6 people Obama isn’t considering for defense secretary but should

Note Alan Mulally of Ford.  Wasn't McNamara a Ford guy? :-)  But this is quite an excerpt:

The national security community has a penchant for defense intellectuals, meaning people who work in DOD or NSC or think tank jobs creating and evaluating government policy. We are ennobled with the title "strategists." But very few of us are actually ever trained for or called on to match objectives to means. Just one small indicator is the paucity of defense experts who know anything about budgeting or think about the defense budget in the context of cost-effectiveness in spending -- its absence ought to be a disqualifying factor. 

Moreover, the president doesn't need a defense strategy. Like it or not, he has one: winding down the wars and minimizing foreign entanglements, killing suspected terrorists by remote means, and training the military forces of other countries to handle their own problems.

V/R

Dave

6 people Obama isn’t considering for defense secretary but should

Posted By Kori Schake  Thursday, December 27, 2012 - 2:00 PM

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/27/six_people_president_obama_isn_t_considering_for_defense_secretary_but_should

The president is closing in on announcing a new defense secretary and birds of prey are fighting over the candidacy of Senator Chuck Hagel, while people close to the president complain that there are no good candidates and Dems fear the president is undercutting their newfound respectability with defense voters by returning the Defense Department to Republican hands. But the president's priorities argue for a technically proficient executive that can intimidate the Department into compliance and the Congress into restraining spending and hobby horses -- a description neither Hagel nor the other preferred candidates fit.

If the president is simply looking to put the Pentagon into the hands of someone who shares his views on foreign policy, Chuck Hagel would achieve that aim, and with the sublime collateral damage of continuing Republican feuding. But it is unlikely to buy the White House congressional support on defense policy -- and that's crucial, given what the White House actually wants to achieve in the coming four years.

The national security community has a penchant for defense intellectuals, meaning people who work in DOD or NSC or think tank jobs creating and evaluating government policy. We are ennobled with the title "strategists." But very few of us are actually ever trained for or called on to match objectives to means. Just one small indicator is the paucity of defense experts who know anything about budgeting or think about the defense budget in the context of cost-effectiveness in spending -- its absence ought to be a disqualifying factor.

Moreover, the president doesn't need a defense strategy. Like it or not, he has one: winding down the wars and minimizing foreign entanglements, killing suspected terrorists by remote means, and training the military forces of other countries to handle their own problems. It is consistent with his broader national security strategy of investing in American domestic strength and rebalancing spending away from defense. If the president's strategy were actually implemented by the Defense Department, it would mean a genuinely revolutionary reduction in DOD spending and redistribution of spending among the military services, greatly to the advantage of the Navy and detriment of the active-duty Army.

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http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/27/six_people_president_obama_isn_t_considering_for_defense_secretary_but_should

Wanted: A Few Good Leaders Fewer veterans are serving in high office in the United States. It's no coincidence that America is going off the rails.

I would respectfully disagree with Mr. Kane.  I think the subtitle of the article is a little over the top – America is not going off the rails because there are fewer veterans serving in high office and to make such a claim would seem to be an example of military arrogance.  Mr. Kane might think his few years of honorable and heroic military service (per his bio below)  has prepared him to be SECDEF or SECSTATE or other high level official but I am not sure I would make the same claim about my military service nor would I think most other Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines.  Certainly many are well prepared but they are likely just as well prepared as their civilians counterparts.

He of course does not mention Eliot Cohen's book Supreme Command which as we all know illustrates that there are very successful strategic leaders without military experience.  I do not think military service is a requirement for high level strategic leadership.  Certainly military service at the senior ranks can help develop strategic thinking and leadership and military service at the junior ranks can also provide a level of empathy for the plight of the common foot Soldier but as Eliot Cohen has shown there are some great historical examples of civilians with superior strategic leadership abilities over their military counterparts (or subordinates).  I personally just want the best person for the job whether he or she is a veteran or not.  Being a veteran should be neither a prerequisite nor a discriminator for high level strategic leadership positions but can and should be considered along with all the other person's qualifications.  Just find us the best man or woman for the job regardless of military experience.

