Chinese supercomputers threaten U.S. security (and comments on Countering Unconventional Warfare)

Will we ever understand unconventional warfare?  I am reminded of this excellent analogy I heard at lunch yesterday with one of my good friends and SF brothers:

"UW is to Warfare as Acupuncture is to Medicine” COL (RET) Jack Jensen, US Army SF, 3 May 2017 

Georgetown appreciates the shout out. And Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab has done great work on Russia's Little Green Men (and assessing revolutionary and insurgent strategies).  Note the heavy emphasis on cyber and UW.  COL Pat Duggan (US Army SF) is one of the leading (or perhaps only) thinkers in the SOF community on cyber and particularly cyber in the human domain which is especially relevant and important to influence political resistance and conducting political warfare which is a major component of unconventional warfare.  Read Pat's latest work here: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/tactical-cema-in-cognitive-spaces or his award winning article Strategic Development of Special Warfare in Cyberspace in Joint Force Quarterly here:  http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-79/Article/621123/strategic-development-of-special-warfare-in-cyberspace/

I would quibble with the idea that the nature of unconventional warfare has changed as it is and always has been about political resistance at the very heart.  Sure there are new characteristics and capabilities but in the end this is a very human endeavor and all the technology in the world is not going to change its nature.

Excerpts:

The Pentagon is two years late in supplying Congress with a study on new strategies for countering unconventional warfare threats posed by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

Rep. Elise M. Stefanik, chairwoman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on emerging threats, pressed a senior Pentagon official on the subject during a hearing Tuesday. The study was required in 2015 legislation.

“This strategy, which is now almost two years late, ultimately can help provide a way to ensure that our ends, ways and means are aligned to help counter these unconventional threats,” said Ms. Stefanik, New York Republican.

Unconventional warfare is the use of nonkinetic warfare capabilities ranging from cyber and electronic attacks to “influence operations” using political, media and legal means.

In response, Theresa Whelan, assistant defense secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict, said unconventional warfare is an emerging threat and the Pentagon is studying the issue. Ms. Whelan noted that the military’s counterterrorism mission has been the main focus of low-intensity conflict.

“We have, as a consequence, had to shift resources to focus on this and develop capabilities and knowledge bases that had, to certain extent, atrophied over the years,” she said.

“But also, because the nature of UW has fundamentally changed because of 21st-century technologies and techniques, we really in many ways have been starting from scratch. And that has been one of the challenges that we’ve faced as we dug into this over the last 18 to 24 months.”

Russia used hybrid warfare to take over Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and its cyber-enabled influence operation targeting the 2016 U.S. presidential election. China has been using similar information operations in its bid to gradually take control of the South China Sea.

Examples of Iranian information operations have included cyberattacks on U.S. banks and a waterway control system in upstate New York.

North Korea has used extensive cyberattacks to achieve objectives — including the cyberattack on Sony Picture Entertainment and cyberattacks on banks in Asia that netted the regime in Pyongyang tens of million of dollars.

The Pentagon is working with other U.S. government agencies to deal with what Ms. Whalen called “multiple threats” from foreign information operations.

Georgetown University has conducted a study for the Pentagon that found that America’s adversaries are “focusing on the seams between our organizational entities and trying to exploit those seams and decision-making cycles in order to gain advantage on us in the space that essentially is below conventional war — the space that we now refer to as the gray zone or hybrid warfare,” Ms. Whalen said.

Two research projects are underway on the topic of unconventional warfare, one at Johns Hopkins University on Russian hybrid warfare, and a Pentagon research effort to develop predictive analytic technologies.

The technologies “will help us identify when countries are utilizing unconventional warfare techniques at levels essentially below our normal observation thresholds,” Ms. Whalen said.

After the Russia unconventional warfare strategy is completed, the Pentagon will look at Chinese and Iranian unconventional warfare threats, she added. “This continues to be an evolving threat.”

Chinese supercomputers threaten U.S. security

• By Bill Gertz, www.washingtontimes.com
• View Original
• May 3rd, 2017

China is eclipsing the United States in developing high-speed supercomputers used to build advanced weapons, and the loss of American leadership in the field poses a threat to U.S. national security.

That’s the conclusion of a recent joint National Security Agency-Energy Department study, based on an assessment of China’s new supercomputer called the TaihuLight.

“National security requires the best computing available, and loss of leadership in [high-performance computing] will severely compromise our national security,” the report warns.

