Monday, May 27, 2013

US intelligence embraces debate in security issues

Excerpt:

Clapper, who has been working on intelligence issues for a half-century, is well aware of how jittery many Americans feel about the spy community. The internal debates, he believes, should bolster their confidence that intelligence officials have thoroughly weighed all aspects of some of the world's most difficult security issues before deciding how high a threat they pose. 
"I think it'd be very unhealthy - and I get a lot of pushback from people - if I tried to insist that you will have one uniform view and this is what I think, and that's what goes. That just wouldn't work," he said. "There is the fundamental tenet of truth to power, presenting inconvenient truths at inconvenient times. That's part of our system."
Much of the focus of this article is on man hunting and intelligence to support drone strikes or in the case of north Korea, enemy capabilities.  While that is hard and important work, what is the real challenge is intelligence analysis anticipating actions and most importantly to be able to assess the intent of others whether they be hostile state or non-state actors.

But I absolutely agree with the thrust of the article in that dissension and disagreement within the intelligence community is not a bad thing.  It illustrates that there are people thinking critically out there and that intelligence is not subject to politicalization (at least among the analysts – but the politicalization can still occur after the assessments and analysis are provided to policy and decision makers).
V/R
Dave

US intelligence embraces debate in security issues


LARA JAKES
Published: Today


FILE - In this May 1, 2011, image released by the White House and digitally altered by the source to obscure the details of a document in front of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, right with hand covering mouth, President Barack Obama, second from left, Vice President Joe Biden, left, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, right, and members of the national security team watch an update of the mission against Osama bin Laden in the White House Situation Room in Washington. As the world now knows well Obama ultimately decided to launch the raid on the Abbottabad compound that killed bin Laden, though faced with a level of widespread skepticism from a veteran intelligence analyst, shared with other top-level officials, which nearly scuttled the raid. That process reflected a sea change within the U.S. spy community, one that embraces debate to avoid “slam-dunk” intelligence in tough national security decisions. (AP Photo/The White House, Pete Souza, File)

WASHINGTON (AP) - In the months leading up to the killing of Osama bin Laden, veteran intelligence analyst Robert Cardillo was given the nickname "Debbie Downer." With each new tidbit of information that tracked bin Laden to a high-walled compound in northern Pakistan - phone records, satellite imaging, clues from other suspects - Cardillo cast doubt that the terror network leader and mastermind was actually there.

As the world now knows well, President Barack Obama ultimately decided to launch a May 2011 raid on the Abbottabad compound that killed bin Laden. But the level of widespread skepticism that Cardillo shared with other top-level officials - which nearly scuttled the raid - reflected a sea change within the U.S. spy community, one that embraces debate to avoid "slam-dunk" intelligence in tough national security decisions.

The same sort of high-stakes dissent was on public display recently as intelligence officials grappled with conflicting opinions about threats in North Korea and Syria. And it is a vital part of ongoing discussions over whether to send deadly drone strikes against terror suspects abroad - including U.S. citizens.

The three cases provide a rare look inside the secretive 16 intelligence agencies as they try to piece together security threats from bits of vague information from around the world. But they also raise concerns about whether officials who make decisions based on their assessments can get clear guidance from a divided intelligence community.

At the helm of what he calls a healthy discord is Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who has spent more than two-thirds of his 72 years collecting, analyzing and reviewing spy data from war zones and rogue nations. Clapper, the nation's fourth top intelligence chief, says disputes are uncommon but absolutely necessary to get as much input as possible in far-flung places where it's hard for the U.S. to extract - or fully understand - ground-level realities.

"What's bad about dissension? Is it a good thing to have uniformity of view where everyone agrees all the time? I don't think so," Clapper told The Associated Press in an interview Friday. "...People lust for uniform clairvoyance. We're not going to do that."

"We are never dealing with a perfect set of facts," Clapper said. "You know the old saw about the difference between mysteries and secrets? Of course, we're held equally responsible for divining both. And so those imponderables like that just have to be factored."

Looking in from the outside, the dissension can seem awkward, if not uneasy - especially when the risks are so high.