V/R

Dave

Wanted: A Few Good Leaders

Fewer veterans are serving in high office in the United States. It's no coincidence that America is going off the rails.

BY PAUL V. KANE | DECEMBER 27, 2012

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/27/Hagel_veterans_leadership?page=full

Looking back at a decade of war -- with $3 trillion spent pursuing victory in Iraq and Afghanistan, millions of our citizens plucked from home for combat deployments, and more than 50,000 of our brethren wounded or killed in action -- Americans need to ask themselves a single blunt question: Are our current military and civilian leaders fit to lead us in the next war?

There's a reason our national experience since 9/11 has been mixed with confusion, pride, trying developments, ruinous expense, and fleeting successes. We have lots of leaders but a national deficit in true leadership. Two trends have brought us to this crisis.

First, the vast majority of our current leaders have only a theoretical, intellectual, and abstract knowledge of the military and war -- not an experiential, visceral, and personal understanding. The proportion of our key decision-makers who have served in the military and have personal experience with defense is in steady decline.

Before 1993, nearly every modern president had served on active duty in uniform, most in wartime, and a few were war heroes. At one point, 77 percent of Congress were veterans. Come 2013, veterans will make up a mere 19 percent of Congress -- and many among this 19 percent have "military service" in their record purely because they sought to avoid the draft and Vietnam combat; they volunteered between 1966 and 1975 for what was then safe, part-time service at home in the National Guard or Reserve.

People who have not served in uniform or combat are often ill equipped to understand how conflict and armies work (or, frequently, how they don't), how war moves to capricious rhythms, and how war plans last only until first contact with the enemy.

Consider the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 -- perhaps the most high-stakes example of this concept.

President John F. Kennedy was a Navy veteran, and his brush with war left him without illusions. He kept his own counsel during the showdown with the Soviets precisely because he had been to war and had his boat sunk in combat. Kennedy was not overawed by the cigar-chomping general with a constellation of stars on his collar who disdainfully told him, "Sir, you have few options on Cuba except ‘surgical strikes' followed by invasion."

JFK knew that using the words "precision" and "bombing" in the same sentence was nonsense. We now know that if he had taken the advice of Gen. Curtis LeMay and others, Soviet commanders at sea and on the island would likely have ordered the use of tactical nuclear weapons -- potentially escalating the crisis beyond the point of no return. Kennedy had the instincts and experience to discern the right course and hold his military to proper account in that unforgiving moment.

Being a veteran does not inoculate someone from making stupid or reckless decisions about war -- not at all. But an executive who's never been to war needs first to be brutally honest with himself -- to know what he does not know -- and second, to surround himself with veterans whom he trusts. The Cuban missile crisis turned out well because Kennedy had served in uniform and he had trusted and experienced advisors who were veterans and could provide a check on the generals; he could walk down the hall to ask Kenny O'Donnell or Dave Powers, two former Air Corps bombardiers from World War II, "Is this the real deal or B.S.?"

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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/27/Hagel_veterans_leadership?page=full

U.S. official: North Korea likely deceived U.S., allies before launching rocket

Yes, we did get deceived. North Korea depends on denial and deception as a fundamental method of operations.  But we should did get deceived this time.

We should realize that the north understands our surveillance methods and that if we can see something it is because they want us to see it.  They wanted us to see that they were dismantling the missile. It is also likely that they had a good idea of how we would react to their statements and what our ISR could observe and they provided the picture and the information that would confirm our analysis bias (e.g., the north continues to have technical problems so it was very plausible that a delay was needed) 

But why the deception?  To reduce our ability to observe and gain data from the launch?  To "protect" the launch? – did fear the US or Japan would try to shoot it down? (note I did not include the ROK as a threat to the north's missile).  Did they simply just want to embarrass us?

