Kimberly Dozier references Project Gray.  I attended the conference yesterday as well.  The US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School has initiated a collaborative web site that will be very useful to all of those who want to focus on the Gray Zone.  I would urge those with an interest to join the site and begin contributing.  It can be accessed at this link: http://www.projectgray.org/  

Excerpt:

Linder held a one-day conference in Washington, D.C., to address how best to fight ISIS, to teach Washington policymakers and think tankers how special operations teams work to help local forces—a messy, years-long process.

​From the Project Gray Web Site:

About Project Gray

---

Project Gray is a collaborative study of the Gray Zone - the space between war and peace - where competitive interactions that fall short of a formal state of war, and which are characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty about relevant policy and legal frameworks, are undertaken by state and non-state actors. Conventional military responses by the Department of Defense lie outside the spectrum of appropriate responses for Gray Zone challenges. To address these conflicts, we must evolve our organization, intellectual, and institutional models to operate successfully in the Gray Zone.

Through a series of publications, forums, and events with academic, government, and military partners and other interested parties, Project Gray will enable us to analyze regional and trans-national conflicts, find solutions and develop best practices to operate in the middle ground between war and peace. It is our hope that the information shared and understanding gained can be used across geographic lines in response to similar challenges.

Project Gray is an initiative of the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence. We invite you to get engaged and join the conversation!

Now regarding this article and MG Linder's comments.  The only thing I can hope for is that the deployment of this "targeting force" could be to satisfy the need for immediate and visible action that can demonstrate metrics and actually provide "cover" and start buying some time for the forces conducting special  warfare to operate. Maybe there is a campaign plan that will employ surgical strike forces and special warfare forces in a mutually supporting and complementary manner.  See highlight paragraph below.

Excerpts:

The idea behind the new expeditionary force is to re-create a smaller version of the elite Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) cell that operated in Iraq during the U.S. occupation. That force eventually carried out dozens of raids each night, with the evidence or information from captives in the first raid leading to the next raid.

Carter and Chairman Dunford told the House Armed Services Committee on Tuesday that the new “expeditionary” special operations force would carry out raids and hostage rescues in Iraq and Syria.

“The raids in Iraq will be done at the invitation of the Iraqi government and focused on defending its borders and building the Iraqi security force's own capacity,” Carter said at Tuesday’s hearing

​.

The targeting troops are part of a two-pronged attack by special operations forces, to buy time for the work of 50 special operations advisers, who are headed to northern Syria to work with the so-called Syrian Arab Coalition, which includes the Kurdish fighters that have proved to be some of the most effective in winning territory back from ISIS.

The idea is to use the same model as the one in Afghanistan in 2001, when roughly 60 U.S. Special Forces Green Berets worked with the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban.

“You have to empower locals to fix their own problems,” said Maj. Gen. James Linder, commander of the Green Beret’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

“You cannot clear out those villages with Americans and have the same results,” he said in an interview with The Daily Beast.

“So you have to get in there to find out who is the key communicator, what’s going to motivate those folks, what is their cause,” he said.

The U.S. advisers can teach them everything from how to train a small unit to carry out an ambush to how to coordinate multiple teams attacking the same target—something that rebel forces on their own have to learn by trial and error, with often deadly and disastrous results.

Other important lessons: teach them not to hit infrastructure or civilians, so that they’ll actually have something to govern afterwards.

Linder held a one-day conference in Washington, D.C., to address how best to fight ISIS, to teach Washington policymakers and think tankers how special operations teams work to help local forces—a messy, years-long process.

 “You need to manage expectations in the U.S. public,” he said, echoing top U.S. military officials who have spoken of this as a generational fight. “This will be a long-term engagement.”

​

thedailybeast.com

Obama Unleashes Hunter-Killers on ISIS

BULLSEYE

The Special Ops Forces that got Bin Laden, Saddam, and Zarqawi are finally being sent by the dozens to go after the Islamic State’s leaders. Can these troops turn the tide?

“You don’t know at night who’s going to be coming in the window. And that’s the sensation that we want all of [ISIS’s] leadership and followers to have.”

The Obama administration is dispatching a targeting force of elite U.S. special operations troops into northern Iraq, after top U.S. defense and intelligence officials warned the ISIS network is growing faster than the coalition that’s fighting it, senior U.S. officials tell The Daily Beast.

The new special operations task force is aimed at denting the so-called Islamic State Group’s popularity by decimating its leadership, and gathering the intelligence needed to cut off more of its operations before they can launch.

