Eight Points of Irregular Warfare:
Special Warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.
–If there is an indigenous solution or an indigenous contribution to the solution for a complex political military problem conduct special warfare – the essence of which is “through, with, and by” as developed by Mark Boyatt
1. Instead
of an end state must determine the acceptable, durable, political
arrangement that can be achieved. (per LTG James Dubik) Without this
clearly articulated and understood there is no way to achieve unity of effort
or to judge mission success. I think Congress must demand this from
the Administration.
2. Eliot Cohen & John Gooch: Military
Misfortune: All military failures are a result of a failure to
learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate. We must learn to anticipate and that is done through thorough and ongoing
assessments and heeding the expert practitioners on the ground. Look at
Mali and Yemen. Did we anticipate the Turegs and the
Houthis? I would submit that SOF on the ground reported on the
growing threats to Mali and Yemen yet our myopic focus on CT blinded us at the
strategic level.
3. Larry Cable (the discredited COIN theorist who
wrote Conflict of Myths) The three P’s: Presence, Patience,
Persistence. You have to be present to make a
difference. You have to be patient because it takes a long time to
influence indigenous forces and develop indigenous capabilities. You must
have cultural respect without going native and you must have an aptitude and
desire for living and working in a foreign culture. It takes persistence
because mistakes will be made, every operation will include discovery learning
and we will have to learn and adapt.
4. Assessment - must conduct continuous
assessment to gain understanding - tactical, operational, and strategic.
Assessments are key to developing strategy and campaign
plans and anticipating potential conflict. Assessments allow you to
challenge assumptions and determine if a rebalance of ways and means with the acceptable,
durable, political arrangement is
required. Understand
the indigenous way of war and adapt to it. Do not force the US
way of war upon indigenous forces if it is counter to their history, customs,
traditions, and abilities.
5. Ensure US and indigenous interests
are sufficiently aligned. If indigenous and US
interests are not sufficiently aligned the mission will fail. If the
US has stronger interest than the indigenous force we can create an “assistance
paradox” - if indigenous forces believe the US mission is "no fail” and the US forces will not allow them to fail and therefore they do not need to try
too hard. They may very well benefit from long term US aid and
support which may be their objective for accepting support in the first place.
6. Employ the right forces for the
right mission. US SOF, conventional, civilian agency, indigenous
forces. Always based on assessment and thorough understanding of the
problem and available resources and capabilities. Cannot over rely
on one force to do everything.
7. Learn how to operate without being in
charge. If we usurp the mission indigenous forces will
never be successful on their own. You cannot pay lip service to
advising and assisting. This is why operations in Colombia and the
Philippines achieve some level of success.
This is not “leading from
behind.” This is the appropriate understanding of the relationship
between USSF/SOF and indigenous forces in a sovereign nation or indigenous
forces seeking self-determination of government.
8. Campaigning - We
have to develop the campaign plan based on Design thinking to determine the
resources and authorities - and then execute the campaign - we have to get good
at campaigning and it has to be more than a military campaign. (USSOCOM Design:
Appreciate the context, understand the problem, and develop an approach). While
disrupting terrorist attacks and attacking terrorist networks and their
finances and auxiliaries are important they are not a strategy. They can be
part of a strategy and campaign but they are not sufficient. We have
to campaign beyond counter-terrorism with a campaign focused on attacking the
enemy’s strategy. This requires deep understanding to include
especially understanding the enemy’s political objectives. Once we
understand the enemy, ways and means can be employed to counter the enemy’s
strategy and his political objectives. Campaigning is important
because it will orchestrate all the activities to achieve the strategic
objectives or the acceptable, durable political arrangement we
seek. Campaigns identify the resources necessary (forces, bases,
funding). Campaigns identify the authorities necessary. Although
many in the military and government desire blanket authorities that is not the
right way to operate. However, establishing programs and funding lines
such as 1206, 1207, 1208, and 1209 and now 127E are not effective either.
Authorities need to be specifically applied to each campaign. And with an
approved campaign plan Congress can more effectively provide oversight rather
than managing funding programs. Campaigns must also account for transitions (and demobilization in UW) when working with indigenous forces because we cannot advise and assist and provide support indefinitely. Focusing on effective campaigning can
discipline the application of the military instrument of power. Of course
it would useful for other elements of national power to be able to “campaign”
as well. We perhaps need to take another look at the 1997 PDD 56 which
was for the management of complex contingency operations in the interagency – a
disciplined process to orchestrate US government agencies and harmonize the
instruments of power.
· A Principle of Special Warfare: "Go early, go small, go local, go long” LTG(R) Charles T. Cleveland remarks at NDU November 30, 2015
· Understanding indigenous forces: ”Potential allies always start as at least unproven. It is hard work that starts with assessments and making the best of who you have, seeking to improve your position (and your partners’) over time.” LTG (R) Charles T. Cleveland, email January 18, 2016 (Note: This can apply to resistance in nK)
· Frank Hoffman's Principle of Understanding. I am a supporter of Dr. Frank Hoffman’s idea that we need a new principle of war called understanding. Although that seems like a no-brainer – as far back as Sun Tzu we have been told that we must know our enemies and know ourselves to be victorious. We all know we need to understand war and warfare, the conditions that give rise to conflict, and the politics that lead to and end conflict. Yet even though the need for understanding is so obvious that we think we do not need to even mention it, it is surprising how so many of our failures can be traced to our lack of understanding. SOF, through its various assessment capabilities and engagement with indigenous populations can make a key contribution to understanding.
