JDN 1-18, "Strategy." 25 Apr 18

This is apparently a new publication. I just saw it for the first time today on the SAMS planners net.  The 47 page publication can be downloaded here. http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf?ver=2018-04-25-150439-540

I do not recall ever seeing a single joint publication focused solely on Strategy in joint doctrine.

I think the author must have been a National War College graduate or faculty member.

I think this will be useful not only for PME but also in civilian institutions that focus on security studies and strategy.

Note that I have excerpted the definitions of interests below.

Key chapter quotes:

Chapter I Theory

“Without a strategy, facing up to any problem or striving for any objective would be considered negligent.” Sir Lawrence Freedman Strategy: A History

Chapter II Strategic Ends and Means

“The most fundamental task in devising a grand strategy is to determine a nation’s national interests. Once they are identified, they drive a nation’s foreign policy and military strategy; they determine the basic direction that it takes, the types and amounts of resources that it needs, and the manner in which the state must employ them to succeed. Because of the critical role that national interests play, they must be carefully justified, not merely assumed.” Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America 

Chapter III Strategic Ways

“The most complete and happy victory is this: to compel one’s enemy to give up his purpose, while suffering no harm oneself.” Flavius Belisarius (505-565) 

Chapter IV Assessing Strategy

“No plan of operation extends with certainty beyond contact with the enemy’s main hostile force.” Field Marshal General Helmuth von Moltke the Elder Chief of the German General Staff (1857-1888) 

JDN 1-18, "Strategy." 25 Apr 18



This joint doctrine note (JDN) provides guidance to develop, implement strategy, and
assess strategy. It focuses on the development of national-level military strategy and how
the military instrument of power is used, in combination with the other instruments of
national power, in pursuit of policy objectives. It discusses the essential elements of any
strategy; the relationship of ends, ways, and means; and the interaction among strategic
objectives, national strategy, and military strategy. It also examines strategies that may be
developed in different situations. Finally, it looks at how strategy is made, who makes it,
what moral criteria guide strategic decisions, and what pitfalls may occur in the making of
strategy.

One approach is to categorize national interests as vital, important, and peripheral. 

 Vital interests: What are we willing to die for? States generally have four vital interests: security of the home territory, safety of citizens at home and abroad, economic prosperity, and preservation of the national way of life. 

 Important interests: What are we willing to fight for? Nations important interests generally include freedom of access to the global commons, regional stability, secure alliances, or the promotion of the state’s values. 

 Peripheral interests: What are we willing to fund (deploy peacekeepers, balance trade deficits)?

Strategy and the North Korea crisis (podcast)

I participated in this one hour loop cast discussion on Friday.  You can access the podcast at the link below.

Strategy and the North Korea crisis

http://www.theloopcast.com/e/strategy-and-the-north-korea-crisis/

October 29th, 2017

David Maxwell discusses strategy and the North Korea crisis. His blog can be found here, and his latest articles on North Korea can be found here: "Why We Are Where We Are With North Korea - And Where Do We Go From Here?" and "15 assumptions about the behavior of North Korea’s Kim Family Regime (KFR)."

The interview today was conducted by Chelsea Daymon, and the show is produced by Chelsea Daymon and Sina Kashefipour.

If you have enjoyed listening to The Loopcast please consider making a donation to the show through our Patreon. We greatly appreciate it.

00:0000:00

Like | Download

Thoughts on Strategy for the Korean Peninsula

My remarks last week at the Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS) conference on The Korean Peninsula Issues and United States National Security.

http://www.icasinc.org/2017/2017f/2017fdsm.html

Thoughts on Strategy for the Korean Peninsula

David S.Maxwell
Georgetown University

Let me just begin with a few framing remarks:

We have successfully deterred a resumption of hostilities by the north for 64 years and I believe we have to continue to deter for as long as it takes until we resolve the security problem on the peninsula. We should keep in mind the wise words of Sir Lawrence Freedman who said "Deterrence works, until it doesn't." 

A Strategic Planning and Preparation Paralysis arises from a fear of what comes next - how to navigate through the War/Collapse Paradox.

In 1998, Dr. Kurt Campbell when he was the DASD for East Asia Pacific affairs made the astute remark:
"There are only two ways to approach planning for the collapse of North Korea: to be ill-prepared or to be really ill-prepared." 

Sun Tzu wrote "never assume the enemy will not attack, make yourself invincible." - The Collapse Corollary is: Never assume the KFR will not collapse - prepare now even though we cannot predict if and when. We should realize that collapse will be catastrophic.

Lastly, we suffer from the tyranny of proximity - the range of north Korean artillery threat to the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area. This restricts our policy options and strategy.