It will be roughly 200 strong, based in northern Iraq, according to a senior defense official.

It’s the sharp end of the spear that will work with 50 special operations advisers who are deploying to northern Syria later this month, to advise local forces how to fight.

"It puts everybody on notice in Syria,” Defense Secretary Ash Carter told Congress on Tuesday. “You don’t know at night who’s going to be coming in the window. And that’s the sensation that we want all of [ISIS’s] leadership and followers to have.”

The war against ISIS began as a mission that President Barack Obama swore would not lead to ground troops. It became an operation in which U.S. officials only grudgingly acknowledged forces were not only on the ground but in combat. Tuesday’s announcement suggests that U.S. forces could now be on the front lines. 

The announcement of additional troops, made during a House Armed Services Committee on the war effort, surprised many at the Pentagon. Several of those involved in the effort struggled to answer basic questions about the new mission.

One thing that’s clear: The extra forces represent the latest adjustment to a strategy that has been stalled for months, according to Pentagon officials. Indeed, at Tuesday’s testimony, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford admitted that the U.S. had “not contained” ISIS. 

Carter and Chairman Dunford told the House Armed Services Committee on Tuesday that the new “expeditionary” special operations force would carry out raids and hostage rescues in Iraq and Syria.

“The raids in Iraq will be done at the invitation of the Iraqi government and focused on defending its borders and building the Iraqi security force's own capacity,” Carter said at Tuesday’s hearing.

The move was dismissed by critics of the Obama administration’s ISIS strategy, which relies on 3,500 U.S. troops already in Iraq to train local forces to do the fighting, combined with U.S. and other coalition airpower to hit ISIS targets.

“There is no firm date when we could get ISIS out of Raqqa or even Mosul,” Senate Armed Services Chairman John McCain (R-AZ) told MSNBC, referring to ISIS’s Iraqi and Syrian capitals. “And as long as they’re there and they have a base, they’re metastasizing.”

Pentagon officials say ISIS has lost 40 percent of its territory in Iraq and 5 percent of what it once held in Syria since the coalition launched attacks in August 2014. 

But U.S. intelligence officials say it continues to draw 1,000 new recruits a month, and is spreading, attracting new followers through violent actions like the attacks in Paris.

The idea behind the new expeditionary force is to re-create a smaller version of the elite Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) cell that operated in Iraq during the U.S. occupation. That force eventually carried out dozens of raids each night, with the evidence or information from captives in the first raid leading to the next raid.

JSOC members have been on the ground in limited numbers since the start of the U.S. anti-ISIS campaign. But the new expeditionary task force will also provide the kind of airpower, combat search and rescue, and medical capability that special operations officials say will enable more aggressive raids throughout Iraq and inside Syria with a lower risk of casualties—an important requirement of the casualty-averse Obama White House.

One senior U.S. official explained that administration officials had been reluctant to approve raids without such resources available, because if operators were badly injured, they’d be outside the “golden hour” to get them to life-saving medical aid.

The targeting troops are part of a two-pronged attack by special operations forces, to buy time for the work of 50 special operations advisers, who are headed to northern Syria to work with the so-called Syrian Arab Coalition, which includes the Kurdish fighters that have proved to be some of the most effective in winning territory back from ISIS.

Senior officials say those advisers are expected to deploy in the next two weeks, with their first job to assess just how well the Syrian Arab Coalition is fighting and how to help them step up their fight against ISIS.

“All we have right now is their interpretation of what’s going on,” a senior official briefed on the operations said. He predicted the assessment of the local fighters could take weeks.

All the officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the special operations deployments.

The idea is to use the same model as the one in Afghanistan in 2001, when roughly 60 U.S. Special Forces Green Berets worked with the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban.

“You have to empower locals to fix their own problems,” said Maj. Gen. James Linder, commander of the Green Beret’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

“You cannot clear out those villages with Americans and have the same results,” he said in an interview with The Daily Beast.

“So you have to get in there to find out who is the key communicator, what’s going to motivate those folks, what is their cause,” he said.

The U.S. advisers can teach them everything from how to train a small unit to carry out an ambush to how to coordinate multiple teams attacking the same target—something that rebel forces on their own have to learn by trial and error, with often deadly and disastrous results.

Other important lessons: teach them not to hit infrastructure or civilians, so that they’ll actually have something to govern afterwards.

