Please go to War on the Rocks to read the entire essay: http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/time-for-u-s-forces-to-leave-south-korea/

Needless to say I cannot express my disagreement with this essay strongly enough. I  will just make a few brief comments.

First, US troops are in Korea now not simply because of the Mutual Defense Treaty but because it is in the US interests to contribute to the alliance to deter an attack by north Korea.  The author would do well to include an analysis of how US interests would be enhanced by removing US forces from Korea.

Second, an analysis of north Korean interests and strategy would be useful to understand how the north will react to what is in effect a key strategic objective it has been seeking since the Armistice and that is a split int he ROK/US alliance.  Although the author mentions some of the comments and concerns of ROK and US policymakers he does not conduct an analysis of what the north might do and how it will exploit this de facto split in the ROK/US alliance (although he mentions extended deterrence I do not think that will have the same deterrent effect as a combined ROK/US force).

Third, I am surprised that there is no discussion of the actual command relationship of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command.  We should keep in mind that the ROK US Combined Forces Command has no "Title 10" authority over ROK forces.  Just as US Title 10 authority is to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces to the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, the ROK JCS has the ROK responsibility to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces to the ROK/US CFC.

While continuously being forward-deployed to South Korea, U.S. forces also created the Combined Forces Command (CFC), led by an American four-star general. 

 

Under the current agreement, South Korean forces would be under this four-star’s command, and he would take the wartime OPCON and oversee the battlefield if a shooting war (presumably with North Korea) emerges. General Curtis Scaparrotti is the current commander of UNC/CFC/USFK and responsible for seamlessly leading, organizing, training, and equipping all forces on the peninsula under Title 10 authority.

This is the usual US perspective that illustrates the lack of understanding of the command relationship.  The ROK/US Combined Forces Command was established in 1978 by both the ROK and US governments in agreement.  The ROK/US/CFC is a completely combined command, with near equal distribution of ROK and US personnel through the entire command (the command. not the subordinate units of course).  But the important point is that the ROK/US CFC answers equally to both governments through the Military Committee. The ROK/US CFC is not a US Command (like most press. pundits, and the population in Korea the author makes the same mistake of equating the ROK/US CFC and US Forces Korea which is the Title 10 authority over US military forces in Korea but it has no relationship with the ROK/US CFC except as a force provider - just as the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff is a force provider of ROK forces to the ROK/US CFC when it determines that it is in the ROK interests to commit forces to the command).  ROK forces are not under US "OPCON"  and as I have said there is no such thing as OPCON transfer - it is a myth - there is only the dissolution of the ROK/US CFC.  If we are going to have a discussion of OPCON transfer then all the key elements and relationships and processes and procedures should be discussed and analyzed.  This paper falls short of a thorough discussion of command relationships and instead relies on the popular talking points of the press and pundits and those who do not want to remain committed to the alliance (both in the ROK and the US).

There is much more to say on this but I will have to stop here.  The bottom line is I strongly disagree with the author's proposal.

TIME FOR U.S. FORCES TO LEAVE SOUTH KOREA

Christopher Lee

July 24, 2014 · in Commentary

http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/time-for-u-s-forces-to-leave-south-korea/

American foreign policy towards the Republic of Korea (hereafter, South Korea) has focused on a substantial amount of military and economic support and is primarily based on the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea (1953). The mutual defense treaty continues to be the cornerstone of the security relationship between the two, which guarantees peace and stability by extended deterrence—28,500 United States Forces Korea (USFK) troops on ground and the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

The combined threats of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and conventional forces, as well as the specter of the collapse of the Kim Jong-Un family regime, compel the United States government to continue its strong military defense of, and economic devotion to, South Korea. The need to protect South Korea against its neighbor to the north also drives—in part—America’s ongoing “rebalance” or “pivot” towards Asia.