Here is the Problem: There is no US and ROK comprehensive strategy to solve the "Korea Question" and address the full spectrum of threats caused by the existence of the Kim Family Regime (KFR).

We must answer these Key Questions: What do we want to achieve in Korea? What is the acceptable durable political arrangement on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia that will serve and protect ROK and US interests?

For any strategy you must make assumptions when you do not have all the facts but must continue planning. You continue to use the assumptions until they are proven as facts. And if the assumptions prove false or erroneous then you must adapt your plans and strategy based on the new facts. Since Korea is such a hard case I feel it is necessary to list fifteen assumptions that drive my strategic thinking.


Assumptions:

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.icasinc.org/2017/2017f/2017fdsm.html

Book Review: Sun Tzu, The Founding Fathers, The Art of Peace, and America’s Strategic Deficit Disorde

Book Review: Sun Tzu, The Founding Fathers, The Art of Peace, and America’s Strategic Deficit Disorder

by David S. Maxwell

Journal Article | November 14, 2016 - 3:35pm

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/book-review-sun-tzu-the-founding-fathers-the-art-of-peace-and-america%E2%80%99s-strategic-deficit-d

Sun Tzu, The Founding Fathers, The Art of Peace, and America’s Strategic Deficit Disorder

David S. Maxwell

The Art of Peace: Engaging in A Complex World

Author: Dr. Juliana Geron Pilon

Transaction Publishers, 2016

If I could recommend one book to the Trump Transition Team it would be Dr. Juliana Geran Pilon’s The Art of Peace: Engaging in Complex World.

Dr. Pilon is a Senior Fellow at the Alexander Hamilton Institute for the Study of Western Civilization and a renowned scholar who has taught at the National Defense University, George Washington University and has held post-doctoral fellowships at Stanford’s Hoover Institution and the Institute for Humane Letters.   He is the author of a number of acclaimed books and over 200 articles.

I am partial to anyone who can write about Sun Tzu and apply the Art of War to contemporary strategy.  However most such attempts use Sun Tzu as a gimmick to gain attention.  Not so with The Art of Peace.  Dr. Pilon masterfully uses Sun Tzu to illustrate the problems we have with strategic thought and reminds us of the timeless elements of strategy that are arguably more relevant today than at any time in history.  I am even more partial to anyone who can combine Sun Tzu and the Founding Fathers to discuss national security strategy and Dr. Pilon masterfully incorporates American history and political philosophy into her work. 

Dr. Pilon argues that “the basic principles of war and peace are transcendent” throughout history and around the world.  What is really unique about this book is that she shows how Sun Tzu’s concepts were applied (admittedly subconsciously) by our Founding Fathers and most importantly that together Sun Tzu and the Founding Fathers still are applicable to the global geo-strategic environment of the 21st Century.

This book is a critique of American strategy and strategic culture and describes the disease from which we suffer – Strategic Deficit Disorder.  It shows us how standing true to the principles of both Sun Tzu and our Founding Fathers will make us better national security practitioners who strive to practice the “art of peace” as well as the art of war.

Why are Sun Tzu and the Founding Fathers still relevant?  They have one important trait in common.  They understood human nature and they devised strategies and built our republic in such a way that took human nature into account.  Of course human nature has always been important from Thucydides’ description of realism of fear, honor, and interest, to Clausewitz’ paradoxical trinity of passion, reason, and chance to understanding conflicts in the 21st Century that have been described as a fight for legitimacy among relevant populations.  As we seek to be able to protect U.S. interests in the gray zone between war and peace it is as important to understand the art of peace as it is the art of war.   In the post- 9-11 world we have recognized the importance of the human domain but we can look to Sun Tzu and our founding fathers to understand human nature.

Her basic premise is summarized here:

“… America can no longer afford to sit on the proverbial three-legged (”military, diplomacy, development) national security stool where one leg is a lot longer than either of the other two.  We are so much becoming militarized as decivilianized (with apologies to spell-check).”

Why is this important, especially to the Trump Transition Team?  Because according to Congressman Randy Forbes: "I think that with a President Trump, you'll see him coming out literally within the first few days saying that we are going to have an international defense strategy that is driven by the Pentagon and not by the political National Security Council."  If this is the case we will have four or more years of a decivilianized foreign policy and national security strategy.

Dr. Pilon argues that we need effective statecraft and policy makers, strategists, and statesmen who can practice political warfare that George Kennan defined as using all means at a nation’s command to achieve its objectives short of war.  Our nation’s civilian leadership needs to be well versed in political warfare and the U.S. military, and in particular special operations forces, needs to conduct operations in support of political warfare.

