The End of the War On Terrorism: Mixed Results will Test US Policies for Years to Come BY JOSEPH J. COLLINS

I do have to take some exception to this excerpt below from Joe's excellent article.  I would add the caveat that most people think that the "focal point" of SOF has been the direct approach.  That is the most visible contribution and the one the press and even senior leaders focus on.  I think when we look beyond Afghanistan and Iraq that there have been a large amount of US Special Operations (in particular, SF, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations/MISO) around the world focusing less on door-kicking and more on cultural awareness (except where the mission is to get other forces focused on door kicking).  But even in Iraq and Afghanistan there has been a lot more focus on training and advising indigenous forces than most people care to think about. It pains me to read that all people think SOF does is direct action, counter-terrorism but of course that is where the action is and that is what sells newspapers and movie tickets.  But rather than think that SOF has to do something new or that it has not been doing I think the simple statement is to let SOF do its job.

Fourth, our assessment efforts must take a hard look at special operations forces, who have been the star players in all three campaigns of the war on terrorism. Their achievements are doubly significant when one considers that they represent only 5 percent of defense personnel and no more than 4 percent of the entire DoD budget. In the war on terrorism, their focal point has been the direct approach. In March 2012, Adm. William McRaven, the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, described this counterterrorist effort as a combination of “precision lethality, focused intelligence and interagency cooperation, all integrated on a digitally networked battlefield.” He believes SOCOM must now shift to an indirect approach to help U.S. allies fight their own battles and expand allied capacity to do that work in the future. 

This will be a difficult shift. Few organizations easily abandon successful programs, especially when they are so popular with the public. The need for engagement, advice and training, however, will soon exceed the need for kinetic operations. It will require fewer shooters and more language-qualified trainers, less door-kicking and more cultural awareness. The nation’s leaders must also protect special operations forces from being used on missions that could be done by general-purpose forces. 

A wide range of common-sense recommendations for the future of SOF can be found in an April Council on Foreign Relations report by Rand expert Linda Robinson. She calls for the United States to “raise the game of special operations forces” by emphasizing the indirect approach of engagement, training and assistance. She concludes the report with this important thought: “The phrase ‘You can’t kill your way to victory,’ coined by a special operator, is a useful signpost on the road to a more comprehensive approach to special operations as part of U.S. national security policy.” Finally, we need to think hard about the evolving terrorist threat. The lonewolf terrorist feeds on psychological discontent and terrorist information operations. The U.S. has killed Osama bin Laden and many of his senior comrades, but his poisonous ideology and other varieties of radical Islamist thought thrive on the Internet. For example, even after his death, the radical sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki motivated the Boston Marathon bombers, just as they had influenced Maj. Nidal Hassan, the lone-wolf terrorist accused of shooting his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood. Along with implementing better immigration controls and screening, the United States must take action against al-Qaida websites and propaganda outlets. While dealing with lone-wolf terrorists at home is a police issue, U.S. forces, diplomats and homeland security experts must help out by defeating the poisonous sites and the “magazines,” like Inspire, that train the wannabe lone wolf in how to build bombs.

V/R

Dave

The End of the War On Terrorism  

Mixed Results will Test US Policies for Years to Come

BY JOSEPH J. COLLINS

The war on terrorism as we know it is coming to an end.

http://armedforcesjournal.va.newsmemory.com/?token=621DB2441565A46F7F3700DC8EB8C962003C9137

For the United States, the big campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are over or winding down.

The campaign against al-Qaida-inspired terrorism has taken a sharp turn toward a better but more complex condition. Pushed by weakened but adaptive enemies, the active theaters are shifting, and the war we know is fading.

With serious changes in all three of the major campaigns of this war, it is time to reassess the authorities that underpin the war and the ways and means that are needed for the future.

The first step in getting the future right is to reassess the past 11½ years with an eye toward trends.