President Barack Obama recently reaffirmed America’s dedication to Seoul and the mutual defense treaty during his official visit to South Koreain April 2014. During that visit, the president promoted his “pivot” and pledged a continuing U.S. commitment to a strong alliance with South Korea. Obama reminded South Korean President Park Guen-Hye that recent developments in North Korea, such as significant increased activity at Punggye-ri nuclear test site coupled with multiple long-range missile tests, beckoned for fiercer efforts toward denuclearization.

Although the mutual defense treaty has secured the alliance for nearly six decades, transformations from both sides in the last decade suggest that a fundamental change is overdue. Based on new fiscal realities and Seoul’s proven ability to defend its national borders, the U.S. government should immediately conduct the transfer of the wartime operational control (OPCON) to South Korea. The country’s robust military force and its ongoing procurement of advanced military systems, combined with its first-rate economy, afford South Korea the ability to defend itself from most aggressors without substantial involvement of American conventional forces. The OPCON transfer would not change the security guarantee of extended deterrence under the United States’ nuclear umbrella. In addition to the transfer, President Obama should turn away from his status quo approach and implement a new security alliance toward South Korea—one that strongly cultivates an autonomous military without extended assistance from the United States.

Dating back to the Korean War, South Korean forces were under heavy scrutiny and control of the United Nations Command (UNC). U.S. forces played a significant role in establishing a democracy in South Korea. Even today, following this paradigm, U.S. troops and conventional weapons retain extensive control of Seoul. While continuously being forward-deployed to South Korea, U.S. forces also created the Combined Forces Command (CFC), led by an American four-star general. Under the current agreement, South Korean forces would be under this four-star’s command, and he would take the wartime OPCON and oversee the battlefield if a shooting war (presumably with North Korea) emerges. General Curtis Scaparrotti is the current commander of UNC/CFC/USFK and responsible for seamlessly leading, organizing, training, and equipping all forces on the peninsula under Title 10 authority.

Despite the substantial number of forward-deployed U.S. personnel in South Korea, both sides have been gradually working toward giving full autonomy to the South Korean military. In 1994, for the first time in nearly four decades, U.S. forces transferred the peacetime OPCON to South Korea. The next and final step in achieving full autonomy for the South Korean military is to solely take over the wartime OPCON. Nonetheless, there has been much controversy over the necessity and practicality of such a step. Scaparrotti, who endorses a cautious 2015 transfer of power, stressed to the Senate Armed Services Committee that “the South will have to meet a variety of benchmarks before any OPCON transfer can go through; it is important to note that the transition is conditions-driven.”

(Continued at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/time-for-u-s-forces-to-leave-south-korea/

If we had paid to the last Security Consultative Meeting this would not be a surprise.  The ROK and US established a joint task force to do a thorough assessment of the issue and make recommendations on the way ahead (something that should have been done as early as 2002 but of course the politics did not allow it to happen at that time and instead we have wasted more than 12 years on the mythical OPCON transfer and devising plans for the dissolution of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command when we could have been focusing on how best to evolve the ROK/US CFC to best achieve the strategic objectives of the alliance.  When the history of this last 12 years is written it will reveal the danger of decisions being made by senior leaders based on emotion and not on strategy).

Yonhap News Agency May 31, 2014 5:03am

S. Korea, U.S. agree to decide on OPCON transfer timing by Oct.

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/140531/s-korea-us-agree-decide-opcon-transfer-timing-oct

SEOUL, May 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States agreed Saturday to fix the timing of and conditions for the transfer of wartime control of South Korean troops from Washington to Seoul by October, officials here said Saturday.

During the bilateral talks in Singapore earlier in the day, Seoul's defense minister Kim Kwan-jin and his U.S. counterpart, Chuck Hagel, agreed upon the work plan that specifies the timetable to decide when and under what conditions the South will regain the wartime operational control (OPCON) of its troops from Washington.

"By October when the allies are scheduled to hold their annual Security Consultative Meeting in Washington, the two sides will have set the appropriate timing and conditions for the OPCON transfer," a defense ministry official said, requesting anonymity.

