Paradoxes of the Gray Zone by Hal Brands

A very important addition to the discussion on the Gray Zone. Hal Brands has done an excellent job outline the 8 paradoxes excerpted below. I would add a couple of things. I am heartened to see the recognition of what is old is new again. Although he does not use unconventional warfare and counter unconventional warfare I think those concepts are implicit within his essay and these 8 paradoxes.

1.     “Gray zone” cannot mean everything if it is to mean anything

2.     Gray zone challenges are the wave of the future—and a blast from the past

3.     Gray zone conflict reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the international order

4.     Gray zone strategies are weapons of the weak against the strong—and of the strong against the weak

5.     Confronting gray zone challenges requires both embracing and dispelling ambiguity

6.     Gray zone conflict is aggression, but military tools are only part of the response

7.     America is not poorly equipped for the gray zone—but it may not be fully prepared

8.     Gray zone challenges can be productive and counterproductive at the same time

First in the gray zone we are going to see a continued struggle between unconventional warfare and counter-unconventional warfare (http://bit.ly/1nOWpVm) We are have seen, are seeing, and will continue to see nation-states and non-state actors exploiting the conditions of revolution, resistance and insurgency (http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html) to achieve their strategic objectives. This causes some conflict between the vital interests of the US and our fundamental values. It is in our national interest to ensure a stable international system based on the concept of sovereignty. Until a new international system can be devised (which may theoretically require nation states to give up sovereignty which I do not see happening as long as the US remains in existence) the US must support the Westphalian nation state system. Yet our fundamental values rely on self determination of government by the people. This interest and value are seemingly incommensurable. When the sovereign nation state system is being challenged we have a national interest to protect it and this of course rests on the foundation of respect for and protection of sovereignty. When countries and non-state actors (e.g., Russia, Iran, China, Al Qaeda, and ISIL/ISIS/IS) are exploiting the conditions of revolution, resistance, and insurgency to destabilize the nation-state system we have an interest in countering them. This requires more than the application of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), interagency support for Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Programs or Security Force Assistance (SFA) to help our friends partners, and allies to defend themselves against lawless, subversion, insurgency and terrorism. It requires a strategy to counter the strategies of those who are exploiting the conditions through execution of unconventional warfare with their own unique characteristics. Thus we need a strategy to counter the adversaries' unconventional warfare strategy. This is an important distinction because we overly focus on the conditions within the contested nation or region and we end up wanting to get involved by leading with expeditionary counterinsurgency and thus we become a de facto occupying force. Resistance and insurgency are the internal domestic problems of the government and its population and the US military and civilian agencies cannot fix the problems that give rise to the conditions of revolution resistance, and insurgency. We can advise and assist and provide support but we need to realize that our adversaries who are exploiting these conditions often have as an objective seeing the US sucked into a domestic conflict because they know the US will go "all in" and focus on the internal problems and try to fix them for the host nation while the real adversaries benefit from the conditions that are created. We fail to see the bigger picture and how our adversaries are exploiting internal conflicts for their interests. The solution to this is perhaps conducting an economy of force mission to help our friends, partners, and allies to defend themselves against resistance and to solve the problems that give rise to the resistance while focusing our main effort of strategy on countering those conducting unconventional warfare for their objectives. This is the essence of countering unconventional warfare (http://bit.ly/1nOWpVm).

Of course there are times when the conditions that give rise to revolution, resistance, and insurgency may need to be exploited by the US. Oppressive and illegitimate regimes conducting crimes against humanity or posing threats internally to their people and externally against other nation-states may also need to be countered in order to protect the international nation state system. This situation may warrant US support to revolution, resistance, and insurgency and this of course is a national decision and not one of SOF, the IC, State or DOD. Unconventional warfare may be a part of this national strategy but it may require more than the application of SOF. We may want to do this in way such as perhaps the French did to support the American Revolution. Of course many will say that is an anachronism and no longer applicable in the 21st century. But in fact while the conditions and situation are much different in the 21st Century the concept remains sound. One of the things that we should admire about the French is that not only did they provide some key advice and assistance, they provided important logistics support and their Navy was instrumental in the outcome of the Revolution. We might want to keep this concept in mind when we decide to support a revolution, resistance, or insurgency which leads me to support another point to emphasize.

