Showing posts with label Special Forces. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Special Forces. Show all posts

Monday, December 3, 2018

Is the OSS Contribution to Special Forces a Result of Disinformation?

Is the OSS Contribution to Special Forces a Result of Disinformation?

David Maxwell

It pained me to read the latest issue of the USASOC Historian Office's publication Veritas and it pains me even more to have to write these words.  You might not be familiar with Veritas because it is not published on line, only in an expensive high gloss print publication.  The specific article in the recent edition is “The OSS Influence on Special Forces.”  The article can be downloaded HERE

The author's thesis is that since only 14 members of the OSS actually served in Special Forces their contribution was not as great as has been described over the years.  The author uses fashionable modern academic analysis focusing solely on data and numbers to reach this outrageous in this conclusion: “The result was concrete evidence of disinformation and exaggeration perpetuated by the active force and veteran associations.”  The only “concrete evidence” the author cites is the number 14.  (As an aside there were at least 15 members of the OSS who served in Special Forces from 1952 to 1954. His list fails to include Robert McDowell who served with the OSS in Yugoslavia.)

The author is trying to prove his thesis by relying on numbers.  However, he undermines his argument with this statement:
Therefore, the five former OSS instructors in the SF Department, constituting approximately one-third of the instructor cadre from 1952-1954, are the ones who provided the most influence from their OSS experiences on the developing forceBecause the five interacted with or impacted every soldier trained in the SF program at the school, they gave students undergoing instruction an exaggerated impression about the overall presence of former OSS veterans in SF.
What the author fails to recognize and appreciate is that the OSS was an organization known for two things: punching well above its weight, i.e., making outsize contributions from its small numbers; and for conducting effective influence operations. At its peak there were some 13,000 members with 7500 serving overseas which was less than one Army division while the Army fielded over 90 divisions in WWII. Its Morale Operations branch focused on “persuasion, penetration, and intimidation” to destabilize governments and mobilize indigenous resistance at the strategic and tactical level.

Rather than assess the numbers of OSS members in SF the author would do a great service by reminding readers that today’s SF assessment and selection, organization (especially the ODA), training, doctrine, and most important the foundational mission of SF, unconventional warfare, are directly related to and descended from the OSS.  For those interested I recommend perusing the USASOC web site OSS Primer and Manuals accessed HERE.  USASOC’s own website says: “Special Forces traces its roots as the Army’s premier proponent of unconventional warfare from the Operational Groups and the Jedburgh teams of the Office of Strategic Services.” I personally traced the development of SF doctrine and the unconventional warfare mission from the OSS to the present (then 1995) HERE.

Continued at Small Wars Journal here:

Wednesday, September 27, 2017

ISIS in Mindanao: A Threat to the U.S.?

ISIS in Mindanao: A Threat to the U.S.?

