Good to see that Congress remains concerned with unconventional warfare.  I asked this question two years ago:  Congress Has Embraced Unconventional Warfare: Will the US Military and The Rest of the US Government?http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/congress-has-embraced-unconventional-warfare-will-the-us-military-and-the-rest-of-the-us-go

I am still waiting for an answer.

You can read Johns Hopkins APL's study on Russia's Little Green Men referenced in the article at this link:  http://www.jhuapl.edu/ourwork/nsa/papers/ARIS_LittleGreenMen.pdf

Countering 'little green men': Pentagon special ops studies Russia ‘gray zone’ conflict

• By Jen Judson, www.defensenews.com
• View Original
• May 15th, 2017

The Pentagon is studying gray zone conflict – otherwise known as hybrid warfare – beginning with a focus on Russia and later moving on to study Iran and China, the acting assistant defense secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict, told members of Congress.

On the heels of a Johns Hopkins University study on the nature of Russian unconventional warfare, U.S. Special Operations – through the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office within ASD SO/LIC – is looking at “developing predictive analytic technologies that will help us identify when countries are utilizing unconventional warfare techniques at levels essentially below our normal observation thresholds,” Theresa Whelan said during a May 2 House Armed Services Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee hearing.

The study will help identify early evidence of unconventional warfare, she added, noting that once her office completes the research on Russian unconventional warfare, it will move on to developing a strategy for Iran and China.

Russian aggression has been characterized by the insertion of “little green men,” special forces that try to discreetly rile up ethnic Russians against the West in countries along its border. Russia’s surprise annexation of Crimea in 2014 has sparked fear in surrounding countries that something similar could take place within their own borders.

And Russia’s behavior in Ukraine and along the Baltic States continue to cause heartburn and worry among the U.S. and its European and NATO allies.

Recently, the top U.S. military commander in Europe said the U.S. has not done enough to reinforce its own and NATO’s nascent efforts to fight Russia’s prolific propaganda against European allies – considered to be classic “gray zone” activity.

By definition, special operations forces in the region would likely be among the first to notice such activity.

The fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act required the defense secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with other U.S. government departments and agencies to develop a strategy to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors. Unconventional warfare “means activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area,” according to the legislation.

The strategy was due to Congress no later than 180 days following enactment.

Rep. Elise Stefanik, R-New York, asked during the hearing, for an update, noting delivery of the unconventional warfare strategy to Congress was roughly two years late.

The Pentagon has “had to shift resources to focus on this and develop capabilities and knowledge bases that had, to a certain extent, atrophied over the years,” Whelan said. “But also, the nature of UW has fundamentally changed because of 21st century technologies and techniques. We really in many ways have been starting from scratch.”

In order to complete the strategy, Whelan added, the Pentagon is working with interagency partners – acknowledgement that UW poses multiple threats to the U.S. government “because of the ways that our adversaries are using it.”

Studies already conducted by the Pentagon, as well as Georgetown University on UW has shown adversaries, “particularly the more sophisticated ones,” are focusing on “seams between our organizational entities and trying to exploit those seams and decision-making cycles in order to gain advantage on us in the space that essentially is below conventional war,” Whelan said.

She added the Pentagon does expect to have an interim “answer with our thoughts” delivered to Congress before the end of June.

The study focused on Russian UW, will feed into the greater strategy. Looking through a Russian lens also makes sense from a special operations perspective because countering the Russian threat is its number two priority. There are roughly 1,400 special operations forces deployed to protect against Russian aggression.

Gen. Raymond Thomas, U.S. Special Operations Command commander, echoed Whelan during the same hearing, stating, “We’re working closely with the department for the overall strategy, but I think as importantly and more practically, we’re focused on the resources and authorities that would underpin that strategy. So we actually are having some pretty substantive discussions specifically as it applies towards countering Russian aggression.”

Chinese supercomputers threaten U.S. security (and comments on Countering Unconventional Warfare)

Will we ever understand unconventional warfare?  I am reminded of this excellent analogy I heard at lunch yesterday with one of my good friends and SF brothers:

"UW is to Warfare as Acupuncture is to Medicine” COL (RET) Jack Jensen, US Army SF, 3 May 2017 

Georgetown appreciates the shout out. And Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab has done great work on Russia's Little Green Men (and assessing revolutionary and insurgent strategies).  Note the heavy emphasis on cyber and UW.  COL Pat Duggan (US Army SF) is one of the leading (or perhaps only) thinkers in the SOF community on cyber and particularly cyber in the human domain which is especially relevant and important to influence political resistance and conducting political warfare which is a major component of unconventional warfare.  Read Pat's latest work here: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/tactical-cema-in-cognitive-spaces or his award winning article Strategic Development of Special Warfare in Cyberspace in Joint Force Quarterly here:  http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-79/Article/621123/strategic-development-of-special-warfare-in-cyberspace/

I would quibble with the idea that the nature of unconventional warfare has changed as it is and always has been about political resistance at the very heart.  Sure there are new characteristics and capabilities but in the end this is a very human endeavor and all the technology in the world is not going to change its nature.

