Saturday, February 9, 2013

Pursuing the Trust of the 23 Million (north Korea)


Key excerpt:

Without this threat, there would be no other way for Pyongyang to obtain Washington’s attention. A North Korea without nuclear weapons is just a regime burdened by economic woes, inflicting human rights abuses on its people, suffering defections and battling with bottom-up marketization. Only with nuclear weapons are they able to maintain their regime, hidden away from the world. This is how they keep their people in chains: through military tension. 
But beyond this, the North Korean regime’s ultimate goal is to “eat” South Korea. The final winner of the inter-Korean game will be he, or she, who gains control of the 75 million people on the Korean Peninsula. Until the game is over, the inter-Korean power struggle is sure to continue. This is the very essence of the past 60 years of inter-Korean relations. 
In truth, the only thing that is stopping the North Korean regime “eating” South Korea is the U.S., which is why they want the U.S. to leave and are trying to make that happen via a U.S.-North Korea peace treaty and the abrogation of the ROK-U.S. military alliance. Whether this is realistic or not, it is their only survival strategy.  
Therefore, North Korea needs to directly or indirectly negotiate with the U.S. Their statements have recently changed: the National Defense Commission revealed on the 24th that its missile and nuclear tests are aimed at the U.S. No more secrets, they said.
V/R
Dave

Pursuing the Trust of the 23 Million
[Sohn Gwang Joo Column]
By Sohn Gwang Joo, Chief, Daily NK Unification Strategy Research Institute
[2013-02-08 21:45 ]  
  

There are two key points to make regarding the third North Korean nuclear test. 

The first is that, as I have said a number of times in previous columns, North Korea’s nuclear strategy is now in its third stage. The first was to develop nuclear weapons, and the second was their mass production. The third, and last, is to mount a lightweight nuclear warhead on a missile. The successful launch of the ICBM ‘Unha-3’ has secured North Korea the means of delivery, and while they do not know how to achieve atmospheric reentry yet, it is incumbent upon us to prepare for that to happen as well.

Yet, interestingly, many nuclear experts seem to think that North Korea’s overall capability is still at an “elementary” stage. However, the truth is that it is not at all “elementary” where South Korea is concerned. 

As ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Sung Hwan told a National Assembly committee on the 4th, “In 2010 the [uranium enrichment] facility [at Yongbyon] was made public, and if we speculate based on that then it appears they have extracted a certain amount of weapons-grade enriched uranium.”

In the fall of 1996 North Korea signed a secret agreement with Pakistan to import its uranium enrichment technology. This was revealed in the testimony of the late Hwang Jang Yop, and Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Kahn also later confirmed it, saying that Pyongyang’s enriched uranium technology is the same as that used by Pakistan. That being the case, we can assume that North Korea has been developing enriched uranium nuclear weapons for almost twelve years. Their reserves of high quality uranium are well regarded in technical circles, and, moreover, because the Kim regime emphasizes military-first politics so heavily, there is no doubt that a vast amount of the nation’s wealth has been put into their development. 
(Continued at the link below)

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