Wednesday, September 27, 2017
We should be clear: Mindanao is not Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan.  We cannot approach a province of our longest standing treaty ally the same way we do in Syria or any of the other 18 or so countries to which the ISIS virus as spread.
As ISIS nears defeat in Syria and Iraq it is trying to keep its ideology alive by spreading to other countries where it is taking advantage of conditions of political resistance that weaken governments and provide safe havens for training, recruiting, and eventual resurrection of its quest for the Caliphate.  This is what appears to have attracted ISIS to Mindanao.  The attraction  is mutual, as threat groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group have embraced the ISIS ideology to enhance their legitimacy and gain recruits, resources, and respect.  
Does this phenomenon in the Philippines and its neighboring countries pose a significant security threat to the U.S. that requires a U.S. military response?
Appreciate the Context
While the ISIS presence makes the headlines, it is important to remember that the Philippines and its neighbors are sovereign nations that are established, relatively stable, and advanced  compared to Syria and other ISIS locales.  However, the Philippines face myriad threats that complicate the security situation.  These range from the external threat of China and the territorial dispute to the existential threat posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) which seek to overthrow the government.  President Duterte's drug war also garners much of the headlines. 
In Mindanao, in addition to the NPA, there is the continued friction with rogue elements of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) despite the 1996 peace agreement that established the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.  There are the terrorist groups of the ASG and the Indonesian based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).  There are also clan conflicts (ridos) and sometimes-violent competition among local political groups.  Lastly, among the major threats, there is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that seeks return of its ancestral domain and has nearly reached a peace agreement with the government though it has not been fully implemented. 
These conflicts together pose a serious challenge to the central government and regional structures, and this leads to sanctuary within Mindanao that allows various groups to survive and thrive.  Although there is no unified resistance to the central government, the widespread but disparate political resistance creates a cauldron that breeds political violence that ISIS has begun to exploit.
Understand the Problem
The nature of the problem is not solely a security threat.  Although the Marawi siege with the Maute Group is a lightning rod that brings focus on ISIS, it is only a symptom of the underlying problem.  It is a Philippine problem and a problem that can only be solved in the long term by the Philippine government at the national, provincial, and local levels.
To illustrate this, I will share one anecdote.  In 2007, I participated in a meeting with US diplomats and MILF leadership in their headquarters in Cotobato.  The purpose of the meeting was to express US support of the ongoing peace process and inform the MILF that a peace agreement will bring US support to the MILF just as  USAID did in 1996 for the MNLF when it signed the peace agreement.  The MILF leadership was quite clear that while they appreciated all the development support the U.S. and the international community would provide, if their political problems were not addressed and solved by the Philippine government, their insurgency would continue.
This can be applied to most of the threats in Mindanao.  The political problems that exist, from the national to the province to the barangay or village level are exploited by groups who seek to use political resistance and political violence to develop their own political power. 
The U.S. executed Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) under the authority of the 2001 AUMF which limited U.S. support to the security forces only conducting operations against Al Qaeda-linked organizations which at the time were the ASG and the JI. As described, the problems in the Philippines go beyond AQ, just as they go beyond ISIS.  It is a problem when the U.S. myopically focuses on a narrow threat that is only in its interests and does not take a holistic approach to the broader challenges faced by its ally.
While ISIS does not pose a direct threat to the U.S. from Mindanao, the political and security problems of the Philippines can serve as an incubator to allow the ISIS threat and others to metastasize and spread throughout the region.  If left unchecked it could use Mindanao as a sanctuary to rest, refit, and train new recruits.  It could exploit the maritime routes to move extremists to new targets of opportunity when it is ready to strike again.  At the very least, ISIS can use Mindanao to keep its ideology alive so that it one day can regain strength to attempt to re-establish its Caliphate somewhere.
Develop an Approach
How should the U.S. respond to the emergence of the ISIS threat in Mindanao?
First, the Philippine government must request additional support.  Despite the end of OEF-P in 2015 the U.S. has continued to provide security assistance in the Philippines to include advice and assistance with the ongoing siege in Marawi. 
Second, just as in OEF-P in 2001 it must conduct a thorough assessment of the situation in complete coordination with the Philippine military that will lead to a combined campaign plan that will integrate US support to the security forces.  The assessment will assist the Philippine government in determining the acceptable durable political arrangement necessary to stabilize the region.  This will also ensure that Philippine and U.S. interests are sufficiently aligned.
Third, the American Embassy in 2006 coined the phrase "Diplomacy, Development, and Defense" (3D) and as in 2006 the effort needs to be holistic and led by the Chief of Mission to ensure full U.S. interagency support to the Philippines.  A military only or military led mission is insufficient.  The approach must focus on assisting the Philippines more broadly than simply combatting ISIS.  It must support Philippine development and political solutions as well as security.
Fourth, the U.S. should act as part of a coalition of friends, partners, and allies.  Recent reports indicate that Australia has made the largest financial commitment to the situation in Marawi, along with the U.S. Japan, Thailand, and the EU.  China has provided the fifth largest contribution with the bulk for medical support of soldiers wounded in Marawi.  Although there are complexities that come with this approach, working as part of a coalition will minimize the focus on the U.S. and allow for greater and more effective support to the Philippines rather than the U.S. being the sole focal point for political opponents.
Fifth, the U.S. must use the right tools and forces for the mission from the capabilities of USAID to the appropriate military advisory forces from across the spectrum to include civil affairs and psychological operations as well as special forces who have developed decades long relationships with members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.  These forces are well suited for operating "without being in charge" as they recognize that this is a Philippine problem and a Philippine fight.  This is not "leading from behind."  This is the appropriate understanding of the relationship between U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and host nation forces in a sovereign nation.
A consideration for any support provided cannot be narrowly focused on ISIS and most certainly cannot use a similar approach as the U.S. has used in Syria and Iraq.  On the one hand, the challenges are bigger than ISIS, so the support to the Philippines must be broader.  On the other, a myopic focus on ISIS will enhance its legitimacy and provide fuel for growth.  It should be treated as a symptom and not the disease in the Philippines.  This must be an important theme in a supporting information and influence activities campaign.
In conclusion, ISIS is a growing global threat that is seeking to sustain itself for the long term even as it appears on the verge of defeat in Syria and Iraq.  It will exploit local political conditions in countries where it can find sanctuary so that it can live to fight another day.  However, in the Philippines, ISIS is only one security challenge.  The U.S., if requested, can provide advice and assistance to support a 3D approach  - diplomacy, development, and defense - that can reduce the ISIS threat by supporting Philippine political solutions.

