Think Piece - Draft US Political Warfare Policy

Dr. D. Robert Worley has drafted an interesting think piece for a DRAFT US Political Warfare Policy.  It can be downloaded here:  https://db.tt/TAJsg9U0 

He has used the Overseas Internal Defense Policy of 1962 as a historical template for guidance (it can be downloaded here: http://bit.ly/1HU2ULh).   I was fortunate to be able to correspond with him and exchange information and share ideas as a result of our Kennan Donovan Initiative which has been a series of round tables over the past 2+ years for members of the SOF community, Georgetown University students in the Security Studies program, professors, think tank professionals, journalists, and scholars in which we discussed various SOF related issues to include unconventional warfare, counter-unconventional warfare and political warfare.)  

Dr. Worley's bio is below the introduction to the policy and the table of contents.  He has given me permission to share this with a wide audience now that the USASOC SOF Support to Political Warfare White Paper as been published.

In our most recent exchange Dr. Worley had this to say:

By the way, I began with the question, If we are to wage political warfare, what would a national policy statement look like?

There’s an entirely different question, a normative question, Should we wage political warfare? You touched on that in your email below. You may have already sent me the attached file; if so, I’m sending it back. The normative question was asked back in 1984 and discussed by a knowledgeable panel. I think if a similar panel was assembled today, the discussion would be the same. No conclusion is reached.

Here is the referenced article: 

SHOULD THE U.S. FIGHT SECRET WARS? Ball, George W;Cline, Ray S;Codevilla, Angelo;Colby, William;Gelb, Leslie;Halperin, Morton;McGehee, Ralph W;Moynihan, Daniel Patrick;Stockwell, John Harper's; Sep 1, 1984; 269, 1612; ProQuest pg. 33

It can be downloaded here:  https://db.tt/QAosu8G9

In answer to Dr. Worley's question I think the answer is yes.  I think our failure to operate effectively in the space between peace and war that is characterized by hybrid warfare, political warfare and unconventional warfare allows our adversaries and the adversaries of our friends partners and allies the ability to operate freely.  We have ceded the initiative to them and they are exploiting our vulnerability gap.  I do not advocate conducting modern unconventional warfare the way the Russians do, or the Three Warfares the way the Chinese do, or unconventional warfare the way the Iranian Quds forces does.  We do not want to meet them head on using their same tactics and techniques just as they do not want to meet us conventionally head on.  We have successfully deterred our adversaries from high end conventional maneuver warfare because we have the best military in the world so they seek asymmetric advantages in the space between peace and war in the various forms of warfare we have mentioned above.  We have to find our own asymmetric approaches to both counter their strategies and campaign plans and to seize the initiative in this space to prevent them from achieving their policy objectives while meeting our own and protecting our interests.

The only way to deter our adversaries in this space is for us to conduct our own US unique form of political warfare.

I would be interested in hearing responses to Dr. Worley's question.

Lastly I would note the model outline of a Political Warfare plan on pages 39-40.  Do we think we could get anyone at the NSC to embrace this?  Perhaps we need an interagency process along the lines of PDD 56 (http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm)

DRAFT

U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE POLICY

https://db.tt/TAJsg9U0

(This (DRAFT) Document was prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee consisting of Representatives of DOS (Chair), DOD, DOT, CIA, and AID and approved as policy by Presidential Directive xxx of dd mm yy.) [Drafted by D. Robert Worley, modeled on the Overseas Internal Defense Policy of 1962, incorporating material provided by the Kennan Donovan Initiative at Georgetown University.]

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
A. A most pressing U.S. national security problem now, and for the foreseeable future, is the ongoing aggressive competition for dominion over territory, resources, and people in the space between peace and war – political warfare. Many years of experience with the techniques of subversion and insurgency have provided opportunists with a comprehensive, tested doctrine for conquest, and new forms of political warfare have emerged in the twenty-first century. Our task is to fashion on an urgent basis an effective plan of action to combat this critical threat to international stability, using all instruments of national power short of war.

B. It is the purpose of this document to provide the responsible executive agencies of the U.S. Government (DOS, DOD, DOT, AID, and CIA) with policy guidance for the employment of U.S. resources to wage political warfare and to assist in the development of balanced capabilities for the competition over sovereign territory and U.S. access to global resources.