Supercomputers play a “vital role” in the design, development and analysis of almost all modern weapons systems, including nuclear weapons, cyberwarfare capabilities, ships, aircraft, communications security, missile defense, precision-strike capabilities and hypersonic weapons, the report said.

China is rapidly developing hypersonic strike missiles that can deliver conventional and nuclear payloads by maneuvering past advanced missile defenses.

“Loss of leadership in [high-performance computing] could significantly reduce the U.S. nuclear deterrence and the sophistication of our future weapons systems,” the report says.

“Conversely, if China fields a weapons system with new capabilities based on superior [high-performance computing], and the U.S. cannot accurately estimate its true capabilities, there is a serious possibility of over- or underestimating the threat.”

A copy of the 18-page report, “U.S. Leadership in High Performance Computing (HPC): A Report from the NSA-DOE Technical Meeting on High Performance Computing,” dated Dec. 1, has been obtained by Inside the Ring.

Chinese supremacy in computer capabilities also could produce distortions in allocating defense funds for U.S. research and development, and strategic policymaking and result in “incorrect responses to world events,” the report said.

Currently, the United States has a cost-effective supercomputer capability. But loss of U.S. leadership in the field would result in acquisition of supercomputers in ways similar to Pentagon acquisition of aircraft carriers — at vastly increased costs.

For industrial applications, if the United States were to become reliant on Chinese supercomputers, it “could threaten the loss of intellectual property and competitive edge.”

“Personal email and private information, social networks and the emerging Internet of Things are all subject to even greater privacy risks if offshore entities have superior HPC analytics or control the data/information markets,” the report said.

The report called for a surge in U.S. government investment and action in supercomputing, including the priorities outlined in the 2016 National Strategic Computing Initiative Plan.

Energy Department national laboratories and the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity are working on cutting-edge supercomputers.

The study was based on a two-day conference in September of some 60 experts, including 40 from U.S. government agencies, 10 from the technology industry and 10 from academia and other organizations.

PENTAGON LATE WITH HYBRID WARFARE STUDY

The Pentagon is two years late in supplying Congress with a study on new strategies for countering unconventional warfare threats posed by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

Rep. Elise M. Stefanik, chairwoman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on emerging threats, pressed a senior Pentagon official on the subject during a hearing Tuesday. The study was required in 2015 legislation.

“This strategy, which is now almost two years late, ultimately can help provide a way to ensure that our ends, ways and means are aligned to help counter these unconventional threats,” said Ms. Stefanik, New York Republican.

Unconventional warfare is the use of nonkinetic warfare capabilities ranging from cyber and electronic attacks to “influence operations” using political, media and legal means.

In response, Theresa Whelan, assistant defense secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict, said unconventional warfare is an emerging threat and the Pentagon is studying the issue. Ms. Whelan noted that the military’s counterterrorism mission has been the main focus of low-intensity conflict.

“We have, as a consequence, had to shift resources to focus on this and develop capabilities and knowledge bases that had, to certain extent, atrophied over the years,” she said.

“But also, because the nature of UW has fundamentally changed because of 21st-century technologies and techniques, we really in many ways have been starting from scratch. And that has been one of the challenges that we’ve faced as we dug into this over the last 18 to 24 months.”

Russia used hybrid warfare to take over Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and its cyber-enabled influence operation targeting the 2016 U.S. presidential election. China has been using similar information operations in its bid to gradually take control of the South China Sea.

Examples of Iranian information operations have included cyberattacks on U.S. banks and a waterway control system in upstate New York.

North Korea has used extensive cyberattacks to achieve objectives — including the cyberattack on Sony Picture Entertainment and cyberattacks on banks in Asia that netted the regime in Pyongyang tens of million of dollars.

The Pentagon is working with other U.S. government agencies to deal with what Ms. Whalen called “multiple threats” from foreign information operations.

Georgetown University has conducted a study for the Pentagon that found that America’s adversaries are “focusing on the seams between our organizational entities and trying to exploit those seams and decision-making cycles in order to gain advantage on us in the space that essentially is below conventional war — the space that we now refer to as the gray zone or hybrid warfare,” Ms. Whalen said.

Two research projects are underway on the topic of unconventional warfare, one at Johns Hopkins University on Russian hybrid warfare, and a Pentagon research effort to develop predictive analytic technologies.

