North Korean leader Kim Jong-un stands and applauds. REUTERS

The North Korean Threat: Where Do We Go From Here?

After its latest test of a long-range rocket, the nuclear threat from North Korea has re-emerged as a major global challenge

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By David Maxwell on Feb 12, 2016 at 11:45 AM

http://www.vocativ.com/news/283367/the-north-korean-threat-where-do-we-go-from-here

Here is the bottom line: The only way that we will have an end to the nuclear and missile programs as well as the human atrocities and crimes against humanity being perpetrated against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim Family Regime is through a unification process that leads to a united republic of Korea.

That is a tall order. Unification is the only way to settle the “Korea Question.” Unification will be hard and will most likely be achieved after the expenditure of much blood and treasure from the Republic of Korea, the United States and regional powers. It will be complex because the path to attain it is uncertain and fraught with danger.

There are four paths to unification: peaceful, regime collapse, war or internal regime change that results in new leadership that seeks to peacefully unify. Each of these paths conflicts with the single vital national interest of North Korea: survival of the Kim Family Regime. Everything the regime does is focused on this objective. It overrides all other considerations to include the welfare of the Korean people living in the north. It also explains why the North Korean nuclear and missile programs are so important and why the regime will never negotiate them away.

The regime believes in nuclear weapons for two critically important reasons. First, that they deter attack from the South and the U.S. The regime believes that the U.S. will never attack another country with nuclear weapons. It looks to the examples of Iraq and Libya and what happens to a regime that does not have nuclear weapons (and the Libyan example is especially important because Qaddafi gave up his weapons willingly). The second reason is that nuclear weapons support its overall objective of keeping the regime alive. Blackmail diplomacy is simply the use of threats and actual provocations to gain political and economic concessions. A nuclear weapon is the largest threat in its arsenal. This has been a key element of its strategy for nearly seven decades and it has been employed regularly since 1994 with great effect.

More The Long, Terrifying History of North Korea’s Missile Testing

Now in 2016 the regime has conducted its fourth nuclear test and a third attempted satellite launch. It has restarted its nuclear reactor and this will allow it to increase its plutonium stockpiles. There is speculation that a fifth nuclear test may occur. The regime follows what it calls the byungjin line—the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development. The North Korean constitution states that it is a nuclear-armed nation. It should be clear even to the casual observer that the regime has no intention of giving up its nuclear program. The ROK, the U.S. and the international community have attempted a broad range of actions from unreciprocated engagement to hardline policies to the current strategy of ignoring the regime with the unofficial title of “strategic patience.” We have been unable to co-opt or coerce the regime because of its belief that nuclear weapons are key to its survival. At the same time some 25 million Koreans living in the north suffer unbelievable hardships, including many abuses outlined in the United Nations Commission of Inquiry report on human rights in North Korea.

Why does North Korea appear to be accelerating its provocative actions? There are myriad reasons. First, it may simply be necessary to test its weapons and missile delivery systems to advance their programs to the next level. It may be that these tests are focused on internal audiences, both the elite and the general population, to reinforce the North Korean narrative that it is a power to be reckoned with in the international community and that it must defend itself from external aggression. This could be part of Kim Jong-un’s consolidation of power.

Another reason for the recent provocations may be that the regime is trying to establish a “new normal” for its nuclear posture during the next two years as both the U.S. and ROK transition to new administrations in 2017 and 2018. Just as it executed what some call “creeping normalcy” in the 1970’s and 1980’s when it repositioned its conventional military forces, increasing its frontline forces to 70 percent over time, this could be their attempt to conduct a “nuclear creeping normalcy” with the intent to be recognized as a nuclear power when the new administrations come into office.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.vocativ.com/news/283367/the-north-korean-threat-where-do-we-go-from-here

U.S. Pacific Commander vows strong response to N.K. provocations

Hopefully the responses won't be the tepid ones that were too little, too late in response to Cheonan sinking  and Y-P Do artillery attack.  The only thing that might deter Kim Jong-un is decisive demonstration of strength.  

We really have to get "WMD" right - word, message, and deed or as I like to think  word, mind, and deed  -the words mean nothing to the mind of the target audience unless they are connected to the right deeds that back up the words (just like the problem we have with ISIL - our ends ways disconnect - degrade and destroy ISIL does not compute in the minds of ISIL, Syrian "moderate" resistance, Iraq government and people, the international community, and the American public when it is not backed with the appropriate deeds - and the "deed" is contracting out the ways to inept proxy indigenous and host nation forces whose interests are not aligned with ours so that they cannot possibly achieve our ends).  Sorry for the seeming rant across continents, theaters and threats - but I think there are similarities to how we should approach "WMD" - word, mind, and deed.

U.S. Pacific Commander vows strong response to N.K. provocations

2015-06-10 17:25

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http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?cid=AEN20150610002952315&domain=3&ctype=A&site=0100000000&input=rss

   The new head of the U.S. Pacific Command reaffirmed Wednesday stern responses to any provocations by the "dangerous and unpredictable" North Korea based upon the steadfast alliance with South Korea.

