a-rogue-nuclear-threat-colonel-david-s-maxwell-guest

The Saturday Special with Michael Zwerling- Guest Host: Rebecca Costa- Dealing with a Rogue Nuclear Threat- Colonel David S Maxwell- Guest

on 23 March 2013.

Stream Live from our website: 

 Download from our website: Download this Podcast here

Dealing with A Rogue Nuclear Threat.  Is America Behind the Curve?

Rebecca fills in for Michael Zwerling and invites Colonel David S Maxwell to discuss the growing threat posed by North Korea.  Growing instability in the Korean Peninsula is causing concern amongst world leaders.  What is the next step?

North Korea warns that U.S. bases in Guam, Japan are within range

A few comments on deterrence because some have mentioned that perhaps we should put Patriots on Guam to protect the bases and deter north Korea just as we are increasing the interceptors in Alaska to deter north Korea.

I would not think of defensive weapons as a deterrent to north Korea in the same sense that anti-ballistic missile defense would be a deterrent in the Cold War and as part of the nuclear stand off with the USSR.  I am not knowledgable enough to judge the efficacy of using Patriots to defend Guam against north Korean missiles.  However, I think neither Patriots in Guam nor interceptors in Alaska do much for deterrence against the north.  What deters the north is offensive military power (and I use power vice capabilities deliberately).  Defensive measures, while prudent of course from a military standpoint for protecting our forces and the ability to conduct operations, do not alone deter the north.  Demonstrated power and commitment to the Alliance are what deters the north and I am very confident that our B-52 overflights had a very powerful effect on the north's thinking.  Patriots in Guam and interceptors in Alaska can never have the same effect by themselves.

As an aside, I think the north is probably having a chuckle about the controversy it has read about regarding the amount of money spent on the stationing of the interceptors as well as the criticism of the system and the idea that it is not proven and may have little effect.  But more importantly the north looks at our defensive measures (and some might interpret them as desperate defensive measures because we are willing to spend a huge amount of money on a not fully proven system) as a sign of our fear of the north's capabilities.  They think they are they ones deterring us and that their actions are having a positive effect for their strategy.  And our defensive reaction is very important to support their internal domestic propaganda because of course they spin this as the north's nuclear and missile capability is making America tremble.

We should take defensive measures that we judge to be prudent to protect our interests and our forces but we should not consider those defensive measures by themselves as a deterrent.  For deterrence we need to demonstrate offensive military power.  And I would recommend that whenever we judge it necessary to take defensive measures we need to demonstrate offensive military power (and this needs to include Alliance military power so that the Alliance is shown to be strong and not being weakened by the north's actions which is a key part of its strategy) so as to strengthen our position, provide a credible deterrent, and undercut the legitimacy of the regime and the regime's actions.

I would add that where I would really like to see more Patriots is in Korea.  I would like the ROK military to buy Patriot PAC 3's to defend their bases.

V/R
Dave

North Korea warns that U.S. bases in Guam, Japan are within range By Jethro Mullen , CNN updated 8:41 PM EDT, Thu March 21, 2013

CNN.com

(CNN) -- The North Korean military issued a fresh burst of ominous rhetoric Thursday, warning that U.S. bases in Guam and Japan are within its "striking range."

The statement from the Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army, carried by the North's state-run news agency, follows the announcement by the United States this week that its B-52 bombers were making flights over South Korea as part of annual military exercises.

"The U.S. should not forget that the Andersen Air Force Base on Guam where the B-52s take off and naval bases in Japan proper and Okinawa where nuclear-powered submarines are launched are within the striking range of the DPRK's precision strike means," the North Korean military said Thursday.

Despite Pyongyang's rhetoric, no U.S. Navy submarines are based in Okinawa or anywhere else in Japan, although they may make calls at U.S. bases there. DPRK is short for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.

Interactive: Nuclear weapons: Who has what?

Citing what it called the United States' "nuclear blackmail and threat," the North said it that it, too, would "take corresponding military actions."

Pyongyang had already reacted angrily to the B-52 flights, warning Wednesday of "strong military counteraction" if the planes made more sorties over the Korean Peninsula.

Angry words after new sanctions

Tensions have spiked in the region since North Korea carried out its latest underground nuclear test last month, the first under its new young leader Kim Jong Un, prompting the United Nations Security Council to respond by toughening sanctions on the secretive regime.