The U.S. war in Iraq — the second Gulf War in as many decades — began 10 years ago. Despite the benefits of not having Saddam Hussein or his evil brood in power, the war has been a net loss. Launched in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction that were not there, the war cost 40,000 allied casualties, at least 110,000 dead Iraqis, and a trillion dollars in direct costs. U.S. standing in the Middle East descended to new depths. The U.S presence in Iraq fueled the al-Qaida narrative for nearly a decade and strengthened Iran in the region.

Adding to the harm, the war in Iraq diverted attention and resources from Afghanistan, which turned out to be more enduringly important than our foray into Iraq.

The single bright spot in U.S. policy in Iraq was the Surge, an act of great political courage by President Bush. The skill of the generals and the valor of coalition forces helped change the war for the better, diminished sectarian violence and allowed for a withdrawal with honor. Sadly, the Obama administration was unable to negotiate a follow-on U.S. security assistance force. The once-potent and influential U.S. presence has shriveled.

For our considerable pains, Iraq today is fractious, internally violent and decreasingly democratic. More civilians die every month in Iraq than in Afghanistan. Sectarian violence and al– Qaida terrorism are on the rise. Iran is more powerful in the region and arguably has more influence in Iraq than the United States does. This may all end one day, peace and stability may follow, and people may compare Baghdad to Philadelphia, but we should not hold our breath. For now, U.S. influence on the Iraqi government fades daily, and the internal situation worsens.

The war in Afghanistan — approaching its 12th anniversary for Americans — is in transition. Not only have the Afghan National Security Forces taken the lead in fighting the enemy, but elections in 2014 will bring in a new government, followed in eight months by the departure of the much-diminished allied expeditionary force. Corruption and inefficiency are still widespread, and despite considerable progress, Afghanistan still has most of the hallmarks of a state that has been at war for 35 years.

The armed struggle in the Hindu Kush is at a stalemate. The hard-pressed Taliban factions fight on, but the government forces have already proven much more capable than many pessimists expected. The allies have pledged security and economic aid for the next decade. Soon, NATO and the United States will announce the “force-after-ISAF,” likely an advisory and assistance force of 9,000 to 15,000 people. Relations with Pakistan are improving, and Islamabad is also looking forward to a first: an orderly transition from one democratic government to another. In Afghanistan, much will hinge on the election in April 2014, the skill and tenacity of the Afghan government forces and the unflagging will of the allies.

The final campaign, the war against al-Qaida terrorism — the most important of the campaigns — has met with great success. The U.S. homeland has not had any large-scale attacks. Al-Qaida Central is in tatters. Decimation does not begin to describe the toll exacted on its leadership. Some of its franchises, especially in Yemen and the Maghreb, are showing more life, but they are all under the gun and seem less interested in attacking the West than in fighting our local allies in the region.

In Libya and Mali, U.S. allies have stepped up their efforts, allowing the U.S. to limit its contributions to advice and support. Some have called this “leading from behind.” That unfortunate expression will never make a popular bumper sticker or an inspiring campaign slogan, but the policy behind it is reenergizing the regional balance of power and encouraging allied efforts to do more for the common defense. It is hard to criticize that.

Along with but apart from al-Qaida’s regional franchises, lone-wolf terrorists have moved to the forefront. These lone wolves — technically, a police and not a military problem — are more vexing but less dangerous than the centrally directed al-Qaida terrorism that dominated the last two decades. Twice in New York City, once at Fort Hood, Texas, and most recently at the Boston Marathon, lone-wolf terrorists — citizens or permanent U.S. residents — have attacked or tried to attack their neighbors with firearms or bombs.

Al-Qaida is on the run in many places, but its poisonous ideology lives on in cyberspace, stalking the humiliated, the alienated and the misfits. American culture is uncomfortable for many immigrants. For others, the American dream has never produced a decent reality. High expectations fall with devastating psychological effects. Waiting in the wings are the radical chat rooms, videos and websites. You can learn anything on the Internet, including how to make a bomb. You can rediscover religious fervor or find friends who share your radical views, even if you are in Missouri and they are physically or virtually in Waziristan.

