Showing posts with label Extended Deterrence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Extended Deterrence. Show all posts

Thursday, March 28, 2013

America’s B-2 bomber ‘practice run’ may have also been about deterring South Korea


This is not helpful.  Speculation of any daylight in the Alliance is not good.

The message of the B-2's and the B-52's is simple and designed for two things deterrence and demonstration of US commitment and resolve - The US is committed to the ROK/US Alliance and if the ROK or US is attacked the US can and will inflict devastation on the north that it has not seen since 1950-1953 and will bring an end to the regime.

This is important for two reasons.  The north only respects one thing: strength and power.  It is important to demonstrate that strength and will.  Second, the north will not attack in the face of strength and readiness.  It needs to attack a weak force, preferable after there is a split in the Alliance which is part of its long term strategy.  It also requires surprise and therefore demonstrated Alliance readiness through exercises and a reinforcement of the peninsula with elements such as the B-52s and B-2s shows that at this time the north cannot achieve surprise.  

I would be worried if the north went silent as they did in 1950 and stopped their propaganda and rhetoric and then made overtures for talks as they did in May 1950. Analysts thought they wanted to have a peaceful settlement to the division of the peninusla.  And we know what happened on the June 25, 1950.

To summarize:

The north's strategy for 60 years has included the important component of trying to split the ROK/US Alliance. Many of the north's actions are designed for that. One thing the Alliance must do is to attack that strategy and it can do that by responding to nK rhetoric and provocations by demonstrating Alliance strength.  Continued combined exercises and training to enhance readiness and deployment of advanced capabilities such as the B-2 demonstrate US commitment to the Alliance and the defense of the ROK.  And most important this demonstrates a failure of the nK strategy.  It is critical that we respond to the north with demonstrated strength and resolve.  I cannot emphasize that enough.  Ironically the stronger we are the less there is a chance of miscalculation by the regime.  If we show daylight in the Alliance they will try to exploit that and then we are going to have trouble. The Alliance is the key to stability as long as the Kim Family regime continues to exist.
V/R
Dave


America’s B-2 bomber ‘practice run’ may have also been about deterring South Korea
Posted by Max Fisher on March 28, 2013 at 11:17 am

(Cherie A. Thurlby/U.S. Air Force/Getty Images)
Two B-2 “Spirit” aircraft, nuclear-capable stealth bombers that are as wide as a 17-story building is tall, took off early on Thursday from an air force base just outside of Knob Noster, Mo. They flew across the Pacific Ocean, past the Korean peninsula, to a small island in the Yellow Sea, where they dropped some inert munitions before flying all the way back to Missouri.
Such exercises are rare, or at least rarely publicized: after it was over, the U.S. military announced the practice bombing run, the first time it has ever acknowledged a B-2 mission over the Korean peninsula, according to a New York Times story.

Why conduct such an elaborate exercise? A big part of the answer is, of course, as a deterrent to North Korea’s recent provocations, which have included severing emergency communication lines with the South, announcing a state of readiness for war and threatening “pre-emptive” nuclear strikes on the U.S.

But there may be something more going on here. Pyongyang’s latest threats are not new; although U.S. shows-of-force are part of the routine, this was an unusually dramatic way to demonstrate American deterrent capability. It’s possible that the bombing test run was also meant as a message to South Korea. That would be a deterrence of a very different sort: not from war, but from the possibility that this long-reliant American ally might seek to develop its own nuclear weapons program.

South Korea has long been under the American nuclear “umbrella,” meaning that the U.S. extends its nuclear deterrent to South Korean soil. But, over the last year, a small group of right-leaning South Korean politicians and opinion-makers have been arguing that their country should develop its own “indigenous” nuclear weapons. And South Koreans appear to be increasingly persuaded: a recent poll estimated that two thirds of the country supported the plan.
(Continued at the link below)

Friday, March 22, 2013

North Korea warns that U.S. bases in Guam, Japan are within range


A few comments on deterrence because some have mentioned that perhaps we should put Patriots on Guam to protect the bases and deter north Korea just as we are increasing the interceptors in Alaska to deter north Korea.