Linder held a one-day conference in Washington, D.C., to address how best to fight ISIS, to teach Washington policymakers and think tankers how special operations teams work to help local forces—a messy, years-long process.

 “You need to manage expectations in the U.S. public,” he said, echoing top U.S. military officials who have spoken of this as a generational fight. “This will be a long-term engagement.”

—with additional reporting by Nancy A. Youssef

 Along the lines of "observe" I would say that one of the key contributions SOF can make is through area assessments, civil information management, and target audience analysis all of which contribute to the most important aspect of the human domain:  situational understanding - we have to move past situational awareness which can be provided by drones, and technical intelligence to situational understanding which allows us to understand the conditions and strategies which will allow us to devise policies and strategies and campaign plans to protect our interests.  And in some cases situational understanding may lead to an appropriate decision to not act.

Excerpts:

So given all that, what can special operators do in the Gray Zone?

“We are most valued-added when we can engage early ... and can get out and understand what’s happening in the areas and helpidentify options for our political leadership and other military leaders out there to help them address, prevent, deter actions from taking place out there,” Votel said. “What I think the Gray Zone offers to us, is the ability to get out there to shape, or detour, or influence things before they become catastrophes. That’s kind of the big idea, we want to get left of problems, and not just show up and try to deal with a bad situation.”

Though they don’t get the kind of headlines spurred by direct action missions like the Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden, one of Special Operations Forces’ main efforts is to observe, train and equip host nation forces in those Gray Zones.

Those kinds of training missions are taking place in Iraq, with the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurds, and have been set in motion for Kurds and Arabs in Syria.

But they also take place around the globe, Votel stressed.

​My thesis:

The future is characterized (not exclusively of course) by states and non-state actors conducting UW (revolution, resistance and insurgency (RRI)) and thus there is a requirement to conduct Counter-UW. SOF is organized, educated, trained, equipped and optimized for both​

​ ​

(but does not conduct them unilaterally or in a vacuum but as one element of the means in support of a joint campaign and national strategy)

​Special Warfare (including u

nconventional warfare

, counter-unconventional warfare and support to political warfare​)

 can provide a strategic capability to operate in this gap

​ (the gray zone between peace and war)​

.  To be effective, elements of the US military and Intelligence Community must continuously assess potential, nascent, and existing resistance organizations around the world on a day-to-day basis.  Assessments will contribute to understanding when USG interests and resistance objectives can be aligned and provide the intellectual foundation to determine if a UW campaign is warranted or if opponents’ UW campaigns should be countered

​.

​

​And a standing "PIR" for resistance (

​basic ​

information that should be sought on every deployment):

•Who is the resistance?

–Leaders, groups, former military, in or out of government, etc.

•What are the objectives of the resistance?

–Do they align with US and friends, partners, and allies?

•Where is it operating?

–From where is it getting support?

•When did it begin?

–When will it/did it commence operations?

•Why is there a resistance or the potential for resistance?

–What are the underlying causes/drivers?

•How will it turn out?

–E.g., what is the assessment of success or failure of the resistance?

•Most important  -  An expert recommendation: Should the US support or counter the resistance and if so how?

​

‘Gray Zone’ conflicts far more complex to combat, says Socom chief Votel

Army Gen. Joseph Votel calls the Islamic State “a non-state actor attempting to operate like a state.” TRIBUNE FILE PHOTO

By Howard Altman | Tribune Staff 
Published: November 28, 2015   |   Updated: November 28, 2015 at 09:51 PM

http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/gray-zone-conflicts-far-more-complex-to-combat-says-socom-chief-votel-20151128/

TAMPA — Between peace and all-out war exists the Gray Zone.

To Army Gen. Joseph Votel, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, the Gray Zone is a familiar place of ambiguity. It’s a place where the Islamic State operates. A place where Russia has taken on Ukraine.

And it’s home to many other spots, hot, lukewarm or otherwise, around the globe.

“The Gray Zone,” said Votel, “really defines this area between ... for the most part healthy economic, political competition between states, and open warfare.”

It’s a place, he said, where “actors, sometimes state actors and sometimes non-state actors, act in a manner just below what would normally take us into normal open warfare.”

In September, Socom, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, issued a paper on Gray Zone challenges. The paper says that while traditional war might have been the dominant means of deadly conflict, Gray Zone challenges have now become the norm, and that countering foes like the former Soviet Union in many ways proved far less complex than taking on current adversaries.