In the fight against al-Qaida and its associates, armed drones — or more accurately, remotely piloted aircraft — have come into their own. Since 2004, according to the New America Foundation, more than 400 RPA strikes have killed between 2,000 and 3,300 militants in Yemen and Pakistan.

While enormously successful, the use of RPAs now faces many critics, who point out that these remotely piloted aircraft often violate the sovereignty of friendly nations, engage in opaque targeted killing, kill U.S. citizens abroad without due process, create new enemies for the United States, and cause collateral damage and unwanted casualties.

When George W. Bush was president, capturing terrorists and detaining them made for problems that still exist at the Guantanamo detention facility. President Obama’s expansion of the use of RPAs, in part to obviate those sorts of complications, has caused a whole new set of problems. The changing nature of the war today has left the Authorization for Use of Military Force Law looking like a blank check few want to honor. 

NEXT STEPS 

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http://armedforcesjournal.va.newsmemory.com/?token=621DB2441565A46F7F3700DC8EB8C962003C9137

The Orphan Master's Accomplices: China and Laos aid send refugees back to the North Korean gulag.

I cannot recommend the Orphan Master's Son strongly enough for some excellent insights into the horrors of north Korea (despite it being a work of fiction it is well researched and aligns with many of the actual first hand accounts we have heard – the plot is far fetched but the way the society is run and the horrors people experience I think are based on reality).

But regarding this incident, this is a powerful conclusion to this OpEd:

Xi's government regularly commits the 21st-century equivalent of sending Jews back to the Nazis, each time as a witting accomplice in the Kim regime's crimes. America shouldn't become an accessory through its silence

V/R

Dave

• June 4, 2013, 9:33 a.m. ET

The Orphan Master's Accomplices

China and Laos aid send refugees back to the North Korean gulag.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324063304578524802439074288.html#printMode

The 2012 Pulitzer Prize-winning novel "The Orphan Master's Son" describes in horrifying detail the lives of North Koreans trapped inside the Kim regime's gulag-state. In April, nine teenagers and young adults probably thought they were leaving that oppression behind when they escaped their country. They traveled thousands of miles through China to Laos, from whence they might have been able to reach South Korea. Instead, Vientiane turned them over to Chinese and North Korean authorities, who returned them to the North last month. They face forced labor or execution for their escape attempt.

The case casts light anew on Pyongyang's accomplices, especially China. Both Laos and China contravened international norms for handling refugees, especially a prohibition on returning asylum-seekers to countries where they would face retribution. This is standard Chinese procedure for treating North Korean defectors, but until now Laos tacitly allowed South Korean officials to handle such refugees. The reasons for Vientiane's change of heart remain unclear.

Neither government can plead ignorance about the fate awaiting the nine. North Korean law criminalizes emigration. A long and growing list of reports based on the testimony of defectors—including from the South Korean National Human Rights Commission—document conditions in the Kim regime's prison camps.

The U.N. will soon begin its own formal investigation of Pyongyang's rights abuses, especially its gulag. For now, several U.N. agencies have raised the alarm about the nine refugees. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres on Thursday said his agency "is deeply concerned about the safety and fundamental human rights of these individuals if they are returned to [North Korea]." 

Also on Thursday, the U.N.'s current special rapporteur on North Korean rights issues, Marzuki Darusman, said that "all the concerned authorities have an urgent responsibility to ensure [the refugees'] protection."

As if on cue, Beijing on Friday condemned the U.N. statements. "We hope that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [under whose aegis Mr. Darusman operates] does not make irresponsible remarks based on unspecified news," Hong Lei of the foreign ministry said at a press briefing. Beijing's problem is that all the known facts undermine China's claim that North Korean defectors are economic migrants not eligible for the protections afforded refugees.

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http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324063304578524802439074288.html#printMode

McRaven: Success in Human Domain Fundamental to Special Ops

Excerpt:

The three great military theorists of the past 200 years -- Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Giulio Douhet -- made powerful arguments for the land, sea and air domains of warfare, Navy Adm. William H. McRaven told the audience at an Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis-Tufts University Fletcher School conference.

I would just add that all three theorists recognized the importance of the "human domain," especially Clausewitz and the human domain is a big part of their theories especially the trinity: 

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity--composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. 

