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Sunday, January 12, 2014
U.S., China discussed contingencies in N. Korea: report
Special Operations in PACOM
For those with an interest in Special Operations in PACOM the latest edition of Special Warfare Magazine can be downloaded at the link below. There is a lot of current information on OEF-P and the Typhoon response in the Philippines as well as the MNLF rebellion in Zamboanga among many other important subjects (to include UW) per the table of contents below.
V/R
Dave
http://static.dvidshub.net/media/pubs/pdf_14790.pdf
08 1st Special Forces Group in the PACOM AOR
16 Q&A with COL Robert McDowell and CSM Brian Johnson
21 1st Special Forces Group Support Battalion
26 Relationship Building
30 1st SFG(A) Operational cycle
34 The Case for India
38 Zamboanga Crisis
46 Operation enduring Freedom - Philippines
52 Operation Damayan
59 Preparing for ODA level initial entry UW Operations in Korea
62 Foal Eagle
66 A Company in the LSF
68 UW in Cyberspace
V/R
Dave
http://static.dvidshub.net/media/pubs/pdf_14790.pdf
08 1st Special Forces Group in the PACOM AOR
16 Q&A with COL Robert McDowell and CSM Brian Johnson
21 1st Special Forces Group Support Battalion
26 Relationship Building
30 1st SFG(A) Operational cycle
34 The Case for India
38 Zamboanga Crisis
46 Operation enduring Freedom - Philippines
52 Operation Damayan
59 Preparing for ODA level initial entry UW Operations in Korea
62 Foal Eagle
66 A Company in the LSF
68 UW in Cyberspace
Saturday, January 11, 2014
"Jackpot" Unification Comes with Caveats
The author Lee Ae Ran could be advocating for an unconventional warfare campaign plan (I would be happy to write one for her). Conclusion:
Conversely, if North Korea continues as it is, unification would not be the jackpot. Unification of a different sort; a phased unification, or a confederation of states as hypothesized elsewhere, would be ruinous for all concerned.The Republic of Korea must stop hesitating and complete the struggle to extend liberal democracy to the territory of North Korea. That is the way forward. It is my hope that President Park will open the way to liberal democratic unification during her term. Only then will unification truly be the jackpot.
In her January 6th press conference, President Park Geun Hye said that unification would be something akin to hitting the jackpot. For me, unification is an opportunity to achieve the prosperity and development of the Korean Peninsula. President Park’s comments were cut from a similar cloth.
And yet we have been talking for some time about the “price of unification.” It is unclear where the figures come from, but a raft of academic, political and economic analyses have come out with astronomical calculations for the total cost of unification. These have caused ordinary Koreans to worry about the potential harm unification could do, and even the possible bankruptcy of a unified Korea.
As a consequence, many South Koreans now have sympathy for the position of those scholars and Sunshine Policy supporters who contend that it would be better to avoid the risk of an economically burdensome unification; rather, they would prefer to go on in the current manner while giving economic assistance to North Korea. This position is shaped by the belief that the price of reunification will fall if South Korea pours assistance into North Korea beforehand.
During ten years of liberal government in pursuit of this very goal, Sunshine Policy theorists handed over many hundreds of millions of dollars to Kim Jong Il and poured taxpayers’ money into North Korea at any sign of trouble. North Korean expectations rose; they got accustomed to the generosity. The cost of doing business rose commensurately, too; Kim Jong Il’s ransom became more expensive. An absurd situation unfolded: there were people visiting North Korea to flatter Kim Jong Il and have their picture taken standing next to him.
Even now there are some scholars and unification experts who cleave to this Sunshine Policy approach, explaining that reunification must be achieved slowly and through economic means; in other words, by affluent South Korea aiding unfortunate North Korea. Inter-Korean exchanges, economic cooperation and dialogue are essential, they say.
Despite the fact that the only things we obtained from ten years of left wing government propping up [North Korea] were nuclear developments and missiles, such people never mention for how long we must help the North, how much help we must give them, or how much better North Korea’s economy must become before its political system will change.
In reality, however, the North Korean economic crisis wouldn’t be solved even if South Korea provided support for a million years. The unification we want might never come about.
The economic crisis in North Korea today is a result of the errors of socialist and communist systems coupled to a hereditary Suryeongist dictatorship that defends that very system. No matter how much money North Korea may accumulate, unless the feudal dynastic system that deprives the North Korean people of their freedoms and human rights changes, those same people will continue to live in hunger. There will be no overcoming North Korea’s economic crisis, and, in the end, there is no nuclear solution without a solution to the difficulties of the North Korean people.