The technologies “will help us identify when countries are utilizing unconventional warfare techniques at levels essentially below our normal observation thresholds,” Ms. Whalen said.

After the Russia unconventional warfare strategy is completed, the Pentagon will look at Chinese and Iranian unconventional warfare threats, she added. “This continues to be an evolving threat.”

REPORT CALLS FOR DEFEATING JIHADIS ONLINE

The global Islamic terrorist movement could not function without the internet and defeating terrorism online is possible, according to a report by the Middle East Research Institute (MEMRI).

“Jihadi organizations used the web to recruit supporters and fighters, provide practical instruction and manuals for terror operations including car bomb and ramming attacks, make arch-terrorists into heroic models for emulation, and raise funds for their activity,” the report says. “The internet provided them with an ideal vehicle for spreading their ideas, even to young children.”

Recently, social media companies have begun to lose advertising revenue as a result of hateful content on their sites. Companies including Johnson & Johnson, Toyota, General Motors, Wal-Mart, AT&T and HSBC have pulled ads to protest terrorist videos, the report said.

Governments also are pressuring media to remove hateful speech, and families have begun to sue internet companies for carrying content that incited and radicalized terrorists who killed relatives.

The MEMRI report said the measures are good first steps but that more needs to be done. The internet should be purged of jihadi propaganda and incitement content through financial investments, and new technologies could identify and remove jihadi material.

“Purging the internet of jihadi content can deal with terrorism at its source, and can have an immediate impact on recruitment, indoctrination and training of terrorists,” the report said. “This will significantly reduce the threat which will, in turn, enable Western democracies to reduce the degree of infringement upon our liberties, freedoms and daily life.”

• Contact Bill Gertz on Twitter at @BillGertz.

My latest article on Small Wars Journal.

Congress Has Embraced Unconventional Warfare: Will the US Military and The Rest of the US Government?

by David S. Maxwell

Journal Article | December 29, 2015 - 1:56pm

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/congress-has-embraced-unconventional-warfare-will-the-us-military-and-the-rest-of-the-us-go

Congress Has Embraced Unconventional Warfare: Will the US Military and The Rest of the US Government?

David S. Maxwell

With the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 the United States Congress has embraced what Russia, Iran, China, Al Qaeda and even ISIS have long known and that is unconventional warfare (UW) is a form of warfare that is optimized for achieving national objectives in the space between peace and war.  Congress, in Section 1097, has directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy to counter unconventional warfare being conducted by adversaries of the US.  Congress recognizes the US has a strategy gap between peace and war and the directive to the SECDEF is the forcing function necessary to develop a strategy and to bring new and creative thinking to the national security challenges we face.

What is Unconventional Warfare?

In Section 1097 and in joint US military doctrine it is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.”

However, our adversaries employ their own unique forms of unconventional warfare by effectively integrating conventional and special operations forces, all elements of their national power, and in particular psychological warfare, while exploiting conditions, to include resistance, in countries and regions around the world to counter the west and often the US directly in order to achieve their political and security objectives.  They take a more holistic approach to unconventional warfare and are willing to employ it as a matter of course.  In     contrast the US has long viewed unconventional warfare as something only Special Forces conduct and then only to be used in very rare situations when there are no other alternatives.  In short, in the past the US has shown it does not have the stomach for unconventional warfare.  Fortunately, Congress has recognized this shortfall in US security strategy.

Directive from Congress

DOD has 180 days to provide to Congress a strategy to counter unconventional warfare.  The clock is ticking.  It will be interesting to read the response to Section 1097.  One possible bureaucratic course of action would consist of reviewing what the Department is already doing and showing the metrics of terrorists removed from the battlefield and listing all the capabilities the Department has that are and can be used to counter-unconventional warfare.  The Department will even tout the new joint unconventional warfare doctrine from the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved in September 2015.  The purpose of this course of action would be to meet the Congressional requirement with minimal disruption to the department and thus get Congress off its back.  Another course of action would be to view this as an opportunity for Congressional support of a new strategy that would be based on a thorough understanding of our adversaries’ strategies and how they are employing unconventional warfare.  The question is how with the department respond?

My concern is that the department and the rest of the US government will continue to have no desire to have anything to do with unconventional warfare.  It is complicated, messy, time-consuming, and hard to measure effectiveness and success especially when compared to counterterrorism and surgical strike operations where immediate results are demonstrated in the number of terrorists removed from the battlefield.