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.

If that is not a (or THE)  description of the human domain than I do not know what is.

V/R

Dave

McRaven: Success in Human Domain Fundamental to Special Ops By Claudette Roulo American Forces Press Service http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120219 WASHINGTON, June 5, 2013 – While there's no shortage of doctrine on how the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps provide value to the nation, special operations forces aren’t restricted to any of the traditional doctrines, the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command said here today. The three great military theorists of the past 200 years -- Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Giulio Douhet -- made powerful arguments for the land, sea and air domains of warfare, Navy Adm. William H. McRaven told the audience at an Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis-Tufts University Fletcher School conference. “But where does SOF fit into all of this?” he asked. While special operations forces are comfortable in the realms of traditional warfare, the human domain is perhaps more important -- both to the troops and to policy makers, McRaven said. The human domain encompasses the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior, he explained. Success in this domain won't be achieved by traditional ground, naval or air forces, he added. “Instead, success in the human domain will depend upon understanding the human terrain and establishing trust with those humans who occupy that space,” the admiral said. Building understanding and trust takes time, but once it’s built, “we can apply unique capabilities that are designed to assess, analyze, operate and prevail in population-centric strategies or struggles,” he said. While operating in the human domain is not the sole purview of special operations forces, it is one of their core competencies, McRaven said. “It is where our language training, our cultural skills and small footprint all lend themselves to developing the military-to-military trust necessary for success,” he explained. Any discussion of the global special operations forces network is incomplete without including the human domain, the admiral added. When that network is laid on top of the human domain, its full potential begins to be revealed, McRaven said. This potential, he added, is what he was trying to capture when he developed the Special Operations Command 2020 vision. Borrowing ideas from Defense Department experts on network-centric operations, the concept is more about networking than the network, McRaven said. “We cannot simply apply new technologies to the current doctrine, platforms and organizations. Organizations, doctrine and technology must co-evolve,” the admiral said. “The power of the network is derived from linking knowledgeable entities that are geographically dispersed,” he said. Today, Socom has more than 11,000 men and women operating in more than 80 countries around the world, he noted. Done right, networking enables special operations forces to share information, to collaborate with partners, to develop shared awareness and to achieve a degree of self-synchronization, McRaven said. Self-synchronization is an understanding of what the other person in the node brings and how to tap into that, McRaven explained. The idea complements the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s mission command philosophy for the joint force, he added. Networking has enormous potential for improving speed of command and force responsiveness, the admiral said, but most importantly, it will improve the understanding of the human domain. This, he said, will improve special operations’ ability to illuminate problems and help policy makers understand the threats and opportunities that are out there. Building understanding of the human domain requires boots on the ground, feeding information into the network, McRaven said. “Every single person on the ground is important,” he said. “Metcalfe's Law, which was developed to understand hard-wired communications systems, states that as the number of nodes in a network increases linearly, the potential value, or effectiveness of the network, increases exponentially.” Humans are more important than hardware, , and “while the law may not be directly suitable to the human network, experience tells me that every additional node in the human network does, in fact, add an exponential understanding of the problem area,” McRaven said. The admiral noted that this exponential increase is achieved with the signature small footprint of special operations forces. “So, it's not about a large footprint, it's about what SOF brings in 80-plus countries around the world, sometimes with only a couple of operators at remote locations, working face-to-face with our partners,” he said. “This is how the network becomes connected, and this is how we can create an operating picture that can effectively inform the Pentagon and the geographic combatant commanders,” McRaven added.

Biographies: Navy Adm. William H. McRaven  U.S Special Operations Command

[Editorial] Unified command: South Korean general to lead allied forces

I am surprised to receive no response to this development.  This did not make today's EarlyBird.  I wonder if it will tomorrow.  The Korean Herald editorial staff is making some important points:

Maintaining the current command structure is a wise decision, given Pyongyang’s increasing nuclear threats and the growing possibility of sudden change in the North. In fact, the present situation is a reason to strengthen the CFC rather than disband it. 