   Adm. Harry Harris, chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, made the pledge during his visit to the South Korean Navy's 2nd Fleet Command in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, some 70 kilometers south of Seoul, where he paid tribute to sailors killed in the North's deadly attack on the South Korean warship Cheonan.

   On March 26, 2010, the 1,200-ton naval corvette sank in the Yellow Sea, killing 46 South Koreans. An international investigation found that Pyongyang had torpedoed the ship, though the belligerent regime has denied responsibility. The hull of the vessel is on display at the fleet's headquarters.

   "I believe North Korea is dangerous, it's unpredictable, and it's led by the leader (Kim Jong-un) who is arrogant. I consider North Korea a rogue nation discredited by the entire world," Harris said, pointing out that Pyongyang has expressed its "willingness to use military provocations to achieve its national goals."

   In a saber-rattling move against South Korea and the U.S., the North has continued to build up its asymmetric capabilities and launch provocative actions. Last month alone, the North carried out live-fire drills twice near the Northern Limit Line, the de facto inter-Korean maritime border in the Yellow Sea.

   "So I have to tell you that the U.S. remains vigil in the face of North Korea's continued provocations and steadfast in our alliance's commitment to the ROK. It is no accident that the first country that I visited as the Pacific Command commander in the bilateral sense was Korea," he added, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.

   He assumed the command position of the U.S. Pacific Command in May 2015.

   Stressing solid bilateral relations and friendship between Seoul and Washington, Harris also said the strong alliance will "allow us together to overcome provocations by North Korea."

Excerpt:

The United States and its allies in East Asia are rightfully demanding “meaningful actions towards denuclearization” before entering into any negotiations. The North Koreans meanwhile are only offering negotiations without preconditions. The conundrum the international community is about to face in the weeks and months ahead, is to find a diplomatic solution when the political fronts are geared towards conflict.

But in a world in which cooperation is largely seen as more beneficial than confrontation, the North Korean offer is paradoxically gaining momentum with every new erupting crisis. As in all the years before, President Obama’s policy of "strategic patience" will come under intense scrutiny. Not only by those who believe that any talk is better than being silent, but also by those who seek to avert a possible military escalation.

However, as painful as it may sound the policy of "strategic patience" appears to be the only feasible way to make the North Koreans comply with their obligations to denuclearize. The South Korean government is still learning this lesson the hard way. From the tedious negotiations on reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex to the abrupt cancelling of cross-border family reunions, Seoul's policy of "trust building" with Pyongyang has been nothing but a rocky road with little to show.

I do not think the "political fronts are geared toward conflict."  None of the five parties want conflict on the Korean Peninsula.  The only country in the region that is geared for conflict is north Korea.  The ball is in the north's court.  Until it demonstrates good faith by taking concrete actions will it benefit from a return to the talks.  To reiterate the phrase is this:

 the North Korean offer is paradoxically gaining momentum with every new erupting crisis

The cycle is that as crisis erupts  certain parties want to move to talks and this just confirms and reinforces the north's blackmail diplomatic strategy: increase tension and rhetoric and conduct provocations to gain political and economic concessions.

On the other hand, I do think that strategic patience on the part of the US while backing the ROK's trustpolitik initiative is the way to go.  But the author should be also have some patience for trustpolitik – I think it will take some years for it to bear fruit. It is not a strategy that is going to bring overnight results or even results in 8 months which is how long President Park has been in office executing her policy.  

But the bottom line is that any conflict on the Peninsula will be the result of the Kim Family Regime' actions and not the ROK, US, Japan, China, or Russia.  The responsibility is solely on Kim Jong-un's shoulders.

V/R

Dave

The North Korea threat

By Stefan Soesanto - 10/17/13 05:00 PM ET

http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/329133-the-north-korea-threat-

  

At a time when countries like Cuba, Myanmar, Syria and even Iran are trying to ease tensions with the United States, one country stands out by adamantly defying this positive trend. Last week, the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed in a report to parliament that the regime in North Korea has restarted its 5 MW nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. The NIS findings end months of speculation following the open-source analysis of satellite imagery by the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University.

Although clearly in violation of several UN Security Council resolutions, the nuclear restart does not really come as a surprise. Pyongyang officially announced its plan to resume operations at Yongbyon back in April, the same month when the North Korean cargo ship Chong Chon Gang set sail for Cuba to pick up 25 containers of military hardware. While the Chong Chon Gang was seized in mid-July by Panamanian authorities and has been found in violation of UN sanctions, evidence of the nuclear restart at Yongbyon has yet to make its impact on the international stage.

The situation regarding North Korea is getting worse by the day, whether it is the nation’s nuclear program, advances in missile technology, cyber warfare operations or its horrible human rights record. But Pyongyang has proven itself to be a formidable opponent and there is little evidence to suggest that additional UN sanctions will bring the North Koreans to their knees. Thus the question becomes: Where do we go from here?

After more than two decades of post-cold war tit-for-tat, relations between Washington and Pyongyang are at an all-time low. Ironically, within this non-cooperative environment of “strategic patience”, intelligence gathering and public diplomacy has been unwillingly outsourced to non-governmental organizations and people like former NBA star Dennis Rodman. Something has indeed gone terribly wrong when the only country in the world that is openly threatening the United States with nuclear warfare is not being taken seriously.