Today’s strategic environment is no longer bi-polar but can be described in terms of the following trinity:

• Revisionist Powers who seek to disrupt and alter the international system to suit their strategic objectives.

• Revolutionary Powers who seek to destroy the international system and replace it with one in which they can dominate.

• Status Quo powers who seek to maintain the strength of the international system by respecting and protecting sovereignty and enforce the rule of law.[i]

To operate in this environment the U.S. needs to be able to conduct political warfare.

(Continued at the link below)

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/book-review-sun-tzu-the-founding-fathers-the-art-of-peace-and-america%E2%80%99s-strategic-deficit-d

On Campaign Plan Phasing: Six-Phase or Unconstrained?

warontherocks.com · by David Maxwell · November 3, 2016

In any problem where an opposing force exists and cannot be regulated, one must foresee and provide for alternative courses. Adaptability is the law which governs survival in war as in life … To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy’s power to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the circumstances met.

-Sir Basil H. Liddel-Hart (Strategy, 1954 )

Lauren Fish’s excellent article on the joint phasing construct illustrates the two challenges we have with planning.

On the one hand, we have the science of war that is mainly the concern of “force providers,” the services and joint staff responsible for allocating forces, getting those forces to the theater of operations, and then resupplying them (the major functions of Transportation Command). This is why planners used to say that “the TPFDD [Time Phased Force Deployment Data] is the plan.” The TPFDD drove operations. How and in what order forces arrived in theater drove the plan, though the order of arrival of forces is theoretically based on the theater commander’s requirements. This was the essence of numbered war plans prior to 9/11.

On the other hand, we have actual warfighting. While science plays an enormous role in warfighting because firepower, mass, correlation of forces are so important, the plan must incorporate the art of war to ultimately succeed. In the 1990’s, theater commanders designed the war plans for warfighting and gave requirements for forces to the force provider for resourcing without regard to the four phase construct that Fish shows. That construct was merely illustrative. Some plans had five phases, some had seven, and some even had sub-phases (e.g., phase IIA, phase IIB). Theater commanders and planners enjoyed the latitude to develop a phasing construct that suited the conditions and threats the theater faced. Yes, Fish is correct in that that a common assumption was that an enemy would attack or invade the territory of a friend, partner, or ally and the United States would have to intervene. Still, the plans were not necessarily the “paint by numbers” construct that became the norm with the six-phase template of the post-9/11 world.

Why did we move from a varied phasing construct to the six-phase template? After 9/11, the war on terrorism competed for the many of the same resources as the major theater war plans. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld demanded a way to compare all war plans to ensure that they could be suitably resourced. If they could not be, planners were tasked with identifying risks as the war on terrorism was prosecuted. The simplest way to compare plans was to ensure they all had a standard phasing construct. While the four-phase construct that Fish described was clearly illustrative, it did not tie planners to those four phases. After 9/11, the new joint doctrine forced all planners to follow the same template regardless of the conditions, threats, and political objectives. This makes eminent sense from a resource allocation perspective, but actually hinders campaign planning and the stifles the intellectual rigor required for operational art and support to national strategy. Given the newly termed threats of the “gray zone” and other irregular threats, T.E. Lawrence’s admonition is apt: “Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.” How can we best apply creative thinking and the art of war in a 21st century environment characterized by ambiguous and irregular threats?

(Continued at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2016/11/on-campaign-plan-phasing-six-phase-or-unconstrained/

Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency Conversion

The 48 page report can be downloaded here. http://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=16765138

Anything by Colin Gray is worth reading.

I think this is very important:

As Dr. Gray posits, "the concepts of tactics and strategy are ones misused abusively on a habitual and widespread basis throughout the U.S. defense community." The author makes the case that "tactics concern military action, strategy is all about the consequences of such behavior." If there is confusion about these two concepts—and the author believes there is—then charting a sensible relationship between them is impossible. This monograph attempts to clear up that confusion by using historical examples where strategy and tactics have failed each other. One such historical example is the lack of strategy issued by Confederate President Jefferson Davis. In fact, Dr. Gray contends that "If any single factor is able to lead in explanation of the failure of the [Confederate States' Army] CSA in the Civil War, most plausibly it was the persisting neglect, even just incomprehension, of strategy." The author argues the tactical action and strategic effect disconnect is repeated throughout U.S. military history including the current conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency Conversion

   