In which case, what is to be done?
The Republic of Korea must change its unification policy, strategy and tactics.
It was possible for the Republic of Korea to become the affluent state that it is today because of the liberal democratic system that President Rhee Syngman founded and the passionate, patriotic desire of President Park Chung Hee to see the people living well. If the two Koreas were unified under such a liberal democratic system then it would indeed be a golden opportunity.
Changing President Park’s “unification is the jackpot” comment slightly, we can say that “unification with North Korea under a liberal democratic system is the jackpot.”
Accordingly, what today’s North Korea needs is a liberal democratic system. If liberal democracy were established in North Korea, the people would develop an advanced, affluent nation even without external help. Naturally, if the capital, technologies and experiences of the Republic of Korea, which overcame its trials via liberal democracy and industrialization, modernization and advancement, were to buttress that process then it would take place all the more quickly.
Conversely, if North Korea continues as it is, unification would not be the jackpot. Unification of a different sort; a phased unification, or a confederation of states as hypothesized elsewhere, would be ruinous for all concerned.
The Republic of Korea must stop hesitating and complete the struggle to extend liberal democracy to the territory of North Korea. That is the way forward. It is my hope that President Park will open the way to liberal democratic unification during her term. Only then will unification truly be the jackpot.
* The views expressed in Guest Columns are independent and not necessarily those of Daily NK.
Friday, January 10, 2014
Rice for Pyongyang, Nothing for Provinces
North Korean authorities have distributed rice harvested last year to workers in Pyongyang, while workers elsewhere in the country are left with nothing, Daily NK has learned.
It was widely assumed that regular distribution would resume this year, so the absence of rations outside of the nation’s capital is disappointing for many, a source in Pyongyang reported.
As the designated “Capital of the Revolution,” Pyongyang has been deemed a “Special Supply Area” and is generally first to receive rations, it was explained.
“Two weeks’ worth of food was delivered on the 3rd and 4th. An edict came down from the Upper (the authorities) that the people will receive more in 15 days, and that after that rations would resume as normal.”
However, “Many people harbor doubts about this, as this has been heard since last year. Nonetheless, the rations that did arrive were certainly welcome.”
Overall ration quantity has increased since December, which has in turn resulted in price stability across the board. Rice in Pyongyang is currently being traded at around 5000 won per kilo, the source confirmed.
Meanwhile, regions outside of Pyongyang continue to wait for their allotted share. While distributing rice released from the No.2 wartime rice reserves last year, the authorities boasted that rations would be normalized in 2014.
A second source located in Yangkang Province told Daily NK, “As of yet there has been no official word or any special decrees related to rations. Ordinary citizens have not been able to receive anything, but families of military and state security personnel have received a comparatively plentiful supply.”
“Most people are just saying, ‘It wasn’t like we got anything before, so let’s just forget about it,’” the source disclosed, before adding, “Even though it was poor quality, the Upper shared some rice with the people last year. But now we don’t even have that. The people are expressing their disappointment by saying, ‘If you’re not going to give us anything, then you shouldn’t have opened your mouths in the first place.’”
Reunification 'Would Boost Korea's Credit'
This is pretty significant If the credit industry has confidence in reunification.
Reunification 'Would Boost Korea's Credit'
Global investment banks predict that Korea reunification would benefit the country's credit rating as constant cross-border tensions end.
The view is shared by Citibank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Macquarie and Morgan Stanley.
The Chosun Ilbo asked the six for their outlook for Korea's sovereign credit rating, national brand value and economic health following reunification. With the exception of Morgan Stanley, they forecast the country's sovereign credit rating would rise by more than two notches.
Morgan Stanley noted that reunification costs would add to the fiscal burden but projected the sovereign credit rating would rise at least one notch over the mid to long-term.
South Korea's sovereign credit rating according to the Fitch ratings firm stands at AA- at present and would go up to AA+, just one notch below the top rating of AAA and the same as the U.K. and France.
It would be the fourth-highest credit rating after the U.S., Germany and Singapore and two notches above Japan.
Yoon Deok-ryong at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy said, "The North Korea security risk has always been a main reason for demerits in evaluations by international ratings firms, so when that disappears, foreign direct investment, which remains the lowest among OECD member nations, could surge."
The view is shared by Citibank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Macquarie and Morgan Stanley.