The envisioned combined command will send a clear message to the North that there won’t be any softening of the allies’ joint security posture even after the planned OPCON transition to South Korea. 

It also illustrates the evolution of the military alliance between the two countries to the level of equal partnership.  

Leaving the current system virtually intact would spare South Korea the trouble of setting up its own command with limited resources. Korea will instead be able to focus on modernizing its armed forces.  

It would also provide the U.S. military with more room to maneuver should a sudden change occur in the North. In a word, it would create a win-win situation for both countries.

One of the most important considerations is that this move attacks the north Korean strategy to split the Alliance.  This is the first development since 1978 that stops the perception of declining support to the Alliance.  During every administration since Carter tried to remove all US forces from Korea, there has been a declining US presence and this so-called OPCON transfer and the dissolution of the Combined Forces Command would have been viewed as one of the most successful effects of the north Korean strategy to split the Alliance.  Given the current strategic conditions in Northeast Asia this is a very wise move as the editorial staff writes.

V/R

Dave

[Editorial] Unified command

South Korean general to lead allied forces

http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130603000326

Published : 2013-06-03 20:03
Updated : 2013-06-03 20:03

The militaries of South Korea and the United States have reportedly agreed to maintain the current unified command structure for allied forces even after Seoul takes back the wartime operational control of its armed forces from Washington in December 2015.

The two sides had originally agreed to dissolve the U.S.-South Korean Combined Forces Command following the planned OPCON transfer, with each military operating on its own under a parallel command structure.

Yet according to reports, they recently reached an accord to retain the current arrangement even after the OPCON transition. Under the agreement, the allies will create a new combined command that will play exactly the same role as the CFC. 

There will be, however, one crucial difference between the two: The new command will be headed by the chairman of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the commander of U.S. Forces Korea serving as deputy commander.

Currently, the USFK commander, who also heads the United Nations Command, leads the CFC, with a South Korean four-star general supporting him as deputy commander.

Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin, who met his American counterpart Chuck Hagel on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Saturday, said details of the scheme would be unveiled at the Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul in October.

Maintaining the current command structure is a wise decision, given Pyongyang’s increasing nuclear threats and the growing possibility of sudden change in the North. In fact, the present situation is a reason to strengthen the CFC rather than disband it.

The envisioned combined command will send a clear message to the North that there won’t be any softening of the allies’ joint security posture even after the planned OPCON transition to South Korea.

It will also ease concerns among people here about the prospect of South Korean and American forces operating as separate entities during wartime. Under the parallel command system, the South Korean military is supposed to lead allied operations should war break out with the North, with U.S. forces playing a supporting role. 

This arrangement, however, leaves the role of the U.S. military ambiguous, casting doubt on whether cooperation between allied forces will be efficient. Furthermore, it is questionable that the South Korean military will be fully prepared by 2015 to operate on its own during war. 

Creating a new combined command will resolve these problems ― without stopping the ongoing process of South Korea regaining wartime control of its troops.

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http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130603000326

(Korean) Allies agree on new combined command

Let the controversy begin.  I do not know anything more than what is in this article but if it is accurate it is certainly something I endorse (and have endorsed for a long time).  But there are those who will be opposed to the new command arrangement.  This is virtually no change for US SOF as it has for decades fallen under the ROK 3 Star SOF commander in the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force.  But we should keep in mind that although not stated in this article the Combined Theater Command (I guess the new acronym will the be the CTC) will likely answer to the Military Committee just as the Combined Forces Command does now.  And the Military Committee is made up of representatives of both nations' National Command and Military Authorities.  But in my mind this is good news.  Will be interesting to see what happens at the Security Consultative Meeting in October.

The agreement by the allies’ Joint Chiefs of Staffs ditched the initial plan for dissolving their Combined Forces Command and building separate command structures 

The plan, which virtually retains the CFC 

Under the allies’ tentative plan, a four-star Korean general is to head the Combined Theater Command ― the envisioned command structure ― while a U.S. general will become its deputy chief.  