While there is a reasonable consensus within the Obama administration to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Six-Party Talks, there is also currently no political incentive within Washington to make any concessions towards Pyongyang. At this critical juncture in time, nobody is going anywhere.

The United States and its allies in East Asia are rightfully demanding “meaningful actions towards denuclearization” before entering into any negotiations. The North Koreans meanwhile are only offering negotiations without preconditions. The conundrum the international community is about to face in the weeks and months ahead, is to find a diplomatic solution when the political fronts are geared towards conflict.

(Continued at the link below)

http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/329133-the-north-korea-threat-

The problem is that China feels that the current north Korean charm offensive is sufficient to warrant re-starting the nuclear talks (see the article that says that the Chinese military told Jim Miller that see the north Korean are changing).  But we need more time and more evidence to judge if the charm offensive is for real or not just part of the normal cycle of provocations.  And of course for it to be real would require the commitment up front, to include action, to eliminate nuclear weapons before we can resume the 6 party talks (and of course we all know that the regime will not and cannot give up the key to regime survival which in its calculus is its nuclear capability).

And as we all know coming back to the 6 party talks will mean legitimatizing the north as a nuclear power as they are going to demand that they be allowed to negotiate as a nuclear power and will want to participate in nuclear arms reduction or strategic arms limitation talks in the same way as the US and USSR did during the Col War.

And lastly, China's recommended course of action for the negotiations is for the US (and the ROK) to make all the concessions to north in the hopes that the regime will commit to denuclearization.  This of course would be very much like the 1994 Agreed Framework and we know how well the north lived up to that agreement.  China-US cooperation from the Chinese perspective is the US giving all the concessions first and in good faith while cooperation from the US perspective is China and the US applying the combination of  the right pressure with the right incentives for the north to not only agree but to actually end its nuclear program.

A provocation is coming.  Yes the world is distracted.  However, as I have mentioned, things may be very different when the next one occurs with President Park now in charge.  I am afraid that the north will be in for a real wake-up call when the ROK military rapidly responds with decisive force at the time and place of the provocation.  It will set the regime back on its heels because it will not have a play in its play book for that.  Yes there will be risk of miscalculation by the arrogant and inexperienced Kim Jong-un but I also think it will cause strategic paralysis because he will not be able to find a play in the play book.  And it must be done because if the ROK does not respond decisively then the cycle of provocations will continue forever.  This could change the calculus on the peninsula if the north's provocation is on a sufficient scale and the ROK's response in defense is of equal scale and rapidly inflicted.  Then perhaps we might see the regime realize that it needs to conduct a real charm offensive in good faith  (I can only hope but I will not ever hold my breath for the north).

Finally, per the last paragraph I think that the ROK is taking the lead and correctly so.  I do not think it needs to go right to the nuclear issue.  But President Park's trustpolitik is having an effect having reached agreements on Kaesong and separated families and eventually tourism (agreements that still have to be backed up with action by the north).  But her policy is more like a charm offensive with strength.  She is extending the olive branch but she has her hand on her sword at her side.  If there is any hope of managing the situation on the peninsula it will be because President Park is in charge and in the lead.  We should support her not because we are distracted but because she is more likely to achieve more than either China or the US in the long run.

V/R

Dave

With the world distracted, trouble is brewing in North Korea

The Korea Herald
Asia News Network September 14, 2013 1:00 am

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/With-the-world-distracted-trouble-is-brewing-in-No-30214798.html

US President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping heightened hopes for resolving North Korea's nuclear problem when they pledged to work together to denuclearise the recalcitrant regime during their summit in June.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye's meetings with the leaders of the two superpowers, which preceded and followed the Obama-Xi talks within a month, seemed to have helped consolidate the momentum toward the resolution of the issue that has threatened security on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia for decades.

As cautioned by some experts, however, the road to North Korea's denuclearisation remains bumpy. With the North having taken no significant steps to demonstrate its sincerity, Washington and Beijing are divided over whether to resume the six-party talks aimed at dismantling Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal. The dialogue has been stalled since 2008. 

China has said the multilateral discussion that also involves the two Koreas, Japan and Russia still remains an important platform to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear programmes and settle other relevant security issues. The US has followed South Korea's stance that it is meaningless to reopen the long-stalled talks unless North Korea shows a clear willingness to abandon its nuclear arms through concrete actions.

Seoul and Washington apparently want Beijing to put further pressure on Pyongyang to withdraw its demand for recognition as a nuclear power and return to credible and authentic negotiations aimed at its denuclearisation. While having managed to push North Korea towards resumption of the talks, China seems to have had difficulty getting its intractable neighbour to change its stance on denuclearisation. Recent satellite images suggested that the North may have begun reactivating its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.