The Chosun Ilbo asked the six for their outlook for Korea's sovereign credit rating, national brand value and economic health following reunification. With the exception of Morgan Stanley, they forecast the country's sovereign credit rating would rise by more than two notches.
Morgan Stanley noted that reunification costs would add to the fiscal burden but projected the sovereign credit rating would rise at least one notch over the mid to long-term.
South Korea's sovereign credit rating according to the Fitch ratings firm stands at AA- at present and would go up to AA+, just one notch below the top rating of AAA and the same as the U.K. and France.
It would be the fourth-highest credit rating after the U.S., Germany and Singapore and two notches above Japan.
Yoon Deok-ryong at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy said, "The North Korea security risk has always been a main reason for demerits in evaluations by international ratings firms, so when that disappears, foreign direct investment, which remains the lowest among OECD member nations, could surge."
englishnews@chosun.com / Jan. 10, 2014 11:02 KST
Wednesday, January 8, 2014
The Complex Calculus of a North Korean Collapse
Excerpt:
In short, a North Korean implosion could be an explosion as well, with catastrophic consequences radiating outward across the region. Concerned governments should begin pondering likely contingencies.
See the graphic below the article that we produced in the 1990's to illustrate the implosion-explosion paradox and the range of contingencies we might face should the Kim Family Regime collapse (of course like Doug Bandow we make no prediction of when it may happen – but know that collapse will be "conditions based" – the loss of central governing effectiveness combined with the loss of coherence of the military)
V/R
Dave
The Complex Calculus of a North Korean Collapse
January 9, 2014
Doug Bandow [2]
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remains a sui generis communist monarchy [3] wrapped in mystery, prone to sporadic brinkmanship and violent spasms. The young leader’s surprise execution of his uncle suggests regime instability, which might spark new international provocations for domestic political purposes.
The latest events have rekindled predictions of a possible North Korean collapse. The greatest danger is that the US would get drawn into the resulting chaos and conflict.Warned [4] the Rand Corporation’s Bruce W. Bennett: “Inadequately prepared, the ROK and the United States could suffer many serious consequences, including a failed or aborted intervention, a destabilization of the region, and possibly broader warfare.”
The Korean peninsula became a U.S. security concern when the US and Soviet Union divided the former Japanese colony after Tokyo’s World War II surrender. Two competing and hostile states emerged, leading to the Korean War. The Truman administration intervened to prevent the DPRK from conquering the South; U.S. troops remained.
Today, however, the Republic of Korea possesses roughly 80 times the North’s GDP and more than twice the latter’s population. Seoul could do whatever it takes to defend itself. The DPRK retains sizeable armed forces but lacks advanced weaponry, combined arms training, adequate human capital, and quality industrial infrastructure. Neither the People’s Republic of China nor Russia would back a North Korean attack. Even Kim probably recognizes that the North would lose.
More likely is a North Korean collapse. Bennett has argued that “There is a reasonable probability that North Korean totalitarianism will end in the foreseeable future.” Columnist Steven Metz recently contended [5]: “The question is not whether the Kim dynasty will fail but when.” Three years ago analyst John Guardiano said the North would “inevitably [6]” implode.
Of course, the Kim dynasty has outlived the Soviet Union by more than two decades. The DPRK may continue to surprise the West with its resilience.
Nevertheless, the system is under increasing stress. Metz observed: “The execution could be a sign that the cohesion of the North Korean elite is crumbling. If so, it is the beginning of the end for the parasitic Kim dynasty.” Jang’s elimination suggests weakness [7], not strength. Jang’s relatives are being imprisoned at home and recalled from abroad; his wife, Kim’s aunt by blood, has disappeared from public view.
Any future political battle could turn even more violent. A breakdown of one-man rule in what Bennett called a “failing state” risks a political free-for-all. The North has never tried power-sharing, or any kind of collective leadership. Concluded Bennett: “The division of the North into factions would likely precipitate civil war, as at least some of the factions will seek primacy and eventual control of all of North Korea.” Moreover, the regime or even one faction could strike outward to rally internal support.
Metz posited “widespread, protracted internal conflict that could make even the Syrian civil war pale by comparison.” The resulting hardship could exceed that resulting from the 1990s famine, which killed a half million or more North Koreans. We should not expect a peaceful, German-style resolution.
Although most people presume reunification would follow a North Korean collapse, Bennett warned that “China could take political control of much of the North, likely in cooperation with one or more North Korean factions. A failure to achieve Korean unification in these circumstances could doom Korea to division for at least many more decades.”