Excerpts:

The Pentagon is two years late in supplying Congress with a study on new strategies for countering unconventional warfare threats posed by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

Rep. Elise M. Stefanik, chairwoman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on emerging threats, pressed a senior Pentagon official on the subject during a hearing Tuesday. The study was required in 2015 legislation.

“This strategy, which is now almost two years late, ultimately can help provide a way to ensure that our ends, ways and means are aligned to help counter these unconventional threats,” said Ms. Stefanik, New York Republican.

Unconventional warfare is the use of nonkinetic warfare capabilities ranging from cyber and electronic attacks to “influence operations” using political, media and legal means.

In response, Theresa Whelan, assistant defense secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict, said unconventional warfare is an emerging threat and the Pentagon is studying the issue. Ms. Whelan noted that the military’s counterterrorism mission has been the main focus of low-intensity conflict.

“We have, as a consequence, had to shift resources to focus on this and develop capabilities and knowledge bases that had, to certain extent, atrophied over the years,” she said.

“But also, because the nature of UW has fundamentally changed because of 21st-century technologies and techniques, we really in many ways have been starting from scratch. And that has been one of the challenges that we’ve faced as we dug into this over the last 18 to 24 months.”

Russia used hybrid warfare to take over Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and its cyber-enabled influence operation targeting the 2016 U.S. presidential election. China has been using similar information operations in its bid to gradually take control of the South China Sea.

Examples of Iranian information operations have included cyberattacks on U.S. banks and a waterway control system in upstate New York.

North Korea has used extensive cyberattacks to achieve objectives — including the cyberattack on Sony Picture Entertainment and cyberattacks on banks in Asia that netted the regime in Pyongyang tens of million of dollars.

The Pentagon is working with other U.S. government agencies to deal with what Ms. Whalen called “multiple threats” from foreign information operations.

Georgetown University has conducted a study for the Pentagon that found that America’s adversaries are “focusing on the seams between our organizational entities and trying to exploit those seams and decision-making cycles in order to gain advantage on us in the space that essentially is below conventional war — the space that we now refer to as the gray zone or hybrid warfare,” Ms. Whalen said.

Two research projects are underway on the topic of unconventional warfare, one at Johns Hopkins University on Russian hybrid warfare, and a Pentagon research effort to develop predictive analytic technologies.

The technologies “will help us identify when countries are utilizing unconventional warfare techniques at levels essentially below our normal observation thresholds,” Ms. Whalen said.

After the Russia unconventional warfare strategy is completed, the Pentagon will look at Chinese and Iranian unconventional warfare threats, she added. “This continues to be an evolving threat.”

Chinese supercomputers threaten U.S. security

• By Bill Gertz, www.washingtontimes.com
• View Original
• May 3rd, 2017

China is eclipsing the United States in developing high-speed supercomputers used to build advanced weapons, and the loss of American leadership in the field poses a threat to U.S. national security.

That’s the conclusion of a recent joint National Security Agency-Energy Department study, based on an assessment of China’s new supercomputer called the TaihuLight.

“National security requires the best computing available, and loss of leadership in [high-performance computing] will severely compromise our national security,” the report warns.

Supercomputers play a “vital role” in the design, development and analysis of almost all modern weapons systems, including nuclear weapons, cyberwarfare capabilities, ships, aircraft, communications security, missile defense, precision-strike capabilities and hypersonic weapons, the report said.

China is rapidly developing hypersonic strike missiles that can deliver conventional and nuclear payloads by maneuvering past advanced missile defenses.

“Loss of leadership in [high-performance computing] could significantly reduce the U.S. nuclear deterrence and the sophistication of our future weapons systems,” the report says.

“Conversely, if China fields a weapons system with new capabilities based on superior [high-performance computing], and the U.S. cannot accurately estimate its true capabilities, there is a serious possibility of over- or underestimating the threat.”