Sunday, June 18, 2017

How U.S., South Korean Special Ops Would Join Forces in a New Korean War

Of course it would not be a new Korean War but a continuation of the current one that was temporarily suspended by the 1953 Armistice.  But we do not always get to choose the titles of our articles.

How U.S., South Korean Special Ops Would Join Forces in a New Korean War

thecipherbrief.com · June 18, 2017
June 18, 2017 | COL David Maxwell


Tensions are rising on the Korean Peninsula. There is fear that the Korean War could restart, since there has only been a temporary suspension of hostilities since the 1953 Armistice. Although this fear is not new and we have experienced high tensions many times over the years, given the global security situation, with two new administrations in Washington and Seoul and the uncertainty of Kim Jong-un’s future actions, some fear that the chances for some form of conflict are greater than ever. There is great focus on North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, continuing North Korean provocations to gain political and economic concessions, and the potential for a conventional war. But there is little focus on the combined special operations forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the U.S., except for occasional rhetoric.
There were a number of ad hoc special operations units led by the U.S. during the Korean War. They went by such names as the UN Partisan Infantry Korea, the 8240th Army Unit, the White Tigers, the Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Korea, and Joint Advisory Commission Korea. The combined special operations capability today has built on this history and has evolved to a quite capable force, the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force, and it will provide critical support to the Commander of the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (ROK/US CFC).
There are two important points to keep in mind about special operations forces (SOF) in Korea. First is that all the legislated U.S. SOF activities specified in U.S. Code will be conducted during conflict. Although there is focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) since the transfer of the counter-WMD mission from U.S. Strategic Command to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 2016, there are many more SOF requirements to support the ROK/US CFC.
The second point is that ROK special operations forces are among the most capable forces with which the U.S. partners. Although they are not the same as U.S. SOF, they share a long history of training and working together not only in Korea but also in Iraq, Afghanistan, and even in places such as the Horn of Africa with ROK Navy SEALs supporting anti-piracy operations. The combination of ROK and U.S. SOF provide a powerful capability to the Commander of ROK/US CFC.
To provide context for the type of operations SOF will conduct it is important to understand the “Big 5” of the Korean strategic challenges:

(Continued at the link below)

Sunday, January 15, 2017

SPECIAL REPORT: The Military Loves the Obama Doctrine. Can It Survive Trump?

I have to wave a huge BS flag on the "Obama Doctrine." 

First, Obama does not deserve credit for "through, with, and by."   That phrase belongs to COL (RET) Mark Boyatt who used it in 1994 to describe the essence of Special Forces operations in unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. (see Mark's 1994 Special Warfare Magazine article on Unconventional Operations, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/8288  as well as his recent 2016 book, Special Forces: A Unique National Asset Through, With and By  here at Amazon)

Second, the concept of "through, with, and by" is NOT a silver bullet and should not form the basis of a doctrine or a strategy. It has taken on a life of its own starting with GEN Odierno's 2008 guidance to the force in Iraq (here in 2008when he issued his guidance to the force there and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.