Last week, Votel sat down to talk to The Tampa Tribune about his vision for Gray Zone conflicts, how the command he leads fits into that paradigm, and how commandos are ideally suited for a mental and physical space that challenges much of what we have come to know about the nature of conflict.

“It is certainly the most challenging environment that I have experienced in 35 years of military service,” Votel said.

It is an especially important topic, given that the Gray Zone is a space that Army Green Berets, Rangers, Delta Force and aviators, Navy SEALs and special warfare boat crews, Marine Raiders and Air Force special operators will be operating in for many years to come

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/gray-zone-conflicts-far-more-complex-to-combat-says-socom-chief-votel-20151128/

Thoughts on Countering Unconventional Warfare

Given Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act directing the SECDEF to develop a strategy to counter unconventional warfare we need now give some thought to this issue since it is in the act passed by Congress.  https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1735/text#toc-H57D78DE2C41D4347BF5202B774B80E94    

Let me provide you with a few comments and some background.  If you have not seen the White Papers from USASOC on Political Warfare and Counter-Unconventional Warfare I recommend perusing them.  They can be downloaded from my blog at the links below. 

I have been focused on countering unconventional warfare for years for a number of reasons.

1)  Our enemies are conducting their unique forms of unconventional warfare; Russia, Iran, China, Al Qaeda, ISIS (I think AQ and ISIS are much broader than "simply" terrorist organizations.  We need to recognize the strategies they are using and attack those strategies.  And of course we have to effectively operate in the "Gray Zone" that space between peace and war where the majority of threats operate and conflict occurs.

2)  By focusing on our enemies conducting their unique forms of UW my intention is to influence people to recognize that we have to operate in the Special Warfare realm and not just the Surgical Strike realm (though I want both/and and not either/or - we have to effectively employ both capabilities in a complementary and mutually supporting way).  

3)  I believe that focusing on terrorism has caused us to think too tactically while a focus on UW can drive us to think more strategically and holistically about the problems we face which are complex political and military problems.

4)  I am disappointed that the NDAA focuses on DOD but of course that is all the HASC can really influence.  I think that USASOC's White paper makes it clear that DOD cannot be the lead in Political Warfare (which includes counter unconventional warfare) but that SOF makes a unique DOD contribution to its conduct.

More of my thoughts are in the commentary in posts at my blog links below.

SOF Support to Political Warfare

http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/03/sof-support-to-political-warfare-white.html

USASOC Counter Unconventional Warfare White Paper

http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2014/10/us-army-special-operations-command.html

USSOCOM White Paper- The Gray Zone

http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/10/ussocom-white-paper-gray-zone.html

The ‘new’ type of war that finally has the Pentagon’s attention

http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-new-type-of-war-that-finally-has.html

Here is what Speaker Ryan says about the President signing the NDAA 2016 today.  Below the Speaker's statement I have pasted my favorite section (1097) fro the NDAA directing the SECDEF to develop a DOD strategy to counter unconventional warfare threats.  Below that I included the language from the markup from the HASC subcommittee which mentions both Russia and Iran.  Notice what the Military Times highlights in the article - including development of gender neutral standards and as the title says a retirement overhaul.

November 25, 2015|Speaker Ryan's Press Office

WASHINGTON – House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) issued the following statement after President Obama signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act passed by the House of Representatives in a vote of 370-58 on November 5, 2015:

"By signing this legislation, President Obama is now required to come up with a real, comprehensive plan to defeat ISIS. That is the ultimate solution to this crisis. In addition, his signature reaffirms longstanding prohibitions on the transfer of Guantanamo Bay detainees to the United States. Overall, this bill takes the next steps to building the 21st century military that we need. I commend Chairman Mac Thornberry and the House Armed Services Committee for their leadership on behalf of our troops and their families."

- See more at: http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/president-now-required-present-plan-defeat-isis#sthash.OCPv9QjM.dpuf

https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1735/text#toc-H57D78DE2C41D4347BF5202B774B80E94      SEC. 1097. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE.

(a) Strategy Required.—The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of other appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) An articulation of the activities that constitute unconventional warfare threats to the United States and allies.

(2) A clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in providing indications and warning of, and protection against, acts of unconventional warfare.

(3) An analysis of the adequacy of current authorities and command structures necessary for countering unconventional warfare.

(4) An articulation of the goals and objectives of the Department of Defense with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(5) An articulation of related or required interagency capabilities and whole-of-Government activities required by the Department of Defense to support a counter-unconventional warfare strategy.