The other aspect of Dr. Brands important essay is that unconventional warfare and counter unconventional warfare in the gray zone are not SOF exclusive or SOF dominated operations. It requires a national decision, and a nationally led effort that exploits the capabilities of SOF integrating conventional forces where appropriate, and employing all the required elements of national power in support of a strategy. We can look to the French for an example but we can also look to the Russians in Crimea and Ukraine and how they are employing their full range of military and civilian capabilities in a holistic manner to exploit revolution, resistance, and insurgency for their strategic objectives. The Iranians are conducting similar operations and the Chinese do in their own way. I am not at all advocating that we copy any of these adversaries but we can study and understand what they are doing and we know that effect joint military operations and effective integration of multiple integration of elements of national power are superior to the piecemeal application that is often focused on the wrong the problem -(note the importance here of concept of design - and Frank Hoffman's proposed principle of war - Understanding).

And I fully concur that America is well equipped for the gray zone but is not well prepared. The foundation of being prepared is the ability to "do" strategy in the gray zone. We have tactics, techniques, and procedures, we have the units and organizations, we have the ability to campaign in the gray zone and we have the instruments of national power. The question is whether we are prepared to orchestrate all these tools, organizations, and elements as part of a holistic strategy with balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means. And a fundamental question is who (a singular person and a specific organization) is responsible for developing and executing the strategy to address the conditions that exist in the gray zone. I would submit that it is not SOF and it is not in DOD. There has to be a national level organization that must be responsible. The question is do we have national security structure capable of operating in the gray zone?

Paradoxes of the Gray Zone

http://www.fpri.org/articles/2016/02...oxes-gray-zone

Hal Brands is an associate professor of public policy and history at Duke University, and a senior fellow at FPRI. He is the author of three books, including What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (2014). His next book, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order, will be released this summer.

February 2016

Gray, it seems, is the new black. The concept of “gray zone” conflict has generated significant attention and controversy recently, within both the U.S. government and the broader strategic studies community. Some analysts have identified gray zone conflict as a new phenomenon that will increasingly characterize, and challenge, the international system in the years to come. Others have argued that the concept is overhyped, ahistorical, and perhaps even meaningless. “The ‘gray wars’ concept lacks even the most basic strategic sense,” writes Adam Elkus. “Beneath the hype is something rather ooh-la-lame rather than ooh-la-la.”
So what is gray zone conflict, to begin with? Gray zone conflict is best understood as activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature, but that is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war. 

Continued at this link: http://www.fpri.org/articles/2016/02...oxes-gray-zone

 Along the lines of "observe" I would say that one of the key contributions SOF can make is through area assessments, civil information management, and target audience analysis all of which contribute to the most important aspect of the human domain:  situational understanding - we have to move past situational awareness which can be provided by drones, and technical intelligence to situational understanding which allows us to understand the conditions and strategies which will allow us to devise policies and strategies and campaign plans to protect our interests.  And in some cases situational understanding may lead to an appropriate decision to not act.

Excerpts:

So given all that, what can special operators do in the Gray Zone?

“We are most valued-added when we can engage early ... and can get out and understand what’s happening in the areas and helpidentify options for our political leadership and other military leaders out there to help them address, prevent, deter actions from taking place out there,” Votel said. “What I think the Gray Zone offers to us, is the ability to get out there to shape, or detour, or influence things before they become catastrophes. That’s kind of the big idea, we want to get left of problems, and not just show up and try to deal with a bad situation.”

Though they don’t get the kind of headlines spurred by direct action missions like the Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden, one of Special Operations Forces’ main efforts is to observe, train and equip host nation forces in those Gray Zones.

Those kinds of training missions are taking place in Iraq, with the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurds, and have been set in motion for Kurds and Arabs in Syria.

But they also take place around the globe, Votel stressed.

​My thesis:

The future is characterized (not exclusively of course) by states and non-state actors conducting UW (revolution, resistance and insurgency (RRI)) and thus there is a requirement to conduct Counter-UW. SOF is organized, educated, trained, equipped and optimized for both​

​ ​

(but does not conduct them unilaterally or in a vacuum but as one element of the means in support of a joint campaign and national strategy)

​Special Warfare (including u

nconventional warfare

, counter-unconventional warfare and support to political warfare​)

 can provide a strategic capability to operate in this gap

​ (the gray zone between peace and war)​

.  To be effective, elements of the US military and Intelligence Community must continuously assess potential, nascent, and existing resistance organizations around the world on a day-to-day basis.  Assessments will contribute to understanding when USG interests and resistance objectives can be aligned and provide the intellectual foundation to determine if a UW campaign is warranted or if opponents’ UW campaigns should be countered

​.