I would not think of defensive weapons as a deterrent to north Korea in the same sense that anti-ballistic missile defense would be a deterrent in the Cold War and as part of the nuclear stand off with the USSR.  I am not knowledgable enough to judge the efficacy of using Patriots to defend Guam against north Korean missiles.  However, I think neither Patriots in Guam nor interceptors in Alaska do much for deterrence against the north.  What deters the north is offensive military power (and I use power vice capabilities deliberately).  Defensive measures, while prudent of course from a military standpoint for protecting our forces and the ability to conduct operations, do not alone deter the north.  Demonstrated power and commitment to the Alliance are what deters the north and I am very confident that our B-52 overflights had a very powerful effect on the north's thinking.  Patriots in Guam and interceptors in Alaska can never have the same effect by themselves.

As an aside, I think the north is probably having a chuckle about the controversy it has read about regarding the amount of money spent on the stationing of the interceptors as well as the criticism of the system and the idea that it is not proven and may have little effect.  But more importantly the north looks at our defensive measures (and some might interpret them as desperate defensive measures because we are willing to spend a huge amount of money on a not fully proven system) as a sign of our fear of the north's capabilities.  They think they are they ones deterring us and that their actions are having a positive effect for their strategy.  And our defensive reaction is very important to support their internal domestic propaganda because of course they spin this as the north's nuclear and missile capability is making America tremble.

We should take defensive measures that we judge to be prudent to protect our interests and our forces but we should not consider those defensive measures by themselves as a deterrent.  For deterrence we need to demonstrate offensive military power.  And I would recommend that whenever we judge it necessary to take defensive measures we need to demonstrate offensive military power (and this needs to include Alliance military power so that the Alliance is shown to be strong and not being weakened by the north's actions which is a key part of its strategy) so as to strengthen our position, provide a credible deterrent, and undercut the legitimacy of the regime and the regime's actions.

I would add that where I would really like to see more Patriots is in Korea.  I would like the ROK military to buy Patriot PAC 3's to defend their bases.
V/R
Dave

North Korea warns that U.S. bases in Guam, Japan are within range
By Jethro Mullen , CNN
updated 8:41 PM EDT, Thu March 21, 2013
CNN.com

(CNN) -- The North Korean military issued a fresh burst of ominous rhetoric Thursday, warning that U.S. bases in Guam and Japan are within its "striking range."

The statement from the Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army, carried by the North's state-run news agency, follows the announcement by the United States this week that its B-52 bombers were making flights over South Korea as part of annual military exercises.

"The U.S. should not forget that the Andersen Air Force Base on Guam where the B-52s take off and naval bases in Japan proper and Okinawa where nuclear-powered submarines are launched are within the striking range of the DPRK's precision strike means," the North Korean military said Thursday.
Despite Pyongyang's rhetoric, no U.S. Navy submarines are based in Okinawa or anywhere else in Japan, although they may make calls at U.S. bases there. DPRK is short for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.


Citing what it called the United States' "nuclear blackmail and threat," the North said it that it, too, would "take corresponding military actions."

Pyongyang had already reacted angrily to the B-52 flights, warning Wednesday of "strong military counteraction" if the planes made more sorties over the Korean Peninsula.
Angry words after new sanctions

Tensions have spiked in the region since North Korea carried out its latest underground nuclear test last month, the first under its new young leader Kim Jong Un, prompting the United Nations Security Council to respond by toughening sanctions on the secretive regime.

The sanctions enraged the North further, and during the week when the Security Council was voting on them, it ratcheted up its threats, suggesting it could carry out a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the United States and South Korea.

Although analysts and American officials say Pyongyang is still a long way from being able to carry out such an attack on the U.S. mainland, the United States' bases in Japan and Guam appear to be within range of the North's conventional weapons.