South Korea handed over control of its forces to the U.S. during the 1950-53 Korean War to defend against invading troops from North Korea. Peacetime control of its forces was returned in 1994, and South Korea is scheduled to get back the wartime control in December 2015.

But last year, Seoul asked for a delay after the communist country conducted its third nuclear test, and South Korean President Park Geun-hye and U.S. President Barack Obama agreed in April to reconsider the timing of the OPCON transfer amid the Pyongyang's threat to carry out yet another nuclear test.

This is the first time that Seoul and Washington agreed upon a detailed schedule for the transfer, the official said, adding the two agreed to set up a permanent consultative body to be led by assistant secretary-level officials for in-depth discussions.

The allies are also planning to expand their joint task force in charge of the coordination efforts to include more entities related to the matter such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the official added.

Experts and officials say chances are high for the two sides to push back the timing for about five to seven years, setting the year of transfer in early 2020.

South and North Korea are still technically at war after the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a truce without a peace treaty. About 28,500 American troops are stationed in South Korea to help defend the Asian ally from threats from the communist nation.

During the Saturday talks, Kim and Hagel also agreed to continue to strengthen their deterrence against North Korea over its nuclear and conventional weapons threats, and to cooperate further in a way to boost their joint defense capabilities, according to the ministry.

The two defense chiefs sat down for talks on the sidelines of the 13th Asia Security Summit, also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, which began on Friday for a three-day run.

Later in the day, the two chiefs are scheduled to join their Japanese counterpart for trilateral talks expected to center on sharing military intelligence to deter North Korea.

<All rights reserved by Yonhap News Agency>

GEN Griffith is of course correct.  I think the Korean military and political leadership of the administration fully understand this (which is the reason for Minister Kim's call for delay in July and the reason for the joint committee established after the Security Consultative Meeting in October to study the issue and make recommendations).  But again, we should cease talking about OPCON transfer and shift the discussion to how best to organize the ROK and US military forces to achieve Alliance strategic objectives. OPCON Transfer only means one thing: dissolution of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command.  As I have said many, many times and I apologize for beating the dead horse but both nations exercise equal OPCON of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command through the military committee.  The US simply provides the commanding general to arguably the most combined military command ever created but OPCON is in effect exercised by both nations.  OPCON transfer is a distraction and red herring. The only thing this "OPCON transfer" does is force the Alliance into having separate military forces, one supported (the ROK) and one supporting (the US) and this of course eliminates unity of command, violating one of the basic principles of war.  Let us end the discussion on OPCON transfer and move to the more mature discussion of how to organize the military forces in a way that is in the mutual best interests of both Alliance partners.  (And then of course we need to have a discussion of the UN Command but lets get the Alliance forces right first).

(Yonhap Interview) OPCON transfer may usher in withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea: ex-general

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/interview/2013/11/18/13/0800000000AEN20131118000100315F.html

2013/11/18 07:40

By Lee Chi-dong and Roh Hyo-dong

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 (Yonhap) -- Should the United States hand over operational command of South Korea's military back to Seoul, it could be a prelude to the withdrawal of American troops from the peninsula, a retired top U.S. Army officer said Sunday.

"Here's my fear: the first step to withdraw of U.S. forces is turn over the command. That's step number one, and it's a slippery slope. We say it's a slippery slope," Retired Gen. Ronald Griffith, former vice chief of staff of the Army, said in an interview with Yonhap News Agency.

He pointed out that the U.S. government will likely face more and more pressure from Congress to bring forces out of Korea not only due to massive defense budget cuts but also as part of downsizing of the nation's military, which has been ongoing since the Cold War.

Gen. Griffith, who also served as the commander of the U.S. 1st Armored Division in the Gulf War, said U.S. military draw-downs in Europe have been done because politicians wanted their troops back to protect the homeland.

He advised South Koreans to take such a reality into account in internally discussing the issue of regaining operational control (OPCON) in the event of a war.

For months, South Korea has been in sensitive consultations with the U.S. over whether and when to take back wartime OPCON.