"Through, with, and by" is an important concept but when it is adopted as a single strategic method it loses its value and undermines its own legitimacy when it is used as the "main effort."  The idea that we are going to use indigenous, surrogate, or forces of another country to protect US national security interests and NOT commit US forces to protect those interests is simply wrong.  The use of "though, with, and by" creates a paradox and a dependency among those forces.  While they are grateful for all the training, advising, assisting, and equipping, they come to believe that if there mission is so important to the US then they become "too big to fail" so to speak and know they will always be bailed out when they are in trouble and that the US will come to their rescue because it is in the US interests to do so.  These forces are smart and they are in their own way learning to "live to fight another day" for their own interests - happy to take US assistance and careful not to over extend themselves so as to husband the resources they have been provided so that they have improved capabilities when the US eventually tires of supporting them and realizes that they cannot really support US interests. The underlying premise of working through, with, and by as we help those who seek self determination through political resistance and insurgency by our application of unconventional and political warfare or who help those to develop the capabilities to defend themselves against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism is that we will help them to help themselves but we will NOT do it for them.  Once we do start doing it for them we they have lost and we now own the problem.  Until we learn this and ween ourselves from the myth that "though, with, and by" is a substitute for strategy and should only be applied in specific circumstances (based on the principle of understanding that rests on comprehensive and continuous assessment) by specific forces we are going to continue to experience strategic failure as we rely on "though, with, and by" as the foundation for our strategy.  The concept has great utility but only when correctly applied in the appropriate conditions for which it is suited.

"Through, with, and by" has been hijacked by those outside of SOF and in particular Special Forces.  It has great strategic value in helping others to seek self-determination (though UW) and to defend themselves against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism (through FID) but it cannot be the foundation for protecting US interests.  It can play a supporting role in achieving US interests but it cannot be a substitute for US forces conducting operations to protect US interests.  This great doctrinal and strategic folly that has been in place since the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf ) unless we never forget that caveat "whenever possible" which seems to have been translated to use in every situation in place of US troops:

Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.





SPECIAL REPORT: The Military Loves the Obama Doctrine. Can It Survive Trump?