In its comments Thursday, "the Kim Jong Un regime is just firing back" at its enemies in response to the B-52 flights and the military exercises of which they're a part, said Lee Jung-hoon, a professor of international relations at Yonsei University in Seoul.

He said that the U.N. sanctions were also likely to be fueling the North's ire, but that the regime's threats were largely driven by domestic concerns.

"They're doing all this to prop up the regime," Lee said.

The military first strategy

Since Kim took over from his father as the head of the North Korean government in late 2011, he appears to have maintained the pursuit of a stronger military deterrent rather than adopting a more conciliatory approach to relations with South Korea and the United States.
(Continued at the link below)
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/20/world/asia/north-korea-threats

Monday, March 11, 2013

As North Korea Blusters, South Flirts With Talk of Nuclear Arms



Excerpt:
But beyond the immediate fear of a military provocation, analysts say deeper anxieties are also at work in the South. One of the biggest is the creeping resurgence of old fears about the reliability of this nation’s longtime protector, the United States. Experts say the talk of South Korea’s acquiring nuclear weapons is an oblique way to voice the concerns of a small but growing number of South Koreans that the United States, either because of budget cuts or a lack of will, may one day no longer act as the South’s ultimate insurance policy.

People ask how this squares with the potential new ROK Defense Minister being "anxious" about the "OPCON Transfer" with the perception that the ROK cannot stand on its own two feet by taking over OPCON.

As I have said this is not about OPCON transfer.  This should be about the Alliance and what is best for the Alliance.  We have a continuous pattern of reducing our commitment to the ROK since Carter attempted to withdraw troops in 1978 (gradually reducing 2dID forces, disbanding the Combined Field Army, withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons, cancelling Team Spirit, withdrawing US forces from DMZ patrols, removing an entire ground combat brigade at once to go to Iraq never to return, removing all US combat forces from the Western Corridor or Kaesong-Munsan approach, to name a few examples). All these actions made logical sense (to some) at the time of the decision but taken as a whole there is the perception of a continuous reduction of the US commitment.  That is the perception of some in the ROK and of course it is the north's perception as well because one of the key conditions they have sought for 6 decades is splitting the Alliance and the dissolution of the ROK/US CFC will be their biggest achievement yet.  But if we were really serious about letting the "ROK's stand on their own two feet" why do we force them to pay the bulk of the costs for moving US forces instead of them being able to invest all the those funds in independent War fighting capabilities? 

Although some in the ROK have questioned whether US really is committed to extended deterrence and we should keep in mind there are some voices in the US who question whether we should have any forces there or maintain the Alliance at all.

But for me I want this  question objectively answered: what is the best way for the Alliance to organize its military instruments of power from a military, political, and economic or financial perspective?  From all those who favor the dissolution of CFC and the red herring and mythical OPCON transfer I would like to see their objective analysis as to how that course of action is best from a military, political, and economic perspective for both members of the Alliance. Show me the real objective analysis that says it is the most feasible, suitable, and acceptable COA to dissolve the ROK/US CFC while faced with a very real threat from the north.
V/R
Dave

March 10, 2013

As North Korea Blusters, South Flirts With Talk of Nuclear Arms


SEOUL, South Korea — As their country prospered, South Koreans have largely shrugged off the constant threat of a North Korean attack. But breakthroughs in the North’s missile and nuclear programs and fiery threats of war have heightened fears in the South that even small miscalculations by the new and untested leaders of each country could have disastrous consequences.

Now this new sense of vulnerability is causing some influential South Koreans to break a decades-old taboo by openly calling for the South to develop its own nuclear arsenal, a move that would raise the stakes in what is already one of the world’s most militarized regions.

While few here think this will happen anytime soon, two recent opinion polls show that two-thirds of South Koreans support the idea posed by a small but growing number of politicians and columnists — a reflection, analysts say, of hardening attitudes since North Korea’s Feb. 12 underground nuclear test, its third since 2006.