Shortly after the outbreak of the 1950-53 Korean War, Seoul granted the U.S.-led U.N. troops operational command of its entire military. South Korea regained its peacetime OPCON in 1994. The transfer of wartime OPCON is slated for December 2015.

The planned transition would require South Korea to play a leading role in staging a war against North Korea, with the U.S. playing a supporting role.

But South Korea's Park Geun-hye administration has requested a delay in the transition, arguing its troops need more time to gain the capability needed to deal with North Korea's enhanced nuclear and missile threats.

Basically, according to Gen. Griffith, the decision is up to the people of South Korea, a sovereign nation, as American soldiers are deployed there as "guests."

   "At this point in history, we are there as guests of the Korean people and the Korean government -- at their invitation. I think that serves Korea well. I think it serves the U.S. well. More importantly, I think it serves the region of Northeast Asia well," he said.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/interview/2013/11/18/13/0800000000AEN20131118000100315F.html

If you eliminate the north's rhetoric and tone there is something to agree with in these statements.  The north is paying attention to the debate.

It added that the combined control structure that Seoul and Washington agreed to create to replace the CFC effectively is no different in its goal, and nullifies the rational for the OPCON transfer.

…

The paper monitored in Seoul said creating another command structure fielded by officers from the two allies aims to deceive the public into thinking change has taken place.

"Just because there is a change in the name and a South Korean officer is placed at the head of the command does not alter the fact that the U.S. will provide intelligence and exercise real wartime operational control," the Rodong Sinmun said.

We should keep in mind that a key part of the north's strategy is taken right out of The Sun Tzu, e.g., to split the alliance:

It then argued that a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula would play a critical role in enhancing global peace and stability, and remove any cause for future conflict.

If the current "OPCON Transfer" plan is executed as planned with a ROK only warfighting command and the US in a separate supporting command the north will assume its plan is working and it will be gaining the advantage since the alliance will no longer have unity of command.

Unfortunately north Korean apologists who would advocate the above course of action do not understand that the exact opposite would occur – the north would believe it has the correlation of forces to successfully execute its campaign plan to reunify the peninsula under the north's control thus ensuring survival of the Kim Family Regime.  The only way to hope to prevent future conflict on the peninsula is for the Kim Family regime to be eliminated.

But if a ROK/US combined command is maintained there should be no daylight in the alliance and thus no opportunity for the north to execute its plans; therefore, the most important mission of the alliance will be accomplished:  deterrence of an attack on the ROK.

But the north's statements should be considered by the ROK/US task force that is studying the OPCON transfer.  It should be very clear that the north wants the OPCON transfer because it realizes its advantage and that OPCON transfer supports its plans.

The complete Rodong Sinmun article is also pasted below.

V/R

Dave

N. Korea slams plan to create new joint S. Korea-U.S. military command

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131107/n-korea-slams-plan-create-new-joint-s-korea-us-military-comm

SEOUL, Nov. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Friday slammed a plan to create a new joint South Korea-U.S. military command after Seoul reclaims wartime operation command (OPCON) of its troops.

In an article carried by the Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, the North claimed that the Combined Forces Command (CFC) that has been in existence for 35 years is nothing more than a criminal organization designed to carry out an invasion of the communist country.

It added that the combined control structure that Seoul and Washington agreed to create to replace the CFC effectively is no different in its goal, and nullifies the rational for the OPCON transfer.

The two allies are currently engaged in talks to push back the deadline for the transfer of OPCON, due to heightened regional tensions triggered by Pyongyang's unwillingness to give up its buildup of weapons of mass destruction. Originally, Seoul is set to regain operational control in late 2015 that will give its generals primary responsibility for defending the country with the United States military playing the supporting role.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131107/n-korea-slams-plan-create-new-joint-s-korea-us-military-comm

Rodong Sinmun Demands Immediate Dismantlement of Mechanism for Invading DPRK http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

