We have been trying to discuss contingency issues since at least 1997 that I am personally aware of.   I think the report Yonhap is referring to is the one "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass  Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues"  at this link:  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf  (I have pasted the table of contents of the report below the Yonhap Article) There is a paragraph on page 26 that quotes Kurt Campbell as "acknowledging talks about 'every' aspect" with the Chinese.  No more detail than that. This 76 page report contains a lot of information about a wide range of security issues such proliferation to include the A.Q. Khan network and Syria as well. U.S., China discussed contingencies in N. Korea: report 2014/01/13 07:40 http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/01/13/26/0401000000AEN20140113000200315F.html   By Lee Chi-dong WASHINGTON, Jan. 12 (Yonhap) -- The United States and China had discussions on the possibility of a regime collapse in North Korea and other contingencies well before the death of former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, according to a U.S. congressional report. But it remains unconfirmed whether the two global powers are continuing such sensitive consultations. "When asked on Oct. 4, 2009, whether the United States and China discussed contingencies in North Korea, (then) Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell acknowledged talks about "every" aspect," the Congressional Research Service, a think tank affiliated with the U.S. Congress, said in a recent report. It did not elaborate. Washington and Beijing are working together for the denuclearization of North Korea but talking formally on contingencies in Pyongyang is apparently tabooed. China is North Korea's largest benefactor and top communist ally. Since North Korea purged and executed Jang Song-thaek, the uncle of leader Kim Jong-un, regional powers have faced increasing calls for drawing up concrete contingency plans on the communist regime. Jang was known as a regent for Kim who took power shortly after the death of his father in December 2011. South Korea and the U.S. emphasize the importance of China's support in dealing with North Korea issues. "We share the view that it is important to keep China and other related parties closely engaged to achieve substantial progress in the denuclearization of North Korea," South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se told reporters here after talks with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry last week. "In this regard, we agreed to place this issue at the top of our agenda so that we can better cope with the increasing volatility of the nuclear issue arising from the evolving political situation in North Korea," Yun added. A senior South Korean official said later that Seoul and Washington will deepen consultations on every possibility that could happen in North Korea. China would be welcome in the talks, the official said. The CRS quoted a Peking University professor well versed in China's policies as saying, "Beijing would not accept an implosion in Pyongyang or watch passively if other countries gain political and military control in North Korea."    lcd@yna.co.kr leechidong@gmail.com (END)   Congressional Research Service  Contents  Purpose and Scope ........................................................................................................................... 1  PRC Proliferation Challenges .......................................................................................................... 1  Partial Nonproliferation Commitments ..................................................................................... 1  Continuing Concerns and Intelligence Report ........................................................................... 2  Nuclear Technology Sales to Pakistan ....................................................................................... 3  Overview ............................................................................................................................. 3  Nuclear Cooperation ........................................................................................................... 3  A. Q. Khan’s Nuclear Network ........................................................................................... 5  Missile Technology Sales to Pakistan ........................................................................................ 6  Overview ............................................................................................................................. 6  Nuclear Technology Sales to Iran .............................................................................................. 7  Overview and Policy Approaches ....................................................................................... 7  Uranium Enrichment ........................................................................................................... 8  Dual Approach and Energy-related Oil and Gas Deals ....................................................... 9  UNSC Resolutions and Sanctions ..................................................................................... 14  Missile Technology Sales to Iran ............................................................................................. 18  Overview ........................................................................................................................... 18  Obama Administration ...................................................................................................... 19  North Korea’s Missile and Nuclear Weapons Programs.......................................................... 19  Suspected Missile Supplies ............................................................................................... 19  Secret Nuclear Programs ................................................................................................... 21  PRC Border, Ports, and Airspace ...................................................................................... 22  PRC-DPRK Military Relationship .................................................................................... 24  Trilateral and Six-Party Talks in Beijing ........................................................................... 26  Missile Technology Sales to Syria ........................................................................................... 50  Policy Issues and Options .............................................................................................................. 50  Issues for Policy ...................................................................................................................... 50  Debate ............................................................................................................................... 51  The PRC Government’s Role ............................................................................................ 51  Foreign and Defense Policies .................................................................................................. 52  Summits ............................................................................................................................. 52  Counter-Terrorism Campaign ............................................................................................ 53  Missile Defense ................................................................................................................. 53  Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and 9/11 Commission ............................................ 53  Export Control Assistance ................................................................................................. 54  Linkage to the Taiwan Question ........................................................................................ 54  Economic Controls .................................................................................................................. 55  Satellite Exports ................................................................................................................ 55  Sanctions and the “Helms Amendment” ........................................................................... 56  Capital Markets ................................................................................................................. 58  Nuclear Cooperation and U.S. Export of Reactors ........................................................... 59  U.S. Import Controls ......................................................................................................... 60  U.S. Export Controls ......................................................................................................... 60  Nonproliferation and Arms Control ......................................................................................... 60  Nonproliferation Regimes (MTCR, NSG, etc.) ................................................................. 60  CTBT, Fissile Materials, and Nuclear Security ................................................................. 62

Can we close the power gap?

Who is in charge?  Unity of effort or unity of command or both?  I still think we need some form of the 1997 PDD 56 for the Management of Complex Contingency  Operations.

V/R

Dave

Can we close the power gap?

By David Ignatius,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-can-we-close-the-power-gap/2013/03/01/38bdbd80-82a6-11e2-b99e-6baf4ebe42df_print.html

Imagine that you’re sitting at the table as the National Security Council debates the deteriorating political and security situation in a North African country (take your pick). The president asks how the United States can prevent conflict there without sending in the military. Various Cabinet members and agency directors look awkwardly at each other — because nobody has a good answer.

Here lies one of the biggest unresolved problem for U.S. national-security planners today: How can America shape events in an unstable world without putting “boots on the ground” or drones in the air? Does this stabilizing mission belong to the experts at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)? Or to the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, which was created in 2011 to deal with such problems? Or to the facilitators and analysts at the U.S. Institute of Peace, which was created in 1984 to help resolve conflicts peacefully? Or maybe to the covert-action planners at the CIA, who work secretly to advance U.S. interests in key countries?

The answer is that all of the above would have some role in shaping the U.S. response to a potential crisis. But in practice, the overlapping roles mean that none of them would have ultimate responsibility. Thus, in our imaginary NSC meeting, no one takes charge.

This is why security problems have tended to default to the military and its regional “combatant commanders,” which in our not-so-imaginary example would mean U.S. Africa Command — AFRICOM. But the age of the “COCOMs” is ending, because of budget strain and military overload, and there’s nothing in sight to take their place.

To understand the implications of this “power gap,” let’s think more about North Africa. White House officials see instability nearly everywhere they look, as the Arab uprisings transform the region. Borders are porous; arms are proliferating, especially from Libya; security services that once provided counterterrorism help have been weakened; ungoverned spaces where terrorists can hide are growing.

There’s no single answer to this multifaceted security problem. In Libya, the challenge is building institutions — a working military, police and government — in a country crippled by Moammar Gaddafi’s decades of misrule. In Egypt and Tunisia, the priorities are economic development and political inclusion. In Mali and other countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the needs are basic development and security assistance.

In all these countries, the United States needs to find ways to fill the power gap without using military force. Each of the agencies I mentioned earlier has its own approach. But too many acronyms are chasing the same target. The White House needs to rationalize the situation so that when the president asks, “Who’s in charge?,” he gets a clear answer.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-can-we-close-the-power-gap/2013/03/01/38bdbd80-82a6-11e2-b99e-6baf4ebe42df_print.html