In a recent move aimed at creating a breakthrough, China has proposed holding a gathering of officials and academics from nations involved in the six-party negotiations in Beijing next week. Seoul and Washington have also remained cautious on sending senior government officials to the informal forum.
(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/With-the-world-distracted-trouble-is-brewing-in-No-30214798.html

A Strategy for Dealing with North Korea's Provocations

My article on a strategy for dealing with north Korea provocations can be accessed directly at this link.  Although I wrote this article for presentation at a conference in June 2012 I think it remains relevant.  The table of contents of the entire issue of the Journal is below.

http://www.icks.org/publication/pdf/2013-SPRING-SUMMER/5.pdf

V/R

Dave

International Journal of Korean Studies Spring/Summer 2013

ISSN 1091-2932

International Journal of

KOREAN STUDIES

Volume XVII, Number 1 • Spring/Summer 2013

http://www.icks.org/publication/index.html

Publisher's Pages and Introduction of Contributors
Obama's Asia Pivot and the Koreas Richard Weitz	1
China-North Korea Relations after Kim Jong-Il Hong Nack Kim	21
The Right Steps to ROK Defense Reform: How to Overcome Constraints Bruce Klingner	50
A Strategy for Dealing with North Korea's Provocations David S. Maxwell	69
The Impact of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement On Both Economies Yoon-shik Park	95
The Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea: Ten Years after Pyongyang's Admission Celeste Arrington	108
The Failure of the Bush Administration’s North Korea Policy: A Critical Analysis James I. Matray	140
The International Journal of Korean Studies is copyrighted under U.S. law. © 2013 International Council on Korean Studies

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON KOREAN STUDIES
COUNCIL ON KOREA-U.S. SECURITY STUDIES

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TRUSTPOLITIK VS. DISTRUSTPOLITIK: DOWN AND OUT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

An important essay by one of our very best analysts and scholars on north Korea (and a mentor of mine) from the new blog "War on the Rocks."  This is probably one of the most succinct and understandable explanations of the nature of the Kim Family Regime.

V/R
Dave

TRUSTPOLITIK VS. DISTRUSTPOLITIK: DOWN AND OUT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

July 23, 2013 · by Robert Collins · in Commentary and Analysis

http://warontherocks.com/2013/07/trustpolitik-vs-distrustpolitik-down-and-out-on-the-korean-peninsula/

After decades of tensions and stalemate, Trustpolitik, a  fresh approach by South Korean President Park Geun-hye towards North Korea, indicates why it is so difficult to build anything resembling a stable relationship between these troubled neighbors. Through Trustpolitik, Park has sought to avoid the excesses and naïveté of Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” – which aimed to induce the Kim family’s Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the table through almost unconditional economic cooperation and aid.

But even President Park’s approach imagines too much sunshine in North Korea.  The distrust between North and South Korea, rooted in their antithetical political systems, cannot be erased.  This distrust has produced one war that has resulted in the death of millions, mostly Koreans, but also troops from the People’s Republic of China, the United States and member nations of the United Nations Command.  It has also produced an armistice that has served as the setting for a 60-year military standoff for, countless provocations, North Korea’s development into a de facto nuclear state, and countless failed attempts at reconciliation.

North Korea remains a family cult-centered dictatorship with the world’s fourth largest military, a poorly-fed populace isolated from the rest of the world, a failed economy, and the ignominious title of the world’s 23rd most failed state, The Republic of Korea in the South, has become an ultra-modern, full-fledged democracy with the world’s 15th largest economyand the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) ranking as the world’s 6th most-wired country.

In the 41 years since the first inter-Korean talks of July 4, 1972, there have been 606 meetings between the North and the South.  These meetings have produced small results and great disappointments.  The July 4th 1972 Joint Declaration, supported by the leadership of the North’s Kim Il-sung and the South’s Pak Chong-hui, was significant in that it was the first official negotiations between the North and South. . In 1991, the North and South held several meetings to produce the “Basic Agreement,” signed in 1992, but never implemented the agreement due to the North’s pursuit of nuclear technology. The agreement would have established a security “holding pattern” while the North figured out how to deal with its security and economic problems in the context of the fall of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most significant development of these meetings was more meetings: two summits between the North’s Kim Jong-il  and two South Korean heads-of-state –  Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. The first summit, in 2000, produced the June 15 Declaration that stated the two Koreas’ determination to solve Korean reunification without outside interference.

(Continued at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2013/07/trustpolitik-vs-distrustpolitik-down-and-out-on-the-korean-peninsula/

Explaining North Korea’s irrationality

I am one (among many) who does not believe that the Kim Family Regime is acting irrationally (see article at this link: http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201201.maxwell.nkorea.html).  Dr. Bruce Bechtol's new book, The Last Days of Kim Jong-il also argues with convincing analysis that through the February 2013 nuclear test, Kim Jong-un is actually executing the script or playbook that Kim Jong-il put in place before he died.  I agree with the author that from our perspective the north appears to be acting irrationally but that it is wrong to explain the north's actions in terms of irrationality. 

V/R

Dave

Explaining North Korea’s irrationality

June 29th, 2013

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/06/29/explaining-north-koreas-irrationality/

Author: Ulv Hanssen, Swedish Institute of International Affairs

The recent North Korean bluster following the latest UN sanctions against Pyongyang ranged from the bizarre to the scary.

