"The first great center
of area studies in the United States was not located in any university, but in
Washington," McGeorge Bundy, onetime dean of the Faculty of Arts and
Sciences at Harvard University and then president of the Ford Foundation,
observed in 1964. The OSS, he said, was "a remarkable institution, half
cops-and-robbers and half faculty meeting.”
America may not be interested
in unconventional warfare but UW is being practiced around the world by those
who are interested in it
Background. Revolutions, resistance, and insurgencies
(RRI) are being conducted around the world and will continue to be the norm in
the space between peace and war.
We have a
strategy gap between diplomacy and war fighting and the US government (USG)
requires a capability to achieve its objectives using all means necessary
beyond diplomacy but short of war (adapted form George Kennan’s political
warfare memo 1948)
Unconventional
warfare can provide a strategic capability to operate in this gap.
To be effective, elements of the US military and Intelligence Community must
continuously assess potential, nascent, and existing resistance organizations
around the world on a day-to-day basis. Assessments will contribute to
understanding when USG interests and resistance objectives can be aligned and
provide the intellectual foundation to determine if a UW campaign is warranted
or if opponents’ UW campaigns should be countered.
Non-Doctrinal
Definition of Resistance:
An
organized group (with leadership, objectives and strategy [a manifesto?]) opposing
an organized structure (e.g., government or occupying power) and employs
methods and activities (subversion to paramilitary and military) across a
spectrum of legality from non-violent political to
violent action to achieve (or force?) accommodation of its aims.
5 Categories of Revolutions - 1962-2009
• Modify the Type of Government
– NPA, FARC, Shining Path, Iranian Revolution, FMLN, Karen National
Liberation Army
• Identity or Ethnic Issues
– LTTE, PLO, Hutu-Tutsi Genocides, Kosovo Liberation Army, PIRA
• Drive out Foreign Power
– Afghan Mujahidin, Vietcong, Chechen Revolution, Hizbollah, Hizbol
Mujahedeen
• Religious Fundamentalism
– Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Taliban, Al Qaeda
• Modernization or Reform
– Niger Delta (MEND), Revolution United Front (RUF), Orange
Revolution, Solidarity
Political Warfare:
George F. Kennan defined political warfare as
“the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace.” While stopping short of the direct kinetic
confrontation between two countries’ armed forces, “political warfare is the employment
of all the means at a nation's command… to achieve its national
objectives.” A country embracing
Political Warfare conducts “both overt and covert” operations in the absence of
declared war or overt force-on-force hostilities. Efforts “range from such
overt actions as political alliances, economic measures…, and ‘white’
propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’
foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of
underground resistance in hostile states.”
See George Kennan, "Policy
Planning Memorandum." May 4, 1948.
SOF Support to Political Warfare:
• A whole-of-government endeavor, Political Warfare is best led by
agencies beyond DoD and can only succeed if it is conducted in a way to
“elevate civilian power alongside military power as equal pillars of U.S.
foreign policy."
• SOF is well suited to lead DOD's contribution to Political
Warfare’s activities, because they are relatively knowledgeable
experts in this form of warfare
• The overall Political Warfare effort relies on persuasive and
coercive diplomacy, economic coercion and engagement, Security Sector
Assistance (SSA), Unconventional Warfare (UW), and Information and Influence
Activities (IIA).
Readings:
“U.S.
Army Special Operations Command Counter-Unconventional Warfare White Paper:” https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-counter-unconventional-warfare/ Focus
on Chapter 3 (12 Pages)
Special
Warfare: The Missing Middle In U.S. Coercive Options:” http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/special-warfare-the-missing-middle-in-u-s-coercive-options/ (About
8 pages)
RAND
Report: “Improving Strategic Competence Lessons from 13 Years of War”
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR816.html
Skim the Summary (12 pages) and Chapter 4 (34 Pages) and focus on Chapter 3 (53
pages)
RAND
Report: “Lessons from 13 Years of War Point to a Better U.S. Strategy:” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/RB9800/RB9814/RAND_RB9814.pdf )
(4 pages)
SOF Support to Political Warfare:
Think Piece US Political Warfare Policy:
Other
references for some historical context:
George
Kennan's 1948 Policy Planning Staff Memorandum - The inauguration of organized
political warfare.
http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm
Army
Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War (BG Stillwell, 1961)
https://db.tt/G2a0p6Yl
UNITED
STATES OVERSEAS INTERNAL DEFENSE POLICY
September
1962
http://www.scribd.com/doc/50366332/Overseas-Internal-Defense-Policy-1962#scribd
NSDD 32
US National Security Strategy 1982 (declassified Reagan NSS)
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-32.pdf
And if
not familiar with the ARIS project at USASOC, I strong recommend perusing it.
Assessing
Revolutionary And Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) Studies
http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html
The
Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project consists of
research conducted for the US Army Special Operations Command by the National Security
Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.
Its goal is to produce academically rigorous yet operationally relevant
research to develop and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and
revolution. Intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the
Special Operations Forces, the ARIS studies allow users to distill vast amounts
of material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons,
enabling the development of future doctrine, professional education, and
training. The ARIS project follows in the tradition of research conducted by
the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in the
1950s and 1960s, adding new research to that body of work, republishing original
SORO studies, and releasing updated editions of selected SORO studies.
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