Now it is the Pakistani's response to the recent Indian essays about Special Forces (probably just coincidence but it is interesting that both India and Pakistan have articles on these similar topics) The author has mixed together a number of concepts (as if he was reading FM 3-24 as the US counter-trerrorism "strategy, and cherry picking from current US debates about the future of warfare), He has clear, hold, build and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat then calls for an Unconventional Warfare Corps to fight the unconventional threats that Pakistan faces. And he does seem to provide an interesting and succinct threat assessment:
What are the root causes of what we are up against? Answer: the state-sponsored jihadi doctrine, civilian misgovernance, lack of dispensation of justice, lack of municipal services and a jihadi curriculum.
On a separate note, it is interesting that the author would call for an Unconventional Warfare Corps instead of the more popular Special Forces or Special Operations Forces. Maybe we should consider renaming Special Forces to the Unconventional Warfare Corps and then we could end the SF versus SOF definition misunderstanding. Everyone can be called special forces and the Green Berets could become the UW Corps. (note tongue in cheek).
Need to raise a new corps
Tuesday, July 16, 2013
From Print Edition
We need to recognise that Pakistan is in a state of war – a long war. We need to separate our enemies from our friends. We need a new war doctrine – a Permanent War Doctrine. We need to raise a new corps – the Unconventional Warfare Corps.
In the Pakistan-India of 1965 we lost 3,800 men, 200 tanks and 20 aircraft. In the 1971 Pakistan-India war we lost 9,000 lives, two destroyers, one minesweeper and one submarine (neutral claims as per the Encyclopaedia of the Developing World).
Imagine, Pakistani fatalities over the past decade in the ongoing war stand at 48,659 of which 5,227 were security forces personnel. Obviously, this is a much bigger – and a much longer – war than the ones we have fought in the past. Imagine, we have been in a state of war for more than ten years and are yet to identify our enemy.
The nature of warfare, this time around, is unconventional. Clearly, the combatants are the state of Pakistan versus non-state violent actors (VNSA). The nature of this warfare is such that the distinction between a combatant and a non-combatant is blurring.
The nature of this warfare is such that the distinction between a soldier and a civilian is blurring. The nature of this warfare is such that even the distinction between war and politics is blurring.
Pakistan’s National Security Strategy (NSS) has to have two pillars – one against the external (conventional) threat and the other against the internal threat. We already have two (conventional) strike corps and half a dozen (conventional) holding corps for the (conventional) external threat. This conventional pillar of the NSS has its own war doctrine – and a rather successful one. But this conventional war doctrine is not appropriate for the kind of unconventional long-war that we are up against.
What we now need is an Unconventional Warfare Corps. We need a corps that is technology-intelligence driven. We need a corps with sophisticated tracking and targeting capacity. We need a corps with special reconnaissance capacity. And we need a corps that has a direct action capacity.
Plus, we need a counterterrorism strategy. The classic one is a three-phased strategy: clear, hold and build. The ‘clearance’ component has three sub-phases and all these phases will be the responsibility of the Unconventional Warfare Corps. The sub-phases are: disrupt, dismantle and defeat.
(Continued at the link below)