But again we must understand that the north will use denial and deception in everything it does and we must look for it and be prepared to deal with it.

V/R
Dave

December 27th, 2012

05:28 PM ET

U.S. official: North Korea likely deceived U.S., allies before launching rocket

By Barbara Starr

http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/27/u-s-official-north-korea-likely-deceived-u-s-allies-before-launching-rocket/?hpt=hp_t3

North Korea likely engaged in a deliberate campaign of deception before a December 12 long-range missile launch, catching the United States and its Asian allies "off guard," according to a U.S. official with direct knowledge of analysis of the incident conducted by U.S. military and intelligence agencies.

The official told CNN that American and Japanese military ships and missile defenses were fully operational and protecting land, sea and airspace on December 12, but that the launch was a surprise when it actually happened.

"We had our dukes up, operationally, but we were caught off guard," the official said.

"The clues point to a concerted effort to deceive us," the official said. The analysis was ordered in the wake of the launch to determine what exactly happened and how much the U.S. intelligence knew at the time.

The official said one conclusion was that while missile defenses can fully protect against a North Korean attack, the North Koreans have shown they can counter U.S. measures to gather intelligence about what they are up to.

"Look, they know when our satellites are passing overhead," the official said. It's believed the North Koreans essentially manipulated the launch so U.S. intelligence satellites simply would not be overhead and able to see what was happening.

The most likely scenario, the official said, was that North Korea wasn't telling the truth when it announced several days before the launch that there were technical problems with the missile.

According to the official, the intelligence analysis found that:

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http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/27/u-s-official-north-korea-likely-deceived-u-s-allies-before-launching-rocket/?hpt=hp_t3

VSO/ALP Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local Defense

But I think we need a little more history written about 2001-2002 from people who were there. I want to read about the proposals that were made by those on the ground and that were not accepted by those not on the ground. Then there can be an analysis of what might have been (though of course this is all water under the bridge but it would be worth knowing that if people on the ground early on had been listened to, things might have turned out differently - though in the end tactical actions are no substitute for poor or no strategy).

V/R

Dave

VSO/ALP

Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local Defense

by Lisa Saum-Manning

Journal Article | December 27, 2012 - 5:30am

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/vsoalp

Introduction

In August 2010, President Karzai authorized the establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program by presidential decree (p. 68). The program falls under the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and aims to train local Afghans in rural areas to defend their communities against insurgents and other illegally-armed groups. The program was designed, and is currently funded and supported by, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in a broader initiative to enhance security and stability at the village level through the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. 

The ALP was originally intended to be a temporary program, targeting a 10,000-man end strength by 2013. On December 11, 2011, U.S. Special Operations Commander Admiral William H. McRaven announced his intention to extend the program beyond its original mandate, and to exceed 30,000 ALP members by 2015. The announcement signaled an important shift in strategic thinking about the way forward in Afghanistan; one geared toward empowering Afghans to take over the reins of local defense, rather than relying on an undetermined level of national and coalition force presence to secure the countryside. However, the notion of expanding the ALP program has been met with skepticism from numerous media, think tank, and NGO (pp. 40-45)  reports that cite allegations of human rights abuse, corruption, and poorly-trained ALP recruits among the rationales for calls to disband the initiative altogether. Such competing perspectives of the value and efficacy of the ALP program underscore the need to examine the program in greater detail.

To this aim, this paper aspires to describe the VSO/ALP program within the Afghan context. The first section provides a brief history of post 9/11 local defense initiatives in Afghanistan and identifies how VSO/ALP differs from past programs. The second section highlights some of the challenges facing the initiative and discusses some recent successes that suggest that the program has the potential to emerge as a viable and enduring solution to security and stability in Afghanistan.

Local Defense Initiatives (2001-current)

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http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/vsoalp

The wrong debate on Afghan withdrawal

The author appears to want balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means.  