​

​And a standing "PIR" for resistance (

​basic ​

information that should be sought on every deployment):

•Who is the resistance?

–Leaders, groups, former military, in or out of government, etc.

•What are the objectives of the resistance?

–Do they align with US and friends, partners, and allies?

•Where is it operating?

–From where is it getting support?

•When did it begin?

–When will it/did it commence operations?

•Why is there a resistance or the potential for resistance?

–What are the underlying causes/drivers?

•How will it turn out?

–E.g., what is the assessment of success or failure of the resistance?

•Most important  -  An expert recommendation: Should the US support or counter the resistance and if so how?

​

‘Gray Zone’ conflicts far more complex to combat, says Socom chief Votel

Army Gen. Joseph Votel calls the Islamic State “a non-state actor attempting to operate like a state.” TRIBUNE FILE PHOTO

By Howard Altman | Tribune Staff 
Published: November 28, 2015   |   Updated: November 28, 2015 at 09:51 PM

http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/gray-zone-conflicts-far-more-complex-to-combat-says-socom-chief-votel-20151128/

TAMPA — Between peace and all-out war exists the Gray Zone.

To Army Gen. Joseph Votel, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, the Gray Zone is a familiar place of ambiguity. It’s a place where the Islamic State operates. A place where Russia has taken on Ukraine.

And it’s home to many other spots, hot, lukewarm or otherwise, around the globe.

“The Gray Zone,” said Votel, “really defines this area between ... for the most part healthy economic, political competition between states, and open warfare.”

It’s a place, he said, where “actors, sometimes state actors and sometimes non-state actors, act in a manner just below what would normally take us into normal open warfare.”

In September, Socom, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, issued a paper on Gray Zone challenges. The paper says that while traditional war might have been the dominant means of deadly conflict, Gray Zone challenges have now become the norm, and that countering foes like the former Soviet Union in many ways proved far less complex than taking on current adversaries.

Last week, Votel sat down to talk to The Tampa Tribune about his vision for Gray Zone conflicts, how the command he leads fits into that paradigm, and how commandos are ideally suited for a mental and physical space that challenges much of what we have come to know about the nature of conflict.

“It is certainly the most challenging environment that I have experienced in 35 years of military service,” Votel said.

It is an especially important topic, given that the Gray Zone is a space that Army Green Berets, Rangers, Delta Force and aviators, Navy SEALs and special warfare boat crews, Marine Raiders and Air Force special operators will be operating in for many years to come

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/gray-zone-conflicts-far-more-complex-to-combat-says-socom-chief-votel-20151128/

USSOCOM White Paper - The Gray Zone

I received this in an email and was ask to disseminate it. 

The 3.3MB USSOCOM White Paper dated 9 Sep 2015 can be downloaded at this link:

https://db.tt/2h0viarh

Excerpt:

"Defining the Gary Zone Challenge 

Gary zone security challenges, existing short of a formal state of war, present novel complications for U.S. policy and interests in the 21st Century. We have well-developed vocabularies, doctrines, and mental models to describe war and peace, but the numerous  gray zone challenges in between defy easy categorization.  For purposes of this paper, gray zone challenges are defined as competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality.  They are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of conflict, opacity of the parties involved or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.

Gray zone challenges can be understood as a pooling of diverse conflicts exhibiting common characteristics. Notably, combining these challenges does not imply a single solution, since each situation contains unique actors and aspects.  Overall, gray zone challenges rise above normal. everyday peacetime geo-political competition and are aggressive, perspective-dependent, and ambiguous."

I would make a few recommendations.

The gray zone is where revolutions, resistance, and insurgency take place.   We need expertise in RRI from the tactical to the strategic level and learn how to campaign in the gray zone to achieve strategic objectives.

1. First is to study the Assessing Revolution and Insurgent Strategies Project at this link.  The 46 case studies as well as the human factors and legal research provide a foundation for study of the phenomena that take place in the gray zone.  Those who want to understand the gray zone should study the documents and publications at this link: http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html  Below are the selected or representative cases of the 5 types of revolutions categorized from 1962-2009.