Should it be adopted as a final version, it would virtually mark the first time for the U.S. military to be under the operational control of a foreign commander.  

Under the envisioned Combined Component Commands, there would be five wings ― the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Special Ops. Only the combined air force would be led by a three-star U.S. commander, sources said, given the massive amount of U.S. aerial assets to be deployed in case of a peninsular contingency.

V/R
Dave

Allies agree on new combined command

Plan may be finalized at SCM in October but will still need political approval

http://nwww.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130602000282&utm_source=feedly

Published : 2013-06-02 20:47
Updated : 2013-06-02 20:48

The South Korean and U.S. militaries have agreed to create a new combined command structure similar to their current decades-old apparatus after the transfer of wartime operational control slated for 2015 to maintain high security vigilance, Seoul officials said Sunday.

The agreement by the allies’ Joint Chiefs of Staffs ditched the initial plan for dissolving their Combined Forces Command and building separate command structures. But it should be endorsed by their legislatures and government leaders, the officials noted. 

The plan, which virtually retains the CFC, may be finalized when the allies’ defense chiefs meet for their annual Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul in October, they said. 

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin (right), U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel (center) and Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera pose for a photo prior to their talks at the annual Asia Security Summit, better known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, in Singapore on Saturday. (Defense Ministry)

“The current command system has been entrenched as an ideal mechanism. Thus, (South Korea and the U.S.) share the understanding that (the efforts to build a new command structure) be pushed for in this direction,” Seoul’s Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin told reporters on the sidelines of the Asia Security Summit, a gathering of defense ministers in Singapore on Saturday.

The allies initially agreed to scrap the CFC and build a cooperative body to ensure bilateral military collaboration. But amid North Korea’s increasing nuclear and missile threats, they have thought twice about the original plan. 

Conservatives here have increased their calls for keeping the CFC as its dissolution could embolden the North, undermine the allies’ operational efficiency and weaken U.S. security commitments. After Seoul retakes the OPCON, it will assume a leading role in wartime operations with the U.S. providing support.

Under the allies’ tentative plan, a four-star Korean general is to head the Combined Theater Command ― the envisioned command structure ― while a U.S. general will become its deputy chief. 

Should it be adopted as a final version, it would virtually mark the first time for the U.S. military to be under the operational control of a foreign commander. 

Under the envisioned Combined Component Commands, there would be five wings ― the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Special Ops. Only the combined air force would be led by a three-star U.S. commander, sources said, given the massive amount of U.S. aerial assets to be deployed in case of a peninsular contingency.

Seoul’s Defense Ministry spokesperson Kim Min-seok expressed caution, stressing the plan was far from finalization.

“Although the allied militaries thought it would be an ideal form, it should go through many procedures such as getting understanding from the government as a whole, and the legislature and other political circles,” he told reporters.

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http://nwww.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130602000282&utm_source=feedly

N. Korea could fall faster than we think By Bruce Bennett

Dr. Bennett has a new report coming out soon and it is the most comprehensive report on north Korean collapse that I have read in 20 years.  It will be of tremendous value to policy makers, strategists, and planners in the ROK/US Alliance.  I think the collapse of the Kim Family Regime is the most complex threat the Alliance and the countries in Northeast Asia faces and one for which extensive preparations need to be made immediately, most importantly by South Korea and particularly in the area of influence operations.  I will not predict a time for collapse (most of us thinking about collapse have never made a time prediction) but I do agree that it could really surprise us when it happens.

V/R
Dave

N. Korea could fall faster than we think

http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130602000197

Published : 2013-06-02 20:38
Updated : 2013-06-02 20:38

Bruce Bennett

On Oct. 7, 1989, members of the East German Politburo looked on approvingly as sharply dressed soldiers and shiny military hardware paraded by them in a gaudy display of military might to mark the 40th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic.

To the world, the 1989 celebration may have looked no different than any of the countless East German military parades that had come before it. But inside East Germany, this one was different. That night, demonstrations demanding political reform spread to the capital for the first time. Whispered calls for democracy were becoming shouts. Whether the rest of the world knew it or not, the days of the German Democratic Republic were numbered.

