The ‘new’ type of war that finally has the Pentagon’s attention

Note Congressman Thornberry's comments.  Below is the verbiage in the mark-up of the NDAA. (note use of unconventional and counter unconventional warfare).  We have to be able to operate in the "gray zone" between peace and war.  As Frank Hoffman says we cannot think of things in terms of black and white.  Are we going to learn from George Kennan when he wrote in 1948? "Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition,

political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national
objectives.

​"​ 

http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm

The bottom line is:

1.  Are we going to get comfortable operating in the space between peace and war that is described by hybrid, political and unconventional warfare?

2.  Are we willing to do strategy in that space to achieve our policy objectives?

3.  Are we willing to inform the national leadership that we have the will and capability to operate in that space between peace and war and conduct our own forms of hybrid, political and unconventional warfare?

I suggest a read of the USASOC SOF Support to Political Warfare White Paper: http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/03/sof-support-to-political-warfare-white.html

This kind of warfare transcends traditional notions of one military confronting another by incorporating both conventional and unconventional forces, information warfare such as propaganda, as well as economic measures to undermine an enemy, according to Frank Hoffman, a professor at the National Defense University.“The critique was, and still is, that America’s view of war is overly simplified,” he said. “We think of things in black-and-white terms. The newly fashionable term is a relatively old concept — its essential elements had been part of Russia’s and China’s military doctrines long before the Kremlin sent its so-called “little green men” into Crimea, according to Hoffman.“This is something that we have to do better as the United States to identify and deal with,” said Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Tex.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, in an interview. “This poses a challenge for us, and adversaries know that. They’re looking to run between the seams and confuse and delay us.”In the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, Thornberry has included a provision calling on the Pentagon to develop a strategy to counter hybrid warfare.“Hopefully, this provision in the bill helps Secretary Carter get more of the thinking and the intellectual heft of the department in helping us have a more effective response,” Thornberry said

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20150422/103282/BILLS-114HR1735ih-U1.pdf 

Section 10XX—Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Unconventional Warfare 

 This section would required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors. This section would require the Secretary of Defense to submit the strategy to the congressional defense committees within 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. The committee is concerned about the growing unconventional warfare capabilities and threats being posed most notably and recently by the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The committee notes that unconventional warfare is defined most accurately as those activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area. The committee also notes that most state-sponsors of unconventional warfare, such as Russia and Iran, have doctrinally linked conventional warfare, economic warfare, cyber warfare, information operations, intelligence operations, and other activities seamlessly in an effort to undermine U.S. national security objectives and the objectives of U.S. allies alike. 

The ‘new’ type of war that 

finally has the Pentagon’s 

attention

Special Forces of the Polish army attack a house during NATO military exercises in June. The force is NATO's response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. (Sean Gallup/Getty Images)

By Thomas Gibbons-Neff July 3 at 6:28 PM  

The Pentagon is increasingly concerned about how to combat “hybrid warfare,” the combination of stealth invasion, local proxy forces and international propaganda that Russia used to annex Crimea and destabilize eastern Ukraine, U.S. officials said.

Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Thursday released the 2015 National Military Strategy in which he cited Russia’s actions in Ukraine and said “hybrid conflicts” will persist well into the future.

This kind of warfare transcends traditional notions of one military confronting another by incorporating both conventional and unconventional forces, information warfare such as propaganda, as well as economic measures to undermine an enemy, according to Frank Hoffman, a professor at the National Defense University.

“The critique was, and still is, that America’s view of war is overly simplified,” he said. “We think of things in black-and-white terms.”

The issue animated Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter’s recent trip to Europe.

“How do we confront cyberattacks, propaganda campaigns and hybrid warfare?” Carter asked during a speech in Berlin. “How do we ensure we can deal with more than one challenge at a time?”

The newly fashionable term is a relatively old concept — its essential elements had been part of Russia’s and China’s military doctrines long before the Kremlin sent its so-called “little green men” into Crimea, according to Hoffman.

“This is something that we have to do better as the United States to identify and deal with,” said Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Tex.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, in an interview. “This poses a challenge for us, and adversaries know that. They’re looking to run between the seams and confuse and delay us.”

In the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, Thornberry has included a provision calling on the Pentagon to develop a strategy to counter hybrid warfare.

(Continued at the link below)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-new-type-of-war-that-finally-has-the-pentagons-attention/2015/07/03/b5e3fcda-20be-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61_story.html

The need for old-fashioned spying on the Islamic State

The conclusion highlighted below is probably one of the most important statements about intelligence in the 21st century.