Commanders say they’re already fighting ISIS the right way: “by, with, and through” local forces.
defenseone.com · by Read bio
ERBIL, Iraq – There’s no welcome sign at this U.S military base discreetly tucked into the corner of the Kurdistan International Airport in northern Iraq. It doesn’t even have a name. But it’s here. Thousands of troops are here, including Americans, Germans, Italians, Finns, and Brits. And this time, it seems the U.S. military is in Iraq to stay.
The temporary tents and dining hall erected to house American forces — including special operators, CIA agents, and private military contractors who hunt, kill, and interrogate for America — are being replaced with permanent buildings. At least five types of U.S. military helicopters criss-cross the bright September skies over Kurdistan’s peaceful, bustling capital city, some ferrying generals up from Baghdad, others heading north into Syria with bearded special operators’ feet dangling from Black Hawk doors, or banking west toward Mosul, bringing Americans to the front lines of war.
It sounds busy and feels familiar, but today’s war in Iraq is a far cry from the mammoth effort of a decade ago. Gone are the hundreds of thousands of American troops and contractors occupying hundreds of sprawling bases and outposts across the country. Gone is the Bush administration’s total war and total occupation of a country. In its place is the Obama Doctrine.
What’s that? In his 2008 campaign, Barack Obama pledged to keep American troops out of unnecessary fighting while helping local populations defend and govern themselves. In short, it was his reaction to the Iraq War and over-extending America in the Middle East, explained Jeff Goldberg in his blockbuster article in Defense One’s sister publication, The Atlantic, after spending hours with the commander in chief. “Obama generally does not believe a president should place American soldiers at great risk in order to prevent humanitarian disasters, unless those disasters pose a direct security threat to the United States,” he said.
But ISIS’ rise in Iraq and Syria has confronted this vision with shocking reality. The unmitigated slaughter of Syrian civilians has provoked heavy, if not quite universal, condemnation of Obama’s and other Western governments. It angered an American electorate tired of wars in the Middle East but increasingly fearful of Islamic extremist terrorism reaching Europe and America. And it fueled perceptions that Obama was keeping the mighty American military on the sidelines, instead of just taking out what looked like nothing more than a savage band of pickup-driving psychopathic murderers. (One 2016 frustrated presidential candidate made the ridiculous suggestion of “carpet-bombing” Iraq.) Obama and U.S. generals have vowed to “destroy ISIS” — but he will this week be replaced in office by a candidate who said he could do it more quickly.
But what does the military want? In dozens of interviews with U.S. officials and coalition military commanders — from the White House to America’s war room in Tampa, the command in Baghdad, forward control centers and training grounds in Kurdistan, defense minister meetings in Paris, and NATO headquarters in Brussels — one thing was clear and consistent. On the whole, America’s military leaders do not want to be here any longer than they must. It also is clear that they wanted to “accelerate” the campaign against ISIS, as Obama has been doing already for more than a year with success, but they do not want America to own this fight. They do want Iraqis to fight and a functioning Iraqi government to take control when the Islamic State is gone. They don’t want to defeat ISIS only to become an occupying force of sitting ducks.
What they want is what Obama wants: patience. It’s a word I hear over and over, talking with special operators tasked to train local forces to fight terrorism and with the faraway policy makers they support. Like the outgoing president, they believe an enduring effort and a long view are key to winning the conflicts in the Middle East and halting the spread of global terrorism. But will Trump have the same patience as Obama? Will Trump have the same patience as his generals?
(Continued at this link)

Tuesday, December 20, 2016

2,900 explosions in a day. Heavy artillery and tank fire returns to the front lines in Ukraine.



Have we forgotten about Ukraine?  There should be no doubt that Russia is conducting unconventional warfare in Ukraine but on a much grander scale.  They are exploiting a resistance movement (even a fabricated one) but employing military and non-military instruments of power and from a military perspective not relying solely on special operations forces but a selective use of its conventional military power.  This is why I say that unconventional warfare does not solely belong to special forces or even the military writ large.  (http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/unconventional-warfare-does-not-belong-to-special-forces/)

We should pay attention to Nate Freier and his Army War College writing team and their report called Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1325 and these words:

Joint ground force commanders—but especially the U.S. Army—will benefit from a thorough reimagining of the potential of expeditionary forces and operations. As it ap­plies to the gray zone, U.S. ground forces need the capability to deploy in large numbers to perform a wide range of missions: enable and support allies, partners, and sister U.S. joint forces; build foreign partner capacity; counter adversary unconventional warfare (UW) campaigns; and perform more traditional offensive and defensive operations (of­ten against hybrid opponents). This requires examining and developing capabilities to defeat A2AD and rapidly delivering ground capabilities on short notice and limited advanced planning. 

This study found UW to be a final area of unique ground force vulnerability for the United States and its partners as they assess and contend with gray zone challenges. As currently defined by American Joint military doctrine, UW is the collection of activi­ties that enable the overthrow of a government through proxy actors in overtly denied areas.  U.S. UW vulnerability emerges in both an offensive and defense context. Offensively, UW provides U.S. decision-makers with a baseline capability for covert degrada­tion of an adversary’s control over contested territory. Defensively, Russian and Iranian UW efforts are currently presenting U.S./partners thorny challenges in Europe and the Middle East. In both instances, U.S. forces are increasingly unfamiliar with the associ­ated ground force demands that might result.

For example, SOF UW competency has atrophied with the substantial counterinsur­gency and counterterrorism demands of the last decade and a half. For their part, GPF have never been required to understand UW as a concept. Improvement is essential on both counts. 