Perhaps more significantly it again spurred questions about the capability of rational policymaking in the isolated country. After the dust settled, the only significant outcome was the shutdown of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Not only did this convey a strong symbolic message by deconstructing the last remnant of ‘Sunshine Policy’ era, it shut off North Korea’s best legal source of foreign currency. In the month following the Kaesong shutdown inter-Korean trade was down by 88 per cent, plummeting to pre-Sunshine Policy levels. This unquestionably hurts Pyongyang much more than Seoul, and North Korea watchers were at pains to explain this seemingly irrational decision.

Another ‘irrational’ decision came after the so-called ‘leap day agreement’ on 29 February 2012 between the US and North Korea. In return for a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests, North Korea was set to receive 240,000 metric tons of food aid. For a country in which nearly a third of children under five show signs of stunting due to malnutrition, such a trade-off would seem like a no-brainer. But less than two months later North Korea conducted a highly publicised rocket launch which blew up in spectacular fashion — much like the leap day deal which was subsequently scrapped. This was an outcome North Korean leaders probably did anticipate, but the launch was still carried through. Irrationality has in foreign policy studies been defined as ‘a decision’s incompatibility with policy goals, prevailing consensus, or preferred outcomes’. If North Korea is seen as an undiversified unit with a uniform intention, as tends to be the case, one is often left with few other alternatives than to explain North Korean decision-making as irrational.

The notion of North Korea as an irrational actor is not a new phenomenon. Ever since the Korean War (1950–53), when the North attacked the South and gambled on US non-intervention, North Korean history has been fraught with examples of apparently irrational actions. These contradictions have sometimes been explained as a North Korean adoption of Richard Nixon’s ‘madman theory’ — in other words, North Korea deliberately portrays itself as irrational to asymmetrically intimidate stronger players. This may sometimes be true, but this view shares a common flaw with most interpretations of North Korean behaviour: it treats North Korea as a monolithic unit and disregards internal power struggles.

After Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994 his son, Kim Jong-il, reshuffled the pecking order of the country’s most powerful institutions: the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the Workers’ Party of Korea and the Cabinet. The songun (military first) policy enhanced the Army’s political power at the expense of the Party. As a result, power politics in North Korea became more prone to institutional jousting and the potential for contradictory policies increased. One analyst has characterised North Korea as an ‘institutional pluralist’ state since Kim Il-sung’s death. However, contradictory foreign-policy goals and actions stemming from conflicting institutional interests seem to have existed even before 1994. For example, one of the most promising periods of North–South conciliatory diplomacy coincided with the 1983 Rangoon bombing in which the North Korean military killed four South Korean cabinet ministers and 13 senior officials on Burmese soil.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/06/29/explaining-north-koreas-irrationality/

The Mirage of Peace in the DMZ A trip to the Korean border makes regime change in Pyongyang seem like the only effective option.

A few key points:

Mr. Kerry's lack of imagination bodes well for Pyongyang's goal of perfecting its nuclear and missile capabilities, and bodes ill for the security of northeast Asia. There can no longer be any realistic hope that the North will denuclearize. 

Moreover, China has refused to isolate the regime despite Washington's repeated pleas for joint action. Yes, some Americans with close ties to China now say that they've never seen Beijing so frustrated with Pyongyang. But there is no indication that new leader Xi Jinping is considering serious sanctions against the North or independent economic and political pressure. 

Committed to a failed negotiation strategy, the U.S. government has all but assured the Kim regime of its safety so long as it doesn't attack the South or Japan. That means negotiations are doomed from the beginning. 

The Obama administration's willingness to return to talks under the "right" conditions plays perfectly into this North Korean strategy of undermining collective resolve. The longer Washington sticks to a failed policy, the more confident Pyongyang grows in its survival. It will figure out a way to proliferate WMDs, likely with Beijing looking the other way.

But in this sentence lies a potential key:

The longer Washington sticks to a failed policy, the more confident Pyongyang grows in its survival.

If one wanted to truly undermine the regime and play three dimensional chess a combination of the status quo negotiating strategy with Pyongyang confident in its survival with a comprehensive psychological operations/ influence campaign targeting the second tier leadership and the population and global intelligence and law enforcement operations against Department 39 could simultaneously cause dissent and discord internally,  prepare for a post-regime Korea , prevent proliferation of WMD (before and after collapse) and set the peninsula on a path to unification.   The supposed "failed strategy" is one key element to this because as long as the regime is confident of its survival it remains one of the best ways to prevent a deliberate attack (but not a provocation) by the north.  But the question is can we and the Alliance operate on multiple levels orchestrating the instruments of national power to achieve the ultimate end state per the 2009 Joint Vision?

V/R
Dave

• OPINION ASIA
• May 1, 2013, 12:26 p.m. ET

The Mirage of Peace in the DMZ

A trip to the Korean border makes regime change in Pyongyang seem like the only effective option.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324266904578456570076166246.html#printMode

By MICHAEL AUSLIN

To understand how North Korea policy has become a diplomatic no-man's land—empty, hopeless and likely to stay that way, if recent pronouncements by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry are any indication—it helps to visit the physical no-man's land of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

The DMZ is not entirely devoid of life, of course, at least on its margins. Approaching from Seoul, only 50 kilometers from the armistice line, a single barbed-wire fence gives way to thicket of guard towers and other fortifications. Busloads of tourists give the scene a surreal commercial streak, while apartment blocks lend a domestic touch here and there.