At a congressional hearing last month, Rep. Doug Lamborn, R-Colo., read from a Defense Intelligence Agency report suggesting North Korea is able to arm long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. The April 11 disclosure, which had been mistakenly declassified, came at the height of Kim Jong Un's sabre-rattling rhetoric and raised fears that U.S. territory or Asian nations could be targeted for an attack.

Within hours, Clapper announced that the DIA report did not reflect the opinions of the rest of the intelligence community, and that North Korea was not yet fully capable of launching a nuclear-armed missile.

Two weeks later, the White House announced that U.S. intelligence concluded that Syrian President Bashar Assad has probably used deadly chemical weapons at least twice in his country's fierce civil war. But White House officials said the intelligence wasn't strong enough to justify sending significant U.S. military support to Syrian rebels who are fighting Assad's regime.

Because the U.S. has few sources to provide first-hand information in Syria, the intelligence agencies split on how confident they were that Assad had deployed chemical weapons. The best they could do was conclude that the Syrian regime, at least, probably had undertaken such an effort. This put Obama in the awkward political position of having said the use of chemical weapons would cross a "red line" and have "enormous consequences," but not moving on the news of chemical weapons use, when the occasion arose, because the intelligence was murky.

Lamborn said he welcomes an internal intelligence community debate but is concerned that the North Korean threat was cavalierly brushed aside.

"If they want to argue among themselves, that's fine," said Lamborn, a member of the House Armed Services Committee. However, he also said, "We should be cautious when evaluating different opinions, and certainly give credence to the more sobering possibilities. ... When it comes to national security, I don't think we want to have rose-colored glasses on, and sweep threats under the rug."
Clapper said that, in fact, U.S. intelligence officials today are more accustomed to predicting gloom and doom. "We rain on parades a lot," he said.

Current and former U.S. intelligence officials say the vigorous internal debate was spawn from a single mistake about a threat - and an overly aggressive response.


Congress demanded widespread intelligence reform after the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks, to fix a system where agencies hoarded threat information instead of routinely sharing it. Turf wars between the CIA and the FBI, in particular, were common. The CIA generally was considered the nation's top intelligence agency, and its director was the president's principal intelligence adviser.
(Continued at the link below)


Friday, May 24, 2013

A Cyberattack Campaign for Syria

Although I am not qualified to judge the situation in Syria (as I am still not sure what is a potentially acceptable end state that we could seek in the situation – and I am just not clear on what we can achieve there with a reason chance of success), what intrigues me about this article is that this is one of the best articulations of cyber operations in support of Unconventional Warfare ("activities to enable a resistance or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power through and with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area").  Clearly what the author lays out will be activities to enable a resistance and both directly and indirectly will coerce and disrupt if not contribute to the overthrow of a government.

I am particularly intrigued by the concept of being able to established a digital safe haven which in today's environment probably is something that should be considered in every unconventional warfare campaign.  I think there could be some very useful synergy between Cyber Command and SOF for collaboration on unconventional warfare.  I am sure there is a lot of collaboration ongoing between USSOCOM and Cyber Command but I hope that includes on unconventional warfare as well.

Also note that not stated in the description of the author below is that he is a graduate student at Georgetown in our Security Studies Program (just for some truth in advertising).
V/R
Dave

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
A Cyberattack Campaign for Syria
By CHRIS FINAN
Published: May 23, 2013

WASHINGTON — LAST week Syrians lost access to the Internet for the second time in a month. While the Assad regime claims the lapses were the result of a faulty network link, the evidence suggests that they were deliberate efforts by the government to hamper the opposition’s ability to communicate inside the country and with the outside world.

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As American policy makers debate additional measures to pressure President Bashar al-Assad and aid moderate elements of the opposition, they should consider a military cybercampaign to give Syrians the ability to communicate freely online. Doing so would serve our strategic interests, while also demonstrating a principled commitment to Internet freedom.