Why Focus on Counter-Unconventional Warfare Strategy?

First, our enemies are conducting their unique forms of unconventional warfare; Russia, Iran, China, Al Qaeda, ISIS (I think AQ and ISIS are much broader than "simply" terrorist organizations.)  We need to recognize the strategies they are using and attack those strategies to effectively operate in the "Gray Zone” between peace and war.

Second, focusing on our enemies conducting their unique forms of UW should lead to the recognition that we have to operate in the Special Warfare realm and not just the Surgical Strike realm.

Third, focusing on terrorism has caused us to think too tactically while a focus on counter UW can drive us to think more strategically and holistically about the problems we face by understanding the enemy’s strategy which poses complex political and military problems.

The Future of Warfare in the Gap Between Peace and War: Past is Prologue

As I opined in 2012 before a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee looking at the future of irregular warfare, we tend to prefer conventional conflict that can be defined as  "an armed struggle or clash between organized political parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve political or military objectives.”  However, what we more routinely face is conflict that is “non-conventional” in nature.  It is something ambiguous and difficult to understand.  It extends the continuum of conflict.  Conflict in the conventional sense begins when the armed struggle begins; however, non-conventional conflict encompasses a broad range of types of conflict, starting with thethreat or possibility of conflict and extending past conflict termination, because the conditions that gave rise to hostilities in the first place may still remain, though not visible or easily recognized.  It also includes armed clashes by unorganized groups that are not seeking to achieve any political or military objectives but may be exploited by external actors.  Non-conventional conflict encompasses the lawlessness of a society in which the governmental system has collapsed, but no organized group has risen to take its place.  Violence and terrorist-like activity can occur out of frustration with no identifiable purpose.  This type of conflict is non-conventional, because it is difficult to determine the objectives and methods of the actors, perhaps difficult to even determine the actors, and thus it is difficult to apply conventional elements of power.  This is the sensitive and complex environment that our adversaries seek to exploit through their unique applications of unconventional warfare.

Since 9-11 we have embarked on the search for new names of forms of conflict and doctrinal terms to address those conflicts and the ever evolving nature of conflict.  We rediscovered Counterinsurgency; we have tried Asymmetric, Hybrid, and Fourth Generation Warfare and now the Gray Zone.  We have invented new doctrinal concepts such as Security Force Assistance; Train, Advise, and Assist; Building Partner Capacity, Train and Equip Programs, Human Domain, and ultimately decided on irregular warfare as the way to describe conflict in the post 9-11 world.  If we examine the history of conflict at theCorrelates of War Project we would realize the irony that what we are calling irregular in fact has been more regular than what we describe as conventional war.  Less that 20% of all conflicts since 1815 have been state-on-state conventional conflicts.  Or simply peruse Sir Lawrence Freedman’s Strategy: A History and Max Boot’s Invisible Armies to see that irregular warfare is the most prevalent form of warfare and is in fact pretty regular.

But at the heart of irregular warfare lies revolution, resistance, and insurgency.  These phenomena are taking place around the world but they are not new.  If you want to be a practitioner and strategist and operate in and develop strategy for the Gray Zone in the space between peace and war and conductpolitical warfare, unconventional warfare, and counter-unconventional warfare, as well as operate effectively in the human domain then you must read, study, and internalize the fundamentals of revolution, resistance, and insurgency as embodied in the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project first produced by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO ) in the 1950's and 1960's. It now continues under the direction of the U S Army Special Operations Command and Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory's National Security Division.  Most important it is unconventional warfare that can support or exploit revolution, resistance, and insurgency.

Russian, Iranian, Chinese, and US Approaches to Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare has not been and is not now well accepted within the US military and the US government.  The most recent attempt to raise unconventional warfare as a strategic option for our national security strategy illustrates the issue.  Some 28 years after the establishment of the USSOCOM in 1987, the command produced for the first time a joint unconventional warfare doctrinal manual.  USSOCOM had to lobby for over a year to get joint staff approval just to write the manual and when it was completed and approved in September 2015 the Joint Staff decided to make the manual For Official Use Only (FOUO).  Although this is not a classification it in effect makes the manual unavailable to the public as well as to academia.   I can only speculate the on the rationale for this but some action officers have said that it is a result of the controversy surround the unconventional warfare exercise Jade Helm that took place in 2015.  The real impact of this decision is summed up in the words of one my mentors who said that the surest way to make a doctrinal manual irrelevant and useless is to make it FOUO.