Excerpts:

A vivid example of the knowledge gap came in an interview with Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that was broadcast this week by PBS’s “Frontline.” Correspondent Martin Smith asked him whether the United States had plans for the loss of Mosul last June.

“Well, no, there were not,” Dempsey answered. “There were several things that surprised us about [the Islamic State], the degree to which they were able to form their own coalition both inside of Syria and inside of northwestern Iraq, the military capability they exhibited, the collapse of the Iraqi security forces. Yeah, in those initial days, there were a few surprises.”

...

Lessons learned? It doesn’t seem so: Nearly a year later, the United States was blindsided again by the collapse of Ramadi. What’s wrong?

The first answer is that the CIA must work with partners to build spy networks inside the Islamic State. Recruiting jihadists is not “Mission: Impossible.” The Islamic State is toxic and has made enemies wherever it operates. But to work this terrain, the agency will have to alter its practices — taking more operational risks and reducing its lopsided emphasis on drone strikes and other covert tools.

...

Let’s be honest about what it would mean to fix the problems Morell describes. CIA officers would have to get out of protected enclaves to spot and recruit the principal agents who, in turn, could find sources within the jihadist lair. Staying “inside the wire” isn’t just ineffective, it’s dangerous, as became tragically clear in 2009 when a Jordanian double agent entered the CIA sanctuary in Khost, Afghanistan, and killed seven Americans.

​Conclusion:

For decades, the CIA and the military have tried to fix intelligence problems by relying on National Security Agency surveillance. But the jihadists have gone to school on the leaks about U.S. capabilities and learned to mask their operations. Gathering intelligence against this 21st-century jihadist adversary, paradoxically, will require the kind of old-fashioned spying and resistance operations we associate with the CIA’s founding generation in the OSS.

​

​Just as a reminder everyone should ready George Kennan's 1948 policy planning memo​ at this link: 

http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm

​Ignatius is advocating a return to political warfar

e and 21st century unconventional warfare.  Kennan was prescient.

The need for old-fashioned 

spying on the Islamic State

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-need-for-old-fashioned-spying-on-the

islamic-state/2015/05/28/22db7660-0567-11e5-a428-c984eb077d4e_story.html

By David Ignatius Opinion writer May 28 at 7:54 PM 

The unexpected fall of Ramadi to the Islamic State this month is the latest sign of a basic intelligence problem: The United States doesn’t know enough about its jihadist adversaries to combat them effectively.

This intelligence deficit afflicts the military, the CIA and other agencies. The problem has been several decades in the making, and it won’t be fixed easily. The solutions — recruiting more spies and embedding Special Operations forces — will bring greater risks.

David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column and contributes to the PostPartisan blog. View Archive

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A vivid example of the knowledge gap came in an interview with Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that was broadcast this week by PBS’s “Frontline.” Correspondent Martin Smith asked him whether the United States had plans for the loss of Mosul last June.

“Well, no, there were not,” Dempsey answered. “There were several things that surprised us about [the Islamic State], the degree to which they were able to form their own coalition both inside of Syria and inside of northwestern Iraq, the military capability they exhibited, the collapse of the Iraqi security forces. Yeah, in those initial days, there were a few surprises.”

Lessons learned? It doesn’t seem so: Nearly a year later, the United States was blindsided again by the collapse of Ramadi. What’s wrong?

The first answer is that the CIA must work with partners to build spy networks inside the Islamic State. Recruiting jihadists is not “Mission: Impossible.” The Islamic State is toxic and has made enemies wherever it operates. But to work this terrain, the agency will have to alter its practices — taking more operational risks and reducing its lopsided emphasis on drone strikes and other covert tools.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-need-for-old-fashioned-spying-on-the-islamic-state/2015/05/28/22db7660-0567-11e5-a428-c984eb077d4e_story.html

SACEUR knows that we need to be able to counter political and unconventional warfare.  The Latvians and Poles have described Russia's new generation warfare (Latvia) and Russian information warfare (Poland) the best in their reports this past spring

NATO members, especially the Baltic states that border Russia, must take into account such tactics as allies prepare for future threats, he said. That means steps should be taken to help build the capacity of other arms of government, such as interior ministries and police forces, to counter unconventional attacks, including propaganda campaigns, cyberassaults or homegrown separatist militias.

“What we see in Russia now, in this hybrid approach to war, is to use all the tools they have ... to stir up problems they can then begin to exploit through their military tool,” said Breedlove, NATO’s supreme allied commander.

By building up pre-crisis capabilities to deal with such tactics, nations will be better able to assign responsibility to an aggressor nation, which is key to triggering NATO involvement in a crisis, Breedlove said.