(6) Recommendations for improving the counter-unconventional warfare capabilities, authorities, and command structures of the Department of Defense.

(7) Recommendations for improving interagency coordination and support mechanisms with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(8) Recommendations for the establishment of joint doctrine to support counter-unconventional warfare capabilities within the Department of Defense.

(9) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(c) Submittal To Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees the strategy required by subsection (a). The strategy shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) Unconventional Warfare Defined.—In this section, the term “unconventional warfare” means activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20150422/103282/BILLS-114HR1735ih-U1.pdf 

Section 10XX—Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Unconventional Warfare 

 This section would required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors. This section would require the Secretary of Defense to submit the strategy to the congressional defense committees within 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. The committee is concerned about the growing unconventional warfare capabilities and threats being posed most notably and recently by the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The committee notes that unconventional warfare is defined most accurately as those activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area. The committee also notes that most state-sponsors of unconventional warfare, such as Russia and Iran, have doctrinally linked conventional warfare, economic warfare, cyber warfare, information operations, intelligence operations, and other activities seamlessly in an effort to undermine U.S. national security objectives and the objectives of U.S. allies alike. 

militarytimes.com

Obama signs defense bill, finalizing military retirement overhaul

• by 5:32 P.M. Est November 25, 2015 
•  Nov. 25, 2015 
•  2 min read 
•  original

After an extra month wait, the annual defense authorization bill is finally law.

President Obama signed the budget and policy bill on Wednesday, marking the 54th consecutive year the measure has survived Washington political fights to become law.

The most significant result for troops is the renewal of dozens of specialty pay and bonus authorities, and a massive overhaul of the military retirement system.

Starting in 2018, newly enlisted troops will no longer have the traditional 20-year, all-or-nothing retirement plan. Under the changes, it will be replaced with a blended pension and investment system, featuring automatic contributions to troops' Thrift Savings Plans and an opportunity for government matches to personal contributions.

The new system is expected to give roughly four in five service members some sort of retirement benefit when they leave the military, as opposed to the current system which benefits only one in five.

The $607 billion authorization bill also includes comprehensive defense acquisition reform and language designed to stop Obama from closing the detention facilities at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

White House officials had objected to that language and hinted at a possible veto. But similar language in the measure each of the last six years didn't stop the president from signing past authorization measures into law.

Obama did veto an earlier draft of this fiscal 2016 authorization bill, but over broader fiscal fights that were resolved last month when lawmakers approved a new two-year spending plan that goes around mandatory budget caps for both defense and nondefense programs.

The legislation is only half the annual budget process for Congress. Lawmakers still need to pass a defense appropriations bill for fiscal 2016 to start new programs and acquisition plans. Congressional leaders are hopeful that can be done before Dec. 11, when a short-term budget extension expires.

But finalizing the annual defense authorization bill is a significant step forward in that larger process, and gives Pentagon planners a host of other policy updates as well:

• Allowing personal firearms on stateside bases — Lawmakers are requiring Defense Secretary Ash Carter to develop a plan by the end of this year that would allow stateside base commanders to decide whether to allow their service members to carry personal firearms on duty, or in areas where that is currently restricted by the military. Any such plan would not supercede local laws.
• A pay freeze for general and flag officers — Troops will see a 1.3 percent pay increase in January, lower than the rate of expected private-sector wage growth but more than their senior officers will get. General and flag officer pay will stay at fiscal 2015 levels.
• Another ban on a new BRAC round — Like in past years, the measure includes a prohibition on defense officials starting another base closing round. But lawmakers did include language allowing military officials to conduct studies on how much excess capacity exists in their stateside footprint, which could ease the path to such a move in the future.
• A ban on "paid patriotism" with sports leagues — The bill includes language that would prohibit the department from entering into contracts "making payments for honoring members of the Armed Forces at sporting events," in response to congressional reports that several professional sports teams were given tens of thousands of dollars to conduct on-field military appreciation events.
• Easier rules for military animal adoption — The measure changes the rules on adopting military dogs and other animals to make it easier for former handlers and families of injured handlers to adopt them following their military service.
• Developing "gender-neutral" standards for military jobs — In response to a push to open more military specialties to female troops, lawmakers want Pentagon leaders to craft "gender-neutral occupational standards" that would allow "decisions on assignments (to) be based on objective analysis."

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