What should Washington do? Guardiano advocated unilateral American intervention: “sooner or later, the U.S. military is going to have to deal with North Korea. And, when we do, we likely will have to occupy and rebuild the country just as we have done in Iraq and are now doing in Afghanistan.”
Seoul might not approve of the Pentagon turning the North into an American colony. More likely, the South would lead any Western military effort. Argued Bennett, the ROK could “decide to intervene in such a crisis with U.S. assistance and seek Korean unification.”
However, the PRC also would be tempted to act militarily—to prevent mass refugee flows into China’s border provinces, safeguard Chinese economic interests, and ensure friendly political control in Pyongyang. Beijing’s incentive to act would be even stronger if U.S. forces entered as well.
Military intervention would be no cakewalk. The Kim dynasty has taught the population that Americans and their South Korean puppets are the enemy; North Koreans might offer little warmer welcome to the PRC. The DPRK military or individual units could fight conventionally or resort to guerrilla combat. Worse would be a clash between allied and Chinese forces. Worried Bennett: “The forces of both sides would have significant incentives to advance rapidly into the North, leading to a risk of accidental combat between them. In the zeal of the moment, the inevitable accidents could escalate into major combat between the ROK and U.S. forces and the Chinese forces.”
In short, a North Korean implosion could be an explosion as well, with catastrophic consequences radiating outward across the region. Concerned governments should begin pondering likely contingencies.
South Korea has the most to do. It should adopt reunification legislation, since under its constitution North Koreans currently are considered ROK nationals, which would complicate the treatment of anyone who might warrant punishment or even questioning. Now would be a good time to consider such questions as property ownership, status of foreign (i.e., Chinese) contracts, treatment of human rights criminals, amnesty provisions, and more. The right answers might help ease concerns among more responsible Northern elites over possible reunification.
However, consultations should not stop in Seoul. Metz proposed “multinational discussions to assess the short-term and long-term challenges of a North Korean collapse,” though the quieter the better since “doing so openly will inflame the Kim regime’s expansive paranoia and increase the chances of disastrous miscalculation.” So far, China has been reluctant to enter talks regarding its ally, but relations between the two states have frayed. The execution of Jang, a friend of Beijing, introduced new tensions in the relationship.
Desirable would be regional cooperation, including providing forces for reconstruction duties. Bennett figured that between 260,000 and 400,000 troops might be necessary to “stabilize” the North. One option would be a multinational force dominated by the ROK and China but including troops from other Asian nations (though not Japan, for reasons of history).
The U.S. should limit its role. Humanitarian aid should primarily come from multinational agencies and the North’s neighbors, especially South Korea, China, and Japan, which have the most at stake.
America should reject any direct military role. In no case should the US be involved in occupying and pacifying the North. Bennett argued that “the ROK will have insufficient forces, even with significant U.S. participation, to fully handle the various challenges of North Korean collapse.” Obviously Seoul needs to take more seriously the possibility and consequences of a North Korean collapse. The U.S. could provide logistical aid for any South Korean military move, though by now Seoul should be able to support its own forces.
(Continued at the link below)
Army Chief: Part-Time Soldiers Cannot Replace Full-Timers
This is an interesting excerpt:
The issue has stirred tensions inside the Pentagon and carries an undertone of class warfare pitting well-compensated full-time soldiers against part-timers. Guard and Reserve advocates contend these soldiers cost far less than active-duty troops and offer a better deal to the U.S. taxpayer. “We are convinced that end-strength reductions in the Reserve component are not a practical or long-term solution to ensuring our nation’s security in an era of fiscal restraints,” lawmakers wrote in a Dec. 13 letter.