 A sharper offensive UW instrument will be an important tool for pressuring active gray zone revisionist powers who themselves employ UW to aggressively undermine U.S. partners. Likewise, deep understanding of UW on the part of GPF forces will en­able them to engage in defensive UW activities to generate greater resilience among the same at risk partners. Finally, a more robust ground force UW capability that can understand, prosecute, and defend against it, employing the widest set of military and non-military tools, may require a new military competency in “political warfare.” This specific focus would enable both conventional and SOF to grasp the underpinnings and requirements necessary for prosecuting offensive and defensive UW activities against sophisticated gray zone actors.



Excerpt:

While Russia continues to support the separatists, the West has buttressed the Ukrainian war effort through training programs and nonlethal aid that includes vehicles, counter-artillery radar, body armor and night-vision equipment. The most recent defense bill passed by the U.S. Congress allocated an additional $50 million for Ukrainian military assistance in 2017, bringing the total to $350 million.

2,900 explosions in a day. Heavy artillery and tank fire returns to the front lines in Ukraine.

The Washington Post · by Thomas Gibbons-Neff · December 20, 2016

A soldier of the separatist self-proclaimed Lugansk People’s Republic walks in a field near the line of contact with the Ukrainian army at the so-called Svitlodarsk bulge in the Luhansk region. (Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters)
An early morning artillery barrage started the latest bloody scrap in eastern Ukraine Sunday as Russian-backed militants and government troops clashed near the town of Svitlodarsk.
A spokesman for the Ukrainian military, Col. Andriy Lysenko, said that five soldiers were killed and 16 wounded during the day-long battle and that Russian-backed separatist forces had attempted to break through government lines. It was the largest single loss of life for Ukrainian troops in five months.
A resident in a nearby separatist-controlled town, who asked not to be identified for personal security reasons, dismissed the idea that any separatist troops had attempted to attack and said the fighting was merely “rocket-tennis” between the two sides.
Lysenko said the Russian-backed fighters suffered about 50 casualties, but that figure could not be independently confirmed.
The site Censor.net, quoting an unnamed Ukrainian defense official, said that four bodies held by Ukrainian authorities were not claimed by the militants, suggesting that the deceased were either Russian soldiers or citizens.
An international monitoring group documented almost 3,000 explosions in the region Sunday — up from 700 on Saturday and 100 on Friday. The majority of Sunday’s detonations were recorded around Svitlodarsk. Despite multiple cease-fire attempts and efforts to remove heavy weapons from the front lines, the day-long bombardment, which included tanks, rocket artillery and howitzers, laid bare the shortcomings of international efforts to quell the conflict.
The fighting sent the residents of Svitlodarsk to their basements, and around nightfall, as temperatures dipped below freezing, the town lost power and gas. Utilities were restored around midnight, according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has observers on the ground.
Social media accounts that follow the conflict indicated that shelling in the area started again Monday night.
Since summer 2014, the front line in eastern Ukraine has been mostly static, and both sides have been relegated to exchanging artillery and machine-gun fire across a heavily mined no man’s land. Svitlodarsk is near the border between the two breakaway territories known as the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic and represents a Ukrainian-controlled bulge along the front line.
In talks brokered by France and Germany, Ukraine and Russia agreed upon a series of cease-fires known as the Minsk Agreements to stop the conflict, but both sides continue to clash daily. Earlier this month, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg encouraged allies to maintain economic sanctions on Russia until there is a lasting cease-fire.
While Russia continues to support the separatists, the West has buttressed the Ukrainian war effort through training programs and nonlethal aid that includes vehicles, counter-artillery radar, body armor and night-vision equipment. The most recent defense bill passed by the U.S. Congress allocated an additional $50 million for Ukrainian military assistance in 2017, bringing the total to $350 million.
It is unclear how President-elect Donald Trump will approach the conflict. His pro-Russian statements have put both NATO allies and the Ukrainian government on edge.
Since the conflict in Ukraine began in April 2014, nearly 10,000 people have been killed and more than 20,000 wounded, according to a United Nations report in June. More than 1.6 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced by the conflict.

Sunday, October 30, 2016

Advice from SOF on the Use of SOF for the Next Administration

I was fortunate to be able to participate in the event and contribute to the discussion.  