Pyongyang, November 8 (KCNA) -- Mechanism for a war of aggression such as the south Korea-U.S. "combined forces command" should be dismantled immediately and the U.S. occupation and domination over south Korea be terminated at an early date, says Rodong Sinmun Friday in an article. The article goes on: The command is a criminal military mechanism for the U.S. colonial domination over south Korea and for the provocation of a war against the north. During the past several decades, the command worked out, supplemented and rounded off various war scenarios aimed to make a preemptive attack upon the DPRK and supervised military drills and arms buildup to help U.S. and south Korean forces get familiar with those scenarios. The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces are blatantly challenging the nation's aspiration and the demand of the era for the improved inter-Korean relations and the peace on the Korean Peninsula. What should not be overlooked is that the U.S. and the south Korean puppet warmongers are seeking to organize a new command instead of dismantling the "combined forces command" under the pretext of the "transfer of the right to control wartime operations." The above-mentioned action is nothing but a ploy to nullify the "transfer of the right to command wartime operations" and deceive public opinion at home and abroad. As a matter of fact, the U.S. is contemplating the conversion of this defunct mechanism into one for combined operations for invading the DPRK by letting member countries of the "UN Command" take part in the joint military drills including Key Resolve and Foal Eagle being staged in south Korea and its vicinity. This is little short of a scenario to create a hotbed of a war on the peninsula and bring a root cause of threatening and disturbing peace and security in Northeast Asia and other parts of the world. With no rhetoric can the U.S. justify the existence of the above-said mechanism or vindicate the presence of its forces in south Korea.

South Korea: Responding to the North Korean threat

Probably the single most concise but comprehensive article on the military situation in South Korea and in particular ROK military develops and the OPCON transfer issue.  As a side note, MG Lee (in the photo below) and I were planners together on the CFC staff back in the 1990's.  The PDF of this article can be downloaded from the web site. This is an important read.

V/R
Dave

South Korea: Responding to the North Korean threat

Bruce E. Bechtol | American Enterprise Institute

http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/south-korea-responding-to-the-north-korean-threat/

November 05, 2013

DefenseImagery.mil

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, left, exchanges greetings with South Korean army Maj. Gen. Lee Seo-young, a South Korean defense attaché, during a gala hosted by South Korean President Park Geun-hye commemorating the 60th anniversary of the US-South Korean alliance May 7, 2013, at the National Portrait Gallery in Washington, DC.

Article Highlights

• S. Korean defense is unevenly prepared for the N. Korean threat.
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• Combined ROK-US wartime operating force must continue to exist to ensure readiness.
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• All other issues will be ancillary for Seoul as long as there is a DPRK.
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DOWNLOAD THE PDF

South Korea is in a unique position. It is an economic powerhouse and a thriving democracy that faces the most ­ominous and imminent threat on its borders of any democracy in the world. Moreover, this is a threat that continues to evolve, with increasing missile, cyber, special operations, and nuclear capabilities and a new leader who shows no signs that he will be any less ruthless or belligerent than his father. To meet this threat, Seoul has undertaken a number of efforts to better deter and defend against North Korean capabilities and provocations, including increasing the defense budget, upping training with US forces, creating new command elements, and establishing plans for preemptive strikes against imminent North Korean missile launches. However, in part because of administration changes in Seoul, the South Korean effort has been uneven. And decisions remain to be made in the areas of missile defense, tactical fighter aircraft, and command-and-control arrangements that will be significant for not only South Korea but all states that have an interest in Northeast Asia’s peace and stability.

Key points in this Outlook:

• South Korea faces a clear, present, and evolving threat from North Korea, with Kim Jong-un showing no indication of moving away from his father’s violent and corrupt policies.
• South Korea’s response to the North Korean threat has been uneven, with increased capabilities in some areas but less than what is needed in others.
• A key issue facing the ROK-US alliance is command and control of allied forces during wartime on the Korean Peninsula. A combined operating force must continue to exist to ensure full readiness and capability.