V/R

Dave

The wrong debate on Afghan withdrawal

Published: December 26

In recent weeks, The Post has run several opinion pieces concerning the coming withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan [“What we’ll need in Afghanistan,” Kimberly and Frederick W. Kagan, Nov. 25; “A job that 10,000 troops can handle,” David Barno and Matthew Irvine, Dec. 2; “The risks of an Afghan drawdown,” Max Boot, Dec. 24]. While I have great respect for these authors, I am disturbed by the focus on troop levels rather than on how a future U.S. presence in Afghanistan advances broader U.S. strategic interests in Eurasia.

By restricting the debate to troop levels, we approach the problem backward.

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http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-wrong-debate-on-afghan-withdrawal/2012/12/26/c5dbbea4-4e00-11e2-835b-02f92c0daa43_print.html

The wrong army: What we built in Afghanistan

Some day when the history is written I am sure we will find Gary's recommendations a part of proposals made and discarded as far back as 2002:

How should we have adjusted to make the Iraq formula work for Afghanistan? We should’ve built a security system of local defense organizations, rather than a huge national army. We should’ve built a smaller national army, with adequate helicopter and air support to reinforce those local forces when they got in trouble. We should have begun the village-stabilization program of local self-defense militias much sooner to rectify this deficiency on a national level.

V/R

Dave

The wrong army

What we built in Afghanistan

• By GARY ANDERSON
• Last Updated: 12:44 AM, December 26, 2012
• Posted: 11:32 PM, December 25, 2012
• http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/the_wrong_army_RLQfo2NQTmtyn0Y046oA8H

A number of recent articles in the press have discussed how unready Afghanistan’s army is to take control of the war there. They’re basically right: The Afghan National Army is a flawed instrument.

We helped to make it so, but the Afghans themselves bear much of the blame. I was part of the problem, because I didn’t realize how bad the situation was until too late.

I served as a civilian adviser helping train the Afghan government in the only Pashtun-majority district in the country’s northwest, after having done similar work in Iraq — where our training mission was generally deemed a success.

It wasn’t until late last spring that I realized what a problem we had in Afghanistan. I worked closely with our Afghan battalion; under the tutelage of an Italian unit and a US Marine Special Operations Team, it performed fairly well. With coalition helicopter and air support, it appeared to be ready for transition.

Our major concern was that the Afghan army wasn’t prepared to logistically resupply its troops in our isolated district on the Turkmenistan border, where there is no road network. All of our resupply came by helicopter or parachute drop, so we were not confident that — once Coalition aircraft were no longer available — our Afghan National Army battalion or the local police could be resupplied through the winter.

We were informed in the spring that we had to leave and transition to Afghan security control by the end of July, far earlier than expected. But we believed that, if they could be resupplied, our battalion would fight.

We were badly mistaken.

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http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/the_wrong_army_RLQfo2NQTmtyn0Y046oA8H

N. Korean leader to purge more of the old guard in new year: expert

More from Sasha Mansourov based on his essays at 38 North/SAIS.  

But I might take issue with the adjective "reckless" to describe the purges of 2012.  It might seem reckless to us but I think they are calculated and so far have resulted in Kim Jong-un's consolidation of power.   But there is some interesting speculation on what might happen to Kim Yong-nam.

V/R

Dave

2012/12/27 04:07 KST

(LEAD) N. Korean leader to purge more of the old guard in new year: expert

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/12/27/39/0401000000AEN20121227000300315F.HTML

By Lee Chi-dong

WASHINGTON, Dec. 26 (Yonhap) -- As North Korean leader Kim Jong-un wraps up his first year in power, marked by the reckless purging of several old guard elites, he may replace the country's No. 2 leader, Kim Yong-nam, and some other top officials next year, according to a North Korea expert here.

   "Who replaces Kim Yong-nam may tell us about the future direction of the restructuring of the political system," said Alexandre Mansourov, a specialist in Northeast Asian security. He now works as a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University.

   He said Kim Yong-nam will likely "honorably retire," rather than being purged.

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http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/12/27/39/0401000000AEN20121227000300315F.HTML