A copy of the 18-page report, “U.S. Leadership in High Performance Computing (HPC): A Report from the NSA-DOE Technical Meeting on High Performance Computing,” dated Dec. 1, has been obtained by Inside the Ring.

Chinese supremacy in computer capabilities also could produce distortions in allocating defense funds for U.S. research and development, and strategic policymaking and result in “incorrect responses to world events,” the report said.

Currently, the United States has a cost-effective supercomputer capability. But loss of U.S. leadership in the field would result in acquisition of supercomputers in ways similar to Pentagon acquisition of aircraft carriers — at vastly increased costs.

For industrial applications, if the United States were to become reliant on Chinese supercomputers, it “could threaten the loss of intellectual property and competitive edge.”

“Personal email and private information, social networks and the emerging Internet of Things are all subject to even greater privacy risks if offshore entities have superior HPC analytics or control the data/information markets,” the report said.

The report called for a surge in U.S. government investment and action in supercomputing, including the priorities outlined in the 2016 National Strategic Computing Initiative Plan.

Energy Department national laboratories and the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity are working on cutting-edge supercomputers.

The study was based on a two-day conference in September of some 60 experts, including 40 from U.S. government agencies, 10 from the technology industry and 10 from academia and other organizations.

PENTAGON LATE WITH HYBRID WARFARE STUDY

The Pentagon is two years late in supplying Congress with a study on new strategies for countering unconventional warfare threats posed by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

Rep. Elise M. Stefanik, chairwoman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on emerging threats, pressed a senior Pentagon official on the subject during a hearing Tuesday. The study was required in 2015 legislation.

“This strategy, which is now almost two years late, ultimately can help provide a way to ensure that our ends, ways and means are aligned to help counter these unconventional threats,” said Ms. Stefanik, New York Republican.

Unconventional warfare is the use of nonkinetic warfare capabilities ranging from cyber and electronic attacks to “influence operations” using political, media and legal means.

In response, Theresa Whelan, assistant defense secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict, said unconventional warfare is an emerging threat and the Pentagon is studying the issue. Ms. Whelan noted that the military’s counterterrorism mission has been the main focus of low-intensity conflict.

“We have, as a consequence, had to shift resources to focus on this and develop capabilities and knowledge bases that had, to certain extent, atrophied over the years,” she said.

“But also, because the nature of UW has fundamentally changed because of 21st-century technologies and techniques, we really in many ways have been starting from scratch. And that has been one of the challenges that we’ve faced as we dug into this over the last 18 to 24 months.”

Russia used hybrid warfare to take over Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and its cyber-enabled influence operation targeting the 2016 U.S. presidential election. China has been using similar information operations in its bid to gradually take control of the South China Sea.

Examples of Iranian information operations have included cyberattacks on U.S. banks and a waterway control system in upstate New York.

North Korea has used extensive cyberattacks to achieve objectives — including the cyberattack on Sony Picture Entertainment and cyberattacks on banks in Asia that netted the regime in Pyongyang tens of million of dollars.

The Pentagon is working with other U.S. government agencies to deal with what Ms. Whalen called “multiple threats” from foreign information operations.

Georgetown University has conducted a study for the Pentagon that found that America’s adversaries are “focusing on the seams between our organizational entities and trying to exploit those seams and decision-making cycles in order to gain advantage on us in the space that essentially is below conventional war — the space that we now refer to as the gray zone or hybrid warfare,” Ms. Whalen said.

Two research projects are underway on the topic of unconventional warfare, one at Johns Hopkins University on Russian hybrid warfare, and a Pentagon research effort to develop predictive analytic technologies.

The technologies “will help us identify when countries are utilizing unconventional warfare techniques at levels essentially below our normal observation thresholds,” Ms. Whalen said.

After the Russia unconventional warfare strategy is completed, the Pentagon will look at Chinese and Iranian unconventional warfare threats, she added. “This continues to be an evolving threat.”

REPORT CALLS FOR DEFEATING JIHADIS ONLINE

The global Islamic terrorist movement could not function without the internet and defeating terrorism online is possible, according to a report by the Middle East Research Institute (MEMRI).

“Jihadi organizations used the web to recruit supporters and fighters, provide practical instruction and manuals for terror operations including car bomb and ramming attacks, make arch-terrorists into heroic models for emulation, and raise funds for their activity,” the report says. “The internet provided them with an ideal vehicle for spreading their ideas, even to young children.”

Recently, social media companies have begun to lose advertising revenue as a result of hateful content on their sites. Companies including Johnson & Johnson, Toyota, General Motors, Wal-Mart, AT&T and HSBC have pulled ads to protest terrorist videos, the report said.