“The third nuclear test was for South Korea what the Cuban missile crisis was for the U.S.,” said Han Yong-sup, a professor of security policy at the Korea National Defense University in Seoul. “It has made the North Korean threat seem very close and very real.”

In recent weeks, the North has approached a crucial threshold with its weapons programs, with the successful launching of a long-range rocket, followed by the test detonation of a nuclear device that could be small enough to fit on top of a rocket. Those advances were followed by a barrage of apocalyptic threats to rain “pre-emptive nuclear strikes” and “final destruction” on Seoul, the South’s neon-drenched capital. The intensification of North Korea’s typically bellicose language shocked many South Koreans, who had thought the main target of the North’s nuclear program was the United States.
Adding to South Koreans’ worries, the North and its nuclear arsenal are in the hands of a young new leader, Kim Jong-un, whose brinkmanship appears to be an effort to ensure the support of his nation’s powerful military.

The South also has a new president, Park Geun-hye, the daughter of a military strongman who stood firm against North Korea, who herself also faces pressure to stand fast against the North. Just two weeks after her inauguration, Ms. Park faces a crisis as the North makes vague threats interpreted by many South Koreans as the precursor to some sort of limited, conventional military provocation. Ms. Park has promised to retaliate if her nation is attacked, aware of the public anger directed at her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, when he showed restraint after the North shelled a South Korean island in 2010, killing four people.
(Continued at the link below)

Sunday, March 3, 2013

Park’s ongoing security dilemma


Retaliation simply for "aiming?" 

But the author makes some important points in these excerpts:
The remaining realistic option would be strengthening our strategic leverage in the U.S. alliance. South Korea could positively consider joining the U.S.-led missile defense system. If it opts to join the planned buildup of defensive posture in the Asia-Pacific arena, South Korea’s strategic importance to the U.S. would increase. In a similar context, we could also negotiate delaying the timetable for the U.S. transfer of wartime operational control set for 2015. These arrangements could heighten the possibility of full commitment and retaliatory response from the U.S. against a North Korean attack.
Deterrence alone cannot be a fundamental solution to the North’s nuclear threat. At the same time, we cannot make a preemptive strike to destroy North Korea’s nuclear weapons as it could trigger a full-blown war. The buildup of mutual trust on the Korean Peninsula - as suggested by President Park - may be a better solution than that. There is no guarantee on how long and how well it will work. But that way would prevent a war and save millions of lives.
V/R
Dave 
Park’s ongoing security dilemma
If the North aims nuclear missiles at the South, would the U.S. immediately retaliate with nuclear weapons?

Mar 01,2013
The uproar over North Korea’s third nuclear test has died down to some extent. Vehement condemnation and outcries toward unruly North Korea - as if it was ready to start a nuclear war - have simmered down. But the advances in the North’s nuclear armament have become alarmingly dangerous and demand quick resolute actions because it poses the first major task for the new Park Geun-hye administration.

In her inaugural address, Park sent a solemn message to Pyongyang, warning that it will end up as the biggest victim from the nuclear test and urging it to put down nuclear weaponry to join the path of peace and co-prosperity. However, she repeated her campaign promise of a different approach from the hardline Lee Myung-bak administration, reiterating that she will strive to build mutual trust with the North - despite its nuclear threat and based on “irrefutable deterrence.” A new storm in a teacup may be brewing.

What does she mean by “irrefutable deterrence?” North Korea is armed with more than 1,000 ballistic missiles that can reach South Korea, Japan and Guam. If it actually succeeded in building a smaller and lighter bomb as it claimed, it is closer to turning out miniaturized nuclear warheads small enough to fit atop its long-range missiles. The country is estimated to be near developing inter-continental ballistic missiles that can even strike the U.S. mainland within a few years. North Korea also supposedly has more than a hundred mobile launchers that can evade preemptive strikes from the U.S. and South Korea.
(Continued at the link below)

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