For example, through the military’s new Cyber Command, we could create a digital “safe haven,” akin to physical safe havens for refugees, by deploying long-distance Wi-Fi technologies along Syria’s borders and in rebel-held areas in coordination with vetted opposition groups. Platforms that enable transmission of Wi-Fi signals over distances of up to 60 miles are already in use in parts of South Asia and other rural markets.

With a guarantee of secure Internet access points, opposition groups would be able to link their terrestrial and wireless networks with those of like-minded groups. This would enable them to reach deeper into the country, giving broad sections of the Syrian populace Internet access. And because the United States would be able to monitor those networks, we could make sure that moderate opposition elements would be the primary beneficiaries.

Subsequent actions could include measures to counter the Assad regime’s capacity to monitor opposition communications within the existing telecommunications infrastructure.

All of this could be done without putting American boots on the ground: Cyber Command specialists could monitor these opposition-held networks from afar to counter any government attempts to interfere with them, while training moderate opposition elements to be able to operate and protect their own digital communications.

Anyone who doubts the power of open Internet access should consider Egypt.

After the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s government, as Salafists sought control by spreading propaganda through traditional media outlets, an Egyptian cardiologist-turned-satirist, Bassem Youssef, began broadcasting YouTube clips to expose their baseless claims. Today, Mr. Youssef’s program is one of the most popular in Egypt, and it is serving to carve out a niche in the country’s political discourse for Egyptians to question poor governance and radical theology.


The Egyptian example also highlights the long-term role that such a cyberstrategy could play in Syria once the regime falls. As in Egypt, the country will enter a difficult period of political transition, during which access to and control of digital communications will be vital. By ensuring that the population has an open means of coordinating and having access to the Internet, the United States could greatly further its goal of promoting moderate views.
(Continued at the link below)


Report raps military propaganda efforts as ineffective


I think it is somewhat ironic that we expended all the effort to change the name from Psychological Operations (PSYOP) to Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to try to eliminate the perception that these operations are considered propaganda and yet this entire article calls these MISO operations "propaganda efforts."  Of course Tom Vanden Brook has targeted anything dealing with information operations. PSYOP, MISO, influence, etc, etc as propaganda.  But old Vanden Brook is just like the other journalists who cannot tell the difference among Special Operations Forces as illustrated in these excerpts:

The report also outlines how propaganda works. In war zones such as Afghanistan, the military deploys three- and four-soldier MISO teams to drop leaflets telling insurgents how to surrender, air radio broadcasts "to explain U.S. military operations in a favorable light," collect local propaganda and devise counterpropaganda, according to the report.
….
In safer countries, teams of two to 10 special forces soldiers are deployed at the request of combatant commanders and ambassadors. They lead programs that include helping "instill confidence by local populations in their law enforcement" and offering rewards for information.
V/R
Dave

Report raps military propaganda efforts as ineffective

Tom Vanden Brook, USATODAY
4:57 p.m. EDT May 23, 2013


(Photo: NONE ISAF)
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
  • Series of Pentagon-run websites not coordinated with other efforts
  • Pentagon runs propaganda operations in 22 countries
  • The GAO did not release the report publicly
WASHINGTON — Pentagon propaganda programs are inadequately tracked, their impact is unclear, and the military doesn't know if it is targeting the right foreign audiences, according to a government report obtained by USA TODAY.

Since 2005, the Pentagon has spent hundreds of million of dollars on Military Information Support Operations (MISO). These propaganda efforts include websites, leaflets and broadcasts intended to change foreigners' "attitudes and behaviors in support of U.S. Government" objectives, according to the report by the Government Accountability Office. Some of them disclose the U.S. military as the source; others don't.

The Pentagon's response noted that it partly concurred with the GAO criticism. Lt. Col. James Gregory, a Pentagon spokesman, said Thursday the military is revising its tracking requirements for propaganda programs, has a pilot program to assess their effectiveness and will soon publish revised guidelines that emphasize better planning of its operations.

