The need for old-fashioned spying on the Islamic State

The conclusion highlighted below is probably one of the most important statements about intelligence in the 21st century.

Excerpts:

A vivid example of the knowledge gap came in an interview with Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that was broadcast this week by PBS’s “Frontline.” Correspondent Martin Smith asked him whether the United States had plans for the loss of Mosul last June.

“Well, no, there were not,” Dempsey answered. “There were several things that surprised us about [the Islamic State], the degree to which they were able to form their own coalition both inside of Syria and inside of northwestern Iraq, the military capability they exhibited, the collapse of the Iraqi security forces. Yeah, in those initial days, there were a few surprises.”

...

Lessons learned? It doesn’t seem so: Nearly a year later, the United States was blindsided again by the collapse of Ramadi. What’s wrong?

The first answer is that the CIA must work with partners to build spy networks inside the Islamic State. Recruiting jihadists is not “Mission: Impossible.” The Islamic State is toxic and has made enemies wherever it operates. But to work this terrain, the agency will have to alter its practices — taking more operational risks and reducing its lopsided emphasis on drone strikes and other covert tools.

...

Let’s be honest about what it would mean to fix the problems Morell describes. CIA officers would have to get out of protected enclaves to spot and recruit the principal agents who, in turn, could find sources within the jihadist lair. Staying “inside the wire” isn’t just ineffective, it’s dangerous, as became tragically clear in 2009 when a Jordanian double agent entered the CIA sanctuary in Khost, Afghanistan, and killed seven Americans.

​Conclusion:

For decades, the CIA and the military have tried to fix intelligence problems by relying on National Security Agency surveillance. But the jihadists have gone to school on the leaks about U.S. capabilities and learned to mask their operations. Gathering intelligence against this 21st-century jihadist adversary, paradoxically, will require the kind of old-fashioned spying and resistance operations we associate with the CIA’s founding generation in the OSS.

​

​Just as a reminder everyone should ready George Kennan's 1948 policy planning memo​ at this link: 

http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm

​Ignatius is advocating a return to political warfar

e and 21st century unconventional warfare.  Kennan was prescient.

The need for old-fashioned 

spying on the Islamic State

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-need-for-old-fashioned-spying-on-the

islamic-state/2015/05/28/22db7660-0567-11e5-a428-c984eb077d4e_story.html

By David Ignatius Opinion writer May 28 at 7:54 PM 

The unexpected fall of Ramadi to the Islamic State this month is the latest sign of a basic intelligence problem: The United States doesn’t know enough about its jihadist adversaries to combat them effectively.

This intelligence deficit afflicts the military, the CIA and other agencies. The problem has been several decades in the making, and it won’t be fixed easily. The solutions — recruiting more spies and embedding Special Operations forces — will bring greater risks.

David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column and contributes to the PostPartisan blog. View Archive

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A vivid example of the knowledge gap came in an interview with Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that was broadcast this week by PBS’s “Frontline.” Correspondent Martin Smith asked him whether the United States had plans for the loss of Mosul last June.

“Well, no, there were not,” Dempsey answered. “There were several things that surprised us about [the Islamic State], the degree to which they were able to form their own coalition both inside of Syria and inside of northwestern Iraq, the military capability they exhibited, the collapse of the Iraqi security forces. Yeah, in those initial days, there were a few surprises.”

Lessons learned? It doesn’t seem so: Nearly a year later, the United States was blindsided again by the collapse of Ramadi. What’s wrong?

The first answer is that the CIA must work with partners to build spy networks inside the Islamic State. Recruiting jihadists is not “Mission: Impossible.” The Islamic State is toxic and has made enemies wherever it operates. But to work this terrain, the agency will have to alter its practices — taking more operational risks and reducing its lopsided emphasis on drone strikes and other covert tools.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-need-for-old-fashioned-spying-on-the-islamic-state/2015/05/28/22db7660-0567-11e5-a428-c984eb077d4e_story.html