“When you cannot attribute (to an aggressor), this causes problems,” Breedlove said. “But the moment we attribute these actions to an aggressor nation, now this is Article 5. So we need to build the nations’ ability to fight through that first onslaught, attribute to an aggressor nation, and then NATO Article 5 kicks in.”

I hate to beat a dead horse but we should pay attention to our own George Kennan who described this in 1948:

•Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP--the Marshall Plan), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states. 

http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm

SACEUR: Allies must prepare for Russia ‘hybrid war’

On Sept. 4, 2014, Gen. Phil Breedlove (right), Supreme Allied Commander Europe, speaks with Gen. Knud Bartels (left), Chairman of the NATO military Committee, just before the meeting on Afghanistan kicks off at NATO Summit 2014 in the Wales, United Kingdom.
EDOUARD BOCQUET/NATO

By John Vandiver

Stars and Stripes

Published: September 4, 2014

http://www.stripes.com/news/saceur-allies-must-prepare-for-russia-hybrid-war-1.301464

NATO must help allies in the east bolster first-line defenses to counter any aggression from Russia, whose unconventional tactics in Ukraine could pose special challenges if deployed on alliance turf, Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO’s top military commander, said Thursday.

Before the incursion of what Western officials say are regular Russian troops into Ukraine, Moscow stirred unrest in other ways during the early stages of the crisis, Breedlove said during an Atlantic Council event that coincided with the start of NATO’s two-day summit in Wales.

Russia’s utilization of troops without national uniforms — the so-called “little green men” — and perhaps “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare” were part of the first Russian push in Ukraine, Breedlove said.

NATO members, especially the Baltic states that border Russia, must take into account such tactics as allies prepare for future threats, he said. That means steps should be taken to help build the capacity of other arms of government, such as interior ministries and police forces, to counter unconventional attacks, including propaganda campaigns, cyberassaults or homegrown separatist militias.

“What we see in Russia now, in this hybrid approach to war, is to use all the tools they have ... to stir up problems they can then begin to exploit through their military tool,” said Breedlove, NATO’s supreme allied commander.

By building up pre-crisis capabilities to deal with such tactics, nations will be better able to assign responsibility to an aggressor nation, which is key to triggering NATO involvement in a crisis, Breedlove said.

“When you cannot attribute (to an aggressor), this causes problems,” Breedlove said. “But the moment we attribute these actions to an aggressor nation, now this is Article 5. So we need to build the nations’ ability to fight through that first onslaught, attribute to an aggressor nation, and then NATO Article 5 kicks in.”

Article 5 is the NATO principle that an attack on one member requires a collective response from all.

Russia continues to deny it has forces in Ukraine, an assertion Breedlove described as absurd.

“We’re observing Russian forces fighting alongside separatists inside Ukraine,” Breedlove said. “Russian air defense assets are being used to conceal the advance of Russian tactical units throughout eastern Ukraine, and still, still, Moscow is continuing to deny any direct involvement across the border. Despite the casualties and deaths that are mounting of their own soldiers.”

In Wales, NATO is expected to act on plans to establish a more visible presence in eastern Europe with a focus on maintaining a troop presence at a series of bases in the region. NATO also needs a forward-stationed headquarters in the region that is focused on Article 5 preparedness, Breedlove said.

An increased presence, along with a NATO Response Force reshaped to better handle rapid-reaction missions, is needed in answer to Russian aggression in Ukraine, Breedlove said. With an operational presence in the east, NATO will also have the ability to surge forces if needed.

“If we need to, we can rapidly respond with much larger and more capable forces if we see an act of aggression,” Breedlove said.

vandiver.john@stripes.com

George Kennan's 1948 Policy Planning Staff Memorandum - The inauguration of organized political warfare.

I really think a review of this memorandum is useful because I think many of our adversaries have adopted various methods from this document (with their own characteristics of course).  Although this was written as a US centric description; like the current Unconventional Warfare definition in Joint Pub 1-02 it does not have to be US centric and in fact explains and describes what is happening around the world such as in Crimea and Ukraine but also by others  such as the Chinese and their “Three Warfares,”  Iran in Syria and other operations by the Quds force, and even Al Qaeda – using terrorism as part of its UW strategy in an attempt to coerce and disrupt and in some cases overthrow governments.