The report offers a rare glimpse inside the cloaked world of military propaganda, much of which is held secret by the Pentagon. It shows the effort extends from Southeast Asia to South America, with special operations troops deployed to embassies to "erode support for violent extremist ideologies."
The stakes are high. Used effectively, the programs can dampen extremism and increase support for U.S. military operations. However, "if used ineffectively, MISO activities have the potential to undermine the credibility of the United States and threaten (Pentagon) and other agencies' efforts to accomplish key foreign policy goals," the report says.

While the report says some of the military's propaganda teams have succeeded in the 22 countries, "it is unclear whether MISO activities are effective overall."

"Once again we are seeing a misguided spending approach by the government," said Scott Amey, general counsel of the non-partisan watchdog the Project on Government Oversight. "It is horrifying to think that millions are spent on propaganda with little administration of those funds and without some metric of the campaigns' success."

Military propaganda and marketing efforts have been the focus of a series of USA TODAY stories. In 2012, the paper found that the Pentagon had spent as much as $580 million per year on propaganda programs at the height of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan but had trouble gauging their effectiveness. It spent $54 million last year, according to the GAO. The GAO refused USA TODAY's request for the report, which was obtained from another government source.

The GAO found three "weaknesses" in the Pentagon's tracking of its propaganda programs:

• The Pentagon and Congress "do not have a complete picture" of the efforts and the funding used to pay for the programs.


• The Pentagon can't measure the effects of propaganda programs well enough to know where to allocate funding.

• Lacking goals, the Pentagon does not have "reasonable assurance" that it is putting resources into countries that need it.

Gregory noted that the Pentagon already provides Congress with substantial data on its MISO programs every three months.
(Continued at the link below)

Thursday, May 23, 2013

H.R. 1960—FY14 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL


 A lot of interesting parts.  The HASC is happy with SOCOM education initiatives (page 68)  but appears unhappy with regional SOF Coordination centers (page 59) as it has limited funding to only those authorized by statute.  I wonder if this is a signal of displeasure with the Global SOF Network?  Note also I have been told that the Defense News article got the SOCOM budget numbers wrong.  The SOCOM budget will not be $12 billion but instead $9.9 billion with a $7.7 billion base and $2.2 billion for OCO.  Will be interesting to see what actually becomes law.

Excerpt:

a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to
5 be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available
6 for fiscal year 2014 for the Department of Defense may
7 be obligated or expended to plan, prepare, establish, or
8 implement any ‘‘Regional Special Operations Forces Co9
ordination Center’’ (RSCC) or similar regional coordina10
tion entities.
11 (b) EXCLUSION.—The limitation contained in sub12
section (a) shall not apply with respect to any RSCC or
13 similar regional coordination entity authorized by statute,
14 including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special
15 Operations Headquarters authorized under section 1244
16 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
17 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2541).

Here is the language that was referenced in the Defense News report yesterday regarding the SECDEF review and assessment  of US Special Operations Command.

1 SEC. 10ll[Log 50976]. REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF
2 UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS
3 FORCES AND UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPER
4 ATIONS COMMAND.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall
6 conduct a review of the United States Special Operations
7 Forces organization, capabilities, and structure.

8 (b) REPORT.—Not later than the date on which the
9 budget of the President is submitted to Congress under
10 section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal
11 year 2015, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
12 congressional defense committees a report on the review
13 conducted under subsection (a). Such report shall include
14 an analysis of each of the following:

15 (1) The organizational structure of the United
16 States Special Operations Command and each subor
17 dinate component, as in effect as of the date of the
18 enactment of this Act.

19 (2) The policy and civilian oversight structures
20 for Special Operations Forces within the Depar
t21ment of Defense, as in effect as of the date of the
22 enactment of this Act, including the statutory struc
23tures and responsibilities of the Office of the Sec-

retary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
2 Intensity Conflict within the Department.

3 (3) The roles and responsibilities of United
4 States Special Operations Command and Special
5 Operations Forces under section 167 of title 10,
6 United States Code.

7 (4) Current and future special operations pecu8
liar requirements of the commanders of the geo9
graphic combatant commands, Theater Special Op10
erations Commands, and command relationships be11
tween United States Special Operations Command
12 and the geographic combatant commands.