At heart, however, the DMZ remains a place of limbo, frozen in time by the armistice of 1953. The four kilometers on either side of the border are crisscrossed only by small animals, and the absence of any human activity creates a false sense of calm.

That stillness reflects the diplomatic stasis of the defunct Six-Party Talks, and the inability of Washington to devise a new approach that could change North Korea's behavior. If anything, by focusing on denuclearization and encouraging greater Chinese pressure on Pyongyang—two strategies that have never worked—Mr. Kerry seems to have adopted an approach expressly designed to maintain the status quo.

Above all, Mr. Kerry seeks a return to fruitless disarmament talks. In his first trip to Tokyo last month, he told reporters, "Our choice is to negotiate, our choice is to move to the table and find a way for the region to have peace." He reiterated such sentiments throughout his Asia trip.

Mr. Kerry's lack of imagination bodes well for Pyongyang's goal of perfecting its nuclear and missile capabilities, and bodes ill for the security of northeast Asia. There can no longer be any realistic hope that the North will denuclearize.

South Korean soldiers patrol along a military fence near the DMZ.

Looking across the DMZ border from a high vantage point, one sees the desolate North Korean landscape and brutish buildings lying just outside the now-shuttered Kaesong Industrial Complex. The bleakness is a reminder that the Kim regime's strength is solely military, and that the nuclear trump card is the regime's lifeline.

Moreover, China has refused to isolate the regime despite Washington's repeated pleas for joint action. Yes, some Americans with close ties to China now say that they've never seen Beijing so frustrated with Pyongyang. But there is no indication that new leader Xi Jinping is considering serious sanctions against the North or independent economic and political pressure.

Instead, China seems to be betting that Washington's future of defense cuts will lead to a reduced American presence in Asia. President Obama's repeated invocation of the U.S.'s so-called strategic "pivot" to Asia may worry Beijing over the short term, but the Chinese believe the budgetary fundamentals are in their favor. And so they see no incentive to deal with the Americans over North Korea.

All of this leads to the question of what to do. Perhaps unexpectedly, a trip to the DMZ makes regime change in the North seem like the only thing that will alter Korea's destiny. Figuring out strategies to get rid of, or at least seriously undermine, the Kim family regime is something both the Bush and Obama administrations have studiously avoided talking about.

Committed to a failed negotiation strategy, the U.S. government has all but assured the Kim regime of its safety so long as it doesn't attack the South or Japan. That means negotiations are doomed from the beginning.

(Continued at the link below)

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324266904578456570076166246.html#printMode

How to avoid war in Korea

With all due respect to our Russian friend Mr. Vorontsov,  the ROK/US Alliance actions are actually what is preventing war.  The most important action to deter war is the presentation of a force that is capable of defending the ROK and destroying the nKPA.  The regime will not deliberate decide to attack into the strength of the ROK/US military alliance.  Mr Vorontsov is another in a long line of north Korean apologists who refuse to recognize that the tensions on the Korean Peninsula are the making solely of the Kim Family Regime.  Although paradoxical perhaps, the ROK/US Alliance is exercising "maximum restraint" by demonstrating strength and resolve and providing no gap or seam for the regime to exploit.  Most importantly is the signal to the north that if it conducts any hostile action against the ROK it will be met with an immediate decisive response (at the time and place of provocation) from the ROK military and supported by the US.

V/R
Dave

How to avoid war in Korea

April 16th, 2013

Author: Alexander Vorontsov, Russian Academy of Sciences

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/16/how-to-avoid-war-in-korea/

Since the beginning of 2013 reports from the Korean Peninsula have been disturbing and contradictory.

On the one hand, tensions continue to escalate as Pyongyang threatens to raze Seoul to the ground. This is the most severe situation since the 1968 Korean crisis, when the DPRK captured the US Navy spy ship Pueblo. Pyongyang’s suggestion that foreign diplomats be evacuated from North Korea in consideration of their safety, made on 5 April, is unprecedented.

On the other hand, on 31 March the Workers’ Party of Korea adopted a policy of economic development, to run in parallel with further build-up of the country’s nuclear forces, and the Supreme People’s Assembly re-appointed former prime minister Pak Pong-ju to head the cabinet. Pak is known as a supporter of economic reforms.

These developments suggest that, rather than unleashing an all-out war, Pyongyang is in fact keen to develop its economy. Of no less importance is the fact that, for the time being, people in both Koreas continue to live their normal daily lives.

Analysis of the current Korean escalation must focus on two major recent events: North Korea’s announcement on 8 March that it was invalidating the 1953 armistice and all associated agreements with South Korea, and its announcement that it had cut military hotlines with Seoul and Washington.

But the international media have been concentrating on Pyongyang’s increasingly belligerent statements — that an order had already been issued to deliver nuclear strikes against US military bases in different regions of the world, that North Korea is now at war with South Korea, and so on. While these statements are sensational, if we discard emotions and properly scrutinise what North Korea is saying there is less call for alarm.