Executive summary and table of contents are excerpted below.
Advice from SOF on the Use of SOF for the Next Administration 
Rapporteur: Alexander Powell 
October 2016

Executive Summary 
On October 14, 2016, CNA convened a half-day meeting of experts to discuss the use of special operations forces (SOF) by the next administration. Our speakers consisted of a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and six former SOF Commanders whose rank at retirement ranged from one to four stars. Our audience of approximately 50 attendees consisted largely of active duty SOF and their civilian equivalents. The conversation was held under the Chatham House Rule of non-attribution. The overarching themes of that discussion included the following: 

• The sanctity of SOF. SOF are a limited resource that are most effective when given clear policies and permissive rules of engagement (ROE), when employed and supported in accordance with the “SOF Truths,” and when allowed to have a strong voice in the decisions and policies governing their employment. Our attendees recommended that policymakers and conventional military commanders should: 

Educate themselves—and seek SOF input—on the relative strengths and weaknesses of SOF, and when they should and should not be used. 

Set policy and ROE, and trust that SOF will accomplish the mission, given their flexibility, adaptability, and record of success. 

Recognize that SOF are fully committed and continuing at the present pace of deployments risks burning out the force. Preservation of the force requires growth or relieving SOF of some of its currently assigned missions. 

• Preparation of the policy environment. In strategic policy and resource discussions, SOF are often reliant on non-SOF experts to represent their capabilities and interests. Our attendees recommended that SOF leaders should: Proactively engage influential civilians inside and outside of government in order to educate them on SOF capabilities, limitations, and requirements. 

Seek a more active voice when the use of SOF is considered as a policy option, for example by placing a flag or general officer on the National Security Council Staff. 

Clearly articulate the SOF narrative. For public audiences, this should include who SOF are, what they do, and why—while not revealing methods. For policy audiences, this should include a framework for how to think about SOF using past successes as examples. 

• Balancing the future force. Countering terrorism will initially be a priority for the next administration and SOF will play a central role in this mission. But the U.S. is also facing increasing threats from China and Russia, among others. For SOF to play a role in shaping near-peer adversaries that is commensurate with their core competencies, some rebalancing of the force is required. Our attendees recommended that policymakers and SOF leaders should: Recognize the role that SOF can—and should—play in shaping the environment around rising and resurgent near-peer adversaries. Give SOF greater space, authorities, and resources to act clandestinely in this role. 

Re-examine the balance between surgical strike and special warfare capabilities, personnel, and resources. 

Increase the diversity of the force via greater recruitment of minorities and women, and place an emphasis on their development, mentorship, and retention. Also increase emphasis on language and micro-regional studies. 

Develop SOF’s operational level capabilities, by codifying lessons from the Special Operations Joint Task Forces, resourcing USSOCOM to source and sustain them, and developing planners for SOF-centric campaigns. 

• SOF as a source of innovation. SOF have pioneered numerous technologies and tactics that have benefitted the conventional military. The reasons behind SOF’s ability to innovate include a willingness to rapidly experiment and foster freedom of thought—these should be imitated and reinforced. Our attendees recommended that policymakers and military leaders should: Shift the military service schoolhouses away from teaching mostly conventional war doctrine and “what to think,” to a balance of conventional and unconventional approaches and an emphasis on “how to think.” 

Adjust military service manpower policies to enable non-traditional career paths, new ways of developing leaders, and lateral transfers into service. 

Create a robust intellectual hub at USSOCOM to foster, develop, and transition new technologies and tactics to SOF and the conventional force. 

The next administration will face a multitude of challenges and SOF will continue to play a central role in many of them. The recommendations above will help ensure SOF are as successful for the next administration as they have been for the last one. 
Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 
Setting the stage for SOF ..................................................................................................... 1 
Key themes ............................................................................................................................. 3 
The sanctity of SOF ............................................................................................................... 3 
Preparation of the policy environment ............................................................................. 4 
Balancing the future force ................................................................................................... 5 
SOF as a source of innovation ............................................................................................ 7 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 9 

Sunday, June 26, 2016

Ban Animal Use in Military Medical Training (says PETA and the NY Times)

The dateline for this editorial is June 25 which as we all know is the anniversary of the start of the Korean War.  How fitting that the NY Times would publish this to recommend banning live tissue training which is arguably training that has saved more American lives on the battlefield than any other training.  While the military is searching hard for simulations to replace it there is nothing that has been developed that can provide equal training benefits that will save lives on the battlefield.  

