Table 1: Contents of Volume I published in 1962I. Southeast Asia1. The Revolution in Vietnam: 1946–19542. The Indonesian Rebellion: 1945–19493. The Revolution in Malaya: 1948–1957II. Latin America4. The Guatemalan Revolution of 19445. The Venezuelan Revolution of 19456. The Argentine Revolution of June 19437. The Bolivian Revolution of 19528. The Cuban Revolution: 1953–1959III. North Africa9. The Tunisian Revolution: 1950–195410. The Algerian Revolution: 1954–1962IV. Africa South of the Sahara11. The Revolution in French Cameroun:1956–196012. The Congolese Coup of 1960V. Middle East13. The Iraqi Coup of 193614. The Egyptian Coup of 195215. The Iranian Coup of 195316. The Iraqi Coup of 195817. The Sudan Coup of 1958VI. Far East18. The Korean Revolution of 196019. The Chinese Communist Revolution:1927–1949VII. Europe20. The German Revolution of 193321. The Spanish Revolution of 193622. The Hungarian Revolution of 195623. The Czechoslovakian Coup of 1948Volume II, 1962-2009The first section deals with revolutions that desire to greatly modify the type of government. They include:1. New People’s Army (NPA)2. Fuerzas Armada Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)3. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)4. 1979 Iranian Revolution5. Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional(FMLN)6. Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)The second section describes revolutions where identity or ethnic issues are prime motivations for the warfare:7. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)8. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)9. Hutu-Tutsi genocides10. Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)11. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)The desire to drive out a foreign power from their area constitutes the third section, with the cases:12. Afghan Mujahidin13. Vietcong14. Chechen Revolution15. Hizbollah16. Hizbul MujahedeenThe fourth section deals with the pressing rise of revolutions based upon religious fundamentalism:17. Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)18. Taliban19. Al QaedaThe last section covers issues of modernization or reform, including:20. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)21. Revolutionary United Front (RUF)22. Orange Revolution of Ukraine23. Solidarity
Saturday, June 28, 2014
Army Irregular Warfare Center prepares to stand down
For those who think that the need to study insurgency (and revolutionary warfare or irregular warfare) is no longer necessary, I would call your attention to the project by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) and American University in 1962 and USASOC and Johns Hopkins in 2009 on the ARIS project (Assessing Revolution and Insurgent Strategies). Below are the 46 case studieson Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare. Note that
,23 in Volume I (1962) and 23 in Volume II (2009) in the Casebook
ecase studies are only illustrative and not a comprehensive list of all the insurgencies and revolutions that have occurred. They were chosen because they are worthy of study to prepare for likely similar events in the future.
Note the five categories defined in Vol II below.
Both casebooks and other important references can be downloaded at this link:
Army Irregular Warfare Center prepares to stand down
Since its beginning in 2006, the Army Irregular Warfare Center, originally the Counterinsurgency Center, has prepared more than 40 brigade combat teams, as well division and corps headquarters, for COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. AIWC also conducted more than 50 irregular warfare webcasts for the community of interest and deploying soldiers.
Beginning Oct. 1, AIWC’s critical tasks and responsibilities will transition to other Army organizations as resources and priorities are realigned.
In recognizing AIWC’s numerous accomplishments during the last eight years, Maj. Gen. Thomas S. James Jr., director of the Mission Command Center of Excellence, said, “AIWC was the driving force that led to the analysis, development and integration of irregular warfare-related concepts, doctrine, training, leadership and education, ensuring the lessons we’ve learned permeate across the Army now through 2025 and beyond.”
The COIN Center was established in July 2006 by then-Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, in conjunction with Marine Corps Deputy Commandant Lt. Gen. James Mattis. The COIN Center was designated in September 2010 as the Army’s focal point for irregular warfare and transitioned to its current organization as the AIWC.
AIWC was established with an initial heavy emphasis on providing first-rate, near real-time support to units preparing for combat. It quickly developed a flexible five-day COIN seminar for BCTs deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, AIWC leveraged the experience and insights of combat veterans to ensure relevancy of seminar content for deploying war-fighting units. The result was an interactive seminar model that was so successful it was requested by III Corps, V Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps, as well as non-deploying units.
AIWC’s primary responsibilities included developing doctrine; coordinating, analyzing and integrating irregular warfare doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities solutions across the Army; advising training centers and other programs; integrating COIN doctrine into training and education; and conducting outreach to the COIN community of interest.
In addition to its seminars and webcasts, other AIWC significant contributions since 2006 included facilitating the re-write of Field Manual 3-24, “Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies,” writing six Army techniques publications, and collaborating irregular warfare issues with military partners, such as France, Iraq, Great Britain, Canada, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Singapore, Afghanistan and India.
AIWC has provided irregular warfare support and expertise through guest lecturers/facilitators at civilian and academic seminars, conferences and workshops, including the Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, Global Center for Security Cooperation, U.S. Institute of Peace and International Development, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Kansas State University, University of Kansas, the National Defense University and Massey University, New Zealand.
AIWC Director Col. Gus Benton II said, “As a SOF (special operations force) practitioner, it’s readily clear that the value of AIWC to the Army goes far beyond the number of events supported; the value is truly drawn from the numerous enlightening anecdotes offered by individual Army leaders up to corps commanders as to how their forces were shaped and prepared to operate successfully within complex COIN environments.”
- As the COIN Center’s first director in 2006, retired Col. Pete Mansoor, said, the mission of the COIN Center was “to think about how we can change our organization (the Army); integrate new technologies; come up with better tactics, techniques and procedures; how to better train our doctrine; and understand the culture, languages and skills that we need to counter insurgency.”
And that is precisely what today’s AIWC has been doing ever since.
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