First, just as was the case with similar statements made by Pyongyang in the past, the fresh threats clearly state that any military action would be entirely reciprocal, only to be resorted to if the country was subjected to outside aggression. These public statements should be seen as a strong warning to North Korea’s opponents not to cross the ‘final line’. But North Korea is most likely harbouring no plans for a pre-emptive strike on its potential adversaries.

Second, it is not just the North that is pushing the two Koreas close to the brink of open warfare. The role of all the parties involved and their contribution to the present standoff needs to be assessed. The United States and South Korea are adding fuel to the fire with just as much enthusiasm as the North. In fact, although so far North Korea has limited itself to rhetoric (admittedly it is fairly belligerent), its opponents have taken actual steps toward real conflict. Washington’s decision to deploy interceptors in Alaska as a measure against a possible North Korean missile attack is one such step. Another is the use of nuclear-capable B-52 strategic bombers (for the first time in many years) and a B-2 stealth bomber close to North Korea’s border in the ongoing joint US–South Korean exercises Key Resolve and Foal Eagle.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/16/how-to-avoid-war-in-korea/

North Korea Orders Artillery to Be Combat Ready, Targeting U.S. Bases

I think it is worth recalling Dr. Bruce Bechtol's assessment of the north's standard provocation pattern that I have previously shared:

1. Intentionally initiated when they are most likely to attract most attention on the regional and international stage
2. They initially appear to be relatively small, easily contained, and quickly “resolved” incidents
3. They involve ever changing tactics and techniques
4. North Korea ensures plausible deniability, and denies responsibility for the incident

I would slightly add to the fourth point:  The north will also act when it can pin blame on the ROK or US as in the Y-P Do artillery firing when it blamed the ROK's provocative actions (its artillery exercise on the island firing toward the South) and then claimed it shelled the island in "self defense."

The other condition the north usually needs is surprise. In some ways we might be somewhat reassured by the rhetoric we are hearing because they are (usually) less likely to conduct an attack when they cannot achieve surprise or if they are attacking against a ready force and I would submit the ROK military is at a very high state of readiness.  

However, I do very much worry about Kim Jong-un's inexperience and potential hubris based on the idea that his western education and experience gives him superior insights into how the US in particular might react.  Combine this will poor military advice from Generals who will be basing their assessments not only on what they think Kim Jong-un wants to hear but on their assessment of ROK/US Alliance actions over the past 6 decades (and I think that both the ROK and US are not going to react in accordance with historical patterns) and we do have the potential for miscalculation by the Kim and his regime.

V/R

Dave

March 26, 2013

North Korea Orders Artillery to Be Combat Ready, Targeting U.S. Bases

By REUTERS

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2013/03/26/world/asia/26reuters-korea-north-combat.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print

SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea said on Tuesday its strategic rocket and long-range artillery units have been ordered to be combat ready, targeting U.S. military bases on Guam, Hawaii and mainland America after U.S. bombers flew sorties threatening the North.

The order, issued in a statement from the North's military "supreme command", marks the latest fiery rhetoric from Pyongyang since the start of joint military drills by U.S. and South Korean forces early this month.

South Korea's defense ministry said it saw no sign of imminent military action by North Korea.

"From this moment, the Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army will be putting into combat duty posture No. 1 all field artillery units, including long-range artillery units and strategic rocket units, that will target all enemy objects in U.S. invasionary bases on its mainland, Hawaii and Guam," the North's KCNA news agency said.

The North previously threatened nuclear attack on the United States and South Korea, although it is not believed to have the capability to hit the continental United States with an atomic weapon. But the U.S. military's bases in the Pacific area are in range of its medium-range missiles.

South Korea's defense ministry said it had detected no signs of unusual activity by the North's military but will monitor the situation. The South and the U.S. military are conducting drills until the end of April, which they have stressed are strictly defensive in nature.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2013/03/26/world/asia/26reuters-korea-north-combat.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print

S. Korea, U.S. sign combined operational plan against N. Korea

Very good news here. Although it may be counterintuitive to some this actually supports President Park's "trustpolitik."  Everything that President Park does in regards to north Korea must rest on the foundation of ROK/US Military Alliance.  The north has to know that there is no daylight in the Alliance and that its strategy to split the Alliance has not and will not work.  This is a first step toward attacking the north's strategy to split the Alliance.  Every time the north ratchets up tension or conducts a provocation must be have a response that shows the strength of the Alliance is only enhanced by the north's action.  Not everything requires a direct military response (though I am happy to see the ROK  military response described in the excerpt below) but careful thought must be given in each case to show the strength of the Alliance and that the north's strategy is failing.  Only then can President Park's "trustpolitik" policy have a chance of working.  Every action the ROK takes must be from a position of "rock solid" strength and that strength is derived from the ROK/US Alliance.

    Gen. Jung said the North's military threats are for real. 

   "We are ready to sternly retaliate North Korea's provocations as this plan was completed," he said. "This plan allows South Korean and U.S. forces to respond more strongly than when they had separate plans." 

    According to the new plan, South Korea's military is set to play a more active role in taking any counteractions against "the origin of North Korean provocation and surrounding forces in the first stage."