Governments also are pressuring media to remove hateful speech, and families have begun to sue internet companies for carrying content that incited and radicalized terrorists who killed relatives.

The MEMRI report said the measures are good first steps but that more needs to be done. The internet should be purged of jihadi propaganda and incitement content through financial investments, and new technologies could identify and remove jihadi material.

“Purging the internet of jihadi content can deal with terrorism at its source, and can have an immediate impact on recruitment, indoctrination and training of terrorists,” the report said. “This will significantly reduce the threat which will, in turn, enable Western democracies to reduce the degree of infringement upon our liberties, freedoms and daily life.”

• Contact Bill Gertz on Twitter at @BillGertz.

Have we forgotten about Ukraine?  There should be no doubt that Russia is conducting unconventional warfare in Ukraine but on a much grander scale.  They are exploiting a resistance movement (even a fabricated one) but employing military and non-military instruments of power and from a military perspective not relying solely on special operations forces but a selective use of its conventional military power.  This is why I say that unconventional warfare does not solely belong to special forces or even the military writ large.  (http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/unconventional-warfare-does-not-belong-to-special-forces/)

We should pay attention to Nate Freier and his Army War College writing team and their report called Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1325 and these words:

Joint ground force commanders—but especially the U.S. Army—will benefit from a thorough reimagining of the potential of expeditionary forces and operations. As it ap­plies to the gray zone, U.S. ground forces need the capability to deploy in large numbers to perform a wide range of missions: enable and support allies, partners, and sister U.S. joint forces; build foreign partner capacity; counter adversary unconventional warfare (UW) campaigns; and perform more traditional offensive and defensive operations (of­ten against hybrid opponents). This requires examining and developing capabilities to defeat A2AD and rapidly delivering ground capabilities on short notice and limited advanced planning. 

This study found UW to be a final area of unique ground force vulnerability for the United States and its partners as they assess and contend with gray zone challenges. As currently defined by American Joint military doctrine, UW is the collection of activi­ties that enable the overthrow of a government through proxy actors in overtly denied areas.  U.S. UW vulnerability emerges in both an offensive and defense context. Offensively, UW provides U.S. decision-makers with a baseline capability for covert degrada­tion of an adversary’s control over contested territory. Defensively, Russian and Iranian UW efforts are currently presenting U.S./partners thorny challenges in Europe and the Middle East. In both instances, U.S. forces are increasingly unfamiliar with the associ­ated ground force demands that might result.

For example, SOF UW competency has atrophied with the substantial counterinsur­gency and counterterrorism demands of the last decade and a half. For their part, GPF have never been required to understand UW as a concept. Improvement is essential on both counts. 

 A sharper offensive UW instrument will be an important tool for pressuring active gray zone revisionist powers who themselves employ UW to aggressively undermine U.S. partners. Likewise, deep understanding of UW on the part of GPF forces will en­able them to engage in defensive UW activities to generate greater resilience among the same at risk partners. Finally, a more robust ground force UW capability that can understand, prosecute, and defend against it, employing the widest set of military and non-military tools, may require a new military competency in “political warfare.” This specific focus would enable both conventional and SOF to grasp the underpinnings and requirements necessary for prosecuting offensive and defensive UW activities against sophisticated gray zone actors.

Excerpt:

While Russia continues to support the separatists, the West has buttressed the Ukrainian war effort through training programs and nonlethal aid that includes vehicles, counter-artillery radar, body armor and night-vision equipment. The most recent defense bill passed by the U.S. Congress allocated an additional $50 million for Ukrainian military assistance in 2017, bringing the total to $350 million.

2,900 explosions in a day. Heavy artillery and tank fire returns to the front lines in Ukraine.

The Washington Post · by Thomas Gibbons-Neff · December 20, 2016

A soldier of the separatist self-proclaimed Lugansk People’s Republic walks in a field near the line of contact with the Ukrainian army at the so-called Svitlodarsk bulge in the Luhansk region. (Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters)

An early morning artillery barrage started the latest bloody scrap in eastern Ukraine Sunday as Russian-backed militants and government troops clashed near the town of Svitlodarsk.

A spokesman for the Ukrainian military, Col. Andriy Lysenko, said that five soldiers were killed and 16 wounded during the day-long battle and that Russian-backed separatist forces had attempted to break through government lines. It was the largest single loss of life for Ukrainian troops in five months.