The sanctions enraged the North further, and during the week when the Security Council was voting on them, it ratcheted up its threats, suggesting it could carry out a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the United States and South Korea.

Although analysts and American officials say Pyongyang is still a long way from being able to carry out such an attack on the U.S. mainland, the United States' bases in Japan and Guam appear to be within range of the North's conventional weapons.

In its comments Thursday, "the Kim Jong Un regime is just firing back" at its enemies in response to the B-52 flights and the military exercises of which they're a part, said Lee Jung-hoon, a professor of international relations at Yonsei University in Seoul.

He said that the U.N. sanctions were also likely to be fueling the North's ire, but that the regime's threats were largely driven by domestic concerns.

"They're doing all this to prop up the regime," Lee said.

The military first strategy

Since Kim took over from his father as the head of the North Korean government in late 2011, he appears to have maintained the pursuit of a stronger military deterrent rather than adopting a more conciliatory approach to relations with South Korea and the United States.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/20/world/asia/north-korea-threats

RENEWED NUKE SALE FEAR AFTER RECENT NKOREA TEST

The north's nuclear program only exists for three reasons. First is for deterrence and the perception that it guarantees survival of the Kim Family Regime (because the US will not attack another nuclear power).  Second is to support blackmail diplomacy which is a key tool in the diplomatic and strategic play book of the Kim Family Regime.  Third is to gain hard currency through sales (along with its missiles and the full range of other proliferation and illicit activities).  So we should not be surprised by the possibility of sales of their nuclear capabilities.  In all our dealings with north Korea we must understand and accept that this is why the north has a nuclear program and these three are reasons why we can never expect the north to give up its program.  Survival of the Kim Family Regime is the single vital national interest and the nuclear program is key to survival on multiple levels.

V/R
Dave

RENEWED NUKE SALE FEAR AFTER RECENT NKOREA TEST

By FOSTER KLUG

—      Mar. 19 7:03 AM EDT

—      http://bigstory.ap.org/article/renewed-nuke-sale-fear-after-recent-nkorea-test

A North Korean soldier looks at the southern side through a pair of binoculars at the border village of the Panmunjom (DMZ) that separates the two Koreas since the Korean War, in Paju, north of Seoul, South Korea, Tuesday, March 19, 2013. The United States is flying nuclear-capable B-52 bombers on training missions over South Korea to highlight Washington's commitment to defend an ally amid rising tensions with North Korea, Pentagon officials said Monday.(AP Photo/Lee Jin-man)

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea's nuclear test last month wasn't just a show of defiance and national pride; it also serves as advertising. The target audience, analysts say, is anyone in the world looking to buy nuclear material.

Though Pyongyang has threatened to launch nuclear strikes on the U.S., the most immediate threat posed by its nuclear technology may be North Korea's willingness to sell it to nations that Washington sees as sponsors of terrorism. The fear of such sales was highlighted this week, when Japan confirmed that cargo seized last year and believed to be from North Korea contained material that could be used to make nuclear centrifuges, which are crucial to enriching uranium into bomb fuel.

The dangerous message North Korea is sending, according to Graham Allison, a nuclear expert at the Harvard Kennedy School: "Nukes are for sale."

North Korea launched a long-range rocket in December, which the U.N. called a cover for a banned test of ballistic missile technology. On Feb. 12, it conducted its third underground nuclear test, which got Pyongyang new U.N. sanctions.

Outside nuclear specialists believe North Korea has enough nuclear material for several crude bombs, but they have yet to see proof that Pyongyang can build a warhead small enough to mount on a missile. The North, however, may be able to help other countries develop nuclear expertise right now, as it is believed to have done in the past.

"There's a growing technical capability and confidence to sell weapons and technology abroad, without fear of reprisal, and that lack of fear comes from (their) growing nuclear capabilities," Joel Wit, a former U.S. State Department official, said at a recent nuclear conference in Seoul.

Pyongyang says it needs nuclear weapons because of what it calls a hostile U.S. policy aimed at invading the North. The U.S., South Korea and others say North Korean brinksmanship meant to win aid and other concessions is the real motive. Even China, North Korea's most important ally, opposes its neighbor's nuclear ambitions.

North Korean nuclear sales earn the impoverished country money that can be pumped back into weapons development, analyst Shin Beomchul at the South Korean-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul said Tuesday.

(Continued at the link below)

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/renewed-nuke-sale-fear-after-recent-nkorea-test