•Modify the Type of Government

–NPA, FARC, Shining Path, Iranian Revolution, FMLN, Karen National Liberation Army

•Identity or Ethnic Issues

–LTTE, PLO, Hutu-Tutsi Genocides, Kosovo Liberation Army, PIRA

•Drive out Foreign Power

–Afghan Mujahidin, Vietcong, Chechen Revolution, Hizbollah, Hizbol Mujahedeen

•Religious Fundamentalism

–Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Taliban, Al Qaeda

•Modernization or Reform

–Niger Delta (MEND), Revolution United Front (RUF), Orange Revolution, Solidarity

2.  Second I would look at George Kennan and his 1948 concept of political warfare: http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm

3.  Third, I would recall the work of Sam Sarkesian on unconventional conflicts  in 1993:

–Asymmetric conflicts: For the US these conflicts will be limited and not considered a threat to its survival or a matter of vital national interests; however, for the indigenous adversaries they are a matter of survival.

–Protracted Conflicts: Require a long term commitment by the US, thus testing the national will, political resolve, and staying power of the US.

–Ambiguous and Ambivalent Conflicts:  Difficult to identify the adversary, or assess the progress of the conflict; i.e., it is rarely obvious who is winning and losing.

–Conflicts with Political-Social Milieu Center of Gravity: The center of gravity will not be the armed forces of adversaries as Clausewitz would argue but more in the political and social realms as Sun Tzu espouses.

Sam Sarkesian in Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,  in 1993

​4.  Lastly I would read the USASOC White Paper on SOF Support to Political Warfare that can be downloaded at this link: https://db.tt/wsGXrO4S

Should America fight more like Iran? Pentagon official raises eyebrows.

We do not need to fight like Iran.  When we talk about the unconventional warfare being conducted in the gray zone the assumption should not be made that we have to conduct operations the way they do.  We cannot and should not.  But we do have to be able to conduct our own political warfare (including unconventional warfare, counter-unconventional, and pro-active fashion unconventional warfare - See USASOC White Paper: "SOF Support to Political Warfare" here http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/03/sof-support-to-political-warfare-white.html ).  The definitions of the 3 forms of unconventional warfare are on pages 19-21 of the white paper. This is my graphic representation. Here is a link to the USSOCOM Commander's testimony from last month in which he discusses the gray zone.  http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Votel_03-26-15.pdf Excerpts: Second, our success in this environment will be determined by our ability to adequately navigate conflicts that fall outside of the traditional peace-or-war construct. Actors taking a "gray zone" approach seek to secure their objectives while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting. In this "gray zone," we are confronted with ambiguity on the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, and the validity of the legal and political claims at stake. These conflicts defy our traditional views of war and require us to invest time and effort in ensuring we prepare ourselves with the proper capabilities, capacities, and authorities to safeguard U.S. interests. ... As an organization that deals with crises that occur in the "gray zone," I believe USSOCOM has an important role to play in facilitating interagency discussion.  Should America fight more like Iran? Pentagon official raises eyebrows. The Pentagon's No. 2 civilian said the US need to be better at operating in the 'gray zone' of 'deception, infiltration, and persistent denial.' But that doesn't mean America has to play dirty, some expert say. By Anna Mulrine, Staff writer APRIL 9, 2015   Mel Evans/AP/File View Caption WASHINGTON - The American military must become better at operating in a "gray zone" of war, one that sometimes calls for using "deception, infiltration, and persistent denial," the Pentagon's No. 2 official said in a little-noticed speech this week. These are the sort of tactics that Russia has been using in Crimea and Ukraine, Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work noted Wednesday in remarks at a strategy conference at the United States Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. America's adversaries today use "agents, paramilitaries, deception, infiltration, and persistent denial - staying within that so-called 'gray zone,' " he told assembled officers. "That's a zone in which we don't typically operate, but one in which we must become more proficient." Recommended: Are you smarter than a US Marine? Take the recruitment quiz Is America's second most senior civilian in the Pentagon suggesting that the country should ... play dirty? Is Russia really a model for what the kind of military action the United States wants to take? Perhaps not, say several military analysts. Rather, his comments point to the evolving nature of war and America's need to change with it. For the foreseeable future, America's wars will be fought in the gray zone, and it should seek to be as good in this realm as it is in conventional warfare. That means knowinghow to use militias as deftly as Russia and Iran do, how to use social media propaganda as effectively as the Islamic State, as well as how to cope with improvised explosive devices and cyber attacks. "The whole concept of 'asymmetric' warfare just means that someone is not being stupid," says Paul Scharre, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. "Why should you assume that our enemies won't be smart?" (Continued at the link below) http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2015/0409/Should-America-fight-more-like-Iran-Pentagon-official-raises-eyebrows