This is the seventh National Security Outlook in a series about the defense capabilities of America’s allies and security partners.[1] 

When analyzing the readiness, capabilities, and future initiatives of the Republic of Korea’s (ROK’s) military, one must take into account the unique geopolitical position that the ROK government finds itself in. There is no ambiguous set of threats for South Korea. Rather, the largest and most dangerous threat to the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula is obvious: the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK).

It is for this threat that policymakers in Seoul must ensure their military is ready. Providing an adequate defense against this threat is the cornerstone of the ROK–US alliance and the most important foreign policy issue between these two allies. As survival of the nation-state is the number-one priority for any national leader, all other issues for Seoul will be ancillary as long as there is a DPRK.

Recognizing that the threatening behavior of its belligerent neighbor to the north is the key military issue for the ROK, it is important to analyze that threat to determine what the priorities of the South Korean military will be and how the threat will influence planning for the ROK–US alliance. Since 2010, North Korea has conducted two violent military provocations: one with a submarine that sank a ROK naval ship and one that involved an artillery barrage against a South Korean island that killed both military and civilian personnel.[2] North Korea also conducted yet another nuclear test this past February.[3] 

In addition, the DPRK has shown with a test launch conducted in mid-December last year that it is now capable (or close to it) of building a missile that can hit Alaska, Hawaii, or perhaps even the west coast of the United States.[4] Pyongyang also has the capability of targeting all of South Korea and most of Japan with its ballistic missiles.[5] 

"All other issues for Seoul will be ancillary as long as there is a DPRK."North Korea has also continued to advance the capabilities and numbers of its armored forces, long-range artillery forces, and special operations forces.[6] And, finally, Kim Jong-un has shown no indication that he has any intentions except to carry on the violent and corrupt policies of his father Kim Jong-il. This means, of course, that South Korea and the ROK–US alliance must continue to prepare for the multifaceted North Korean threat for the foreseeable future.

Initiatives against the North Korean Threat

Despite calls by the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–08) for a “balancer policy”—a policy that moved South Korea away from its traditional security ties with the United States to a more neutral or balancing role between the United States, Japan, and the old communist bloc of China, Russia, and North Korea—the fact remains that the primary issue for which Seoul must build its military capabilities and plan its contingencies is North Korea.[7] This process has been exacerbated by the fact that the threat the DPRK presents has evolved and become even more complicated in recent years.

Following the two violent provocations in 2010 already described, it became obvious that the South Korean government and military needed to take steps to counter future provocations from North Korea. As noted North Korean specialist Robert M. Collins has stated, “Since the end of the Korean Conflict in 1953, the ROK–US alliance has done a very good job of deterring against a war initiated by North Korea. The alliance has not done a good job of deterring North Korean provocations.”[8] Thus, the planning, policies, and procedures South Koreans initiated (and coordinated with their key ally in Washington) are very timely and needed now more than ever.

During April 2013, it was reported that the United States and South Korea had finalized a plan to respond more forcefully and appropriately to North Korean provocations.[9] This new “counterprovocation” plan will ensure that there is a speedy “response in kind” that still prevents escalation to all-out war. The existence of the plan was also made public in part, it seems, because Seoul and Washington wanted to both warn the North Koreans and reassure the South Korean populace.

In an earlier and equally important move, the South Korean military established a separate Northwest Islands Command. The establishment of the new command and the appointment of a commander with the autonomy to respond with necessary force in a timely manner under more liberal rules of engagement empower the South Korean military to respond more effectively to violent provocations the North initiates in the Northern Limit Line (NLL) area.[10]

Formally established in June 2011, the command was first headed by Lt. Gen. Yoo Nak-jun, the commandant of the ROK Marine Corps, with a Marine major general as deputy commander and a staff that includes colonels from each of the ROK military services. Built around a division-sized joint unit, with the key contingents being the ROK Marine Sixth Brigade and the Yeonpyeong Defense battalion, the new command now has the ability to respond to North Korean attacks more effectively and rapidly. As such, ROK forces are now better positioned to deter and defend against North Korean provocations.[11]

The attacks in 2010 and the rhetoric from North Korea since have had the opposite effect of what Pyongyang likely wanted. If anything, DPRK behavior has strengthened South Korea’s resolve to strike back against North Korean aggression.[12] The South Korean Navy is now on a heightened state of readiness in the NLL area—the demarcation line in the West (Yellow) Sea between the DPRK and ROK—and has been equipped with the best maritime equipment that the government can provide.[13]

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/south-korea-responding-to-the-north-korean-threat/

As usual the journalist omits the key part of the mythical OPCON transfer." 