While the Joint Staff allowed unconventional warfare doctrine to be marginalized our adversaries have been perfecting and employing theirs.  The following charts summarize the unique unconventional warfare approaches of the Russians, Iranians, and the Chinese.  The last chart summarizes the US approach to supporting a resistance or insurgency.  As you read these charts notice that the Russian, Iranian, and Chinese approaches provide a strategic framework for understanding how they will employ special operations and conventional forces and all the instruments of national power to accomplish their objectives while the US approach is very tactical and focused on “how to do” UW by Special Forces only.

Russian New Generation Warfare

(Continued at the link below)

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/congress-has-embraced-unconventional-warfare-will-the-us-military-and-the-rest-of-the-us-go

Thoughts on Countering Unconventional Warfare

Given Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act directing the SECDEF to develop a strategy to counter unconventional warfare we need now give some thought to this issue since it is in the act passed by Congress.  https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1735/text#toc-H57D78DE2C41D4347BF5202B774B80E94    

Let me provide you with a few comments and some background.  If you have not seen the White Papers from USASOC on Political Warfare and Counter-Unconventional Warfare I recommend perusing them.  They can be downloaded from my blog at the links below. 

I have been focused on countering unconventional warfare for years for a number of reasons.

1)  Our enemies are conducting their unique forms of unconventional warfare; Russia, Iran, China, Al Qaeda, ISIS (I think AQ and ISIS are much broader than "simply" terrorist organizations.  We need to recognize the strategies they are using and attack those strategies.  And of course we have to effectively operate in the "Gray Zone" that space between peace and war where the majority of threats operate and conflict occurs.

2)  By focusing on our enemies conducting their unique forms of UW my intention is to influence people to recognize that we have to operate in the Special Warfare realm and not just the Surgical Strike realm (though I want both/and and not either/or - we have to effectively employ both capabilities in a complementary and mutually supporting way).  

3)  I believe that focusing on terrorism has caused us to think too tactically while a focus on UW can drive us to think more strategically and holistically about the problems we face which are complex political and military problems.

4)  I am disappointed that the NDAA focuses on DOD but of course that is all the HASC can really influence.  I think that USASOC's White paper makes it clear that DOD cannot be the lead in Political Warfare (which includes counter unconventional warfare) but that SOF makes a unique DOD contribution to its conduct.

More of my thoughts are in the commentary in posts at my blog links below.

SOF Support to Political Warfare

http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/03/sof-support-to-political-warfare-white.html

USASOC Counter Unconventional Warfare White Paper

http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2014/10/us-army-special-operations-command.html

USSOCOM White Paper- The Gray Zone

http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/10/ussocom-white-paper-gray-zone.html

The ‘new’ type of war that finally has the Pentagon’s attention

http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-new-type-of-war-that-finally-has.html

Here is what Speaker Ryan says about the President signing the NDAA 2016 today.  Below the Speaker's statement I have pasted my favorite section (1097) fro the NDAA directing the SECDEF to develop a DOD strategy to counter unconventional warfare threats.  Below that I included the language from the markup from the HASC subcommittee which mentions both Russia and Iran.  Notice what the Military Times highlights in the article - including development of gender neutral standards and as the title says a retirement overhaul.

November 25, 2015|Speaker Ryan's Press Office

WASHINGTON – House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) issued the following statement after President Obama signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act passed by the House of Representatives in a vote of 370-58 on November 5, 2015:

"By signing this legislation, President Obama is now required to come up with a real, comprehensive plan to defeat ISIS. That is the ultimate solution to this crisis. In addition, his signature reaffirms longstanding prohibitions on the transfer of Guantanamo Bay detainees to the United States. Overall, this bill takes the next steps to building the 21st century military that we need. I commend Chairman Mac Thornberry and the House Armed Services Committee for their leadership on behalf of our troops and their families."

- See more at: http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/president-now-required-present-plan-defeat-isis#sthash.OCPv9QjM.dpuf

https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1735/text#toc-H57D78DE2C41D4347BF5202B774B80E94      SEC. 1097. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE.

(a) Strategy Required.—The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of other appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) An articulation of the activities that constitute unconventional warfare threats to the United States and allies.