Within weeks, the Berlin Wall fell. Less than a year later, agreements for the reunification of East and West Germany were signed. And just like that, there was one fewer communist nation threatening Europe.

When it comes to ostentatious displays of military might these days, no one outdoes North Korea, where parades are only the beginning. When leader Kim Jong-un wants a macho show of military strength, he’s likely to order nuclear tests, or rocket launches, or the firing of short range missiles into the sea as he did this week.

What the former East Germany and North Korea have in common is that they both have relied on shows of military might to divert domestic dissent while propping up regimes that face enormous challenges, both internal and external. Could North Korea collapse with as little warning as East Germany did 24 years ago? It’s possible.

When analysts look at the Korean Peninsula, they often talk of the reunification of the two Koreas as a long-off goal that should be planned for over the span of decades. But in the 1980s, the reunification of Germany seemed equally distant.

The United States, South Korea and their allies would be well advised to factor in the possibility that North Korea could collapse in a fit of revolt and economic decay at any time, just as East Germany did.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye has made clear her hopes for talks at some point between Seoul and Pyongyang to prepare for peaceful coexistence and perhaps even unification over the coming decades. But she has said little about how South Korea might deal with an early collapse of the North. A sudden collapse is possible in the coming years and could create regional chaos and impossible burdens on the road to reunification unless South Korea and its allies are better prepared.

Should Kim Jong-un be assassinated and a successor government fail to arise from the likely factions, South Korea and its neighbors would find themselves dealing with a humanitarian crisis of historic proportions. In the aftermath of a collapse, hunger would likely be the immediate urgency and food the most valued commodity. South Korea should make it clear to North Koreans that it is creating stockpiles of food that will be available in the event of a collapse, just as the West German’s offered “greeting money” to East Germans during the unification process.

At the same time, South Korea will have to deal with a broad range of other issues, like securing North Korean weapons, keeping its massive military appeased, and dealing with the remnants of Kim Jong-un’s regime.

How these huge issues are resolved will depend largely on how invested the North Korean people are in becoming one with the south. In the divided Germany of the late 1980s, virtually all Germans thought they would be better off if unification occurred. South Korea should be working toward creating this same kind of feeling of solidarity between its people and those of North Korea. If the North Korean people oppose unification, it may be impossible to secure the North, aborting the unification process. Once aborted, unification may never happen ― there may only be one chance.

South Korea has been successful in recent years in establishing a national brand that is cultural, economic and political. It includes music and technology and all the things South Korea is known for around the world. Making this brand more inclusive of all Koreans would be a good place to start creating a shared view of Korean success.

South Korea should seek to communicate to the North Korean people, and especially the elites, how life after unification will be in their best interest. They will share in the Korean economic plenty, have broad access to education including college, and only those guilty of serious human rights violations will be subjected to judicial punishments. While such offers may seem overly generous, they may be necessary to secure North Korean support for unification.

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http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130602000197

Book Review: Joan Johnson-Freese. Educating America's Military.

I look forward to reading this book (though per the review there are likely to be some "interesting" and controversial aspects and things I certainly may not agree with from my experience as a student and faculty member at the National War College).  But this statement from the review (with which I strongly agree)  is worth keeping in mind:

Not all officers possess a passion for lifelong learning. However, those who do should be encouraged to pursue it. The United States faces complicated and difficult national security challenges; the armed forces and the country should want the intellectually as well as the morally and the physically courageous to be on the frontlines in addressing them.

This of course applies to more than just the military: it applies to all National Security Thinkers and Practitioners.

V/R

Dave

Joan Johnson-Freese. Educating America's Military. Cass Military Studies Series. New York: Routledge, 2013. 160 pp. $155.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-415-63535-6; $35.95 (paper), ISBN 978-0-415-63499-1.