---

Foreword

            Dr. Colin Gray's Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency Conversion examines in depth the conversion of tactical behavior with its strategic consequences. This topic should be of great interest to the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community because special operations has recently been the 'option of choice' when dealing with various foreign policy crises. SOF are sent on these missions because of their skills and small-scale mission sets. More importantly, however, is the belief that these tactical operations will have a strategic effect. Unfortunately, that conversion does not always happen. Dr. Gray addresses this conversion by breaking down what is meant by using the term tactical versus strategic. As Dr. Gray posits, "the concepts of tactics and strategy are ones misused abusively on a habitual and widespread basis throughout the U.S. defense community." The author makes the case that "tactics concern military action, strategy is all about the consequences of such behavior." If there is confusion about these two concepts—and the author believes there is—then charting a sensible relationship between them is impossible. This monograph attempts to clear up that confusion by using historical examples where strategy and tactics have failed each other. One such historical example is the lack of strategy issued by Confederate President Jefferson Davis. In fact, Dr. Gray contends that "If any single factor is able to lead in explanation of the failure of the [Confederate States' Army] CSA in the Civil War, most plausibly it was the persisting neglect, even just incomprehension, of strategy." The author argues the tactical action and strategic effect disconnect is repeated throughout U.S. military history including the current conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

            Dr. Gray's analysis is broken down into three main parts: problem, argument, and solution. The first part, the problem, explores the disharmony between the levels of action and desired consequences. For the SOF community, this problem addresses how "SOF should be conducted with, and in purposeful devotion to, action and other activities that contain or represent strategic sense for the promotion of the desired effect." While this sounds straightforward in theory, Dr. Gray reminds the reader it is difficult to obey in practice. The second part, the argument, distinguishes between the two sets of ideas of strategy and tactics and explains why the distinction is of vital importance. SOF tactical actions are assumed to be highly skillful, yet these actions are often dismissed as strategically insignificant based on the small scale of the operation. Gray argues that strategic is not another word meaning big or large in scale but rather the value of SOF can be found in their ability to strategically target a critically important part of an enemy. In the final part, the solution, the author argues that SOF operations need to be better understood by those outside and inside the SOF community. Dr. Gray states that "neither the SOF community nor the rest of the military establishment, including the allies, really understands the proper roles that should be assigned SOF." The goal is to have the necessary direction and leadership providing solid strategic sense so SOF may achieve the effects needed to advance U.S. policy. This will not be easy, nor will it happen quickly, but getting it right will allow tactical operations to convert to strategic effect for the nation.

US Military Forces in Asia in Support of US Policy and Strategy

US Military Forces in Asia in Support of US Policy and Strategy

Vision:  The United States is a global power and must operate globally in all regions of the world.  It requires a military force that has a proper mixture of forward basing and stationing combined with an effective rotational structure and deployment capability.  This will allow for the projection of US military power whenever and wherever necessary to support the interests of the United States and to support its friends, partners, and allies. Most important, military capabilities must support the leading instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic, and informational.  The US can lead with these three instruments because they will rest on the rock solid foundation of military power.

The US cannot make its military the centerpiece of strategy in Asia.  Yet it has to be the foundation of US strategy.

The US strategy in the Asia-Pacific and around the world must be built around strategic reassurance and strategic resolve (Steinberg & O’Hanlon 2012)[1] The US will reassure its allies as well friends and partners and will demonstrate strategic resolve to defend its interests, access to the global commons, and to ensure stability and allow for commerce and economic growth.

Problem:  Despite the Asia Rebalance/Pivot shifting a small percentage of military forces to the region over the next decade, an overall diminishing US military structure, combined with unproductive rhetoric, unrealistic priorities, over commitment of US forces (in particular ground forces but air and sea as well) have undermined US strategic reassurance and strategic resolve in the Asia-Pacific. This is combined with a lack of strategy requiring balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means, with an understanding of threats, risks, and opportunities.  This prevents the US from developing effective policies and executing strategies that protect US national interests in the region.  Ultimately this leads to instability in the Asia-Pacific and globally. 

Key Ideas:

China and the US will be strategic competitors throughout the 21^st century, with competition for markets, resources, and influence.  Cooperation is possible but there will always be competition:

Competition does not have to lead to military conflict.

-       The US competes economically - it protects free market principles

-       The US competes for influence - it demonstrates strategic reassurance and strategic resolve

-       The US competes for ideas - self determination, rule of law, international standards, treaties, and organizations

-       The US competes for access - freedom of navigation is the US priority

Competition is not zero-sum.  Winning is defined based on the competitors cultural, political, and economic systems and goals and desires and definitions of winning should not be mirror imaged.