South Korea was slated to regain the OPCON in December next year, but earlier this year, Seoul asked the U.S. to reconsider the process, citing rising threats from North Korea. However, some U.S. politicians are opposed to South Korea’s request for another push-back, saying that the East Asian country is attempting to “free-ride” on U.S. security guarantees without doing much to boost its own defense capabilities.

There is no real OPCON transfer.  There is the dissolution of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command.  That is what is slated to occur in 2015.

US politicians who are opposed to maintaining the ROK/US Combined Forces Command because they think the ROK "is attempting to "free ride" on US security guarantees without doing much to boots its own defenses" might want to 1) examine US interests in Northeast Asia and Asia writ large and 2) ask for an assessment on how to organize the military instruments of power of the Alliance to protect those US interests.  However, with all due respect to"some US politicians" I find comments like that disrespectful, disingenuous and made by those who are ill-informed on the threats, the Alliance, US interests, and military strategy and operations in general.

V/R

Dave

'Talks over OPCON transition to speed up' By Kang Seung-woo http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/10/116_144918.html   Kim Jang-soo, chief of National Security Office A top national security official said on Thursday that there will be progress in discussions on the issue of pushing back the handover of U.S. wartime Operational Control (OPCON) of the South Korean military to Seoul. Kim Jang-soo, chief of Cheong Wa Dae's national security office, arrived in Washington for consultations with White House National Security Adviser Susan Rice on North Korea and South Korean-U.S. alliance issues during his four-day trip. “The OPCON issue will be addressed in my consultations with the U.S. side. Since there is an agreement made at the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), there could be some discussions to facilitate it,” Kim told reporters. Earlier this month, Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin and his U.S. counterpart Chuck Hagel held discussions on the matter during the annual military meeting in Seoul, during which both sides agreed to reach a final decision in the first half of next year. South Korea was slated to regain the OPCON in December next year, but earlier this year, Seoul asked the U.S. to reconsider the process, citing rising threats from North Korea. However, some U.S. politicians are opposed to South Korea’s request for another push-back, saying that the East Asian country is attempting to “free-ride” on U.S. security guarantees without doing much to boost its own defense capabilities. In view of this growing sentiment, Kim said: “There are both positive and negative reactions and I do not believe everyone is opposed to a postponement.” The OPCON transfer has been an ongoing hot-button issue for years. The transfer of responsibility was initially supposed to happen in April, 2012, but this was pushed back to December 2015 following the sinking of the South’s frigate Cheonan by a North Korean torpedo in March 2010. (Continued at the link below) http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/10/116_144918.html

I am not clear if the title is correct or if the first paragraph is correct; e.g., will the task force look at OPCON transfer or will it study Seoul's ability to respond to nK provocations?

But I hope the task force puts aside the OPCON transfer issue and gets at two real questions:

How should the ROK and US military forces be organized to achieve the strategic objectives of the Alliance? (not merely respond to nK provocations though that is an important consideration but one of many)

As part of that issue this question needs to be answered:  Should the ROK/US Combined Forces Command be dissolved?

The answers to those questions, based on a comprehensive strategic assessment of all the issues on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia should guide the future organization of the ROK/US Military Alliance and rather than ill-consider decisions that were made based on emotional reactions vice strategic considerations by senior leaders in both countries.

And with the establishment of this task force maybe the pundits and politicians can leave the OPCON issue alone for the next year and wait for the task force to do its job and provide its results.