(2) A clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in providing indications and warning of, and protection against, acts of unconventional warfare.

(3) An analysis of the adequacy of current authorities and command structures necessary for countering unconventional warfare.

(4) An articulation of the goals and objectives of the Department of Defense with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(5) An articulation of related or required interagency capabilities and whole-of-Government activities required by the Department of Defense to support a counter-unconventional warfare strategy.

(6) Recommendations for improving the counter-unconventional warfare capabilities, authorities, and command structures of the Department of Defense.

(7) Recommendations for improving interagency coordination and support mechanisms with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(8) Recommendations for the establishment of joint doctrine to support counter-unconventional warfare capabilities within the Department of Defense.

(9) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(c) Submittal To Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees the strategy required by subsection (a). The strategy shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) Unconventional Warfare Defined.—In this section, the term “unconventional warfare” means activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20150422/103282/BILLS-114HR1735ih-U1.pdf 

Section 10XX—Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Unconventional Warfare 

 This section would required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors. This section would require the Secretary of Defense to submit the strategy to the congressional defense committees within 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. The committee is concerned about the growing unconventional warfare capabilities and threats being posed most notably and recently by the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The committee notes that unconventional warfare is defined most accurately as those activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area. The committee also notes that most state-sponsors of unconventional warfare, such as Russia and Iran, have doctrinally linked conventional warfare, economic warfare, cyber warfare, information operations, intelligence operations, and other activities seamlessly in an effort to undermine U.S. national security objectives and the objectives of U.S. allies alike. 

militarytimes.com

Obama signs defense bill, finalizing military retirement overhaul

• by 5:32 P.M. Est November 25, 2015 
•  Nov. 25, 2015 
•  2 min read 
•  original

After an extra month wait, the annual defense authorization bill is finally law.

President Obama signed the budget and policy bill on Wednesday, marking the 54th consecutive year the measure has survived Washington political fights to become law.

The most significant result for troops is the renewal of dozens of specialty pay and bonus authorities, and a massive overhaul of the military retirement system.

Starting in 2018, newly enlisted troops will no longer have the traditional 20-year, all-or-nothing retirement plan. Under the changes, it will be replaced with a blended pension and investment system, featuring automatic contributions to troops' Thrift Savings Plans and an opportunity for government matches to personal contributions.

The new system is expected to give roughly four in five service members some sort of retirement benefit when they leave the military, as opposed to the current system which benefits only one in five.

The $607 billion authorization bill also includes comprehensive defense acquisition reform and language designed to stop Obama from closing the detention facilities at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

White House officials had objected to that language and hinted at a possible veto. But similar language in the measure each of the last six years didn't stop the president from signing past authorization measures into law.

Obama did veto an earlier draft of this fiscal 2016 authorization bill, but over broader fiscal fights that were resolved last month when lawmakers approved a new two-year spending plan that goes around mandatory budget caps for both defense and nondefense programs.

The legislation is only half the annual budget process for Congress. Lawmakers still need to pass a defense appropriations bill for fiscal 2016 to start new programs and acquisition plans. Congressional leaders are hopeful that can be done before Dec. 11, when a short-term budget extension expires.

But finalizing the annual defense authorization bill is a significant step forward in that larger process, and gives Pentagon planners a host of other policy updates as well:

• Allowing personal firearms on stateside bases — Lawmakers are requiring Defense Secretary Ash Carter to develop a plan by the end of this year that would allow stateside base commanders to decide whether to allow their service members to carry personal firearms on duty, or in areas where that is currently restricted by the military. Any such plan would not supercede local laws.
• A pay freeze for general and flag officers — Troops will see a 1.3 percent pay increase in January, lower than the rate of expected private-sector wage growth but more than their senior officers will get. General and flag officer pay will stay at fiscal 2015 levels.
• Another ban on a new BRAC round — Like in past years, the measure includes a prohibition on defense officials starting another base closing round. But lawmakers did include language allowing military officials to conduct studies on how much excess capacity exists in their stateside footprint, which could ease the path to such a move in the future.
• A ban on "paid patriotism" with sports leagues — The bill includes language that would prohibit the department from entering into contracts "making payments for honoring members of the Armed Forces at sporting events," in response to congressional reports that several professional sports teams were given tens of thousands of dollars to conduct on-field military appreciation events.
• Easier rules for military animal adoption — The measure changes the rules on adopting military dogs and other animals to make it easier for former handlers and families of injured handlers to adopt them following their military service.
• Developing "gender-neutral" standards for military jobs — In response to a push to open more military specialties to female troops, lawmakers want Pentagon leaders to craft "gender-neutral occupational standards" that would allow "decisions on assignments (to) be based on objective analysis."