Although we might shy away from conducting organized political warfare, many other nations and groups do not.  It is best for us to understand it.

http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm

269. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 
Washington, May 4, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council,
NSC 10/2. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An earlier, similar version, April 30,
is ibid., RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1944-47: Lot 64 D 563, Box
11. The Policy Planning Staff minutes for May 3 state: "There was a discussion of the Planning Staff
Memorandum of April 30, 1948 on the inauguration of organized political warfare. This paper was generally
approved and Mr. Kennan will present it tomorrow for discussion at a meeting of NSC consultants." (Ibid., Box
32)

The Problem

The inauguration of organized political warfare.

Analysis

1. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition,
political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national
objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP--the Marshall Plan), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.

2. The creation, success, and survival of the British Empire has been due in part to the British understanding and application of the principles of political warfare. Lenin so synthesized the teachings of Marx and Clausewitz that the Kremlin's conduct of political warfare has become the most refined and effective of any in history. We have been handicapped however by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of sporting context outside of all political context, by a national tendency to seek for a political cure-all, and by a reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations--the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.

3. This Government has, of course, in part consciously and in part unconsciously, been conducting political
warfare. Aggressive Soviet political warfare has driven us overtly first to the Truman Doctrine, next to ERP, then to sponsorship of Western Union [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This was all political warfare
and should be recognized as such.

4. Understanding the concept of political warfare, we should also recognize that there are two major types of
political warfare--one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and
coordinated by the Department of State. Overt operations are, of course, the traditional policy activities of any
foreign office enjoying positive leadership, whether or not they are recognized as political warfare. Covert
operations are traditional in many European chancelleries but are relatively unfamiliar to this Government.

5. Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history and having been engaged by the full might of the Kremlin's political warfare, we cannot afford to leave unmobilized our resources for covert political warfare. We cannot afford in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to scramble into impromptu covert operations [1 line of source text not declassified].

6. It was with all of the foregoing in mind that the Policy Planning Staff began some three months ago/2/ a
consideration of specific projects in the field of covert operations, where they should be fitted into the structure
of this Government, and how the Department of State should exercise direction and coordination.

/2/Although the following page of the source text indicates that 3 lines were missing from the bottom of the
previous page, a comparison with the April 30 version of the memorandum cited in the source note above finds that no words were missing.

7. There are listed below projects which have been or are now being suggested by the Staff:

a. Liberation Committees.

Purpose: To encourage the formation of a public American organization which will sponsor selected political
refugee committees so that they may (a) act as foci of national hope and revive a sense of purpose among
political refugees from the Soviet World; (b) provide an inspiration for continuing popular resistance within the
countries of the Soviet World; and (c) serve as a potential nucleus for all-out liberation movements in the event
of war.

Description: This is primarily an overt operation which, however, should receive covert guidance and possibly
assistance from the Government. It is proposed that trusted private American citizens be encouraged to establish a public committee which would give support and guidance in U.S. interests to national movements (many of them now in existence) publicly led by outstanding political refugees from the Soviet World, such as Mikolajczyk and Nagy [of Poland and Hungary, respectively]. The American Committee should be so selected and organized as to cooperate closely with this Government. The functions of the American Committee should be limited to enabling selected refugee leaders [to keep alive as public figures with access to printing presses and microphones. It should not engage in underground activities.]/3/

/3/The words in brackets were taken from the April 30 version; see footnote 1 above.

What is proposed here is an operation in the traditional American form: organized public support of resistance to tyranny in foreign countries. Throughout our history, private American citizens have banded together to champion the cause of freedom for people suffering under oppression. (The Communists and Zionists have exploited this tradition to the extreme, to their own ends and to our national detriment, as witness the Abraham Lincoln brigade during the Spanish Civil War and the current illegal Zionist activities.) Our proposal is that this tradition be revived specifically to further American national interests in the present crisis.

[1 heading and 2 paragraphs (21-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. Support of Indigenous Anti-Communist Elements in Threatened Countries of the Free World.

Purpose: To strengthen indigenous forces combating communism in countries where Soviet political warfare is a threat to our national security.

Description: This is a covert operation again utilizing private intermediaries. To insure cover, the private
American organizations conducting the operation should be separate from the organizations mentioned in
previous projects. [3 lines of source text not declassified] This project is a matter of urgency because the
communists are reported to be planning the disruption of ERP through labor disturbances in France. [2 lines of
source text not declassified]

d. Preventive Direct Action in Free Countries.

Purpose: Only in cases of critical necessity, to resort to direct action to prevent vital installations, other material, or personnel from being (1) sabotaged or liquidated or (2) captured intact by Kremlin agents or agencies.

Description: This covert operation involves, for example, (1) control over anti-sabotage activities in the
Venezuelan oil fields, (2) American sabotage of Near Eastern oil installations on the verge of Soviet capture, and (3) designation of key individuals threatened by the Kremlin who should be protected or removed elsewhere.