This last sentence is key because when the north conducts a military provocation that is a direct attack on the South such as what happened at Y-P Do in 2010, the ROK military must "win" the tactical engagement and that means a rapid response at the point of provocation – time and place.

   "The South Korean military's operational plan now calls for striking the origin of the enemy's provocation and supporting and command forces," a senior South Korean defense ministry official said. "Depending on the type of provocations and operational circumstance, the U.S. with its weapons can strike North Korean territories."

V/R

Dave

S. Korea, U.S. sign combined operational plan against N. Korea

2013-03-24 12:00

Normal FontLarge Font

http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?cid=AEN20130322011000315&domain=3&ctype=A&site=0100000000   

The militaries of South Korea and the United States said Sunday they have worked out a new joint operational plan that details how they should cooperate to deal with North Korean provocations.

   The Combined Counter-Provocation Plan, signed between South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Gen. Jung Seung-jo and Gen. James Thurman, the commander of the U.S. Forces in South Korea, went into effect immediately.

   "By completing this plan, we improved our combined readiness posture to allow us to immediately and decisively respond to any North Korean provocation," the Combined Forces Command (CFC) of the two allies said in a statement. "The completed plan includes procedures for consultation and action to allow for a strong and decisive combined Republic of Korea-U.S. response to North Korean provocations and threats."

    The allies have been working on the plan since 2010 when North Korea torpedoed the South Korean warship Cheonan and bombarded the South's border island of Yeonpyeong in the Yellow Sea. A total of 50 South Koreans, 48 of them soldiers, were killed.

   The need to strengthen military cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. has gained new urgency amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula following a series of North Korean military provocations.

   North Korea has recently been ratcheting up war rhetoric almost daily in response to new U.N. sanctions for its third nuclear test in February and recent joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises which it denounced as invasion preparations.

    Gen. Jung said the North's military threats are for real.

   "We are ready to sternly retaliate North Korea's provocations as this plan was completed," he said. "This plan allows South Korean and U.S. forces to respond more strongly than when they had separate plans."

N. Korean leader guides artillery exercise against S. Korean islands

Received a message that says some twitter chatter assesses that this is going to mean a strike on the Northwest Islands.

If they do fire there the ROK is going to have a massive response.

Two things: One is that we have seen Kim Jong-un visiting there and taking lots of photos with women and children.  Perhaps they are going to try to provoke the ROKs into a decisive response and then go for the propaganda win by saying that the ROKs killed all these women and children.  We will see photos of dead women and children and of course the claim will be that they were the ones that Kim Jong-un had just visited.

However a second COA is that they will not conduct an action in the Northwest Islands at all. This is merely deception to keep all the focus there when in fact they plan to conduct a provocation somewhere else and may be of a type no one is expecting.  That of course will make the ROK look bad because they cannot defend against the north as it has to ability to conduct strike or operations at the time and place of its choosing and the ROK cannot defend everywhere.  

So in either case they will attempt to discredit the ROK.  

But the question is what is their and game for this round?  I think they are trying to "sell us" an April nuclear test and try to drive us to be extorted so that we provide the political and economic concessions in return for them not conducting a nuclear test.  They think they are providing a "win-win" so that we win by them not conducting another nuclear test and of course they get what they want (and of course they have no need to conduct another nuclear test so soon after their last one so they can "sell" a unnecessary test to us).

But I think the regime is miscalculating the US response.  I do not think this Administration is going to allow itself to be blackmailed so soon after missile and nuclear tests.  As much as some do not want another test, I do not think there is anyone in the Administration who thinks they could handle the political fallout if they give in to the north.

On the other hand I had thought they were miscalculating the ROK response but perhaps they do expect it now and they are planning accordingly.

Interesting times.

V/R

Dave

2013/03/14 09:42 KST

N. Korean leader guides artillery exercise against S. Korean islands

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/03/14/43/0401000000AEN20130314001100315F.HTML

SEOUL, March 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un guided artillery exercises that targeted South Korean islands in the Yellow Sea, the communist country's media reported Thursday.

   The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) report monitored in Seoul said Kim oversaw live ammunition drills to test the capabilities of artillery batteries under real battle conditions. It said that exercises were aimed at the islands of Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong that lie just south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) that acts as the de facto sea border between the two Koreas. The North does not recognize the NLL and has tried to impose its own demarcation line that has been rejected by Seoul.

Kim's actions come as Pyongyang put its armed forces on high alert in response to the joint South Korea-U.S. Foal Eagle and Key Resolve military exercises that began in earnest on Monday. It also follows the isolationist country's moves to ratchet up tensions on the Korean Peninsula by unilaterally nullifying the Armistice Agreement that halted the Korean War (1950-53) and claiming all nonaggression pacts between the two countries were null and void. The North on several occasions has threatened to turn Seoul and Washington into a "sea of fire" and boasted it has significant nuclear weapons capability to deal with outside aggressors.

   The North's official news wire service, meanwhile, did not give the exact date of the exercise or the units involved, but it likely took place on Wednesday, and involved batteries capable of targeting Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong. It said the North Korean leader, who holds the rank of marshal in the Korean People's Army, was pleased with the level of accuracy of the artillery units.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/03/14/43/0401000000AEN20130314001100315F.HTML