I was always under the impression the National Guard and Reserve service members received the same compensation as active duty personnel when they are on active duty. I think this is the kind of rhetoric we are going to see more of and the active force (and the veterans who have retired) are going to be the growing targets of "compensation reform." The new narrative is going to be that the active duty force and retired veterans are over compensated and thus should have their health and pension benefits reduced in order to reduce defense expenditures as well as protect the entitlement programs of other parts of the government. As I have said (and I know people do not like this analogy) but the political mobilization of the latent or incipient phase of the anti-military/veteran
I do believe that there must be compensation reform and I think there are ways to do it for the good of the force over the long term but I am afraid that Congress and the fiscal hardliners (and the Department of Defense based on the current rhetoric) are going to focus on the short term solutions that will end up having long term negative effectives for the military in general and military personnel and families in particular. The answer is that all the military support organizations, e.g., MOAA, AUSA, etc (who ironically have no opposing lobbying organizations who deliberately advocate against the agendas of these organizations) must develop realistic strategies that will have to include compromise that lead to effective reforms of the military compensation system. It is going to be a hard pill to swallow but we are going to need to take a long term approach that will have to include some sacrifice. Otherwise we might end up winning all the battles (such as restoring the 1% COLA cut) and in the end lose the war (big cuts to retirement and health care for military person, veterans, and their families). The one thing that we might want to consider advocating is that if the military and veterans must sacrifice then non-military citizens who benefit from government entitlement
V/R
Dave
Dave
1/7/2014
| Army Chief: Part-Time Soldiers Cannot Replace Full-Timers |
By Sandra I. Erwin 
Gen. Ray Odierno
At the height of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Army active-duty soldiers made up 51 percent of the force. The other 49 percent was a mix of reservists and members of the National Guard.Over the coming years — as budgets shrink and the active-duty Army thins its ranks — that split will shift in favor of the Guard and Reserve, said Gen. Ray Odierno, Army chief of staff.
The Army is comfortable with a 46/54 share, Odierno said Jan. 7 at the National Press Club, in Washington, D.C. But any further rebalancing would not be acceptable, he said, because it would leave the Army with too many part-time soldiers.
Odierno insisted that each component of the Army — active-duty, Reserve and National Guard — has unique skills and missions, and that all are needed.
The chief’s comments come amid a torrent of congressional criticism that the Army is dipping into the National Guard to help pay for training, operations and other priorities. In letters to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel last month, leaders of the House and Senate grumbled about Army proposals to trim the National Guard down to 315,000 troops, or about 35,000 fewer than the pre-9/11 force.
The issue has stirred tensions inside the Pentagon and carries an undertone of class warfare pitting well-compensated full-time soldiers against part-timers. Guard and Reserve advocates contend these soldiers cost far less than active-duty troops and offer a better deal to the U.S. taxpayer. “We are convinced that end-strength reductions in the Reserve component are not a practical or long-term solution to ensuring our nation’s security in an era of fiscal restraints,” lawmakers wrote in a Dec. 13 letter.
Odierno pushed back, noting that the active-duty force is bearing the bulk of the reductions. The Army’s original plan was to downsize from a peak of 570,000 to 490,000 by 2018. In the wake of sequester cuts last year, the goal was accelerated by two years. The current force stands at 527,000, with projected annual cuts of 20,000 through the end of fiscal year 2015. “Then we will have to make decisions on where we go from there,” depending on “available resources,” Odierno said. The Reserve and Guard combined currently have about 555,000 troops.
If the active-duty Army has to drop below 490,000, he said, the Reserve and Guard can also expect further cuts, said Odierno. “We're still working on what those numbers are.”
Each component is important, he said, but the “capabilities are not interchangeable.” There is a reason why the active component is more expensive, he added. “It gives you a higher level of readiness because they're full time.”
National Guard soldiers perform valuable duties, he said, but they train only 39 days a year. “To say that the National Guard is cheaper and can replace the active-duty force is not true,” he said. The same can be said about active-duty troops not being adequate substitutes for guardsmen who have unique responsibilities in homeland defense under state governments. “It's about getting the right balance between the two,” said Odierno.
The 2014-2015 budget deal that Congress approved in December gives the military some relief from sequester cuts but not enough to spare the Army from deep cuts, Odierno noted. “I'm grateful” for the budget agreement, he said. In the long term, however, the Army still has more people, missions and programs than it can afford. After next year, “We go back to the problem of the balance between end strength, readiness and modernization,” he said. “I can't get that balance until 2020. That creates six years of vulnerability.”
The reduced spending caps that Congress mandated in the Budget Control Act of 2011 — which still are in place for eight years after 2015 — could compel further reductions in ground forces, Hagel warned in July when he unveiled a "Strategic Choices and Management Review" as a preview of what future budgets might entail.
One scenario would be to shrink Army end-strength to between 420,000 and 450,000 active-duty troops and between 490,000 and 530,000 in the reserves.
Hagel cast the spending choices as a tradeoff between a larger, but poorly equipped force and one that is smaller, but more technologically advanced. “The balance we strike between capability, capacity, and readiness will determine the composition and the size of the force for years to come,” Hagel said.
(Continued at the link below)
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