Reviewed by Suzanne C. Nielsen (U.S. Military Academy)
Published on H-Diplo (May, 2013)
Commissioned by Seth Offenbach

http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=37632

In March 2013 remarks to the World Affairs Council of Washington DC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey characterized himself as being both the highest-ranking teacher and the highest-ranking student in uniform. “Part of being a leader is a deep dedication to lifelong learning. If you don’t continue to learn, you’re stagnant and you fall behind.”[1] While many military officers would agree with this rhetoric, a corresponding willingness on the part of the services to make serious investments in higher education is all too often absent. Officers who wish to pursue available graduate degree programs must be willing to act against career incentive structures and prevailing cultural norms, usually assuming at least short-term risks to their prospects for advancement. These dynamics also play out in the military’s own educational institutions, as Joan Johnson-Freese explains in her new book, Educating America’s Military. A member of the Naval War College faculty who has taught in the military education system for twenty years, she can speak with authority on this topic.

It may be surprising to read about the unwillingness of the services to invest in education, given that each branch has impressive professional military education (PME) systems. As officers progress through their careers, they complete courses at the junior and mid-grade ranks. High-performing officers with the potential to serve at flag rank (as generals or admirals) are then selected for resident attendance at one of the country’s war colleges. These accredited institutions of higher education offer a ten-month academic experience and confer a master’s degree (the specific degree title varies across the war colleges). However, according to Johnson-Freese, “guidance and follow-through support from the military is lacking, and so the education provided to War College students is not what it could be, or needs to be” (p. 17).

Though her book provides a valuable insider’s look, it also suffers from a tendency toward unsupported generalizations across the various levels of PME; across the country’s six war colleges (Army War College, Naval War College, Air War College, Marine Corps War College, National War College, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces); and across the military services. However, this is a weakness that Johnson-Freese acknowledges up front, saying that the book “is partly a social-science effort and partly a journalistic enterprise, and even to some extent a memoir of my own career and experiences” (p. viii). Overall, weaknesses in evidence do not cause the book to fail in its core purpose, which she hopes will be to “assist in the development of appropriate questions to ask in the gathering of data in the future” (p. 17). These questions would examine the structural challenges that the war colleges face, as well as the effects of tensions that exist between the ideal of lifelong learning and contradictory elements of military culture on their mission accomplishments.

In providing a quality educational opportunity to their students, the war colleges face significant structural challenges. First, it can be difficult to maintain academic standards since these colleges have no control over the academic qualifications of incoming students and face perceived pressure to grant a degree to every member of the student body who completes the course. Second, these institutions have imperfect control over the quality of their faculties. Though civilian faculty members are generally selected through competitive search processes, some of the military faculty members may be assigned by their services with little regard to aptitude or qualification. Third, the war colleges have occasionally selected administrators who have little or no background in higher education. As the author points out, the assumption is that an individual who commanded a helicopter squadron can surely lead an academic department. In reality, however, this assumption is as bad as the assumption would be that an academic department head is automatically qualified to command a helicopter squadron. Finally, educators at these colleges have to work against the occasional anti-intellectualism and discomfort exhibited by institutional leaders and visiting flag officers, who mock rather than celebrate the endeavor with jokes such as “it is only a lot of reading if you do it.” All too often, senior military leaders pander to the lowest common denominator, emphasizing how they improved their golf games during their war college years. These statements work against fostering the serious intellectual inquiry encouraged by quality institutions of higher education.

It is when Johnson-Freese probes the cultural tensions that exist within the war colleges that her book is at its best. For example, she acknowledges the tension in all PME institutions between training that explains “what to think, especially when lives are at stake,” and education designed to help one figure out “how to think” (p. 98). Training is often intended to be directly relevant to current or next assignments, while educational goals are longer term. Of course, military officers need both training and education. In the war colleges, however, where officers are transitioning from leading at tactical and operational levels to serving as institutional developers, strategic leaders, and political-military advisors, the intellectual agility fostered by education deserves greater weight. It is a rare occurrence, indeed, when a significant policy or strategic challenge can be addressed successfully using a purely formulaic approach. Yet it can be difficult to foster appropriate habits of mind in officers who have spent decades being rewarded for success as tactical operators--particularly if those who have advanced before them deride the investment that serious inquiry requires.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=37632