A resident in a nearby separatist-controlled town, who asked not to be identified for personal security reasons, dismissed the idea that any separatist troops had attempted to attack and said the fighting was merely “rocket-tennis” between the two sides.

Lysenko said the Russian-backed fighters suffered about 50 casualties, but that figure could not be independently confirmed.

The site Censor.net, quoting an unnamed Ukrainian defense official, said that four bodies held by Ukrainian authorities were not claimed by the militants, suggesting that the deceased were either Russian soldiers or citizens.

An international monitoring group documented almost 3,000 explosions in the region Sunday — up from 700 on Saturday and 100 on Friday. The majority of Sunday’s detonations were recorded around Svitlodarsk. Despite multiple cease-fire attempts and efforts to remove heavy weapons from the front lines, the day-long bombardment, which included tanks, rocket artillery and howitzers, laid bare the shortcomings of international efforts to quell the conflict.

The fighting sent the residents of Svitlodarsk to their basements, and around nightfall, as temperatures dipped below freezing, the town lost power and gas. Utilities were restored around midnight, according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has observers on the ground.

Social media accounts that follow the conflict indicated that shelling in the area started again Monday night.

Since summer 2014, the front line in eastern Ukraine has been mostly static, and both sides have been relegated to exchanging artillery and machine-gun fire across a heavily mined no man’s land. Svitlodarsk is near the border between the two breakaway territories known as the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic and represents a Ukrainian-controlled bulge along the front line.

In talks brokered by France and Germany, Ukraine and Russia agreed upon a series of cease-fires known as the Minsk Agreements to stop the conflict, but both sides continue to clash daily. Earlier this month, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg encouraged allies to maintain economic sanctions on Russia until there is a lasting cease-fire.

While Russia continues to support the separatists, the West has buttressed the Ukrainian war effort through training programs and nonlethal aid that includes vehicles, counter-artillery radar, body armor and night-vision equipment. The most recent defense bill passed by the U.S. Congress allocated an additional $50 million for Ukrainian military assistance in 2017, bringing the total to $350 million.

It is unclear how President-elect Donald Trump will approach the conflict. His pro-Russian statements have put both NATO allies and the Ukrainian government on edge.

Since the conflict in Ukraine began in April 2014, nearly 10,000 people have been killed and more than 20,000 wounded, according to a United Nations report in June. More than 1.6 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced by the conflict.

The Washington Post · by Thomas Gibbons-Neff · December 20, 2016

SSP Podcast - Episode 7 - Col. (Ret.) David Maxwell- discuss unconventional warfare (UW), the “gray zone,” and strategy

In case anyone is bored on election day or needs a sleep aid.

Thanks to SSP Alum Jeff Palmer for putting together the SSP Podcast program.  I was honored to join the members of our distinguished SSP faculty and friends of SSP (Professor Richard English) and participating in Jeff's latest podcast episode.  All the podcast episodes can be accessed through iTunes at the link below or from the Center for Security Studies Web page at this link: https://css.georgetown.edu/podcast  These include Bruce Hoffman, Richard English, Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault, Ariane Tabatabai, Elizabeth Stanley, and Dan Byman.

Security Studies Podcast - Episode 7 - Col. (Ret.) David Maxwell

ReleasedNov 08, 2016

Episode 7 of the Security Studies Podcast features Col. David Maxwell (Ret.), Associate Director of Georgetown’s Security Studies Program, to discuss unconventional warfare (UW), the “gray zone,” and strategy. We define and conceptualize these terms, cover current examples of the use of UW, discuss the need for the U.S. to develop counter-UW capabilities, and talk about his inspiration to do strategy. Col. Maxwell also shares stories of how his blog came to be (www.maxoki161.blogspot.com) and of a special memento in his office. The Security Studies Podcast is produced by Jeffrey Palmer. Music: www.bensound.com/royalty-free-music

https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/security-studies-podcast-episode/id1110393903?i=1000377620329&mt=2

THE SECURITY STUDIES PODCAST

The Security Studies Podcast invites SSP faculty to discuss the most pressing and complex global security issues of today.

Subscribe to The Security Studies Podcast on iTunes here.