V/R
Dave

US-South Korea task force to examine OPCON handover

http://www.stripes.com/news/us-south-korea-task-force-to-examine-opcon-handover-1.247190

A U.S. soldier walks forward while a South Korean soldier stands ready as three North Korean soldiers approach the demarcation line at the Joint Security Area, South Korea, July 27, 2013. Both U.S. and South Korean soldiers are United Nations Command Security Battalion members.
ARMANDO R. LIMON/STARS AND STRIPES

By Ashley Rowland and Yoo Kyong Chang

Stars and Stripes

Published: October 15, 201

SEOUL — A joint U.S.-South Korean task force will study Seoul’s ability to respond to possible North Korean provocations as officials consider whether to delay transferring U.S. wartime control of allied troops to South Korea, according to the Ministry of National Defense.

The task force will start work next month, and a decision on a delay is expected by the middle of 2014, an MND spokesman said Tuesday, speaking on customary condition of anonymity.

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin told lawmakers last week that the planned OPCON transfer date of December 2015 is “inappropriate” in light of North Korean provocations earlier this year, including Pyongyang’s third nuclear test in February.

“North Korea is different from the past. Considering the third nuclear test and the situations from March to May, the December 2015 deadline is not appropriate,” he said.

The top U.S. commander would now lead both U.S. and South Korean forces if war broke out on the peninsula. That responsibility would fall to the top South Korean commander after the transfer of operational control takes place.

A Pentagon-commissioned study last year suggested the U.S. military take a number of steps to cover for perceived shortcomings in the South’s ability to defend itself, including delaying the OPCON transfer.

The transfer was initially supposed to happen in 2007, but was postponed until 2012. In 2010, that target date was pushed forward again, to 2015, in the wake of criticism of the South’s response to North Korea’s sinking of one of its warships earlier that year that left 46 sailors dead.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.stripes.com/news/us-south-korea-task-force-to-examine-opcon-handover-1.247190

Hopefully we will tire of the discussion of OPCON transfer over the next year, we will conduct a thorough strategic analysis of how to best organize our combined military forces to achieve our alliance strategic objectives and when the plan is announced at next October's Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) it will not be controversial and will illustrate the proper evolution of the alliance as it adapts to changing conditions while always keep the alliance strategic objectives and threat in the forefront.

V/R

Dave

Yonhap News AgencyOctober 14, 2013 00:47

S. Korea, U.S. to decide timing of OPCON transfer next year

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131014/s-korea-us-decide-timing-opcon-transfer-next-year

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Oct. 14 (Yonhap) -- Seoul and Washington have agreed to reset the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) next year after reviewing North Korean threat and the South Korean forces capabilities to deal with it, the defense ministry here said Monday.

The issue of the OPCON transfer to Seoul surfaced as the major issue in this year's parliamentary audit on the defense ministry, which in May proposed the U.S. government to reconsider the December 2015 deadline in light of the rising North Korean nuclear and missile threat.

In a bilateral defense summit earlier this month, the two nations agreed to form a task force team to discuss conditions for the right timing and draw a conclusion in the first half of next year, the defense ministry said in a report.

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin stressed the importance of the allies' combined surveillance capabilities to detect movments by the North Korean military, pledging to bolster his military's own capabilities to deter the present danger and potential threat.

"The South Korea-U.S. combined forces are critical in making command decisions, while South Korean forces have enough strike capabilities," Kim said during the parliamentary defense meeting. "The South Korean forces are currently preparing to cope with the North Korean threat, while preparing for potential threat in the future. We will consider mid- and long-term measures to bolster capabilities against potential threat."

South Korea is scheduled to take over the wartime operational command of all troops on the peninsula in December 2015, a timeline that had already been pushed back from the previous deadline of 2012, but rising threat from the communist rival fueled concerns over the planned transition.

In light of the heightened tension with Pyongyang's near-daily war threats against South Korea and the U.S. for their joint military drills in spring, Kim said he suggested that President Park Geun-hye reconsider the timing of the planned transition.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131014/s-korea-us-decide-timing-opcon-transfer-next-year