C. This document is concerned with (1) hostile parties gaining dominion over territory and its people and resources and (2) other types of resistance, revolution, subversion, secession, and insurgency which are inimical to U.S. national security interests in all countries of the world whether or not they are allies.

D. The scope of this document embraces the range of U.S. measures to wage political warfare described in (1) and (2) above. The tactical employment of U.S. Armed Forces in combat operations in direct support of governments under insurgent military attack – counterinsurgency or foreign internal defense - is beyond the scope of this document.

U.S. Political Warfare Policy

Table of Contents

I. Purpose and Scope.......................................1
II. Background.................................................1
A. The Pattern.............................................1
B. The Factors.............................................3
C. Objectives..............................................4
D. Lessons.................................................4
III. Approaches to Political Warfare.......................4
A. Chinese Three Warfares..................................5
B. Three Principles of Iranian Unconventional Warfare......5
C. Russian Unconventional Warfare..........................5
D. U.S.-Sponsored Insurgency...............................7
E. Comparison..............................................8
IV. Framework of U.S. Political Warfare Policy.............8
A. U.S. Political Warfare Purpose and Objective............8
B. U.S. Interests..........................................8
C. U.S. Political Warfare Role.............................9
V. The U.S. Strategy......................................10
A. Selective..............................................11
B. Multilateral...........................................11
C. Understanding the Operational Environment..............12
D. Actions in the Operational Environment.................19
VI. Application of U.S. Strategy..........................20
A. Concept of Operations..................................20
1. Intelligence...........................................21
2. Influence..............................................21
3. Stages of Political Warfare............................22
4. Washington.............................................24
5. Abroad.................................................26
B. Roles and Missions.....................................27
1. The Role of the Department of State....................27
2. The Role of the Agency for International Development...29
3. The Role of the Department of Defense..................31
4. The Role of the Department of Treasury.................33
5. The Role of the Central Intelligence Agency............33
Annex A: Glossary of Terms................................35

Annex B: Model Outline of Political Warfare Plan..........39

D. ROBERT WORLEY

D. Robert Worley is a strategic advisor, military force structure analyst, expert in training and readiness of higher echelon military forces, author, and teacher. He is currently a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins University’s Center for Advanced Governmental Studies where he teaches graduate courses in national and international security, and he is a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. He currently provides advice and subject matter expertise on strategic and operational level joint and interagency operation in support of the Army’s Mission Command Battle Laboratory at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He was an invited lecturer on national security strategy to senior Taiwanese officials and an invited speaker at the National War College, service colleges, and other U.S. government agencies.

Robert previously carried out studies at the Institute for Defense Analyses’ Joint Advanced Warfighting Program. He carried out military experiments in the Middle East and a counterterrorist study in the Horn of Africa. He served as an advisor on a counterterrorist strategy to the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command. He authored Shaping U.S. Military Forces: Revolution or Relevance in a Post-Cold War World while the topic of force transformation was the subject of Pentagon processes. He authored Waging Ancient War: The Limits of Preemptive Force after the 9/11 attacks. Robert authored The National Security Council: Recommendations for the New President for the 2009 presidential transition, and he recently authoredOrchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System. He has published in Georgetown’s National Security Studies Quarterly, Joint Forces Quarterly, Small Wars Journal, and with the Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute.

Robert previously conducted studies at the Rand Corporation’s Army Research Division and National Security Research Division. He specialized in the study of command and control in higher echelon headquarters and later in the training and readiness of those same headquarters. He participated in high level, interagency wargaming at the Rand Strategy Assessment Center, Naval War College, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Joint Warfighting Center, and Army Battle Labs.

Robert has degrees in electrical engineering and computer science from the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Southern California, and the University of California at Los Angeles. He also has postdoctoral graduate degrees in government and in national security studies from Johns Hopkins University and Georgetown University, respectively. He completed the Security Studies Program for Senior Executives at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He has served on the faculties of UCLA’s School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, and Johns Hopkins University’s School of Arts and Sciences, where he was received the Excellence in Teaching award for 2007.

Robert served as an enlisted Marine from 1967 to 1971, attaining the rank of sergeant, and serving one tour of duty in Vietnam.