And it is ironic that they chose to use the metaphor that PETA has been waging a guerrilla war against this training since the force that has pioneered this training and executes it most extensively is Special Forces which is the force that is singularly organized, trained, educated, equipped, and optimized to support and/or conduct guerrilla warfare. 

And just as an aside, although animals are used for this training, the handling of these animals is done in an extraordinarily humane way and they are treated with dignity and respect especially because SF medics have spent so much time raising and caring for them before they are used in the final training scenarios. 

We should also remember that Doctors conduct live tissue training on humans in hospitals as part of their medical training.  Although SF medics do conduct training in hospitals they are not allowed to conduct the same type of procedures in hospitals that they must perform on the battlefield and the only way they can get that training to become the outstanding medical practitioners that they become is through live tissue training on animals.  As one Doctor used to say, SF medics should be called "wilderness doctors" because they are trained to be as proficient in the field outside of a hospital as any doctor with the same field medical kit can be (and many doctors will admit that in the field SF medics are in many ways more proficient than many doctors).

And as one of our great SF Sergeants Major once said, the first time that a medic puts his hands in the bleeding guts of a fellow soldier should not be on the actual battlefield.  But that is what this ban will cause and many American soldiers will die because of it.  I urge everyone to support the counter-guerrilla war against PETA's efforts.

I hope cooler heads will prevail in Congress and we will not put the lives of American soldiers at risk needlessly. 

PETA please find another cause for your work.

Ban Animal Use in Military Medical Training

By THE EDITORIAL BOARDJUNE 25, 2016

For years, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals has been waging a guerrilla war against the Pentagon over its use of live goats and pigs to train combat medics. Their primary tactic: obtaining footage of training sessionsto expose the barbarity of a practice that’s cruel and unnecessary.
The Pentagon has taken steps to phase out live-tissue training, as the practice is called, by using human-shaped simulators. But military officials have refused to do away with using animals entirely, arguing that doing so could result in more battlefield deaths.
Photo
Army flight medics train using a high-fidelity mannequin. CreditSmiley N. Pool/Houston Chronicle, via Associated Press
Until relatively recently, PETA’s cause got relatively little sympathy on Capitol Hill. Representative Hank Johnson, a Georgia Democrat,introduced a bill in 2013 seeking to abolish the practice, but it hasn’t come close to passing. In recent months, though, PETA has gone on the offensive, and last week, 71 members of Congress, including 16 Republicans and 10 veterans, sent a letter to the secretary of defense, Ashton Carter, seeking detailed information about the use of animals in medic training and urging the department to hasten its adoption of simulators. The letter noted that military medical experts concluded in a 2014 study that using live animals offers no advantage over using simulators.
Representative Joe Heck, a Republican from Nevada and one of the two sponsors of the letter, has helped broaden support for the cause. Mr. Heck, a doctor, was medical director of the Casualty Care Research Center at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences from 1998 to 2003. He has served in the Army Reserve since 1991 and ran an emergency room combat hospital in Baghdad during one of his deployments. The letter’s other sponsor was Representative Jackie Speier, a California Democrat.
Separately, several medical associations — including the National Medical Association and the American Medical Student Association — have recently endorsed Mr. Johnson’s bill, which would require the Pentagon to stop using animals for medic training by 2020.
It shouldn’t take an act of Congress for the Pentagon to give up this practice. Among the 28 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 22 have banned the use of animals for medic training. The vast majority of programs in the United States that train civilian medical workers in trauma care use simulators exclusively. There’s no reason the Pentagon should continue inflicting cruelty on animals.
A version of this editorial appears in print on June 26, 2016, on page SR10 o

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