Read or Share this story: http://militari.ly/1jkjPQ2

Thornberry: Defense policy bill close to being finalized (will it include section 1097: countering unconventional warfare?)

I just want to know if this section will be in the final approved bill that gets signed. (https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1735/text/enr)

1097.

Department of Defense strategy for countering unconventional warfare

(a)

Strategy required

The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of other appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors.

(b)

Elements

The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1)

An articulation of the activities that constitute unconventional warfare threats to the United States and allies.

(2)

A clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in providing indications and warning of, and protection against, acts of unconventional warfare.

(3)

An analysis of the adequacy of current authorities and command structures necessary for countering unconventional warfare.

(4)

An articulation of the goals and objectives of the Department of Defense with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(5)

An articulation of related or required interagency capabilities and whole-of-Government activities required by the Department of Defense to support a counter-unconventional warfare strategy.

(6)

Recommendations for improving the counter-unconventional warfare capabilities, authorities, and command structures of the Department of Defense.

(7)

Recommendations for improving interagency coordination and support mechanisms with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(8)

Recommendations for the establishment of joint doctrine to support counter-unconventional warfare capabilities within the Department of Defense.

(9)

Any other matters the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(c)

Submittal to Congress

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees the strategy required by subsection (a). The strategy shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d)

Unconventional warfare defined

In this section, the term unconventional warfare means activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.

thehill.com

Thornberry: Defense policy bill close to being finalized

By Kristina Wong - 11/02/15 03:30 PM EST

• Nov. 2, 2015 
•  2 min read 
•  original

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry (R-Texas) said he expects to finish cutting $5 billion from Congress' 2016 defense policy bill on Monday in order to match it with a budget agreement reached last week.

"We should finalize the $5 billion reduction today," he told reporters after speaking on a Defense One Summit panel. "I don't know for sure when it would be public."

"As you go back through, time means that you can make some adjustments in certain programs," Thornberry said when asked what could be cut from the bill, which authorizes Pentagon programs and funding.

"But," he added, "You can't get $5 billion by additional fuel savings, and things like that, so there will be programs that are cut, and that's what we're trying to finalize today, with the appropriates and the Senate."

In response to a question on whether they are looking at "big-ticket programs" like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, he said, "We're looking at them all...and trying to do the least damage but...there's going to be pain.”

Congress and the White House last week agreed on a budget agreement that would leave the Pentagon with $5 billion less in 2016 than was authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act.

Thornberry said he is working with senators and defense appropriators to cut the $5 billion, which could help rally Democratic support this Thursday, when the House is scheduled to vote to override President Obama's veto of the defense bill.

Congress passed the defense bill last month and sent it to the president to sign, despite a veto threat over its use of a war fund to skirt budget caps for defense spending.

The recently negotiated budget agreement would lift caps for both defense and non-defense spending, but leave the Pentagon short of $5 billion than authorized, which Thornberry said will hurt some Defense Department programs since the budget has already been cut in the past several years.

One plan to pass the defense bill is for lawmakers to vote to override the president's veto, which would require Republican and Democratic support, and then send a follow-on bill to fix the funding levels.

The second plan is to send a whole new bill through Congress again. But Thornberry said he is worried that senators may try to amend provisions that have already been hashed out during the first process, complicating its passage.

Thornberry said he thinks he is in the "ballpark" of enough votes to override the president's veto, which he said would be the easier path forward.

"It would be the cleanest, simplest way," he said. "We can't open it back up."

The final version of the bill passed the House last month, 270-156. The bill would need 20 more supporters to override the president's veto.

Thornberry said "most of the Republicans are back who had voted against it, and some Democrats will switch their votes to ‘yes,’ since the president's objection to the bill is fixed.”

Thornberry said he hoped Congress could return to a bipartisan approach in passing a defense policy bill, which has passed annually for 53 consecutive years with bipartisan support.

"We're going to be ready with both options," he added, however.

"It's really going to be a leadership call on which approach to take," he said.

-- Updated 5:17 p.m.