13 (5) The funding authorities, uses, and oversight
14 mechanisms of Major Force Program–11.
15 (6) Changes to structure, authorities, oversight
16 mechanisms, Major Force Program–11 funding,
17 roles, and responsibilities assumed in the 2014

18 Quadrennial Defense Review.
19 (7) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense
20 determines are appropriate to ensure a comprehen21
sive review and assessment.

22 (c) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the
23 date on which the report required by subsection (b) is sub24
mitted, the Comptroller General of the United States shall
25 submit to the congressional defense committees a review

1 of the report. Such review shall include an assessment of
2 United States Special Operations Forces organization, ca3
pabilities, and force structure with respect to conventional
4 force structures and national military strategies.




.

Wednesday, May 22, 2013

HASC Panel Adopts Administration's Special Ops Budget Request


Note the required reporting (if the bill passes into law with the language in the house bill).  Seems to me the HASC is giving SOCOM all the funding requested but is also asking for some detailed explanation of command relationships and support to the geographic combatant commanders as if they really want the Global SOF Network spelled out for them in detail.  Furthermore, the review and assessment of the organization, missions, and authorities can be interpreted in a number of ways but perhaps it is time for a thorough assessment of SOF some 26 years after Nunn-Cohen.  I think the HASC wants an azimuth check of SOF (despite the fact that everyone is enamored with SOF these days).  It will be interesting to do a detailed analysis of the language to determine the real intent of the committee.

But perhaps someone could explain to Mr. Bennett that there will never, ever be 70,000 commandos in the US military.  I think if you add together every SOF "operator" in a ground tactical billet (in Special Forces, SEALs/Naval Special Warfare, MARSOC, the Ranger Regiment, Special Tactics Teams, Combat Control Teams, and the Special Mission Units) you might have a total of 10,000 "of the most lethal killers."  There is no way that the operational force is going to grow by another 10,000 "commandos"  (and we should note that the only commandos we have in SOF are the Air Commandos of the Air Force Special Operations Command – nonie of our US SOF whether Rangers, SF, SELAS, or MARSOC go by the name commando).  

Excerpts:

The legislation also would require Pentagon brass to "review and assess the organization, missions, and authorities related to U.S. special operations forces and U.S. Special Operations Command and to provide a report to the congressional defense committees." 
If enacted in the final version of the National Defense Authorization Act later this year, that report would have to spell out all "policy and civilian oversight structures for special operations forces within the Department of Defense. 
Notably, the legislation would require the report to cover "current and future special operations peculiar requirements of the commanders of the geographic combatant commands, theater special operations commands, and command relationships between United States Special Operations Command and the geographic combatant commands."

V/R
Dave

HASC Panel Adopts Administration's Special Ops Budget Request
By JOHN T. BENNETT
Posted: Wednesday May 22, 2013

Legislation approved Wednesday by a US House subcommittee fully supports the Obama administration's plan to budget special operations forces for more than $12 billion in 2014.
Moments before the House Armed Services intelligence, emerging threats and capabilities subpanel approved its part of the full panel's 2014 Pentagon policy bill, Chairman Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, said the legislation fully funds the administration's special operations request.

In its military budget request, delivered to Congress in April, the White House proposed spending $12.4 billion on America's elite commandos next fiscal year. If enacted by Congress, that would make special ops one of the few parts of the Pentagon's annual budget expected to grow during the sequestration era.

The $12.4 billion would help grow the ranks of the nation's most-lethal killers by 10,000, to a force over just over 70,000 commandos.

Subcommittee leaders said they authorized the administration's funding level because special operators are taking on a larger role in U.S. military operations, a trend they expect will expand in coming years.
(Continued at the link below)

‘Don’t do it in Korea’ U.S. Soldiers’ cultural awareness training


We should thank Bill Gates for being an excellent training aid for cultural awareness training in Korea.  Intelligent men learn from their mistakes and wise men learn from the mistakes of others (though I recall when this incident happened other photos of him with other national leaders with his hand in his pocket – he an equal opportunity insulter who apparently has not learned from his mistakes – or perhaps no one has told him he was making a mistake) .  I will bet that Soldiers will remember the object lesson below better than other examples (of course we also might see all the windows operating systems crash after this gets out).  