8. It would seem that the time is now fully ripe for the creation of a covert political warfare operations directorate within the Government. If we are to engage in such operations, they must be under unified direction. One man must be boss. And he must, as those responsible for the overt phases of political warfare, be answerable to the Secretary of State, who directs the whole in coordination.

9. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

10. The National Security Council Secretariat would seem to provide the best possible cover for such a
directorate. Such cover would also permit a direct chain of command from the Secretary of State and be a
natural meeting ground for close collaboration with the military establishment.

Recommendations 
11. There should promptly be established, under the cover of the National Security Council Secretariat, a
directorate of political warfare operations to be known as the Consultative (or Evaluation) Board of the National Security Council.

12. The Director should be designated by the Secretary of State and should be responsible to him.

13. The Director should have initially a staff of 4 officers designated by the Department of State and 4 officers
designated by the Secretary of National Defense.

14. The Board should have complete authority over covert political warfare operations conducted by this
Government. It should have the authority to initiate new operations and to bring under its control or abolish
existing covert political warfare activities.

15. Specifically, (a) the four projects mentioned in paragraph 7 above should be activated by the Board and (b) covert political warfare now under CIA and theater commanders abroad should be brought under the authority of the Board.

16. The coordination of the above covert operations with the overt conduct of foreign policy should, of course,
be accomplished through the offices of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State. 

TWE Remembers: NSC-68

Here is an interesting interpretation of events in 1950:

The debate over NSC-68 might have sputtered out and the memo might have become nothing more than a historical footnote if not for North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. The attack by Moscow’s ally seemed to confirm what NSC-68 had argued, the Soviet slave state was on the march and only American military might could stop it. Truman’s nearly immediate decision to order U.S. troops to come to South Korea’s aid guaranteed a major jump in U.S. defense spending. (Truman had proposed a $13 billion defense budget for FY 1951; it ended up ballooning to $58 billion.) With cost no longer an obstacle, NSC-68 became official policy. As Acheson later observed, “Korea saved us.”

Historians might debate Acheson’s claim—and some have. They might also debate whether NSC-68 correctly gauged Soviet intentions and actions, or exaggerated the Soviet threat and exposed the United States and the rest of the Free World to needless conflicts and crises. What isn’t in dispute is that the blandly named “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” set the basic guidelines that would govern U.S. national security policy for four decades.

TWE Remembers: NSC-68

by James M. Lindsay
April 14, 2012

http://blogs.cfr.org/lindsay/2012/04/14/twe-remembers-nsc-68/

The cover of NSC-68. (Harry S. Truman Library and Museum)

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11

13

“United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” is a rather bland title for a report. Especially one that turns out to help drive history. But that’s the formal name given to NSC-68, the foundational document for America’s Cold War strategy. It was issued by President Harry Truman’s National Security Council for review on April 14, 1950.*

To understand the origins of NSC-68, it helps first to know some background. The second half of 1949 had been a tough time for the Truman administration on the foreign policy front. In August, the Soviet Union detonated an atomic device for the first time, ending the U.S. nuclear monopoly far sooner than Washington thought would be the case. Then, in October, Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the communist People’s Republic of China. That set off a bitter debate in the United States over who “lost” China, a debate that helped set the stage for Sen. Joseph McCarthy’s famed Wheeling, West Virginia speech alleging that communists were running rampant at the State Department.

The Soviet A-bomb test and the victory of the Chinese communists helped prompt Truman to order a reevaluation of the country’s national security policy on January 31, 1950. The task of leading the review was handed over to a group of officials known officially as the State-Defense Policy Review Group. They were led by Paul Nitze, the director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, and supported by Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

The participants in the review believed that the United States needed a tougher foreign policy, and they set out to use their report to convince the rest of government that they were right. Robert Lovett, a consultant to the project, said that the memo should use “Hemingway sentences” to make its points. “If we can sell every useless article known to man in large quantities,” Lovett argued, “we should be able to sell our very fine story in larger quantities.” Acheson thought along the same lines. “The purpose of NSC-68,” he later wrote, “was to so bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government’ that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out.”

NSC-68’s authors took Lovett’s and Acheson’s advice. The report came packed with more rhetorical ammunition than most other government memos. The dramatic tone started in the introduction:

The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions.

So what were the momentous issues? The Soviet Union (and its satellites) stood diametrically opposed to everything that the United States (and by extension the rest of the “free world”) stood for:

(Continued at the link below)

http://blogs.cfr.org/lindsay/2012/04/14/twe-remembers-nsc-68/