Produced by Jeffrey Palmer

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U.S. Army Special Operations Command Primer on Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine 2013-2014

Page Count: 78 pages
Date: June 2015
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: U.S. Army Special Operations Command
File Type: pdf
File Size: 8,767,432 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):2F98D69E0550FB86FB8820C6C936948C0B6B0E3B81C788C4B061A2B6244D93AA

 Download the full PDF file (~8mb) here: https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-little-green-men/

---

This document is intended as a primer—a brief, informative treatment—concerning the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It is an unclassified expansion of an earlier classified version that drew from numerous classified and unclassified sources, including key US Department of State diplomatic cables. For this version, the authors drew from open source articles, journals, and books. Because the primer examines a very recent conflict, it does not reflect a comprehensive historiography, nor does it achieve in-depth analysis. Instead, it is intended to acquaint the reader with the essential background to and course of the Russian intervention in Ukraine from the onset of the crisis in late 2013 through the end of 2014. The document’s key points are summarized below.

PART I. CONTEXT AND THEORY OF RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

·         Key Principles

o    Strategy to deal with states and regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation

o    Primacy of nonmilitary factors: politics, diplomacy, economics, finance, information, and intelligence

o    Primacy of the information domain: use of cyberwarfare, propaganda, and deception, especially toward the Russian-speaking populace

o    Persistent (rather than plausible) denial of Russian operations

o    Use of unidentified local and Russian agents

o    Use of intimidation, bribery, assassination, and agitation

o    Start of military activity without war declaration; actions appear to be spontaneous actions of local troops/militias

o    Use of armed civilian proxies, self-defense militias, and imported paramilitary units (e.g., Cossacks, Vostok Battalion) instead of, or in advance of, regular troops

o    Asymmetric, nonlinear actions

·         For the purpose of clarity and uniformity within this study, the authors use the term unconventional warfare to embrace the wide variety of military, informational, political, diplomatic, economic, financial, cultural, and religious activities Russia employed in Ukraine.

·         Evolution of Russian unconventional warfare. Russian intervention in Ukraine has featured refined and modernized techniques evolved through observation and analysis of Western methods (the color revolutions, Arab Spring) and Russian experiences since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Specifically, they drew lessons from interventions in:

o    Lithuania, 1991

o    Transnistria, 1990–1992

o    Chechnya (and Dagestan), 1994–1996 (1999–2009)

o    Georgia, 2008

·         Russian information warfare has emerged as a key component of Russian strategy. Igor Panarin and Alexandr Dugin are the primary theorists.

·         Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov’s model for interstate conflict reflects the growing importance of nonkinetic factors in Russian strategy.

PART II. RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN UKRAINE, 2013–2014

·         Historical Context

o    Ukraine’s historical, cultural, religious, and economic ties to Russia make it a vital interest to Moscow.

o    Western encroachment into the Russian sphere of influence, primarily through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion and European Union (EU) economic ties, stimulated a reactionary movement among Russian conservatives to stop the loss of peripheral states to the West.

o    The Crimean peninsula, with a majority of ethnic Russians, includes Russia’s Black Sea naval base of Sevastopol and is a vital interest to Moscow.

o    The Maidan movement is viewed as a product of Western—especially American—conspiracy.

o    Vladimir Putin has boosted his popularity by portraying himself as the defender of Russian nationalism and Russian Orthodoxy in Ukraine.

·         Russian Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures in Ukraine, 2013–2014

o    Political organization within the conflict region to create and sustain pro-Russian political parties, unions, and paramilitary groups

o    Recruitment and support of regional SPETSNAZ

o    Importation of “little green men”—unidentified Russian agents (usually SPETSNAZ) to organize and lead protests and paramilitary operations

o    Importation of Cossack, Chechen, Serbian, and Russian paramilitary “volunteers”

o    Persistent (rather than plausible) denial of Russian operations, even in the face of photographic evidence and firsthand testimonials

o    Domination of television, radio, and social media through the use of highly trained operatives, including “hacktivists” and seemingly independent bloggers; use of Russia Today television as a highly effective propaganda tool; use of professional actors who portray themselves as pro-Russian Ukrainians

o    Use of blackmail, bribery, intimidation, assassination, and kidnapping against regional political opponents and government officials, including police and military officials

o    Use of “relief columns” to import weapons, soldiers, equipment, and supplies to pro-Russian forces

o    Small-scale invasion and precision operations by conventional Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) based along the Russian border

o    Issuing Russian passports to pro-Russian populations and touting Moscow’s need to defend the Russian diaspora against alleged abuses

CONCLUSION

·         Driven by a desire to roll back Western encroachment into the Russian sphere of influence, the current generation of Russian leaders has crafted a multidisciplinary art and science of unconventional warfare. Capitalizing on deception, psychological manipulation, and domination of the information domain, their approach represents a notable threat to Western security.

·         The new forms of Russian unconventional warfare challenge the structure of the NATO Charter, because they obviate the appearance of “armed invasion.”