I am sure there are some Americans who are taken aback by this but I also will bet that this also might serve as a kind of apology for Mr. Gates' rudeness to the President and I bet there are some Koreans who might positively interpret this gesture (it sure caught the eye of the press as it is both in Yonhap news and in the Korea Times).  I think this is good initiative on the part of 2ID and USFK.
V/R
Dave

Yonhapnews (web)
May 21, 2013

‘Don’t do it in Korea’ U.S. Soldiers’ cultural awareness training



‘Don’t do it in Korea.’ (Dongducheon=Yonhapnews) Reporter Lim, Byeong Sik = Staff Sgt. Hun Lee Rosenberry, Korean-American service member, explained a proper way to shake hands in Korea based on an exemplary photo between Mr. Bill Gates and President Pak, Geun Hye during the Cultural Awareness Training at the Warrior Readiness Center, Camp Hovey, located in Dongducheon City, Gyeonggi Province on May 21.

(Dongducheon=Yonhapnews) Reporter Lim, Byeong Sik = “We have to be the ‘Warrior’ not a ‘Trouble maker.’”

There was an interesting education drawing soldiers’ attention at the Warrior Readiness Center, U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Hovey, located in Dongducheon City, Gyeonggi Province on May 21.
The education was the integrated Cultural Awareness Training with an assistance of the Northern Gyeonggi Province Office.

The training was carried out by an American of Korean descent, Staff Sgt. Hun Lee Rosenberry, and two Korean Augmentation Troops to the U.S. Army (KATUSA), Pfc. Yoo, Ha Lim and Pfc. Pak, Jong Weon for more than 100 newcomers.

The instructor team was selected through the strict test and prepared the presentation after practicing it more than 100 times for the last three months.

The attendees aged in 19 to 25 years old just arrived in Korea through the Incheon Airport a week ago. They took the time to adjust themselves in Korea before being stationed to their units.

A representative of the U.S. Army said “there used to be an introduction briefing about Korea to newcomers, but after the series of incidents in March, we decided to apply more effective training.”

The education started with the Korean History and Culture. Staff Sgt. Rosenberry, Pfc. Yoo and Pfc. Pak perfectly teamed up to explain the history from the ancient part which Korea once spread out to Manchuria area to the modern one which Korea has been divided since the Korean War.


USFK Newcomers’ Cultural education (Dongducheon=Yonhapnews) Reporter Lim, Byeong Sik = Baby-face young newcomers listened to the Cultural Awareness Training at the Warrior Readiness Center, Camp Hovey, located in Dongducheon City, Gyeonggi Province on May 21.

The presentation included not only a slide showing the size of Korea territory and population but also the climate such as the yellow dust.
(Continued at the link below)


S. Korea, Japan, US defense chiefs to meet


Will be interesting to see the results of this and how well the trilateral relationship does after recent events.  I concur that the members of the trilateral relationship need to show a united front but given the Japanese visit to Pyongyang and other Japanese actions of late, I have to ask the question: Will Japan play well with others?
V/R
Dave

S. Korea, Japan, US defense chiefs to meet
By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
Posted: Wednesday May 22, 2013

The defense chiefs of South Korea, Japan and the United States will hold their first trilateral meeting for four years at the end of this month, with North Korea likely to top the agenda.

The three top officials will meet on the sidelines of the annual Asia Security Summit to be held in Singapore from May 31 to June 2, a South Korean defense ministry spokesman said Wednesday.

It will be their first three-way ministerial-level meeting since 2009, with defense dialogue between Seoul and Tokyo having been marred in recent years by a long-running territorial dispute and other issues.
(Continued at the link below)

Giving Tuesday Recommendations

  Dear Friends,  I do not normally do this (except I did this last year and for the last few years now, too) and I certainly do not mean to ...