The Asian paradox as described by Korean President Park is present and growing:  Asian nations are increasingly economically interdependent yet they have unresolved political and security issues.  Despite growing economic interdependence there is growing insecurity.[2]

A vital strategic US interest is freedom of navigation.  Territorial disputes cannot impede freedom navigation in the South China Sea, the Asia-Pacific region, and throughout the world.

The US will engage bilaterally, multilaterally and through regional and international organizations and mechanisms.  No two situations are the same and therefore all means of engagement must be at the disposal of the US.

We must maintain forces to not only deter threats and defend our interests; we must have overwhelming force to stop violence wherever we are faced with it.  This especially applies to the Korean peninsula where the ROK/US alliance must have the combined forces of air, land, maritime, and special operations to be able to win the war and end the violence that will occur during either post-conflict or post-regime collapse in North Korea.

The US will not be able to increase the number of bases in the Asia-Pacific for both US fiscal constraints but also host nation domestic political challenges.

Building new permanent bases requires a minimum of a five-year lead time from a Congressional approval and resourcing and an engineering construction perspective and often longer form a political/diplomatic perspective.

Key Concepts: 

The US must lead with the diplomatic and economic instruments of power.  The concept of US leadership in the Asia-Pacific should be based on statesmanship with Statesmen leading the US strategic efforts.  A Statesman is a wise, skillful, and respected political leader and this will describe the type of men and women that will make up leaders on the US national security team both in Washington and those responsible for the US policy in the Asia-Pacific region.

The first priority for the US is to reinforce and strengthen relationships with and commitments to the five treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific: Australia, Japan, The Republic of Korea, The Republic of the Philippines, and The Kingdom of Thailand.   US Strategic Reassurance and Strategic Resolve rests on this alliance structure.

Although the alliance and basing structures evolved over the Cold War it does not mean that they are anachronistic.  As long as the US and our five treaty allies have sufficiently aligned interests we must sustain and strengthen our relationships.  The bases that we have in Japan and Korea, as well as the US territory of Guam and the access we have in Australia, Thailand and the Philippines for rotational forces provide the US with strategic flexibility and agility.  The one law that the US cannot violate is the law of physics that controls time and distance.  Until we can overcome that law we suffer from the tyranny of distance.  To ensure our strategic reassurance and strategic resolve we must have presence and persistence.  Our forces must be present and we must persistently improve the military interoperability of the US and its treaty partners as well as friends and partners with like-minded values and interests.  In terms of maintaining our basing structure we should borrow the adage of the combat infantryman on patrol – “never give up the high ground” because once you do you may not be able to get back to the top.

Forces based and stationed in the region provide a critical capability to support humanitarian assistance when needed and requested.  These capabilities have been demonstrated for decades with recent examples in response to tsunamis in Southeast Asia and Japan, and typhoons and volcanic eruptions in the Philippines and other disasters in other countries.  Providing humanitarian assistance reinforces US strategic reassurance and strategic resolve.

The US will support Korean unification as the only long term and permanent solution to the North Korean nuclear program and human rights atrocities and crimes against humanity being perpetrated by the Kim Family Regime.  The US will develop joint military and interagency plans to support the ROK in achieving the United Republic of Korea (UROK – pronounced “You Rock”)[3]

Lastly, the US cannot be deterred by threats whether they are economic, diplomatic, or military.  The US will protect its interests in the Asia-Pacific, defend it allies, support friends, and partners, and ensure regional and global adherence to international laws and norms.

Key Force Concepts:

The first priority is to maintain the current force structure in Japan and Korea as well as in Guam and Hawaii as the baseline force structure for the Asia-Pacific.  There can be no reduction in US presence in the region. 

An aircraft carrier battle group must always be home ported in Japan.

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets must be properly deployed throughout the region to provide the US with unparalleled situational awareness, situational understanding, and early warning.

The development of an integrated missile defense system is vital to protect the US, its forces in the region, and US allies.  This system will be land, sea, and space based.

Ground forces in the Pacific will be postured for defense of the ROK/US Alliance and then interoperability throughout the Asia-Pacific region, first with US allies and then with like-minded friends and partners.

David S. Maxwell

Associate Director, Center for Security Studies

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

Georgetown University

Phone and email:  202-687-3834; david.maxwell@georgetown.edu 

---

[1] James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: US China Relations in the 21^st Century, (Princeton University Press, 2014) Borrowed and adapted from the title of their book.

[2] Park Geun-Hye, “A Plan for Peace in North Asia,” Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2012 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323894704578114310294100492?alg=y

[3] Center for New American Security, INFOGRAPHIC: The Geopolitical Implications of Korean Unification, October 16, 2015, http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/10/infographic-geopolitical-implications.html